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
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THE HISTORY

OF

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR,

BY

THUCYDIDES.

A NEW AND LITERAL VERSION,

FROM THE TEXT OF ARNOLD,

COLLATED WITH BEKKER, GÖLLER, AND POPPO.

BY

THE REV. HENRY DALE, M. A.

HEAD MASTER OF THE NEW PROPRIETARY SCHOOL, BLACKHEATH,
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
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
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M. A. R.



JOHN CHILDS AND SON, BUNGAY.

ERRATA.

Page	Line	
310,	14,	for "there went" read "there, went"
320,	23,	for "man" read "men"
331,	35,	for "in Attic" read "in Attic writers"
361,	37,	for "send" read "sent"
379,	28,	for "having led" read "who led"
383,	17,	for "information" read "instruction"
387,	35,	for "personal wealth" read "personal worth"
398,	15,	for "which" read "what"
409,	12,	for "large force" read "large a force"
413,	35,	for "στήγη" read "στήλη"
424,	19,	for "courage" read "bravery"
—,	28,	for "disorderly" read "tumultuous"
425,	4,	for "generals, both few" read "generals both few"
437,	38,	for "for ἡκαρον" read "ἡκαζον"
450,	20,	for "Euryclus" read "Euryelus"
464,	39,	for "these divers" read "these, divers"
478,	1,	for "Euryelus the same" read "Euryelus, the same"
494,	6,	for "in former times" read "of former times"
526,	8,	for "Phrynicius" read "Phrynichus"
—,	39,	for "Syracusan" read "Syracusans"
553,	19,	for "cleverness; and yet" read "cleverness, yet"
557,	37,	for "soldiers and most of all" read "soldiers, and, most of all,"
578,	11,	for "on the Hellespont" read "in the Hellespont"
—,	20,	for "Hellespont" read "Chersonese"
580,	3,	for "on the security" read "in the security"
581,	35,	for "afraid on" read "afraid, on"



PREFACE.

THE object of this volume is to give a version of the original so strictly faithful as to be of service to the classical student; while the style, though perfectly simple and unpretending, may contain nothing so opposed to the idiom of our own language as to deter the general reader, who may wish to know exactly what the Greek historian wrote. To gain both these ends, however, except in a limited degree, is perhaps scarcely possible in translating an author like Thucydides; whose style is frequently so very obscure, as regards the meaning, and so totally different, as regards the form and arrangement of his narrative, from what we are accustomed to in our own writers of history. It may be well therefore to say, that wherever the two parts of the object I have mentioned seemed incompatible, the latter, as the less important, has been sacrificed to the former; particularly in the earlier part of the work, where the student naturally stands most in need of every help that can be given him. With this explanation, I venture to hope that the present version may be found, in not a few passages, to answer the end proposed better than any of those which preceded it. The very great additions which within the last few years have been made to our knowledge of the original, may reasonably exempt the expression of such a hope from the charge of arrogance. And though want of leisure, arising from more pressing occupations, has prevented my deriving all the ben-

might have done from the works of more learned labourers in the same field, yet even an imperfect acquaintance with the annotations of such scholars as have recently edited Thucydides, could scarcely fail to give me a decided advantage over earlier translators. To one of those scholars, especially, I am bound most thankfully to acknowledge my very great obligations; though his eye is, alas! closed to such expressions of gratitude. It was under the personal instruction of Dr. Arnold that I had the happiness to make my first acquaintance with the language of his favourite author; and his annotations upon the work have never long been out of my hands, since they were first published. The text of his last edition is what I have adopted for this translation; and I have sometimes felt compelled to borrow the very words with which he rendered a difficult passage; for when his version was meant to be literal, it seemed almost impossible to change it without sacrificing some part of the sense. The very few notes, too, which were compatible with the form and design of the volume, are in many cases only extracts from, or references to, his more copious illustrations of the text: though the views of other editors, particularly of Haack, Bekker, Göller, Poppo, and Bloomfield, are also quoted on doubtful passages, where my mind was not quite made up, with respect either to the best reading, or the most probable interpretation. With such valuable aids at my command, my task might well have been executed far better than it is. But such as it is, I commit it very humbly to the judgment of the public; more particularly of those who are acquainted with the original, and will therefore be best able to appreciate the difficulties which a translator of Thucydides has to encounter.

THUCYDIDES.

BOOK I.

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, how they warred against each other; having begun from its very outset, with the expectation that it would prove a great one, and more worthy¹ of relation than all that had been before it; inferring so much, as well from the fact that both sides were at the height of all kinds of preparation for it, as also because he saw the rest of Greece joining with the one side or the other, some immediately, and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest movement that ever happened amongst the Greeks, and some part of the barbarians, and extending, as one may say, even to most nations of the world. For the events that preceded this, and those again that are yet more ancient, it² was impossible, through length of time, to ascertain with certainty; but³ from such evidence as I am led

¹ Literally, "most worthy—of all," etc. : but this use of the superlative, though one of the most common idioms of the Greek language, has not been naturalized in our own; notwithstanding Milton's well-known imitation of it, in which he makes Adam the "goodliest of all *his sons* since born, The fairest of *her daughters* Eve."

² As he refers, I think, to his own actual investigations on the subject, there seems no reason for giving to *ἢν* the hypothetical force, as translators have generally done. The same remark applies to the use of the same verb in the first sentence of chap. 22, *χαλεπόν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεύσαι ἢν*; and the truth of it appears to be confirmed by the expression *ἐπιτόνους δὲ εὐρίσκετο* in the same chapter.

³ The relative *ὃν* is referred by some to *σκοποῦντι*, by others to *πιστεύσαι*; and in either case it would seem but an ordinary instance of attraction; though Arnold thinks that "neither of these expressions can be admitted." I have preferred the latter, both because the participial clause might very naturally be inserted in this parenthetical way; and from reference to a very similar passage in the beginning of chap. 20, *Τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα εὖρον, χαλεπὰ δὲ πάντα παντὶ ἐξῆς τεκμηρίω πιστεύσαι*. Schäfer, as quoted by Göller, supplies *ἐξ* from the antecedent clause.—*Ἐνυμφαίνει* seems here

to trust, on looking back as far as possible, I do not think they were great, either with respect to wars or otherwise.

2. For it is evident, that what is now called Hellas, was not of old inhabited in a settled manner; but that formerly there were frequent removals, and that each tribe readily left the place of their abode, being forced by such as were from time to time more numerous. For as there was no traffic, and they did not mix with one another without fear, either by sea or land; and they each so used what they had as but barely to live on it, without having any superfluity of riches, or planting their land, (because it was uncertain when another should invade them, and carry all away, especially as they had not the defence of walls;) and as they thought that they might any where obtain their necessary daily sustenance, they made little difficulty in removing: and for this cause they were not strong, either in greatness of cities, or other resources. And the best of the land was always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessaly, and Bœotia, and the greatest part of the Peloponnese, (except Arcadia,) and of the rest of Greece whatsoever was most fertile. For through the goodness of the land, both the power of some particular men growing greater caused factions among them, whereby they were ruined; and withal they were more exposed to the plots of strangers. Attica, at any rate, having through the poverty of the soil been for the longest period free from factions, was always inhabited by the same people. And this which follows is not the least evidence of my assertion, that it was owing to its migrations that Greece did not equally increase in other parts. For such as by war or sedition were driven out of the rest of Greece, the most powerful of them retired to Athens, as to a place of security; and becoming citizens at a very early period, made the city still greater in the number of inhabitants; so that afterwards they even sent out colonies into Ionia, as Attica itself was not able to contain them. 3. And to me the weakness of ancient times is not a little demonstrated by this too. Before the Trojan war, Greece appears to have done nothing in common; and, as it seems to me, the whole of it had not as yet even this name; nay, before the time of Hellen, the son of Deu-

to express simply a *result*, without implying any thing of its fortuitous nature, as it more commonly does.

calion, it does not appear that this appellation existed at all ; but that in their different tribes, and the Pelasgian to the greatest extent, they furnished from themselves the name [of their people.]¹ But when Hellen and his sons had grown strong in Phthiotis, and men invited them for their aid into the other cities ; from associating with them, separate communities were now more commonly called Hellenes :² and yet not for a long time after could that name prevail amongst them all. And Homer proves this most fully ; for, though born long after the Trojan war, he has no where called them all by that name, nor indeed any others but those that came with Achilles out of Phthiotis ; who were the very original Hellenes ; but in his poems he mentions Danaans, Argives, and Achæans. Nor again does he speak of barbarians ; because neither were the Hellenes, in my opinion, as yet distinguished by one common term in opposition to that. The several Hellenic communities, then, who in the different cities understood each other's language, and were³ afterwards all so called, did nothing in a body before the Trojan war, through want of strength and mutual intercourse. Nay, even for this expedition they united [only] because they now made more use of the sea. 4. For Minos was the most ancient of all with whom we are acquainted by report, that acquired a navy : and he made himself master of the greater part of what is now the Grecian sea ; and both ruled over the islands called Cyclades, and was the first that colonized most of them, having expelled the Carians, and established his own sons in them as governors ; and, as was natural, he swept piracy from the sea as much as he could, for the better coming in to him of his revenues. 5. For the Grecians in old time, and of the barbarians both those on the continent who lived near the sea, and all who inhabited islands, after they began to cross over more commonly to one another in ships, turned to piracy,

¹ i. e. there were different tribes, of which the Pelasgian was the predominant one, called by their different names, instead of being all comprehended under one, as they were afterwards. Or it may refer to the gradual formation of such general names even at that early period, by one tribe extending its own appellation to others.

² For a striking instance of such a change in the language of a barbarian people at a much later period, I may refer to the inhabitants of the Ambracian Argos, of whom Thucydides says, II. 68, ἐλληνίσθησαν τὴν νῦν Ἰωνίαν τότε πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ξυνοικισάντων· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἀμπρακοὶ βάρβαροι εἰσιν.

³ See Arnold's note on this difficult passage.

under the conduct of their most powerful men, with a view both to their own gain, and to maintenance for the needy ; and falling upon towns that were unfortified, and inhabited like villages,¹ they rifled them, and made most of their livelihood by this means ; as this employment did not yet involve any disgrace, but rather brought with it even somewhat of glory. This is shown by some that dwell on the continent even at the present day, with whom it is an honour to perform this cleverly ; and by the ancient poets, who introduce men asking the question of such as sail to their coasts, in all cases alike, whether they are pirates : as though neither those of whom they inquire, disowned the employment ; nor those who were interested in knowing, reproached them with it. They also robbed one another on the continent ; and to this day many parts of Greece live after the old fashion ; as the Locri Ozolæ, the Ætolians, and Acarnanians, and those in that part of the continent. And the fashion of wearing arms has continued amongst these continental states from their old trade of piracy. 6. For the whole of Greece used to wear arms, owing to their habitations being unprotected, and their communication with each other insecure ; and they passed their ordinary life with weapons, like the barbarians. And those parts of Greece which still live in this way, are a proof of the same mode of life having also formerly extended to all. Now the Athenians were the first who laid down their armour, and by a more easy style of life changed to greater luxury. And the elders of their rich men no long time ago ceased wearing from delicacy linen tunics, and binding up a knot of the hair on their heads with a tie of golden grasshoppers. Whence also this fashion prevailed for a long time with the elders of the Ionians, from their affinity to them. But on the contrary, a moderate style of dressing, and according to the present mode, was first used by the Lacedæmonians ; and in other respects their wealthier men most conformed themselves in their living to the common people. And they were the first who stripped themselves, and undressing in public, smeared themselves with grease,² in their gymnastic exercises. And formerly even at the Olympic games the combatants contended with girdles round their

¹ i. e. in an open and straggling manner. Compare his description of Sparta, to which the term was still applicable, chap. 10.

² The rude original of the *κρίμα* in later times.

middle; and it is not many years since it ceased to be so. Nay even now amongst some of the barbarians, and especially those of Asia, prizes for boxing and wrestling are given, and they wear girdles when they contend for them. And in many other respects also one might show that the ancient Greeks lived in a manner similar to the barbarians of the present age.

7. Of the cities, again, such as were founded most recently, and when there were now greater facilities of navigation, having greater abundance of wealth, they were built with walls on the very shores; and occupied isthmuses, with a view both to commerce and to security against their several neighbours: whereas the old ones, owing to the¹ long continuance of piracy, were built farther off from the sea, both those in the islands and those on the mainlands; (for they used to plunder one another, and all the rest who lived by the sea without being seamen;) and even to the present day they are built inland.

8. And the islanders especially were pirates, being Carians and Phœnicians. For it was these that had colonized most of the islands. And this is a proof of it:—When Delos was purified by the Athenians in the course of this war, and all the sepulchres of those who had died in the island were taken up, above half were found to be Carians; being known by the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the manner in which they still bury. But when the navy of Minos was established, there were greater facilities of sailing to each other. For the malefactors in the islands were expelled by him, at the same time that he was colonizing most of them. And the men on the sea-coast, now making greater acquisition of wealth, led a more settled life: and some of them even surrounded themselves with walls, on the strength of growing richer than they had before been. For through desire of gain, the lower orders submitted to be slaves to their betters; and the more powerful, having a superabundance of money, brought the smaller cities into subjection. And being now more in this state of things, some time after they made the expedition against Troy.

9. And Agamemnon appears to me to have assembled the armament because he surpassed the men of that day in power, and not so much because he took the suitors of Helen bound

¹ Goeller reads *ἀντιστοιχεῖν* instead of *ἀντιστοιχῶσαν*, which he pronounces inexplicable, and interprets it thus, "Veteres urbes ob latrocinia, postquam diu et recititerunt et perduraverunt, longius a mari conditæ sunt."

by their oaths to Tyndarus. It is said too by those of the Peloponnesians who have received the most certain accounts by tradition from their forefathers, that Pelops first acquired power by the abundance of riches with which he came from Asia to men who were in needy circumstances; and although a new-comer, yet gave his name to the country;¹ and that afterwards still greater power fell to the lot of his descendants, as Eurystheus was killed in Attica by the Heraclidæ, and Atreus was his mother's brother, and Eurystheus, when going on the expedition, intrusted Mycenæ and the government to Atreus, on the ground of their connexion; (he happened to be flying from his father on account of the death of Chrysippus:) and when Eurystheus did not return again, they say that at the wish of the Mycenæans themselves, through their fear of the Heraclidæ, and also because he appeared to be powerful, and had courted the commons, Atreus received the kingdom of the Mycenæans and all that Eurystheus ruled over; and that so the descendants of Pelops became greater than those of Perseus. And I think that Agamemnon, from having received this inheritance, and from being strong in his navy also at the same time to a greater extent than others, assembled and made the expedition not so much by favour as by fear. For he appears to have both come himself with most ships, and to have furnished them for the Arcadians besides; as Homer has also shown, if he is sufficient authority for any one,² and also, in [his account of] the transmission of the sceptre, he has mentioned that he "O'er numerous islands and all Argos ruled." Now, as he lived on the mainland, he would not have been master of islands, except those that were adjacent, (and those would not be numerous,) if he had not also had some naval force. And we must conjecture by this expedition, what was the character of those before it.

10. And as to Mycenæ having been a small place, or if any town in those times appear now to be inconsiderable, this would be no certain proof to rest upon, for disbelieving that the armament was as large as the poets have said, and as report prevails. For if the city of the Lacedæmonians were laid desolate, and the temples and foundations of the public buildings were left, I think that when a long time had passed by,

¹ Or more literally, "gave occasion to the naming of the country after him."

² Literally, "sufficient to prove it to any one."

posterity would have great disbelief of their power in proportion to their fame. (And yet they occupy two of the five divisions of the Peloponnese, and take the lead of the whole of it, and of their allies out of it in great numbers. Still, as the city is neither built closely, nor has sumptuous temples and public buildings, but is built in villages, after the old fashion of Greece, it would have an inferior appearance.) Whereas if the Athenians were to suffer the same fate, I think their power would be conjectured, from the appearance of the city to the eye, to have been double what it is. It is not therefore right to be incredulous, nor to look at the appearance of cities rather than their power; but to think that that expedition was greater indeed than any that were before it, but inferior to those of the present day; if on this point again we must believe the poetry of Homer, which it is natural that he, as a poet, set off on the side of exaggeration; but, nevertheless, even on this view it appears inferior. For he has made it to consist of twelve hundred ships, those of the Boeotians carrying 120 men, and those of Philoctetes 50; meaning to show, as I think, the largest and the least; at any rate he has made no mention of the size of any others in the catalogue of the ships. And that they all were themselves rowers and fighting men, he has shown in the case of the ships of Philoctetes. For he has represented all the men at the oar as bowmen. And it is not probable that many supernumeraries would sail with them, except the kings and highest officers; especially as they were going to cross the open sea with munitions of war; and, on the other hand, had not their vessels decked, but equipped, after the old fashion, more like privateers. Looking then at the mean of the largest and the smallest ships, they do not appear to have gone in any great number, considering that they were sent by the whole of Greece in common.

11. And the reason was not so much scarcity of men as want of money. For owing to difficulty of subsistence, they took their army the smaller, and such only as they hoped would live on the country itself while carrying on the war; and when on their arrival they were superior in battle, (and that they were so is evident, for they would not else have built the fortification for their camp,) they appear not even then to have employed all their force, but to have turned to the cultivation of the Chersonese, and to piracy, for want of

food. And in this way the Trojans, owing to their being scattered, the more easily held out¹ by open force those ten years; being a match for those who successively were left behind. But if they had gone with abundance of food, and in a body had continuously carried through the war, without foraging and agriculture, they would easily have conquered them in battle, and taken the place; since even though not united, but only with the part that was successively present, they held out against them. Now by pressing the siege, [I say,] they would have taken Troy both in less time and with less trouble; but through want of money both the undertakings before this² were weak, and this itself, though more famous than the former, is shown by facts³ to have been inferior to its fame, and to the present report of it, which has prevailed by means of the poets.

12. For even after the Trojan war Greece was still moving about, and settling itself;⁴ so that it could not increase its power by remaining at rest. For the return of the Greeks from Troy, having taken place so late, caused many revolutions; and factions, generally speaking, arose in the states; in consequence of which men were expelled, and founded cities. For those who are now called Bœotians, being driven out of Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, settled in what is now called Bœotia, but was before called the Cadmean country. (Though there was a division of them in this country before, some of whom also joined the expedition against Troy.) And the Dorians in the eightieth year took possession of the Peloponnese with the Heraclidæ. And Greece having with difficulty, after a long time, enjoyed settled peace, and being no longer subject to migrations, began to send out colonies; and the Athenians colonized Ionia, and most of the islands; and the Peloponnesians, the greater part of Italy and Sicily, and some places in the rest of Greece.⁵ But all these places were founded after the Trojan war.

¹ i. e. keeping the field, and not merely fighting from their walls.

² The *plural* pronoun in the Greek, is used with reference to τὰ Τρωϊκά, the common term to signify the Trojan war.

³ Or, "inferior in the facts."

⁴ i. e. it was not yet settled.—*Arnold*. The old reading, μετακίετο, would mean, "was changing its place of abode."

⁵ The term "Greece" is here used in its widest sense, as including all countries that had a Greek population.

13. Now when Greece was becoming more powerful, and acquiring possession of money still more than before, tyrannies, generally speaking, were established in the cities, from the revenues becoming greater; whereas before there had been hereditary kingly governments with definite privileges; and Greece began to fit out navies, and they paid more attention to the sea. Now the Corinthians are said first to have managed naval matters most nearly to the present fashion, and triremes to have been built at Corinth first in Greece. And Aminocles, a Corinthian shipwright, appears to have built four ships for the Samians also. Now it is about three hundred years to the end of this war from the time that Aminocles went to the Samians; and the most ancient sea-fight with which we are acquainted was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans. And from that too it is about two hundred and sixty years to the same period. For the Corinthians, having their city situated on the isthmus, had always possessed an emporium; as the Greeks of old, both those within the Peloponnese and those without, had intercourse with each other by land more than by sea, through *their* country: and they were very rich, as is shown even by the old poets; for they gave the title of "wealthy" to the place. And when the Greeks began to make more voyages, having got their ships they put down piracy; and rendered their city rich in income of money, as they afforded an emporium both ways. And the Ionians afterwards had a large navy in the time of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and Cambyses his son; and while at war with Cyrus, commanded the sea along their coast for some time. Polycrates also, tyrant of Samos, in the time of Cambyses, having a strong fleet, both made some other of the islands subject to him, and took Rhenea and dedicated it to the Delian Apollo. And the Phocæans, while founding Massalia, conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight.

14. These were the strongest of their navies. But even these, though many generations after the Trojan war, appear to have used but few triremes, and to have been still fitted out with fifty-oared vessels, and long boats, as that fleet was. And it was but a short time before the Median war, and the death of Darius, who was king of the Persians after Cambyses, that triremes were possessed in any number by the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyraeans. For these were the last navies

worth mentioning established in Greece before the expedition of Xerxes : as the Æginetans and Athenians, and whoever else had any, possessed but small ones, and of those the greater part fifty-oared vessels ; and it was only lately that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, when at war with the Æginetans, and when the barbarian was also expected, to build those very ships with which they fought him by sea ; and these were not yet decked throughout.

15. Of such a [deficient] character then were the navies of the Greeks, both the ancient ones and those which were built afterwards. And yet those who paid attention to them obtained the greatest power, both by income of money and dominion over others : for they sailed against the islands, and subdued them ; especially those who had not sufficient extent of country. But as for war by land, from which any *power*¹ was acquired, there was none. Such as did arise, were all against their several neighbours ; and the Greeks did not go out in any foreign expeditions far from their country for the subjugation of others. For they had not ranged themselves with the chief states as subjects ; nor, on the other hand, did they of their own accord, on fair and equal terms, make common expeditions ; but it was rather neighbouring states that separately waged war upon each other. But it was for the war carried on at an early period between the Chalcidians and Eretrians, that the rest of Greece also was most generally divided in alliance with one side or the other.

16. Now to others there arose in other ways obstacles to their increase ; and in the case of the Ionians, when their power had advanced to a high pitch, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, having subdued Croesus and all within the Halys to the sea, marched against them, and reduced to bondage their cities on the mainland, as Darius afterwards did even the islands, conquering them by means of the fleet of the Phœnicians.

17. As for the tyrants, such as there were in the Grecian cities, since they provided only for what concerned themselves, with a view to the safety of their own persons, and the aggrandizement of their own family, they governed their cities

¹ From the position of the *kai* here, it seems intended only to make the following word more emphatic ; as it is often used, before *verbs* especially ; an instance of which occurs in the very next sentence, *ὅσοι καὶ ἐτίμωρον*.

with caution, as far as they possibly could ; and nothing memorable was achieved by them ; [indeed nothing,] except it might be against their own several border states. [I speak of those in old Greece,] for those in *Sicily* advanced to a very great degree of power. Thus on all sides Greece for a long time was kept in check ; so that it both performed nothing illustrious in common, and was less daring as regards individual states.

18. But after the tyrants of the Athenians and those in the rest of Greece, (which even at an earlier period¹ was for a long time subject to tyrants,) the most and last, excepting those in *Sicily*, had been deposed by the Lacedæmonians ; (for Lacedæmon, after the settlement of the Dorians, who now inhabit it, though torn by factions for the longest time of any country that we are acquainted with, yet from the earliest period enjoyed good laws, and was always free from tyrants ; for it is about four hundred years, or a little more, to the end of this war, that the Lacedæmonians have been in possession of the same form of government ; and being for this reason powerful, they settled matters in the other states also ;) after,² I say, the deposition of the tyrants in the rest of Greece, not many years subsequently the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and Athenians. And in the tenth year after it, the barbarians came again with the great armament against Greece to enslave it. And when great danger was impending, the Lacedæmonians took the lead of the confederate Greeks, as being the most powerful ; and the Athenians, on the approach of the Medes, determined to leave their city, and having broken up their establishments,³ went on board their ships, and became a naval people. And having together repulsed the barbarian, no long time after, both those Greeks who had revolted from the king, and those who had joined in the war [against him], were divided between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. For these states respectively appeared the most powerful ; for the one was strong by land, and the other by sea. And for a short time the confederacy held together ; but afterwards the Lacedæmonians and Athe-

¹ i. e. than the Athenians.

² A common force of *ὁὶ* after a long parenthesis.

³ Or, "having removed their furniture," the word meaning just the reverse of *κατασκευάζουσι*. Bloomfield connects it with *ἐς τὰς ναῦς*.

nians, having quarrelled, waged war against each other with their allies: and of the rest of the Greeks, whoever in any quarter were at variance, now betook themselves to these. So that, from the Persian war all the time to this, making peace at one time, and at another war, either with each other or with their own revolting allies, they prepared themselves well in military matters, and became more experienced from going through their training in scenes of danger.¹

19. Now the Lacedæmonians did not treat² as tributaries the allies whom they led, but only took care that they should be governed by an oligarchy, in accordance with their own interest; whereas the Athenians had in course of time taken ships from the states [in *their* league,] except the Chians and Lesbians, and had commanded all to pay a tribute in money. And their own separate resources for this war were greater than when before they had been in their fullest bloom with their entire alliance.

20. Such then I found to be the early state of things, though it is difficult to trust every proof of it in succession. For men receive alike without examination from each other the reports of past events, even though they may have happened in their own country. For instance, the mass of the Athenians think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogiton; and do not know that

¹ "Their field of exercise was not the parade, but the field of battle."—Arnold.

² The full force of the Greek could not I think be expressed here, (or in the next chapter, *τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν*,) without this change of the participle into the verb, the original verb of the sentence following in a subordinate clause. This is by no means an uncommon construction, and Kühner might have added more numerous, and perhaps more apposite examples to the single one by which he illustrates it, viz. Soph. El. 345, *ἰλοῦ γε θάτερόν, ἢ φρονεῖν κακῶς, ἢ τῶν φίλων φρονεῖν μὴ μνήμην ἔχειν*, i. e. *ἢ τῶν φίλων μὴ μνήμην ἔχουσα (εὖ) φρονεῖν*. His rule is as follows: "Although the Greeks make great use of the participle to express the accidental accompaniments of an action, and thus distinguish it from that action itself, yet this is sometimes reversed; the principal action is expressed in the participle as a mere accompaniment, while the accompaniment assumes the character of the principal verb of the sentence." Gr. Gr. Jelf. 705. 2. In Matthiæ there is not any notice of the construction that I am aware of. The same participle, *ἔχοντες*, is used in precisely a similar manner, chap. 144, *τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονομίους ἀφῆσμεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονομίους ἔχοντες ἐσπειράμεθα*: "if we treated them as independent when we made the treaty:" and by Xenophon, Anab. I. 8. 22. *καὶ πάντες δὲ οἱ τῶν βαβέδρων ἔρχοντες μίσουν ἔχοντες τὸ αὐτῶν ἡγούντο*: "occupied the centre—when they led on."

Hippias held the government as being the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, and Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. But Harmodius and Aristogiton having suspected that on that day, and at the very moment, some information had been given to Hippias by their accomplices, abstained from attacking him, as being fore-warned; but as they wished before they were seized to do something even at all hazards, having fallen in with Hipparchus near the Leocorium, as it is called, while arranging the Panathenaic procession, they slew him. And there are many other things also, even at the present day, and not such as are thrown into oblivion by time, of which the rest of the Greeks too have not correct notions; as, that the kings of the Lacedæmonians do not vote with one vote each, but with two; and that they have a Pitaneisian Lochus; which never yet existed. With so little pains is the investigation of truth pursued by most men; and they rather turn to views already formed.

21. If, however, from the proofs which have been mentioned any one should suppose that things were, on the whole, such as I have described them; instead of rather believing what either poets have sung of them, setting them off in terms of exaggeration, or historians have composed, in language more attractive¹ to the ear than truthful, their subjects admitting of no proof, and most of them, through length of time,² having come to be regarded as fabulous—and if he should consider that, allowing for their antiquity, they have been sufficiently ascertained from the most certain data; he would not be mistaken in his opinion. And though men always think the war of their own times to be the greatest while they are engaged in it, but when they have ceased from it, regard earlier events with more admiration; yet, to such as look at it from the facts themselves, this war will evidently appear to be greater than those.

22. And as for what they severally advanced in speaking, either when about to go to war, or when already in it, it was hard to remember the exact words of what was said; both for myself, with regard to what I heard in person, and for those who reported it to me from any other quarters: but as I thought that they would severally have spoken most to the purpose on the subjects from time to time before them, while I adhered as

¹ Literally, "for listening to;" in reference to the public recitation which in ancient times was the ordinary mode of publishing works of literature.

² Literally, "having won their way to the fabulous."

closely as possible to the general sense of what was really said, so have I recorded it. But with regard to the *facts* of what was done in the war, I did not presume to state them on hearsay from any chance informant, nor as I thought probable myself; but those at which I was personally present, and, when informed by others, only after investigating them accurately in every particular, as far as was possible. And it was with labour that they were ascertained; because those who were present in the several affairs did not give the same account of the same things, but as each was well inclined to either party, or remembered [the circumstances.] Now, for hearing it recited, perhaps the unfabulous character of my work will appear less agreeable: but as many as shall wish to see the truth of what both *has* happened, and *will* hereafter happen again, according to human nature—the same or pretty nearly so—for such to think it useful will be sufficient. And it is composed as a possession for ever, rather than as a prize-task to listen to at the present moment.

23. Now of former achievements, the greatest that was performed was the Median; and yet that had its decision quickly, in two battles by sea and two by land. But of this war both the duration was very long, and sufferings befell Greece in the course of it, such as were never matched in the same time. For neither were so many cities ever taken and laid desolate, some by barbarians, and some by the parties themselves opposed in the war; (some, too, changed their inhabitants when taken;) nor was there so much banishing of men and bloodshed, partly in the war itself, and partly through sedition. And things which before were spoken of from hearsay, but scantily confirmed by fact, were rendered not incredible; both about earthquakes, which at once extended over the greatest part of the world, and most violent at the same time; and eclipses of the sun, which happened more frequently than was on record of former times; and great droughts in some parts, and from them famines also; and what hurt them most, and destroyed a considerable part—the plague. For all these things fell upon them at once along with this war: which the Athenians and Peloponnesians began by breaking the thirty years' truce after the taking of Eubœa. As for the reason why they broke it, I have first narrated their grounds of complaint and their differences, that no one might ever have to inquire

from what origin so great a war broke out amongst the Greeks. For the truest reason, though least brought forward in words, I consider to have been, that the Athenians, by becoming great, and causing alarm to the Lacedæmonians, compelled them to proceed to hostilities. But the following were the grounds of complaints openly alleged on either side, from which they broke the truce, and set to the war.

24. Epidamnus is a city situated on the right hand as you sail into the Ionian Gulf; bordering upon it, are the Taulantii, a barbarian people of Illyria. It was planted by the Corcyræans, but the leader of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidus, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, who,¹ according to the ancient custom, was invited for this object from the mother city. There were also some of the Corinthians, and of the rest of the Doric nation, who joined in the colony. In process of time, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; but having for many years together, as is reported, been torn by factions arising from a war made upon them by the neighbouring barbarians, they were brought low, and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But the last thing which had taken place before this war was, that the commons had driven out the nobles, who, having retired, were plundering those in the city both by land and sea, in conjunction with the barbarians. The Epidamnians that were in the town, being hard pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother-city, praying the Corcyræans not to stand by and see them perish, but to reconcile their exiles to them, and to put an end to the barbarian war. And this they entreated in the character of suppliants, sitting down in the temple of Juno. But the Corcyræans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect. 25. So the Epidamnians, finding that there was no relief for them from the Corcyræans, were at a loss how to settle the present affair; and sending to Delphi, inquired of the god whether they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians, as their founders, and try to obtain some aid from them. He answered, that they should deliver it to them, and make them their leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth, and according

¹ The conjunction *ὅτι* in this and similar passages merely serves to call for the reader's attention. "In compliance, *you must know*, with the ancient custom."—*Arnold*.

to the advice of the oracle, gave up their city, declaring how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them; and entreated that they would not stand by and see them destroyed, but help them. And the Corinthians undertook their defence, both on the ground of equity, (as thinking the colony no less their own than the Corcyraeans,) and also for hatred of the Corcyraeans; because, although they were their colony, they slighted them. For they neither gave¹ to them the customary privileges in their general religious assemblies, nor to any individual Corinthian,² when performing the initiatory rites of sacrifice, as their other colonies did; but despised them, as they were both equal in wealth to the very richest of the Greeks at that time, and more powerful in resources for war, and sometimes prided themselves on being even *very far* superior in their *fleet*; and on the ground of the Phocæans, who were famous in naval matters, having before lived in Corcyra. And on this account too they prepared their navy with the greater spirit, and were not deficient in power; for they had 120 triremes when they began the war. 26. The Corinthians therefore, having complaints against them for all these things, gladly proceeded to send the aid to Epidamnus, not only telling whosoever would to go and dwell there, but also sending a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and their own citizens; which succours marched by land to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, for fear of the Corcyraeans, lest they should be hindered by them in their pas-

¹ The verbs in this and the two following sentences are in the original participles, depending on *παρημέλουν*, to be understood from the preceding sentence. Literally, "for they did so by neither giving," &c.

² I have followed the interpretation which Goeller and Arnold give to this disputed passage, viz. that the words *Κορινθίων ἀνδρῶν* depend upon *διδόντες*; and that the singular number is introduced with reference to any *single* Corinthian who might be present at a sacrifice in Corcyra, and ought therefore, according to the usual practice of Greek colonies, to be selected for the honourable office of performing the introductory ceremonies; in contradistinction to the marks of respect that should have been shown to the citizens of the mother-country in a more general manner, when the colonists met them at any of their public festivals. Bloomfield makes the dative depend upon *προκαταρχόμενοι*, and explains it as signifying "in the person of" or "by the agency of," but does not give any instance of its being so used elsewhere. His objection to Goeller's interpretation, as dropping the force of the *πρό*, has no weight, as is proved by Arnold's quotation from Diodorus, *προκατάρχεσθαι πόλεμον*, and Goeller's reference to the *ambiguous* use of the more common form *κατάρχεσθαι*; which might have led Thucydides to prefix the *πρό* for the sake of clearness. For a later opinion on this passage, see note p. 540.

sage by sea. The Corcyræans, on finding that the settlers¹ and the garrison were come to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered up to the Corinthians, were very angry; and sailing immediately thither with twenty-five ships, and afterwards with another fleet, commanded them, by way of insult, both to recall those whom they had banished, (for the exiles of the Epidamnians had come to Corcyra, pointing out the sepulchres of their ancestors and their kindred to them, on the plea of which they begged that they would restore them,) and to dismiss the garrison sent thither by the Corinthians and the settlers. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to them. Whereupon the Corcyræans went against them with forty ships, together with the banished men, with a view to restore them; taking with them the Illyrians also. And sitting down before the city, they made proclamation, that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely; otherwise they would treat them as enemies. But when they did not obey them, the Corcyræans proceeded (the place being an isthmus) to besiege the city.

27. Now the Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus of its being besieged, immediately began to prepare an army; and at the same time proclaimed a colony to Epidamnus, and that any one who would might go on a fair and equal footing; and that if any one should not be willing to join the expedition immediately, but still wished to have a share in the colony, he might stay behind on depositing fifty Corinthian drachmas. And there were many both that went, and that paid down the money. Moreover, they begged the Megareans to convoy them with some ships, in case they might be stopped in their passage by the Corcyræans; and they prepared to sail with them with eight, and the citizens of Pale, in Cephalaria, with four. They also begged the Epidaurians, who furnished five, the citizens of Hermione one, the Træzenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots eight. The Thebans and Phliasians they asked for money; and the Eleans both for money and empty ships: while of the Corinthians themselves there were getting ready thirty ships, and three thousand heavy-armed.

28. Now when the Corcyræans heard of this preparation,

¹ Properly, "the inhabitants," i. e. those who were sent to inhabit the town.

they went to Corinth in company with some Lacedæmonian and Sicyonian ambassadors, whom they took with them, and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and settlers that were in Epidamnus, as they had nothing to do with the place. But if they laid any claim to it, they were willing to submit to trial¹ in the Peloponnesus before such cities as they should both agree on; and to which ever of the two parties it should be decided that the colony belonged, they should retain it. They were willing also to refer their cause to the oracle of Delphi. But they told them not to proceed to war; else they would themselves also, they said, be forced by their violence to make very different friends from those they already had, for the sake of gaining assistance. The Corinthians answered them, that if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would consult on the matter; but till that was done, it was not right that the Epidamnians should be besieged, while *they* were appealing to justice. The Corcyræans replied, that if the Corinthians too would withdraw the men they had in Epidamnus, they would do so; or they were also content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and to make a treaty till the cause should be decided.

29. The Corinthians did not listen to any of these proposals; but when their ships were manned, and their confederates had come, having first sent a herald to declare war upon the Corcyræans, they weighed anchor with seventy-five ships and two thousand heavy-armed, and set sail for Epidamnus to wage war against the Corcyræans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellichas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes; the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. After they were come to Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where is the temple of Apollo, at the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyræans sent forward a herald to them to forbid their sailing against them; and at the same time were manning their ships, having both

¹ "To submit the quarrel to a fair discussion;" "to offer satisfaction by negotiation." "In their disputes with one another the several Greek states acknowledged one common public law, like our law of nations, to which they held themselves amenable; and before they appealed to arms, it was considered due to their common blood and common religion, to try to settle their differences by a reference to the principles of this law."—*Arnold*.

undergirded the old ones, so as to make them sea-worthy, and equipped the rest. When the herald brought back from the Corinthians no peaceable answer, and their ships were manned, to the number of eighty sail, (for forty were besieging Epidamnus,) they put out against them, and formed their line, and engaged them: and the Corcyræans won a decided victory, and destroyed fifteen ships of the Corinthians. It happened likewise the same day, that those too who were besieging Epidamnus reduced it to surrender, on condition that they should sell the strangers, and keep the Corinthians in bonds, till something else should be determined.

30. After the battle, the Corcyræans having set up a trophy on Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew the other prisoners they had taken, but kept the Corinthians in bonds. Subsequently, when the Corinthians and their allies, after being vanquished at sea, were gone home, the Corcyræans were masters of the whole sea in those parts, and sailed to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and wasted part of the territory; and burnt Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans, because they had furnished both money and shipping to the Corinthians. And most of the time after the battle they were masters of the sea, and continued sailing against and ravaging the allies of the Corinthians; until,¹ on the return of summer, the Corinthians sent ships and an army, in consequence of the distress of their allies, and formed an encampment on Actium, and about Chimerium in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and such other states as were friendly to them. The Corcyræans also formed an encampment in opposition to them, on Leucimna, both for their ships and land-forces. And neither party sailed against the other; but remaining in opposite stations this summer, at the approach of winter they then each retired homeward.

31. Now the whole of the year after the sea-fight, and the succeeding one, the Corinthians, being indignant about the war with the Corcyræans, were building ships, and preparing with all their might a naval armament, drawing together rowers both from the Peloponnese itself and the rest of Greece, by the inducement of the pay they gave. And the Corcy-

¹ The reading retained by Bekker, Gölter, and others, *περίορι τῷ θέρει*, is supposed to signify, "during the remainder of the summer." For the arguments in favour of each reading, see the notes of Gölter, Arnold, and Bloomfield.

means, on hearing of their preparations, were alarmed; and being in alliance with none of the Greeks, and not having enrolled themselves in the league either of the Athenians or of the Lacedæmonians, they determined to go to the Athenians, and make alliance with them, and endeavour to obtain some assistance from them. And the Corinthians, on hearing this, went themselves also to Athens on an embassy, to prevent the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyræans being an impediment to their concluding the war as they wished. And an assembly having been convened, they came to controversy; and the Corcyræans spoke as follows:—

32. "It is but just, Athenians, that those who without any previous obligation, either of great benefit or alliance, come to their neighbours, as we now do, to beg their assistance, should convince them in the first place,¹ if possible, that they ask what is even expedient; but if not that, at any rate what is not injurious; and in the second place, that they will also retain a lasting sense of the favour: and if they establish none of these points clearly, they should not be angry if they do not succeed. But the Corcyræans have sent us with a conviction that, together with their request for alliance, they will show that these points may be relied on by you. Now the same policy has happened² to prove inconsistent in your eyes, with regard to our request, and inexpedient, with regard to our own interest at the present time. For having never yet in time past voluntarily become the allies of any party, we are now come to beg this of others; and at the same time we have, owing to it, been left destitute with regard to the present war with the Corinthians; and what before seemed our prudence, viz. not to join in the peril of our neighbour's views by being in alliance with others, has turned out now to be evident folly and weakness. In the late sea-fight, indeed, by ourselves and single-handed we repulsed the Corinthians. But since they have set out against us with a larger force from

¹ This is perhaps the most convenient way of rendering the phrase *μάλιστα μὲν*, when used, as it so often is, to draw attention to what appears the *best* thing of *all*, with *εἰ δὲ μή* following for the *second* best, and answering to *εἰ δυνατόν*, sometimes expressed, but much more generally implied, in the former part of the alternative. Latin writers translate them by "*maxime quidem*" and "*sin minus.*"

² The participle *ὄν* is understood here, just as *ὄντων* is, I. 120. 7. See Jelf Gr. Gr. 694, obs. 1.

the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece, and we see ourselves unable to escape by our own power alone; and at the same time our peril is great, if we are subjugated by them; we must beg assistance both from you and every one else: and it is pardonable, if we venture on a course contrary to our former non-interference, [which was practised,] not from any evil intention, but rather from an error of judgment.

33. "Now if you are persuaded by us, the occurrence of our request will be honourable to you in many respects: first, because you will be granting the assistance to men who are injured, and not injuring others: in the next place, by receiving men who have their highest interests at stake, you would bestow the obligation with testimony [to the fact]¹ that would, as far as possible, be always remembered; and, [lastly,] we are in possession of a navy the largest except yours. And consider what good fortune is more rare, or what more annoying to the enemy, than if that power, the addition of which to yours you would have valued above much money and favour, come of its own accord, offering itself without dangers and expense; and moreover affording, in the eyes of the world at large, a character for goodness, and to those whom you will assist, obligation; and to yourselves, strength; all of which advantages together have fallen to the lot of few indeed in the whole course of time: and few are there who, when begging alliance, go conferring safety and honour on the men whose aid they invoke, no less than to receive them. And as for the war in which we should be useful, if any of you do not think that it will arise, he is deceived in his opinion; and does not observe that the Lacedæmonians, through their fear of you, are longing for war; and that the Corinthians have power with them, and are hostile to you, and are now first subduing *us* with a view to attacking *you*, that we may not stand with each other in common hostility to them; and that they may not fail to gain one of two advantages, either to injure us, or to strengthen themselves. But it is our business, on the contrary, to be beforehand with them, by *our* offering and *your* accepting the alli-

¹ i. e. "The fact of their having been preserved from such imminent peril will be the most enduring record of the obligation under which you have thereby laid them." Gölter explains *καταθήσει* as being "a metaphor taken from laying up money in a bank, that it may be drawn out afterwards with interest."

ance ; and to plot against them first, rather than to meet their plots against us.

34. "But should they say that it is not just for you to receive their colonists, let them learn that every colony, if well treated, honours its mother-country ; but if wronged, is estranged from it ; for they are not sent out to be slaves, but to be on the same footing with those who are left at home. And that they wronged us, is evident ; for when challenged¹ to a judicial decision respecting Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute the charges by war rather than by equity. And let what they are doing to us, their kinsmen, be a warning to *you*, that you may both avoid being seduced by them, through any false pretence ; and may refuse to assist them, if they ask you in a straightforward manner : for he who incurs the fewest regrets from gratifying his enemies would continue in the greatest safety.

35. "But neither will you break the treaty with the Lacedæmonians by receiving us, who are allies of neither party. For it is mentioned in it, that whichever of the Grecian states is in alliance with no other, it has permission to go to whichever side it may please. And it is hard if these shall be allowed to man their ships both from the confederates, and moreover from the rest of Greece also, and especially from your subjects, while they will exclude *us* both from our proposed alliance, and from assistance from any other quarter ; and then consider it an injustice if you are persuaded to what we request. But much greater fault shall *we* find with you, if we do *not* persuade you. For us who are in peril, and not actuated by any hostile feeling, you will reject ; while these men who are thus actuated, and have made the attack, you will be so far from restraining, that you will even overlook their gaining additional power from your dominions ; which you should not do ; but should either stop their mercenaries drawn from your country, or send succour to us also, in whatever way you may be persuaded ; but it were best of all to receive us openly, and assist us. And many, as we hinted at the beginning, are the advantages we hold forth to you ; but the greatest of them is, that we both have the same enemies,²

¹ See note on I. 27. 2.

² Göller observes that we should have expected *εἰς* here, rather than *ἡ* ; but the construction is confused, and the imperfect *ἦσαν* is to be re-

(which is the surest bond,) and those not weak, but able to harm such as have stood aloof from them. And as it is a naval, and not a land alliance that is offered you, the loss of it is not the same ; but it were best, if possible,¹ to allow no one else to possess ships ; but if not, whoever is strongest in them, to have him for your friend.

36. "And whoever thinks that these things which we have urged are indeed expedient, but is afraid that through being persuaded by them he would break the treaty ; let him know that his fear, being attended by strength, will cause greater alarm to his enemies ; but that his confidence in not having received us, being powerless, will be less formidable to his foes who are strong ; and also, that it is not about Corecra more than about Athens too that he is deliberating ; and that he is not providing the best for her, when for the war that is coming, and all but here, he hesitates, from present considerations, to receive a country which is made either a friend or a foe, with the greatest opportunities [for good or evil]. For it lies well for the voyage along shore to Italy and Sicily, so as both to prevent a navy from coming thence to the Peloponnesians, and to help on its way a fleet from these parts to those ; and in other respects it is most advantageous. But the shortest summary,² both for general and particular statements, from which you may learn not to give us up, is the following : There being³ but three navies worth mentioning amongst the Greeks, yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians, if you allow two of these to come together, and the Corinthians bring us

ferred to *ὀπείκωμεν*, rather than to *ἀποδαίκνυμεν*. "We say, what we said before, namely, that we had both the same enemies."—*Arnold*.

¹ Arnold says that "the infinitive moods *ἰάν* and *ἔχειν* depend upon a verb understood, which is to be borrowed from the preceding clause : for *οὐκ ὁμοία* is the same thing in sense as *οὐκ ὁμοίως ξυμφέρεσι* ; from whence the verb *ξυμφέρεσι* is to be tacitly repeated with what follows."—That some such impersonal verb is understood is very probable : but is not *οὐκ ὁμοία* rather equivalent to *οὐκ ὁμοίως ἀξυμφορὸν ἔστι* ? "Not merely the same as it would be in the case of a land alliance, but much greater." Compare two expressions in I. 143. 3, 4, *καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μεγάλα ἔχειν—καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται Πελοποννήσου μέρος τι τηρῆναι καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἄρπασαν* κ. τ. λ.

² This is Poppo's interpretation of the passage, and it is perhaps impossible to express its full meaning more literally. He considers *τοῖς ξύμμασι* and *ἑκαστον* as neuters.

³ I have followed the explanation of those who suppose the conjunction *δέ* to be placed in the apodosis of the sentence. Göller and Poppo supply *ἔστι* from the preceding *μάθουσι*.

under their power first, you will have to fight at sea with both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians ; but if you receive us you will be able to contend against them with the greater number of ships on your side.”¹ Thus spoke the Corcyraeans ; and the Corinthians after them as follows.

37. “ Since these Corcyraeans have made their harangue, not only about receiving them, but also to show that *we* are acting unjustly, and *they* are unfairly attacked ; it is necessary that we too should first touch on both these points, and so proceed to the rest of our speech ; that you may know more certainly beforehand the grounds of our request, and may with good reason reject their petition. Now they say that it was from regard to *prudence* that hitherto they accepted the alliance of no party : whereas they adopted this practice for villany, and not for virtue ; but from wishing to have no ally or witness in their unjust deeds, nor to be put to the blush by calling him to their aid. And their city also, lying in a self-sufficient position, makes them judges of the injuries they inflict on any one, rather than that there should be judges appointed by agreement ; because, while they very seldom sail from home to their neighbours, they very frequently receive others, who of necessity touch there. And herein consists the specious shunning of confederacies, which they have put forward ; not that they may avoid committing injustice with others, but that they may commit them by themselves ; and that wherever they have the power, they may act with violence ; and where they escape observation, they may take unfair advantage ; and if in any case they have seized on something, they may not be put to the blush. And yet, if they were, as they say, honest men, the more impregnable they were to their neighbours, the more manifestly might they have shown their virtue, by giving and taking what was just.

38. “ But neither to others nor to us are they of such a character ; but although our colonists, they have all along revolted from us, and are now making war upon us ; saying that they were not sent out to be ill-treated. But *we* say that neither did we settle them there to be insulted by them, but to be

¹ Göller reads *ἡμετέρας*, making it depend upon *πλοῖσι*, like *πολλῶ* in the phrase *πολλῶ πλοῖσι*, “ with more ships by ours,”—i. e. with all the advantage in point of number that our ships would give you. Arnold thinks Bekker right in retaining the old reading.

their leaders, and to be properly respected by them. Our other colonies, at least, honour us, and we are very much beloved by our colonists; and it is evident, that if we are pleasing to the greater part, we should not, on a right view of the case, be displeasing to these alone; nor do we attack them unbecomingly,¹ without being also signally injured by them. Even if we were in the wrong, it had been honourable for them to have yielded to our humour; but disgraceful for us to have done violence to their moderation: but through pride, and power of wealth, they have both acted wrongly towards us in many other things, and with regard to Epidamnus, which belonged to us, when it was ill-treated they did not claim it; but when we went to its assistance, they took it by force, and keep it.

39. "And they say, forsooth, that they were before willing to have it judicially decided: but with regard to this, it is not the man who proposes it with superiority,² and in safety, that should be considered to say any thing; but that man, who puts alike his actions and words on the same footing,³ before he enters on the struggle. But as for these men, it was not before they besieged the place, but when they thought that we should not put up with it, that they also advanced the specious plea of a judicial decision. And they are come hither, not only having themselves done wrong there, but now requesting *you* also to join them, not in alliance, but in injury; and to receive them, when they are at variance with us. But then ought they to have applied to you, when they were most secure; and not at a time when *we* have been injured, and *they* are in peril; nor at a time when you, though you did not share their power then, will now give them a share of your aid; and though you stood aloof from their misdeeds, will incur equal blame from us; but they ought long ago to have communicated their power to you, and so to have the results also in common. [As,⁴ however, you have had no share

¹ i. e. as we *should* do, if we were not signally injured by them.—Göller takes the *ἰσίστατόμεν* in a more general sense, as expressing the habitual policy of the Corinthians. "Neque solemus bellum inferre indigno majoris patriæ modo, nisi insigni injuria cogimur."

² A secondary meaning of *προκαλεῖσθαι*, very common when it is not followed by an accusative of the person with *ἑ*. See II. 72. 3, 5; 73. 1; 74. 1, 2.

³ i. e. who does not say one thing and do another. Poppo takes *ἴσον* in the sense of 'equity': "eum, qui factis pariter atque oratione æquitatem retinet."

⁴ "These words, which are wanting in the text of most of the best MSS.,

only in the accusations brought against them, so you should not participate in the consequences of their actions.]

40. "That we ourselves, then, come with accusations on proper grounds, and that these are violent and rapacious, has been proved: and that you could not with justice receive them, you must now learn. For if it is said in the treaty, that any of the states not registered in it may go to whichever side it please, the agreement was not meant for those who go to the detriment of others; but to any one who, without withdrawing himself from another, is in need of protection; and who will not cause war instead of peace to those who receive him, ([as they will not do¹] if they are wise;) which would now be your case, if not persuaded by us. For you would not only become auxiliaries to these, but also enemies to us, instead of being connected by treaty; for if you come with them, we must defend ourselves against them without excepting you. And yet you ought, if possible, to stand aloof from both parties; or if not that, on the contrary, to go with *us* against them; (with the Corinthians, at any rate, you are connected by treaty; while with the Corcyræans you were never yet so much as in truce;) and not to establish the law, that we should receive those who are revolting from others. For neither did *we*, when the Samians had revolted, give our vote against *you*, when the rest of the Peloponnesians were divided in their votes, as to whether they should assist them; but we openly maintained the contrary, that each one should punish his own allies. For if you receive and assist those who are doing wrong, there will be found no fewer of your allies also who will come over to us; and you will make the law against yourselves, rather than against us.

41. "These, then, are the pleas of right which we have to urge to you, sufficiently strong according to the laws of the Greeks; and we have the following advice, and claim on you for favour,

have been omitted by Bekker, and enclosed in brackets by Gölter. Dr. Bloomfield defends them, except the single word *μόνον*, which he gives up as unintelligible."—*Arnold*.

¹ There is a confusion in the expression, and the words *ἐν συμφρονούσι* have really nothing to do with the sentence as it is actually expressed, which is suggested as it were parenthetically to the writer's mind, but which he did not set down in words: if written at length it would run thus; "The benefit of the treaty was intended for such only as should not involve those who received them in war, (as, if you are wise, you will take care that these men do not involve you.)"—*Arnold*.

which, being not enemies so as to hurt you, nor, on the other hand, such friends as to be very intimate with you, we say ought to be repaid to us at the present time. For once, when you were in want of long ships for the war with the Æginetans, before that with the Medes, you received from the Corinthians twenty ships. And this service, and that with regard to the Samians, namely, that it was through us that the Peloponnesians did not assist them, gave you the mastery of the Æginetans, and the chastisement of the Samians: and it took place in those critical times in which men, when proceeding against their enemies, are most regardless of every thing besides victory.¹ For they esteem him a friend who assists them, even though he may before have been an enemy; and him a foe who opposes them, though he may have happened to be a friend; nay they even mismanage their own affairs for the sake of their animosity at the moment.

42. "Thinking then of these things, and each younger man having learned them from some one older, let him resolve to requite us with the like, and not deem that these things are justly urged, but that others are expedient in case of his going to war. For expediency most attends that line of conduct in which one does least wrong. And as for the² coming of the war, frightening you with which the Corcyreans bid you commit injustice, it lies as yet in uncertainty; and it is not worth while, through being excited by it, to incur a certain enmity with the Corinthians, immediate, and not coming; but rather it were prudent to remove somewhat of our before existing suspicion on account of the Megareans. For the latest obligation, when well timed, even though it may be comparatively small, has power to wipe out a greater subject of complaint. And be not induced by the fact that it is a great *naval* alliance that they offer you. For not to injure your equals is a power more to be relied on, than, through being buoyed up by momentary appearances, to gain an unfair advantage by a perilous course.

43. "We then, having fallen under the rule which we pounded ourselves at Lacedæmon, that every one should

¹ Or, "in comparison with victory."

² Referring to these words of the Corcyreans, *ὅταν ἐς τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον τὸ αὐτὴν περισκοπῶν ἐνδοιάξῃ χωρίον προσλαβεῖν* κ. τ. λ. Chap. 36. 1.

punish his own allies, now claim to receive the same from you ; and not that you, after being benefited by our vote, should harm us by yours. Make us then a fair return ; knowing that this is that very crisis, in which he that helps is most a friend, and he that opposes, a foe. And for these Corcyræans, neither receive them as allies in spite of us, nor help them in doing wrong. By thus acting, you will both do what becomes you, and advise the best for yourselves." To this effect then did the Corinthians also speak.

44. Now the Athenians, after hearing both sides, when an assembly had been¹ even twice held, in the former rather admitted the arguments of the Corinthians ; but in the one held the next day they changed their minds, and determined, not indeed to make an alliance with the Corcyræans, so as to have the same enemies and friends, (for if the Corcyræans had desired them to sail against Corinth, the treaty with the Peloponnesians would have been broken by them ;) but they made a defensive alliance, to succour each other's country, should any one go against Corcyra, or Athens, or their allies. For they thought that, even as it was, they should have the war with the Peloponnesians ; and they wished not to give up Corcyra to the Corinthians, with so large a navy as it had, but to wear them out as much as possible against each other ; that both the Corinthians and the rest who had navies might be in a weaker condition when they went to war with them, if it should be necessary to do so. And at the same time the island appeared to them to lie well in the line of voyage along shore to Italy and Sicily.

45. With such a view of the case the Athenians admitted the Corcyræans into alliance ; and when the Corinthians had departed, they sent ten ships to assist them. The commanders of them were Lacedæmonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epiclees. They charged them not to engage with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against Corcyra, and threaten to land, or against any of the places belonging to them ; but in that case to prevent them to their utmost : and this charge they gave them with a view to not breaking the treaty. So the ships arrive at Corcyra.

¹ The great importance of the subject prevented their deciding in a single day.

46. But the Corinthians, when they had made their preparations, set sail against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. There were ten of the Eleans, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots seven and twenty, of the Anactorians one, and of the Corinthians themselves ninety. In command of these there were different men for the different forces according to their states, and of the Corinthians, Xenoclides, the son of Euthycles, with four others. And when, in their course from Leucas, they made land on the continent opposite Corcyra, they came to anchor at Chimerium in the territory of Thesprotis. It¹ is a harbour, and a city named Ephyre lies beyond it, away from the sea, in the Elean district of Thesprotis. By it the Acherusian lake empties itself into the sea; and into this lake the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis, empties itself; from which also it takes its name. The river Thyamis also flows there, bounding Thesprotis and Cestrine; and between these rivers the promontory of Chimerium rises. The Corinthians then came to anchor at that part of the continent, and formed their encampment.

47. But the Corcyræans, when they perceived them sailing up, manned a hundred and ten ships, which were commanded by Miciades, Esimides, and Eurybates; and encamped on one of the islands which are called Sybota; and the ten Athenian ships were with them. And on the promontory of Leucimna was their land force, and a thousand heavy-armed of the Zacynthians, who had come to their assistance. The Corinthians also had on the mainland many of the barbarians, who had joined them to give assistance; for the people in that part of the continent have always² been friendly with them.

48. When the preparations of the Corinthians were made, taking three days' provision, they put out from Chimerium by night, with the purpose of engaging; and in the morning, while on their course, they observed the ships of the Corcyræans

¹ Bloomfield, in his new edition, has a long note to prove that it ought to be translated "*there* is a harbour," instead of "*it* is:" but I cannot see the force of his argument; as the quotation from Colonel Leake, on which he chiefly relies, establishes no more than what Arnold had already observed, that in sect. 6, "the point of Chimerium seems to be distinguished by Thucydides from the port of Chimerium;" of which he clearly is speaking in this section.

² Literally, "always in former times;" like the expression "ever of old" in the Psalms.

out at sea, and sailing against them. And when they saw each other, they drew up in opposite lines of battle. On the right wing of the Corcyraeans were the Athenian ships, but the rest of the line they themselves occupied, having formed three squadrons of their ships, which were commanded each by one of the three generals. In this way did the Corcyraeans form their line. On the side of the Corinthians, the Megarean and Ambraciot ships occupied the right wing; in the centre were the rest of the allies severally; while the left wing was occupied by the Corinthians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed to the Athenians and the right of the Corcyraeans.

49. As soon as the signals on each side were raised, they closed, and fought; both sides having many heavy-armed on the decks, and many bowmen and dartmen; as they were still rudely equipped in the old fashion. And the battle was well contested; not so much in point of skill, but more like a land fight. For whenever they happened to run on board one another, they did not easily get clear again, owing to the numbers and confusion of the ships; and because they trusted for victory, in a greater measure, to the heavy-armed on deck, who set to and fought,¹ while the ships remained stationary. There was no breaking through the line, but they fought with fierceness and strength, more than with science. On all sides then there was much confusion, and the battle was a disorderly one; and during it the Athenian vessels coming up to the Corcyraeans, if they were pressed at any point, struck fear into the enemy, but did not begin fighting, as the commanders were afraid of the charge given by the Athenians. It was the right wing of the Corinthians which was most distressed; for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships having routed and pursued them in a scattered condition to the continent, sailed up to their encampment, and having made a descent upon them, burnt the deserted tents, and plundered their goods. On that side then the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans were victorious: but where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they had a decided victory; as

¹ Bloomfield says that "καταστάντες denotes maintaining the 'pugna stataria,' fighting hand to hand." Such a meaning may perhaps be inferred from the following words, *ἡσυχάζουσάν τῶν νεών*; but I think nothing more is intended than might be otherwise expressed by *ἐν μάχῃ κατέστησαν*. Compare the expression *καταστάντες ἐπολέμουν*. II. 1; and V. 4, 6.

twenty ships of the Corcyraeans, from a number [originally] smaller, had not returned from the pursuit. But the Athenians, seeing the Corcyraeans hard pressed, assisted them now more unequivocally; though at first they refrained from charging any vessel; but when the rout had clearly taken place, and the Corinthians were lying close on them, then indeed every one at length set to work, and there was no longer any distinction, but it had come to such urgent necessity, that the Corinthians and Athenians attacked each other.

50. Now when the rout had taken place, the Corinthians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the vessels which they might happen to have sunk,¹ but turned their attention to the men, sailing throughout to butcher, rather than to make prisoners; and some of their own friends, not being aware that those in the right wing had been worsted, they unwittingly killed. For as both fleets were numerous, and extended over a wide space of the sea; when they closed with each other, they did not easily distinguish, who were conquering, or being conquered; for this engagement, for one of Greeks against Greeks, was greater in the number of vessels than any of those before it. After the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyraeans to land, they turned their attention to the wrecks, and their own dead, and got possession of most of them, so as to take them to Sybota, where their land force composed of the barbarians had come to their assistance. Now Sybota is a desert port of Thesprotis. Having done this, they mustered again, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who with their seaworthy ships, and such as were left,² in conjunction with those of the Athenians, on their side also sailed out to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land on their territory. It was now late, and the Pæan had been sung by them for the advance, when the Corinthians suddenly began to row sternwards, on observing twenty ships of the Athenians sailing up;

¹ "Καταδύειν ναῦν" does not mean to sink a ship to the bottom, but to make her water-logged, so that she was useless, although she did not absolutely go down. The Greek triremes were so light and so shallow that they would float in a manner under water, or rather with parts of the vessel still out of water, on which the crew used to take refuge."—*Arnold*.

² "Probabilis est opinio Popponis, τὰς λοιπὰς intelligi decem illas naves, quæ ex 120 navibus Corcyreorum superabant; nam pugnam ingressi erant cum navibus 110 (vid. cap. 47. 1) habebant autem universas 120. Vid. cap. 25. 6.—*Göller*."

which the Athenians had sent after the ten to help them; fearing, (as was the case,) that the Corcyræans might be conquered, and their own ten ships be¹ too few to aid them.

51. These, then, the Corinthians having first seen, and suspecting that they were from Athens, [and were] not merely as many as they saw, but more, began to retreat. But by the Corcyræans they were not seen, (for they were advancing more out of *their* view,) and they wondered at the Corinthians rowing astern, till some saw them and said, "There are ships yonder sailing towards us." Then *they* also withdrew; for it was now growing dark, and the Corinthians by turning back had occasioned the suspension of hostilities. In this way they parted from each other, and the battle ceased at night. And when the Corcyræans were encamped on Leucimna, these twenty ships from Athens, which were commanded by Glauco, the son of Leager, and Andocides, the son of Leogoras, coming on through the dead bodies and the wrecks, sailed up to the camp not long after they had been descried. Now the Corcyræans (it being night) were afraid they might be enemies; but afterwards they recognised them, and they came to anchor.

52. The next day the thirty Athenian ships, and as many of the Corcyræan as were sea-worthy, put out and sailed to the harbour at Sybota, in which the Corinthians were anchored, wishing to know whether they would engage. But they, having put out with their ships from the land, and formed them in line at sea, remained quiet; not intending voluntarily to begin a battle, since they saw that fresh ships from Athens had joined them; and that they themselves were involved in many difficulties, with regard to the safe keeping of the prisoners they had on board, and because there were no means of refitting their ships in so deserted a place. Nay, they were thinking of their voyage home, how they should return; being afraid that the Athenians might consider the treaty to have been broken, because they had come to blows, and not allow them to sail away.

53. They determined therefore to put some men on board a skiff and send them without a herald's wand to the Athenians, and make an experiment. And having sent them,

¹ Arnold compares II. 61. ταπεινὴ ὑμῶν ἡ διάνοια ἐγκαρτερεῖν ἃ εἴγνωτε; and Herodotus VI. 109. ὀλίγους γὰρ εἶναι στρατεῖ τῇ Μήδων συμβαλλέειν.

they spoke as follows: "You do wrong, Athenians, in beginning war, and breaking treaty: for while we are avenging ourselves on our enemies, you stand in our way, and raise arms against us. Now if your purpose is to stop our sailing to Corcyra, or wherever else we wish, and if you mean to break the treaty,¹ then seize us here in the first place, and treat us as enemies." They spoke to this effect, and all the army of the Corcyræans that heard them immediately cried out, "Seize them and put them to death!" But the Athenians answered as follows: "We are neither commencing war, Peloponnesians, nor breaking the treaty; but we have come to assist the Corcyræans here, who are our allies. If therefore you wish to sail any where else, we do not stop you; but if you sail against Corcyra, or to any of the places belonging to them, we shall, to the best of our power, not permit it."

54. The Athenians having made this reply, the Corinthians began to prepare for their voyage homewards, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent: while the Corcyræans took up the wrecks and dead bodies which had been carried to them by the current and the wind, which had risen in the night, and scattered them in all directions; and erected a counter-trophy at Sybota on the island, considering that they had been victorious. It was on the following view of the case that each side claimed the victory.—The Corinthians erected a trophy, as having had the advantage in the battle until night, so that they got possession of most wrecks and dead bodies; as having no less than a thousand prisoners; and as having sunk more than seventy ships. The Corcyræans erected a trophy for these reasons;—because they had destroyed about thirty ships; and after the Athenians were come, had taken up the wrecks and dead on their side; and because the Corinthians the day before had rowed sternwards and retreated from them, on seeing the Athenian ships; and after they were come,² did not sail out from Sybota to oppose them. Thus each side claimed to be victorious.

¹ *Áeters* is the present tense with a kind of future signification, as it often has. "If you are for breaking," &c.

² Arnold repeats the *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι* with *ἤλθον*, and refers to chap. 52. 2, which, he thinks, "decides that the words are rightly inserted, and that the Athenians are the real subject of the verb *ἤλθον*." Poppo puts the words in brackets, and Göller omits them altogether.

55. As the Corinthians were sailing away homeward, they took by treachery Anactorium, which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and was possessed in common by the Corcyraeans and them; and after establishing in it a Corinthian population [only],¹ they retired homewards; and of the Corcyraeans, eight hundred who were slaves they sold, but two hundred and fifty they kept in custody, and treated with great attention, that on their return they might win over Corcyra to them. For most of them happened to be the first men of the city in power. Corcyra then in this way outlived the war² with the Corinthians; and the ships of the Athenians returned from it. This was the first ground the Corinthians had for their war against the Athenians, namely, that in time of peace they had fought with them by sea in conjunction with the Corcyraeans.

56. Immediately after this the following disagreements arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, to lead them to war. While the Corinthians were contriving how to avenge themselves on them, the Athenians, suspecting their hostility, ordered the Potidaeans, who live on the isthmus of Pallene, being colonists of the Corinthians, but their own subjects and tributaries, to throw down the wall towards Pallene, and give hostages; and to dismiss, and not receive in future, the magistrates³ whom the Corinthians used to send every year; being afraid that they might revolt at the instigation of Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and lead the rest of their allies Thrace-ward⁴ to revolt with them.

57. These precautionary measures with regard to the Potidaeans the Athenians began to adopt immediately after the sea-fight at Corcyra. For the Corinthians were now openly at variance with them; and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had been made their enemy, though he was before an ally and a friend. He became such, be-

¹ i. e. to the exclusion of the Corcyraeans, who had before had joint possession of the town with them.

² Or, as Göller interprets it, "had the better of the war."

³ "The term *Δημιουργοί*, or *Δαμιουργοί*, was a title applied to the chief magistrates of the Peloponnesians, expressive of their doing 'the service of the people.'—Asclepiades, as quoted by the Scholiast, considers the preposition *ἐν* superfluous. Göller understands it to express an *additional* or *extra* magistrate, sent by the mother country to act as a colleague to the *demurgi* appointed by the colonists themselves."—*Arnold*.

⁴ "A general term applied to the Greek states which lined the northern coast of the Aegean from Thessaly to the Hellespont."—*Arnold*.

cause the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, when acting together against him. And being alarmed, he both sent to Lacedæmon, and tried to contrive that they might be involved in war with the Peloponnesians, and endeavoured to win over the Corinthians, with a view to Potidæa's revolting; and made proposals also to the Thrace-ward Chalcidians and the Bottiæans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had in alliance with him these places on his borders, he should more easily carry on the war in conjunction with them. The Athenians perceiving these things, and wishing to anticipate the revolt of the cities, as they happened to be sending out thirty ships and a thousand heavy-armed against his country, with Archestratus, the son of Lyscomedes, as general with ten others, gave orders to the commanders of the fleet to take hostages of the Potidæans, and throw down the wall, and keep a watchful eye over the neighbouring cities, to prevent their revolting.

58. Now the Potidæans sent ambassadors to the Athenians, to try if by any means they might persuade them to adopt no new measures against them; and went also to Lacedæmon in company with the Corinthians, to provide themselves with assistance, should it be necessary; and when, after long negotiating, they obtained no favourable answer from the Athenians, but the ships commissioned against Macedonia were sailing just as much against *them*; and when the authorities at Lacedæmon promised them, that should the Athenians go against Potidæa, they would make an incursion into Attica; then indeed, at that favourable moment, they revolted with the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, having entered into a league together. And Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and throw down their cities on the sea, and remove inland to Olynthus, and make that one city a place of strength for themselves. And to those who abandoned them he gave a part of his own territory in Mygdonia, round lake Bolbe, to enjoy as long as the war with the Athenians lasted. And so, throwing down their cities, they removed inland, and prepared for war.

59. The thirty ships of the Athenians arrived at the Thrace-ward towns, and found Potidæa and the rest in revolt: and the generals thinking it impossible with their present force to carry on war both with Philip and the revolted towns, turned their attention to Macedonia, the object for which they were first

sent out; and having established themselves there,¹ carried on the war in conjunction with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country with an army from the interior.

60. And at this time, when Potidæa had revolted and the Athenian ships were cruising about Macedonia, the Corinthians, being alarmed for the place, and considering the danger to affect themselves, sent volunteers of their own people and mercenaries of the rest of the Peloponnesians, sixteen hundred heavy-armed in all and four hundred light-armed. Their general was Aristeus, the son of Adimantus; and it was from friendship for him especially that most of the soldiers from Corinth joined the expedition as volunteers; for he was always favourably disposed towards the Potidæans. And they arrived in Thrace the fortieth day after Potidæa had revolted.

61. To the Athenians too came immediately the tidings of the cities having revolted; and when they found that the forces with Aristeus had gone there besides, they sent two thousand heavy-armed of their own men and forty ships to the revolted towns, with Callias, the son of Calliades, as general with four others; who, on arriving in Macedonia first, found that the former thousand had just taken Therme, and were besieging Pydna. So they also sat down before Pydna, and besieged it; but afterwards, having made terms and a compulsory alliance² with Perdiccas, as they were hurried on by Potidæa and the arrival of Aristeus there, they withdrew from Macedonia; and having gone to Beræa, and thence turned again [to the coast], (after first attempting the place without taking it,) they continued their march by land to Potidæa, with three thousand heavy-armed of their own, and many of the allies besides, and six hundred horse of the Macedonians with Philip and Pausanias. At the same time seventy ships were sailing in a line with them. And advancing by short marches, they arrived at Gignonus, and pitched their camp.

62. Now the Potidæans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus, in expectation of the Athenians, were encamped towards

¹ i. e. "Quum eo venissent, castra possissent."—*Bauer, as quoted by Göller*. Or it may mean no more than "having set to," as in the passages quoted in the note on chap. 49. 3.

² i. e. "which they only made because they could not help it." Compare II. 70. 1, *ἑρῶμεν περὶ δυνάτας*, "Food which none but a starving man would eat."—*Arnold*.

Olynthus, on the isthmus, and had established their market outside the city. As general of all the infantry the allies had chosen Aristeus; of the cavalry, Perdiccas; for he had broken terms again immediately with the Athenians, and was in alliance with the Potidæans, having appointed Iolaus to represent him as commander. The plan of Aristeus was to keep his own force¹ on the isthmus, and watch the Athenians, in case of their coming against them; while the Chalcidians, and the allies beyond the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry with Perdiccas, should remain at Olynthus; and when the Athenians advanced against his force, they should come up in their rear to assist him, and enclose the enemy between them. But on the other hand, Callias, the general of the Athenians, and his fellow-commanders, despatch the cavalry of the Macedonians and a few of the allies towards Olynthus, to prevent the troops there from giving any assistance; while they themselves broke up their camp, and proceeded to Potidæa. And when they were at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing for battle, *they* also took an opposite position; and not long after they began the engagement. And just the wing of Aristeus, and such picked troops of the Corinthians and the rest as were around him, routed the wing opposed to them, and advanced in pursuit a considerable distance; but the remaining force of the Potidæans and Peloponnesians was beaten by the Athenians, and fled within the wall for refuge.

63. When Aristeus was returning from the pursuit, seeing the rest of the army conquered, he was at a loss which place he should risk going to, whether towards Olynthus, or to Potidæa. He determined, however, to draw his men into as small a space as possible, and at a running pace force his way into Potidæa: and he passed along the breakwater through the sea, annoyed by missiles [from the Athenian ships], and with difficulty; having lost a few men, but saved the rest. Now the auxiliaries of the Potidæans from Olynthus, (the town is about sixty stades off, and within sight,) when the battle was beginning, and the signals had been hoisted, advanced a short distance to give succour, and the Macedonian horse drew up against them to prevent it; but when the victory soon declared for the Athenians, and the signals had been taken

¹ ἑσπερι.] Constructio ad sensum facta: nam verborum τοῦ Ἀριστέως γράμμι ἢ idem sensus, ac si dixisset τοῦ Ἀριστοῦ ἰδοῦσι.—Göller.

down, they retired again within the wall, and the Macedonians to the Athenians. So neither side had any cavalry present [in the engagement]. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidæans under truce. There were killed of the Potidæans and their allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, and Callias their general.

64. Now against the wall on¹ the side of the isthmus the Athenians immediately raised works, and manned them. But that towards Pallene had no works raised against it; for they did not think themselves strong enough both to keep a garrison on the isthmus, and to cross over to Pallene and raise works there; fearing that the Potidæans and their allies might attack them when divided. And the Athenians in the city, hearing that Pallene had no works on it, some time after send sixteen hundred heavy-armed of their own, and Phormio, the son of Asopius, as general; who reached Pallene, and setting out from Aphytis,² led his army to Potidæa, advancing by short marches, and ravaging the country at the same time: and when no one came out to offer him battle, he threw up works against the wall on the side of Pallene. And thus Potidæa was now besieged with all their power, on both sides, and from the sea at the same time by ships that were blockading it.

65. Now Aristeus, when it was surrounded with works, and he had no hope of its escape, unless some movement from the Peloponnese, or something else beyond their calculation, should occur, advised all, except five hundred, to watch for a wind and sail out of it, that their provisions might hold out the longer; and he was willing himself to be one of those who remained. But when he did not persuade them, from a wish to provide what was the next best thing to be done, and in order that affairs out of the place might proceed in the best way possible, he sailed out, without being observed by the guard-ships of the Athenians. And remaining amongst

¹ Literally, "having walled off," i. e. cut off by a transverse wall from communication with the country. The absence of any such wall on the opposite side of the city is afterwards expressed by τὴν Παλλήνην ἀπείχιστον οὖσαν.

² I do not think that more is meant by ἀρμώμενος in this passage than that he set out by land from Aphytis, having come with his ships to that place, as being the most convenient for his plan of advancing to Potidæa through Pallene.

the Chalcidians, he joined in the other measures of the war ; and laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermyllians, and cut off many of them ; and sending to the Peloponnesians,¹ endeavoured to contrive a way in which some assistance might be brought. After the works round Potidæa were finished, Phormio with his sixteen hundred men proceeded to ravage Chalcidice and Bottice, and took some of the towns also.

66. The Athenians then and Peloponnesians had had these previous grounds of complaint against each other ; the Corinthians, because Potidæa, which was a colony of their own, and men of Corinth and from the Peloponnesians in it, were being besieged ; the Athenians against the Peloponnesians, because they had caused the revolt of a city which was their ally and tributary, and had come and openly fought with them in conjunction with the Potidæans. The war however had not yet positively broken out, but at present there was a suspension of hostilities ; for the Corinthians had done these things on their own responsibility alone.

67. When, however, Potidæa was being besieged, they did not remain quiet, as they had men in it, and were alarmed for the place. And immediately they summoned the allies to Lacedæmon, and came and cried out against the Athenians, as having broken the treaty, and as injuring the Peloponnesians. And the Æginetans, though they did not openly send ambassadors, for fear of the Athenians, yet in secret most of all urged on the war in conjunction with them, saying that they were not independent according to the treaty. So the Lacedæmonians, after summoning any one of the allies besides, who said that in any other respect he had been injured by the Athenians, held their ordinary assembly, and told them to speak. And others came forward and severally made their complaints, and especially the Megareans, who urged no few other grounds of quarrel, but most of all their being excluded from the ports in the Athenian dominions, and from the Attic market, contrary to the treaty. And the Corinthians came forward last, after permitting the others first to exasperate the Lacedæmonians ; and they spoke after them as follows.

68. "The trustiness of your policy and intercourse amongst

¹ The original is a condensed expression, the participle *πέμπων* being understood, as is evident from chap. 57. 3, where it is expressed, *δεδιώκει τε ἱππασσεν ἕς τε τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πέμπων ὄπας*, κ. τ. λ.

yourselves, Lacedæmonians, renders you the more distrustful with regard to others, if we say any thing [against them]; and from this you have a character for sober-mindedness, but betray too great ignorance with regard to foreign affairs. For though we often forewarned you what injuries we were going to receive from the Athenians, you did not gain information respecting what we told you from time to time, but rather suspected the speakers of speaking for their own private interests. And for this reason it was not before we suffered, but when we are in the very act of suffering, that you have summoned the allies here; amongst whom *we* may speak with the greatest propriety, inasmuch as we have also the greatest complaints to make, being insulted by the Athenians, and neglected by you. And if they were an obscure people any where¹ who were injuring Greece, you might have required additional warning, as not being acquainted with them; but as it is, why need we speak at any great length, when you see that some of us are already enslaved, and that they are plotting against others, and especially against our allies, and have been for a long time prepared beforehand, in case they should ever go to war. For they would not else have stolen Corcyra from us, and kept it in spite of us, and besieged Potidæa; of which places, the one is the most convenient for their deriving the full benefit from their possessions Thrace-ward,² and the other would have supplied the largest navy to the Peloponnesians.

69. "And for these things it is you who are to blame, by having at first permitted them to fortify their city after the Median war, and subsequently to build the long walls; and by continually up to the present time depriving of liberty, not only those who had been enslaved by them, but your own allies also now. For it is not he who has enslaved them, but he who has the power to stop it, but overlooks it, that more truly does this; especially if he enjoys the reputation for virtue as being the liberator of Greece. But with difficulty have

¹ The *rov* in the original would perhaps be most fully expressed by our colloquial phrase, "in some corner or other."

² Arnold translates it, "so as to give *you* the full benefit of your dominion in the neighbourhood of Thrace." But could the Lacedæmonians be said to have any such dominion, at any rate before the expedition of Brasidas? and does not the *Πελοποννησίου* in the next sentence seem to be put emphatically, as in opposition to the Athenian dominion just alluded to?

we assembled now, and not even now for any clearly defined object. For we ought to be considering no longer whether we are injured, but in what way we shall defend ourselves. For the aggressors come with their plans already formed against us who have not made up our minds; at once, and not putting it off.¹ And we know in what way, and how gradually, the Athenians encroach upon their neighbours. And while they think that they are not observed through your want of perception,² they feel less confident; but when they know that you are aware of their designs, but overlook them, they will press on you with all their power. For you alone of the Greeks, Lacedæmonians, remain quiet, defending yourselves against any one, not by exertion of your power, but by mere demonstration of it; and you alone put down the power of your enemies, not when beginning, but when growing twice as great as it was. And yet you used to have the name of cautious; but in your case the name, it seems, was more than the reality. For we ourselves know that the Mede came from the ends of the earth to the Peloponnese, before your forces went out to meet him as they should have done; and now the Athenians, who are not far removed, as he was, but close at hand, you overlook; and instead of attacking them, prefer to defend yourselves against their attack, and to reduce yourselves to mere chances in struggling with them when in a much more powerful condition: though you know that even the barbarian was chiefly wrecked upon himself;³ and that with regard to these very Athenians, we have often ere this escaped more by their errors than by assistance from you. For indeed hopes of you have before now in some instances even ruined some, while unprepared through trusting you. And let none of you think that this is spoken for enmity, rather than for expostulation; for expostulation is due to friends who are in error, but accusation to enemies who have committed injustice.

70. "At the same time we consider that we, if any, have a right to administer rebuke to our neighbours, especially as the

¹ Or, "not merely threatening to attack us," as *μὴ λησις* is used below.

² Or, *διὰ τὸ ἀναισθητὸν ὑμῶν* may be taken with *θαρσύνει*, and be rendered "through your not perceiving it."

³ i. e. he was himself, as it were, the rock on which his fortune split. "Perished by his own folly."—*Arnold*.

differences [between you and them] are great; of which you do not seem to us to have any perception, nor to have ever yet considered with what kind of people you will have to struggle in the Athenians, and how very, nay, how entirely different from yourselves. They, for instance, are innovating, and quick to plan and accomplish by action what they have designed; while you are disposed to keep what you have, and form no new design, and by action not even to carry out what is necessary. Again, they are bold even beyond their power, and adventurous beyond their judgment, and sanguine in dangers; while your character is to undertake things beneath your power, and not to trust even the sure grounds of your judgment, and to think that you will never escape from your dangers. Moreover, they are unhesitating, in opposition to you who are dilatory; and fond of going from home, in opposition to you who are most fond of staying at home: for they think that by their absence they may acquire something; whereas you think that by attempting [more] you would do harm to what you have. When they conquer their enemies, they carry out their advantage to the utmost; and when conquered, they fall back the least. Further, they use their bodies as least belonging to them, for the good of their country;¹ but their mind, as being most peculiarly their own, for achieving something on her account. And what they have planned but not carried out, they think that in this they lose something already their own; what they have attempted and gained, that in this they have achieved but little in comparison with what they mean to do. Then, if they fail in an attempt at any thing, by forming fresh hopes in its stead, they supply the deficiency: for they are the only people that² succeed to the full extent of their hope in what they have planned, because they quickly undertake what they have resolved. And in this way they labour, with toils and dangers, all their life long; and least enjoy what they have, because they are always getting, and think a feast to be nothing else but to gain their ends, and in-

¹ For this use of ἀλλότριος compare Homer, Odys. 20. 346.

μνηστῆραι δὲ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
Ἀσείστον γέλον ὥρσε . . . οἱ δὲ γναβμοῖσι γελῶσι
ἀλλοτρίοισιν:—

and Horace's imitation of it, Sat. 2. 3. 72.

"Cum rapies in jus malis ridentem alienis."

² More literally, "possess in the same degree as they hope for."

active quiet to be no less a calamity than laborious occupation. So that if any one should sum up their character, by saying, that they are made neither to be quiet themselves, nor let the rest of the world be so, he would speak correctly.

71. "And yet when such is the character of this state that is opposed to you, Lacedæmonians, you go on delaying, and think that peace is not most lasting in the case of those men, who with their resources do what is right, while as regards their feelings, they are known to be determined not to put up with it, if they are injured : but you practise fair dealing on the principle of neither annoying others, nor being hurt yourselves in self-defence. Scarcely, however, could you have succeeded in this, though you had lived by a state of congenial views : while as it is, your ways, as we just now showed you, are old-fashioned compared with them. But, as in the case of art, improvements must ever prevail ; and though for a state that enjoys quiet, unchanged institutions are best ; yet, for those who are compelled to apply to many things, many a new device is also necessary. And for this reason the institutions of the Athenians, from their great experience, have been remodelled to a greater extent than yours. At this point then let your dilatoriness cease : and now assist us, and especially the Potidæans, as you undertook, by making with all speed an incursion into Attica ; that you may not give up men who are your friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and turn the rest of us in despair to some other alliance. And in that we should do nothing unjust, in the sight either of the gods who received our oaths¹ or of the men who witness [our conduct] : for the breakers of a treaty are not those who from destitution apply to others, but those who do not assist their confederates. If, however, you will be zealous, we will stand by you ; for neither should we act rightly in changing, nor should we find others more congenial. Wherefore deliberate well, and endeavour to keep a supremacy in the Peloponnese no less than your fathers bequeathed to you."

72. To this effect spoke the Corinthians. And the Athenians, happening before this to have an embassy at Lacedæmon, and hearing what was said, thought that they ought to come before the Lacedæmonians, not to make any defence on

¹ Or, as Arnold, after Reiske and others, explains it, "who are capable of feeling and observing."

the subject of the charges which the states brought against them, but to prove, on a general view of the question, that they ought not to deliberate in a hurry, but take more time to consider it. They wished also to show how powerful their city was; and to remind the older men of what they knew, and to relate to the younger what they were unacquainted with; thinking that in consequence of what they said, they would be more disposed to remain quiet than to go to war. So they came to the Lacedæmonians,¹ and said that *they* also, [as the Corinthians had done,] wished to speak to their people, if nothing prevented. They told them to come forward; and the Athenians came forward, and spoke as follows.

73. "Our embassy was not sent for the purpose of controversy with your allies, but on the business on which the state sent us. Perceiving, however, that there is no small outcry against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the states, (for our words would not be addressed to you as judges, either of us or of them,) but to prevent your adopting bad counsel through being easily persuaded by the allies on matters of great importance; and at the same time with a wish to show, on a view of the general argument as it affects us, that we do not improperly hold what we possess, and that our state is worthy of consideration. Now as to things of very ancient date, why need we mention them? since hearsay must attest them, rather than the eyes of those who will be our auditors. But the Median war, and the deeds with which you yourselves are acquainted, we must speak of; though it will be rather irksome to us to be for ever bringing them forward: for when we performed them, the danger was run for a benefit, of the reality of which you had your share; and let us not be deprived of the whole credit, if it is of any service to us. Our words, however, will be spoken, not so much for the purpose of exculpation, as of testimony, and of showing with what kind of a state you will have to contend, if you do not take good counsel. For we say that at Marathon we alone stood in the van of danger against the barbarian; and that when he came the second time, though we were not able to defend ourselves by land, we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis; which prevented his sail-

¹ i. e. to the government, whose consent was required before they could address the assembled people.

ing against and ravaging the Peloponnese, city by city, while you would have been unable to assist one another against his numerous ships. And he himself gave the greatest proof of this; for when conquered by sea, thinking that his power was no longer what it had been, he retreated as quickly as he could with the greater part of his army.

74. "Such now having been the result, and it having been clearly shown that it was on the fleet of the Greeks that their cause depended, we contributed the three most useful things towards it; viz. the greatest number of ships, the most able man as a general, and the most unshrinking zeal. Towards the four hundred ships we contributed not less than two parts;¹ and Themistocles as commander, who was chiefly instrumental of their fighting in the Strait, which most clearly saved their cause; and you yourselves for this reason honoured him most, for a stranger, of all that have ever gone to you. And a zeal by far the most daring we exhibited, inasmuch as when no one came to assist us by land, the rest as far as us being already enslaved, we determined, though we had left our city, and sacrificed our property, not even in those circumstances to abandon the common cause of the remaining allies, nor to become useless to them by dispersing; but to go on board our ships, and face the danger; and not to be angry because you had not previously assisted us. So then we assert that we ourselves no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we obtained one. For *you*, setting out from cities that were inhabited, and with a view to enjoying them in future, came to our assistance, [only] after you were afraid for yourselves, and not so much for us; (at any rate, when we were still in safety, you did not come to us;) but *we*, setting

¹ What parts we must suppose the speaker to have referred to in this passage, whether quarters or thirds, is much disputed. Didot and Göller maintain the former, as being in strict agreement with the statement of Herodotus, who makes the whole fleet to have consisted of three hundred and seventy-eight ships, and the Athenian portion of one hundred and eighty. Arnold, after Bredow and Poppe, supports the other interpretation, and observes, that "this is not the statement of Thucydides, but of the Athenian orator, who is made very characteristically to indulge in gross exaggerations." See his whole note on the passage. Bishop Thirlwall, however, thinks that such an exaggeration would have been in very bad taste on such an occasion; and that Thucydides meant to state the true numbers; "in which," he observes, "if we read *τριακοσίας* for *τετρα*, he would have followed Æschylus instead of Herodotus, whom indeed it is possible he had not read." Vol. 2. Append. 4.

out from a country which was no more, and running the risk for what existed only in scanty hope, bore our full share in the deliverance both of you and of ourselves. But if we had before joined the Mede through fear for our country, like others, or had afterwards had no heart to go on board our ships, considering ourselves as ruined men; there would have been no longer any need of your fighting by sea without a sufficient number of ships, but things would have quietly progressed for him just as he wished.

75. "Do we not then deserve, Lacedæmonians, both for our zeal at that time, and the intelligence of our counsel, not to lie under such excessive odium with the Greeks, at least for the empire we possess? For this very empire we gained, not by acting with violence, but through your having been unwilling to stand by them to finish the business with the barbarian, and through the allies having come to us, and of their own accord begged us to become their leaders: and from this very fact we were compelled at first to advance it to its present height, principally from motives of fear, then of honour also, and afterwards of advantage too. And it no longer appeared to be safe, when we were hated by the generality, and when some who had already revolted had been subdued, and you were no longer friends with us, as you had been, but suspicious of us, and at variance with us, to run the risk of giving it up; for those who revolted would have gone over to you.¹ And all may without odium secure their own interests with regard to the greatest perils.²

76. "You, at least, Lacedæmonians, have settled to your own advantage the government of the states in the Peloponnese over which you have a supremacy; and if at that time you had remained through the whole business, and been disliked in your command, as we were, we know full well that you would have become no less severe to the allies, and would have been compelled either to rule with a strong hand, or yourselves be exposed to danger. So neither have we done any thing marvellous, or contrary to the disposition of man, in having accepted an empire that was offered to us, and not giving it up, influenced as we are by the strongest motives, honour, and fear, and profit; and when, again, we had not

¹ Literally, "the revolts would have been to you."

² Or, "none are grudged securing," &c.

been the first to set such a precedent, but it had always been a settled rule that the weaker should be constrained by the stronger; and when at the same time we thought ourselves worthy of it, and were thought so by you, until, from calculations of expediency, you now avail yourselves of the appeal to justice; which no one ever yet brought forward when he had a chance of gaining any thing by might, and abstained from taking the advantage. Nay, all are worthy of praise, who, after acting according to human nature in ruling others, have been more just than their actual power enabled them to be. At any rate we imagine, that if some others had possessed our means, they would have best shown whether we are at all moderate or not; though to us there has unfairly resulted from our good nature disrepute rather than commendation.

77. "For from putting up with less than we might have had in contract-suits with the allies, and from having made our decisions in our own courts on the footing of equal laws, we are thought to be litigious. And none of them considers why this reproach is not brought against those who have empire in any other quarter also, and are less moderate towards their subjects than we have been: for those who can act with violence have no need besides to act with justice. But they, from being accustomed to have intercourse with us on a fair footing, if contrary to their notions of right they have been worsted in any thing, either by a legal judgment or by the power of our empire, even in any degree whatever; they feel no gratitude for not being deprived of the greater part [of their possessions], but are more indignant for what is lost, than if from the first we had laid aside law, and openly taken advantage of them. In that case not even they themselves would have denied that it was right for the weaker to yield to the stronger. But when injured, it seems, men are more angry than when treated with violence: for the one case is regarded as an advantage taken by their equal; the other, as compulsion by their superior. At least they endured much harder treatment than this at the hand of the Medes; whereas *our* rule is thought to be severe; and naturally so; for their present condition is always irksome to subjects. You, at any rate, should you subdue us and possess an empire, would quickly lose the good-will which you have enjoyed through their fear of us; if you have the same views now as you gave

symptoms of then, when you led them against the Mede for a short time. For you have institutions by yourselves, distinct from the rest of the world; and, moreover, each individual of you, on going abroad, neither acts according to these, nor to those which the rest of Greece recognises.

78. "Deliberate therefore slowly, as on no trifling matters; and do not, through being influenced by other people's views and accusations, bring on yourselves trouble of your own: but consider beforehand, previously to your being engaged in it, how far beyond calculation is war; for when long protracted, it generally comes in the end to depend on chances; from which we are equally removed, and run the risk in uncertainty as to which way it will turn out. And in going to war men generally turn to deeds first, which they ought to do afterwards; and when they are in distress, then they have recourse to words. We however, being neither ourselves yet involved in such an error, nor seeing you in it, charge you, while good counsel is still eligible to both sides, not to break treaty nor offend against your oaths, but to let our differences be judicially settled according to agreement. Else we will call to witness the gods who received our oaths, and endeavour to requite you for commencing hostilities, in such a way as you may set the example."

79. Thus spoke the Athenians. After the Lacedæmonians had heard from the allies their charges against the Athenians, and from the Athenians what they had to say, they made them all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question before them. And the opinions of the majority went the same way; viz. that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they ought to go to war with all speed. But Archidamus their king, a man who was considered both intelligent and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows.

80. "I have both myself already had experience in many wars, Lacedæmonians, and see that those of you who are of the same age [have had it also]; so that one would neither desire the business from inexperience, as might be the case with most men, nor from thinking it a good and safe one. But this war, about which you are now consulting, you would find likely to be none of the least, if any one should soberly consider it. For against the Peloponnesians and our neighbours our strength is of the same description, and we can

quickly reach our destination in each case. But against men who live in a country far away, and besides are most skilful by sea, and most excellently provided with every thing else, with riches, both private and public, and ships, and horses, and heavy-armed, and a crowd of irregulars, such as there is not in any one Grecian town beside, and moreover, have many allies under payment of tribute; how can it be right to declare war rashly against these men? and in what do we trust, that we should hurry on to it unprepared? Is it in our ships? Nay, we are inferior to them: but if we shall practise and prepare against them, time will pass in the interval. Well then, is it in our money? Nay, but we are still more deficient in this, and neither have it in the public treasury, nor readily contribute it from our private funds.

81. "Perhaps some one might feel confident because we excel them in heavy-armed troops, and in numbers, so that we might invade and ravage their land. But they have other land in abundance, over which they rule, and will import what they want by sea. If, again, we shall attempt to make their allies revolt from them, we shall have to assist these also with ships, as they are generally islanders. What then will be the character of our war? For if we do not either conquer them by sea, or take away the revenues with which they maintain their fleet, we shall receive the greater damage; and at such a time it will no longer even be honourable to make peace; especially if we are thought to have begun the quarrel more than they. For let us now not be buoyed up with *this* hope, at any rate, that the war will soon be ended, if we ravage their land. Rather do I fear that we should bequeath it even to our children: so probable is it that the Athenians would neither be enslaved¹ in spirit to their land, nor, like inexperienced men, be panic-stricken by the war.

82. "I do not however, on the other hand, tell you to permit them, without noticing it, to harm our allies, and not to detect them in plotting against us; but I tell you not to take up arms at present, but to send and remonstrate; neither showing too violent signs of war, nor yet that we will put up with their conduct; and in the mean time to complete our own preparations also, both by bringing over allies, whether Greeks

¹ Compare II. 61. 3. Δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον. κ. τ. λ.

or barbarians, from whatever source we shall receive additional strength, either in ships or in money; (for all who, like us, are plotted against by the Athenians, may without odium save themselves by accepting the aid not only of Greeks, but of barbarians also;) and at the same time let us bring out our own resources. And if they listen at all to our ambassadors, that is the best conclusion; but if not, after an interval of two or three years, we shall then go against them, if we think fit, in a better state of defence. And perhaps when they then saw our preparation, and our language speaking in accordance with it, they might be more disposed to yield, while they had their land as yet unravaged, and were deliberating about good things still enjoyed by them, and not yet sacrificed. For in their land consider that you have nothing else but a hostage; and the more so, the better it is cultivated. You should therefore spare it as long as possible, and not, through having reduced them to desperation, find them the more difficult to subdue. For if we are hurried on by the complaints of our allies, and ravage it while we are unprepared, see that we do not come off in a manner more disgraceful and perplexing to the Peloponnese [than we should wish¹]. For complaints, both of states and individuals, it is possible to settle: but when all together have, for their own separate interests, undertaken a war, of which it is impossible to know how it will go on, it is not easy to effect a creditable arrangement.

83. "And let no one think it shows a want of courage for many not at once to advance against one state. For they too have no fewer allies who pay them tribute;² and war is not so much a thing of arms as of money, by means of which arms are of service; especially in the case of continental against maritime powers. Let us first then provide ourselves with this, and not be excited beforehand by the speeches of the allies; but as we shall have the greater part of the responsibility for the consequences either way, so also let us quietly take a view of them beforehand.

84. "And as for the slowness and dilatoriness which they most blame in us, be not ashamed of them. For by hurrying [to begin the war] you would be the more slow in finishing it, because you took it in hand when unprepared: and at the same

¹ Or the comparative may perhaps be used for the positive.

² These words are *only* applicable to the allies of the *Athenians*.

time we always enjoy a city that is free and most glorious ; and it is a wise moderation that can best constitute this. For owing to it we alone do not grow insolent in success, and yield less than others to misfortunes. We are not excited by the pleasure afforded by those who with praise stimulate us to dangers contrary to our conviction ; and if any one provoke us with accusation, we are not the more prevailed on through being thus annoyed. We are both warlike and wise through our orderly temper : warlike, because shame partakes very largely of moderation, and courage of shame ; and wise, because we are brought up with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them ; and are not over-clever in useless things, so that while in word we might ably find fault with our enemies' resources, we should not go against them so well in deed ;¹ but are taught to think that our neighbours' plans,² and the chances which befall in war, are very similar, as things not admitting of nice distinction in language. But we always provide *in deed* against our adversaries with the expectation of their planning well ; and must not rest our hopes on the probability of their blundering, but on the belief of our own taking cautious forethought. Again, we should not think that one man differs much from another, but that he is the best who is educated in the most necessary things.

85. "These practices then, which our fathers bequeathed to us, and which we have always retained with benefit, let us not give up, nor determine hurriedly, in the short space of a day, about many lives, and riches, and states, and honours, but let us do it calmly ; as *we* may do more than others, on account of our power. And send to the Athenians respecting Potidæa, and send respecting those things in which the allies say they are injured ; especially as they are ready to submit to judicial decision ; and against the party which offers that, it is not right to proceed as against a guilty one. But prepare for war at the

¹ Or, "should not so well follow up our words with deeds."—The following infinitive *νομιζειν* depends upon *παιδευόμενοι* understood again.

² I have followed the punctuation and interpretation of Göller and Arnold in their last edition ; though not with a perfect conviction of its correctness, as I doubt whether the *τε* has any place before *παραπλησίους* *καὶ* taken in this sense. But see Göller's note.—According to Haack and Poppe it would be, "that our neighbours' plans are very similar to our own, and that the chances of war," &c.

same time. For in this you will determine both what is best, and what is most formidable to your adversaries." Archidamus spoke to this effect; but Sthenelaidas, who was one of the ephors at that time, came forward last, and spoke before the Lacedæmonians as follows.

86. "As for the long speech of the Athenians, I do not understand it; for though they praised themselves a great deal, in no part did they deny that they are injuring our allies and the Peloponnese. And yet if they were good men then against the Medes, but are bad ones now against us, they deserve double punishment for having become bad instead of good. But *we* are the same both then and now; and shall not, if we are wise, overlook our allies' being injured, nor delay to assist them; for there is no longer delay in their being ill-treated. Others have in abundance riches, and ships, and horses; but *we* have good allies, whom we must not give up to the Athenians, nor decide the question with suits and words, while it is not also in word that we are injured; but we must assist them with speed and with all our might. And let no one tell me that it is proper for us to deliberate who are being wronged. It is for those who are about to commit the wrong that it is much more proper to deliberate for a long time. Vote then, Lacedæmonians, for war, as is worthy of Sparta; and neither permit the Athenians to become greater, nor let us betray our allies; but with the help of the gods let us proceed against those who are wronging them."

87. Having spoken to this effect he himself, as ephor, put the question to the assembly of the Lacedæmonians. As they decide by acclamation and not by vote, he said that he did not distinguish on which side the acclamation was greater; but wishing to instigate them the more to war¹ by their openly expressing their views, he said, "Whoever of you, Lacedæmonians, thinks the treaty to have been broken, and the Athenians to have been guilty, let him² rise and go yonder" (pointing out a certain place to them); "and whoever does not think so, let him go to the other side." They arose and divided, and there was a large majority who thought that the

¹ Because individuals might be afraid of openly opposing the popular wish, which was decidedly for the war.

² For another instance of a compound of *ιστημι* used in the same pregnant manner as *ἀνίστημι* is here, see I. 101. 2. *ἐς ἰθάμην ἀνίστησαν*.

treaty had been broken. And having summoned the allies, they told them that their own opinion was that the Athenians were in the wrong; but that they wished to summon all the allies also, and to put it to the vote; that after general consultation they might declare war, if they thought fit. They then, after having settled this, returned home; as did the ambassadors of the Athenians afterwards, when they had despatched the business they had gone on. This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the continuance of the thirty years' truce, which had been concluded after the war with Eubœa.

88. Now the Lacedæmonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that war should be declared, not so much because they were convinced by the arguments of the allies, as because they were afraid that the Athenians might attain to greater power, seeing that most parts of Greece were already under their hands.

89. For it was in the following manner that the Athenians were brought to those circumstances under which they increased their power. When the Medes had retreated from Europe after being conquered both by sea and land by the Greeks, and those of them had been destroyed who had fled with their ships to Mycale; Leotychides, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was the leader of the Greeks at Mycale, returned home with the allies that were from the Peloponnese; while the Athenians, and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, stayed behind, and laid siege to Sestos, of which the Medes were in possession. Having spent the winter before it, they took it, after the barbarians had evacuated it; and then sailed away from the Hellespont, each to his own city. And the people of Athens, when they found the barbarians had departed from their country, proceeded immediately to carry over their children and wives, and the remnant of their furniture, from where they had put them out of the way; and were preparing to rebuild their city and their walls. For short spaces of the enclosure were standing; and though the majority of the houses had fallen, a few remained; in which the grandees of the Persians had themselves taken up their quarters.

90. The Lacedæmonians, perceiving what they were about to do, sent an embassy [to them]; partly because they them-

selves would have been more pleased to see neither them nor any one else in possession of a wall; but still more because the allies instigated them, and were afraid of their numerous fleet, which before they had not had, and of the bravery they had shown in the Median war. And they begged them not to build their walls, but rather to join them in throwing down those of the cities out of the Peloponnese; not betraying their real wishes, and their suspicious feelings towards the Athenians; but representing that the barbarian, if he should again come against them, would not then be able to make his advances from any strong hold, as in the present instance he had done from Thebes; and the Peloponnese, they said, was sufficient for all, as a place to retreat into and sally forth from. When the Lacedæmonians had thus spoken, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, answered that they would send ambassadors to them concerning what they spoke of; and immediately dismissed them. And Themistocles advised them to send himself as quickly as possible to Lacedæmon, and having chosen other ambassadors besides himself, not to despatch them immediately, but to wait till such time as they should have raised their wall to the height most absolutely necessary for fighting from; and that the whole population in the city, men, women, and children, should build it, sparing neither private nor public edifice, from which any assistance towards the work would be gained, but throwing down every thing. After giving these instructions, and suggesting that he would himself manage all other matters there, he took his departure. On his arrival at Lacedæmon he did not apply to the authorities, but kept putting off and making excuses. And whenever any of those who were in office asked him why he did not come before the assembly,¹ he said that he was waiting for his colleagues; that owing to some engagement they had been left behind; he expected, however, that they would shortly come, and wondered that they were not already there.

91. When they heard this, they believed Themistocles through their friendship for him; but when every one else²

¹ Or, "about his not coming," according to Arnold, who objects to the common mode of explanation, by understanding *διδ* before *ἔτι*.

² i. e. those who came from Athens, and could therefore speak to the fact. *Κατηγορούντων* is thought by some to mean, "charging him with the fact;" but with that signification it would require a genitive case after it, (e. g. ch. 95. 7.) and as none is expressed, I have preferred taking it in the more general sense.

came and distinctly informed them that the walls were building, and already advancing to some height, they did not know how to discredit it. When he found this, he told them not to be led away by tales, but rather to send men of their own body who were of good character, and would bring back a credible report after inspection. They despatched them therefore; and Themistocles secretly sent directions about them to the Athenians, to detain them, with as little appearance of it as possible, and not to let them go until they themselves had returned back; (for by this time his colleagues, Abronychus, the son of Lysicles, and Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, had also come to him with the news that the wall was sufficiently advanced;) for he was afraid that the Lacedæmonians, when they heard the truth, might not then let them go. So the Athenians detained the ambassadors, as was told them; and Themistocles, having come to an audience of the Lacedæmonians, then indeed told them plainly that their city was already walled, so as to be capable of defending its inhabitants; and if the Lacedæmonians or the allies wished to send any embassy to them, they should in future go as to men who could discern what were their own and the general interests. For when they thought it better to abandon their city and to go on board their ships, they said that they had made up their minds, and had the courage to do it, without consulting *them*; and again, on whatever matters they had deliberated with them, they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment. And so at the present time, likewise, they thought it was better that their city should have a wall, and that it would be more expedient for their citizens in particular, as well as for the allies in general; for it was not possible for any one without equal resources to give any equal or fair advice for the common good. Either all therefore, he said, should join the confederacy without walls, or they should consider that the present case also was as it ought to be.

92. The Lacedæmonians, on hearing this, did not let their anger appear to the Athenians; (for they had not sent their embassy to obstruct their designs, but to offer counsel, they said, to their state;¹ and besides, they were at that time on very friendly terms with them owing to their zeal against the

¹ Or, as the scholiast explains it, "for the good of their state;" which is adopted by Arnold.

Mede;) in secret, however, they were annoyed at failing in their wish. So the ambassadors of each state returned home without any complaint being made.

93. In this way the Athenians walled their city in a short time. And the building still shows even now that it was executed in haste; for the foundations are laid with stones of all kinds, and in some places not wrought together, but as the several parties at any time brought them to the spot: and many columns from tombs, and wrought stones, were worked up in them. For the enclosure of the city was carried out to a greater extent on every side; and for this reason they hurried on the work, removing every thing alike. Themistocles also persuaded them to build the remaining walls of the Piræus, (they had been begun by him before, at the time of his office as archon, which he had held for a year over the Athenians,) thinking that the site was a fine one, as it contained three natural harbours; and that by becoming a naval people they would make a great advance towards the acquisition of power. For he was the first who ventured to tell them that they must apply closely to the sea; and he began immediately to assist in paving the way for their empire. It was by his advice that they built the walls of that thickness which is still seen round the Piræus; for two waggons meeting each other brought up the stones. And in the inside there was neither rubble nor mortar, but large and square-cut stones wrought together, cramped on the outside with iron and lead. But only about half of the height he intended was finished. For he wished by their great dimensions and thickness to keep off the attacks of their enemies; and thought that the protection of a few, and those the least efficient troops, would be sufficient, while the rest would go on board their ships. For to the navy he paid the greatest attention; seeing, I suppose, that the approach of the king's forces against them was easier by sea than by land: and he considered the Piræus more serviceable than the upper city, and often advised the Athenians, in case of their ever being hard pressed by land, to go down into it, and defy the world with their navy. Thus then the Athenians were enclosed with walls, and began to furnish themselves with other buildings immediately after the retreat of the Medes.

94. Now Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, was sent out

from Lacedæmon as general of the Greeks with twenty ships from the Peloponnese; there sailed with him also the Athenians with thirty ships, and a large number of the other allies. And they made an expedition against Cyprus, and subdued the greater part of it; and afterwards against Byzantium, of which the Medes were in possession, and reduced it during this period of his command.

95. But when he was now acting with violence, the rest of the Greeks were offended, and especially the Ionians, and such as had lately been liberated from the king; and going to the Athenians, they begged them to become their leaders, on the ground of their relationship; and not to overlook it in Pausanias, if in any case he should treat them with violence. The Athenians received their proposals, and attended to them with a determination not to overlook it, and to settle all other matters as might seem best to them. At this time the Lacedæmonians sent for Pausanias, to bring him to account for what they had heard of him; for many charges were brought against him by the Greeks who came to them; and it appeared to be an imitation of a tyranny, rather than the command of a general. It happened that he was summoned at the very time the allies, through their hatred of him, went over and ranged themselves with the Athenians, except the soldiers from the Peloponnese. So when he came to Lacedæmon, he was censured for the wrongs he had done to any one individually; but was acquitted, as not guilty, on the heaviest charges. (He was especially accused of medizing, and it appeared to be most clearly established.) Him they sent out no more as commander, but Dorcis and some others with him, with no great number of troops; but the allies would no longer give up the command to them. On finding this, they returned; and the Lacedæmonians sent out no others after them; fearing that they might find those who went abroad becoming corrupted, just as they saw in the case of Pausanias; and also because they wished to be rid of the Median war, and considered the Athenians competent to take the lead, and well disposed towards themselves at that time.

96. The Athenians having in this way succeeded to the command at the wish of the allies, owing to their hatred of

¹ Literally, "much guilt was laid to his charge."

Pausanias, arranged which of the states were to furnish money against the barbarian, and which of them ships: for their pretext was to avenge themselves for what they had suffered, by ravaging the king's country. And the office of treasurers-of-Greece was then first established by the Athenians; who received the tribute, for so the contribution-money was called. The first tribute that was fixed was 460 talents. Their treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were held in the temple.

97. Now they led the allies at first as possessing independence, and deliberating in common councils; and executed, both in the field and in their administration of affairs, between this war and the Median, the following undertakings; which were achieved by them against the barbarian, and against their own innovating allies, and those of the Peloponnesians who from time to time came in contact with them in each matter. I have written an account of these events, and made this digression from my history, because this subject was omitted by all before me; who either wrote the history of Greece before the Median war, or of that war itself: and Hellanicus, who *did* touch on them in his Attic history, mentioned them but briefly, and not accurately with regard to their chronology. Besides, they also afford¹ an opportunity of showing in what manner the empire of the Athenians was established.

98. In the first place, Eion on the Strymon, of which the Medes were in possession, was taken by them after a siege, and reduced to slavery, under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades. In the next place, Scyros, the island in the Ægean Sea, which was inhabited by Dolopes, was reduced to slavery, and colonized by themselves. They had a war also with the Carystians, without the rest of the Eubœans joining in it; and in course of time they surrendered on conditions. With the Naxians, who had revolted,² they afterwards waged war, and reduced them after a siege; and this was the first

¹ For an explanation of *ἔχουσι*, in the sense which I have here given to it, see Gôller's note on I. 9. 2.

² This is perhaps too strong a term to use with reference to this early period of the Athenian sway, in which *ἀφίστασθαι* more properly signifies "standing aloof" (or "retiring") "from the confederacy." I have used it, however, for the sake of uniformity; and especially as it is impossible to fix on any particular part of the history, at which the original verb and its cognate substantive began to be used in the more definite and full meaning which they had gradually acquired.

'allied city that was subjugated contrary to the agreement; then the rest, as each happened.

99. Now there were other reasons for the revolts, but the principal were arrears of tribute and ships, and failing (if any did so) in military service: for the Athenians strictly exacted these things, and were offensive, by using compulsion to men who were neither accustomed nor willing to do hard work. In some other respects also they were no longer liked in their government, as they had been; and while they did not join in the service on an equal footing, at the same time it was easy for them to bring to subjection those who revolted. And for this the allies themselves were to blame; for owing to this aversion to expeditions, the greater part of them, to avoid being away from home, agreed to contribute money instead of ships as their quota of the expense; and so the fleet of the Athenians was increased from the funds which they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, found themselves unprepared and inexperienced for war.

100. After this was fought the battle at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, both by land and sea, between the Athenians and their allies and the Medes; and the Athenians were victorious in both engagements on the same day, under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades; and took and destroyed in all two hundred triremes of the Phœnicians. Some time after it happened that the Thasians revolted from them, having quarrelled about the marts on the opposite coast of Thrace and the mine of which they were in possession. And the Athenians, having sailed with their fleet to Thasos, gained the victory in a sea-fight, and made a descent on their land. About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens and the allies to the Strymon, to colonize what was then called the Nine Ways, but now Amphipolis; and they made themselves masters of the Nine Ways, which was held by the Edones; but having advanced into the interior of Thrace, were cut off at Drabescus, a town of the Edones, by the united Thracians, by whom the settlement of the town of Nine Ways was regarded with hostility.

101. The Thasians, having been conquered in some engagements, and being invested, called the Lacedæmonians to their aid, and desired that they would assist them by invading Attica. They promised to do so, without letting the Atheni-

ans know, and intended it ; but were prevented by the earthquake which took place ; on which occasion also they saw the Helots, and the Thurians and Cetheans amongst the *Periæci*,¹ establish themselves in revolt at Ithome.² Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old Messenians who were enslaved at that time [with which all are acquainted³] : and for this reason the whole body of them were called Messenians. A war then was commenced by the Lacedæmonians against those in Ithome : and the Thasians in the third year of the siege came to terms with the Athenians, throwing down their wall, and delivering up their ships, and agreeing both to pay immediately the sum of money required, and to pay tribute in future, and surrendering their mainland towns and the mine.

102. The Lacedæmonians, when they found the war against those in Ithome prolonged, called other allies to their aid, and the Athenians also ; who went under the command of Cimon with no small force. They asked their aid, because they were considered to be skilful in conducting sieges : whereas in themselves, from the siege having been so protracted, there seemed to be a deficiency of this skill ; for else they would have taken the place by assault. It was from this expedition that the first open quarrel arose between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. For the Lacedæmonians, when the place was not taken by storm, fearing the boldness and innovating spirit of the Athenians—and moreover considering that they were of a different race from themselves—lest, if they remained, they might at the persuasion of those in Ithome attempt some revolution, dismissed them alone of all the allies ; not letting their suspicion appear, but saying that they were no longer in any need of them. The Athenians, however, knew that they were dismissed, not on the more creditable reason assigned, but from some suspicion having arisen : and considering it hard usage, and not thinking that they deserved to be so treated by the Lacedæmonians, immediately on their return they broke off the alliance which they had made with them against the Medæ, and became allies of the Argives, their enemies. The same oaths also were taken, and the same alliance made by both with the Thessalians.

¹ i. e. the inhabitants of the districts adjacent to the capital ; or the dependent Achaian population of Laconia in general, as distinct from their Dorian conquerors, the Spartans. For a fuller account of them see Arnold's note, and Appendix 2.

² See note on ch. 87. ³

³ These words, explanatory of the *τότε*, are adopted from Gölter.

103. Those in Ithome, in the tenth year, when they could hold out no longer, surrendered to the Lacedæmonians on condition of their going out of the Peloponnese under truce, and never setting foot on it again; and that if any one were caught doing so, he should be the slave of him who caught him. The Lacedæmonians had also before this a Pythian response made to them, "to let go the suppliant of Jupiter at Ithome." So they went out, themselves, and their children, and their wives; and the Athenians received them, on the strength of the hatred they now felt for the Lacedæmonians, and settled them at Naupactus, which they had lately taken from the Locri Ozolæ who held it. The Megareans also came over into alliance with the Athenians, having revolted from the Lacedæmonians, because the Corinthians were pressing them with war about the boundaries of their territory. And the Athenians received possession of Megara and Pegæ, and built for the Messenians the long walls from the city to Nisæa, and themselves manned them. And it was chiefly from this that their excessive hatred of the Athenians first began to be felt by the Corinthians.

104. Now Inarus, the son of Psammetichus, the Libyan king of the Libyans bordering on Egypt, having his headquarters at Maræa, the city above Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt from king Artaxerxes, and being himself made ruler of it, invited the Athenians to his aid. They, happening to be engaged in an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of the allies, left Cyprus and came to him; and having sailed up from the sea into the Nile, and being masters of the river and two-thirds of Memphis, proceeded to hostilities against the third division, which is called the White-castle, and in which were those of the Persians and Medes who had fled there for refuge, and those of the Egyptians who had not joined in the revolt.

105. The Athenians, having with their fleet made a descent on Haliaë, had a battle with the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and the Corinthians gained the victory. Afterwards the Athenians had a sea-fight with the fleet of the Peloponnesians off Cecryphalea, and the Athenians gained the victory. After this, war having been commenced by the Athenians on the Æginetans, a great sea-fight took place off Ægina, between

the Athenians and the Æginetans, and the allies were present on both sides; and the Athenians gained the victory, and having taken seventy of their ships, made a descent on the country, and besieged them, under the command of Leocrates, the son of Stræbus. Then the Peloponnesians, wishing to assist the Æginetans, sent over to Ægina three hundred heavy-armed, who were before auxiliaries of the Corinthians and Epidaurians. And the Corinthians with their allies seized the heights of Geranea, and marched down into the Megarid, thinking that the Athenians would be unable to succour the Megareans, while a large force was absent at Ægina and in Egypt; but that if they did assist them, they would raise the siege of Ægina. The Athenians, however, did not remove the army that was at Ægina, but the oldest and the youngest of those who had been left behind in the city came to Megara under the command of Myronides. After an indecisive battle had been fought with the Corinthians, they separated, each side thinking that they had not had the worst in the action. And the Athenians (for they notwithstanding¹ had the advantage rather [than their opponents]) on the departure of the Corinthians erected a trophy; but the Corinthians, being reproached by the elder men in the city, made preparations for about twelve days after, and went out and proceeded to set up a counter-trophy on their side also, as having been victorious. And the Athenians, having sallied out from Megara, cut to pieces those who were erecting the trophy, and engaged and defeated the rest.

106. The conquered forces commenced a retreat; and a considerable division of them, being hard pressed and having missed their way, rushed into a field belonging to a private person, which had a deep trench enclosing it, and there was no road out. The Athenians, perceiving this, hemmed them in with heavy-armed in front, and having placed their light-armed all round, stoned to death all who had gone in; and this was a severe blow for the Corinthians. The main body of their army returned home.

107. About this time the Athenians began also to build their long walls down to the sea, both that to Phalerus, and that to Piræus. And the Phocians having marched against

¹ i. e. notwithstanding the claim to it made by the Corinthians.

the Dorians, the mother-country of the Lacedæmonians, [whose towns were] Bœum, and Citinium, and Erineum, and having taken one of these places, the Lacedæmonians under the command of Nicomedes, the son of Cleombrotus, in the stead of Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was yet a minor, went to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their own, and ten thousand of the allies; and having compelled the Phocians to restore the town on certain conditions, they proceeded to return back. Now by sea, if they should wish to cross over the Crissæan Gulf, the Athenians were ready to stop them, having sailed round with a fleet: while the march over Geranea did not appear safe for them, as the Athenians were in possession of Megara and Pegæ. For Geranea was both [naturally] difficult to cross, and was continually guarded by the Athenians: and at that time they knew they were going to stop them that way, as well [as by sea]. So they determined to wait in Bœotia, and see in what way they might march across most safely. They were also in some measure urged to this in secret by certain of the Athenians, who hoped to put a stop to the democracy, and to the long walls that were building. But the Athenians sallied out against them with all their citizens, and a thousand Argives, and the several contingents of the other allies, amounting in all to fourteen thousand. They marched against them because they thought they were at a loss how to effect a passage, and in some measure also from a suspicion of the democracy being put down. The Athenians were also joined, in accordance with the treaty, by a thousand horse of the Thessalians, who went over during the action to the Lacedæmonians.

108. A battle having been fought at Tanagra in Bœotia, the Lacedæmonians and their allies were victorious, and there was much bloodshed on both sides. And the Lacedæmonians, after going into the Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees, returned back home across Geranea and the isthmus: while the Athenians, on the sixty-second day after the battle, marched, under the command of Myronides, against the Bœotians, and having defeated them in an engagement at Œenophyta, made themselves masters of the country of Bœotia and Phocis, and demolished the wall of the Tanagræans, and took from the Opuntian Locrians their richest hundred men

as hostages, and finished their own long walls. The Æginetans also after this surrendered on condition to the Athenians, demolishing their walls, and giving up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future. And the Athenians sailed round the Peloponnese under the command of Tolmides, the son of Tolmæus, and burnt the arsenal of the Lacedæmonians, and took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians in a battle during a descent which they made on their land.

109. The Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still remaining there, and hostilities assumed many different phases with them. For at first the Athenians were masters of Egypt; and the king sent Megabazus, a Persian, to Lacedæmon with a sum of money, that he might cause the recall of the Athenians from Egypt by the Peloponnesians being persuaded to invade Attica. But when he did not succeed, and the money was being spent to no purpose, Megabazus with the remainder of it went back to Asia; and he sent Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large force; who, having arrived by land, defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a battle, and drove the Greeks out of Memphis, and at last shut them up in the island of Prosopis, and besieged them in it a year and six months, till by draining the canal and turning off the water by another course, he left their ships on dry ground, and joined most of the island to the mainland, and crossed over and took it on foot.

110. Thus the cause of the Greeks was ruined, after a war of six years: and only a few of many marched through Libya and escaped to Cyrene, while most of them perished. So Egypt again came under the power of the king, excepting Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, whom they could not take owing to the extent of the fen; and besides, the marshmen are the most warlike of the Egyptians. As for Inarus, the king of the Libyans, who had concocted the whole business respecting Egypt, he was taken by treachery and crucified. Moreover, fifty triremes that were sailing to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the confederacy to relieve their former force, put in to shore at the Mendesian branch, knowing nothing of what had happened: and the land forces falling on them from the shore, and the fleet of the Phœnicians by sea, destroyed the greater part of the ships: the smaller

part escaped back. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt.

111. Now Orestes, son of Echekratidas, king of the Thes-salians, being banished from Thessaly, persuaded the Athe-nians to restore him: and taking with them the Bœotians and Phocians, who were their allies, the Athenians marched against Pharsalus in Thessaly. And they were masters of the country, as far as they could be so without advancing far from their camp,¹ (for the cavalry of the Thessalians kept them in check,) but did not take the city, nor succeed in any other of the designs with which they made the expedition; but they returned with Orestes without effecting any thing. Not long after this, one thousand Athenians having embarked in the ships that were at Pegæ, (for they were themselves in possession of that port,) coasted along to Sicyon, under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus, and landed, and defeated those of the Sicyonians who met them in battle. And immediately taking with them the Achæans, and sailing across, they turned their arms against Cœniadæ in Acarnania, and besieged it: they did not, however, take it, but returned home.

112. Subsequently, after an interval of three years, a truce for five years was made between the Peloponnesians and Athe-nians. So the Athenians ceased from prosecuting the war in Greece, but made an expedition against Cyprus with two hun-dred ships of their own and of the allies, under the command of Cimon; sixty of which sailed from them to Egypt, being sent for by Amyrtæus, the king in the marshes; while the rest besieged Citium. Cimon having died, and there being a dearth of provisions, they retired from Citium; and while sail-ing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought both by sea and land at the same time with the Phœnicians and Cilicians; and having conquered in both engagements, returned home, and with them the ships that had come back from Egypt. After this, the Lacedæmonians waged what is called the sacred war, and having taken possession of the temple at Delphi, gave it up to the Delphians: and the Athenians again afterwards, on their

¹ Literally, "from their *arms*," i. e. the place where their spears and shields were piled.—Arnold observes that *ὅσα μὴ*, like *ὅτι μὴ*, *ἄτε*, *οἶα*, &c., has grown by usage into a complete adverb, so as to have lost all the gram-matical construction which *ὅσα* would require as an adjective.

retiring, marched and took possession of it, and restored it to the Phocians.

113. Some time having elapsed after these things, the Bœotian exiles being in possession of Orchomenus, Chæronea, and some other places in Bœotia, the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides, son of Tolmæus, marched with one thousand heavy-armed of their own and the several contingents of the allies, against these places; for they were hostile to them. Having taken Chæronea, [and reduced it to slavery,¹] they were retiring, after placing a garrison in it. But as they were on their march, the Bœotian exiles from Orchomenus, and with them some Locrians and exiles of the Eubœans, and all that were of the same views, attacked them at Coronæa, and, having defeated them in battle, slew some of the Athenians, and took others of them alive. So the Athenians evacuated all Bœotia, having made peace on condition of recovering their men. And the exiles of the Bœotians were restored, and they and all the rest became independent again.

114. Not long after this, Eubœa revolted from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already crossed over to it with an army of Athenians, news was brought him that Megara had revolted; that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica; and that the Athenian garrison had been put to the sword by the Megareans, except as many as had escaped to Nisæa. Now the Megareans had revolted, after calling to their aid the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and Epidaurians. So Pericles took the army back from Eubœa as quickly as possible. After this the Peloponnesians made an incursion as far as Eleusis and Thrium, and ravaged the country, under the command of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians; and without advancing any farther they returned home. And the Athenians having again crossed over to Eubœa under the command of Pericles, subdued the whole of it, and settled the rest of the island by treaty; but the Histieans they expelled from their homes, and held the territory themselves.

115. Having returned from Eubœa, not long after they made a truce with the Lacedæmonians and their allies for thirty years, giving back Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, Achaia;

¹ Poppo and Gölter omit these words; Bekker and Arnold put them in brackets.

for of these places in the Peloponnese the Athenians were in possession. Now in the sixth year a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians about Priene; and the Milesians being worsted in the war went to the Athenians, and raised an outcry against the Samians; some private individuals from Samos itself taking part with them, from a wish to effect a revolution in the government. The Athenians therefore sailed to Samos with forty ships, and established a democracy; and taking as hostages from the Samians fifty boys and as many men, deposited them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in the island, withdrew. But the exiles of the Samians (for there were some who did not remain in the island, but fled to the continent) having made arrangements with the most powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with Pisuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had the satrapy of Sardis at that time, and having collected auxiliaries to the number of seven hundred, crossed over to Samos towards night, and in the first place rose up against the commons, and secured most of them; then, having secretly removed their hostages from Lemnos, they revolted, and gave up to Pisuthnes the garrison and its commanders that were with them, and immediately prepared to go against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them.

116. The Athenians, when they were aware of it, sailed with sixty ships for Samos, but did not use sixteen of them (for some were gone towards Caria to look out for the Phœnician fleet; others towards Chios and Lesbos, carrying about orders to bring reinforcements); with forty-four, however, under the command of Pericles and nine others, they fought a battle near the island of Tragia with seventy ships of the Samians, twenty of which were transports, (they all happened to be sailing from Miletus,) and the Athenians were victorious. Afterwards there came to them a reinforcement of forty ships from Athens, and five and twenty from Chios and Lesbos; and when they had disembarked, and had the superiority in land forces, they invested the city with three walls, and blockaded it by sea at the same time. Then Pericles took sixty ships of the blockading squadron, and went as quickly as possible in the direction of Caunus and Caria, news having been brought that the Phœnician fleet was sailing against them: for there had also gone from Samos

Stesagoras and some others with five ships to fetch those of the Phœnicians.

117. At this time the Samians, having suddenly sallied out, fell on the unprotected camp, and destroyed the guard-ships, and in a sea-fight defeated those that put out against them, and were masters of the sea along their coasts about fourteen days, carrying in and out what they pleased. But on the arrival of Pericles they were again closely blockaded by the fleet. Afterwards there came reinforcements, of forty ships with Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, from Athens, and of thirty from Chios and Lesbos. Against these the Samians fought a short battle by sea, but being unable to hold out, were reduced in the ninth month, and surrendered on conditions; dismantling their wall, and giving hostages, and delivering up their ships, and agreeing to pay back by instalments the expenses of the war. The Byzantines also agreed to be subject as before.

118. After these things, though not many years later, what we have before narrated now took place, namely, the affair of Corcyra, and that of Potidæa, and whatever was made a pretext for this war. All these things that the Greeks performed against one another and the barbarian, occurred in about fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war: in the course of which the Athenians established their empire on a firmer footing, and themselves advanced to a great pitch of power; while the Lacedæmonians, though they perceived it, did not try to stop them, except for a short time, but remained quiet the greater part of the period. For even before this they were not quick in proceeding to hostilities, unless they were compelled; and to a certain extent also they were hindered by intestine wars;¹ until the power of the Athenians was clearly rising to a dangerous height, and they were encroaching on their confederacy. Then, however, they considered it no longer endurable, but were of opinion that they ought with the greatest resolution to attack their power, and overthrow it, if they could, by commencing this war. Now the Lacedæmonians themselves had decided that the treaty had been broken, and that the Athenians were guilty; but they sent to Delphi,

¹ He seems to refer especially to the revolt of the Helots.

and inquired of the god, whether it would be better for them if they went to war : and he answered them, as it is reported, that if they carried on the war with all their might, they would gain the victory ; and said that he would himself take part with them, whether called upon or not.

119. Still they wished to summon the allies again, and put it to the vote, whether they should go to war. When the ambassadors had come from the confederates, and an assembly had been held, the others said what they wished, most of them accusing the Athenians, and demanding that war should be declared ; and the Corinthians, who had even before begged them each separately, state by state, to vote for the war—being afraid for Potidæa, lest it should be destroyed first—and who were present then also, came forward last, and spoke as follows :

120. " We can no longer, allies, find fault with the Lacedæmonians, as not having both themselves voted for war, and now brought us together for this purpose :¹ [though we should have blamed them if they had not done so]. For it is the duty of leaders, while they conduct their private affairs on a footing of equality, to provide for the interests of all ; as they are also in other respects honoured above all. Now as many of us as have already had any dealings with the Athenians require no warning to beware of them ; but those who live more in the interior, and not in the high way of communication, ought to know, that if they do not defend those on the coast, they will find the carrying down of their produce [for exportation] more difficult, and the procuring again of those things which the sea affords to the mainland ; and they ought not to be indifferent judges of what is now said, as though it did not affect them, but to consider that some time or other, if they should sacrifice the towns on the coast, the danger would reach even to them ; and that they are now consulting for themselves no less [than for others]. And for this reason they ought not to shrink from passing to war instead of peace. For it is the part of prudent men, indeed, to remain quiet, should they not be injured ; but of brave men, when in-

¹ The γὰρ in the succeeding words, καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, refers to a suppressed sentence : " We cannot now blame them ; but had they acted differently, we should have had a right to blame them ; for those who command others should provide for the welfare of others."—*Arnold*.

jured, to go from peace to war; and when a good opportunity offers, to come to an understanding again from hostilities; and neither to be elated by their success in war, nor to brook injury through being charmed with the quiet of peace. For he who shrinks from this course for love of pleasure, would most quickly be deprived of the delights of indolence, for which he shrinks from it, should he remain quiet; and he who in war becomes grasping through success, does not reflect that he is buoyed up by a confidence that cannot be trusted. For many measures, though badly planned, have yet succeeded, through¹ the adversary being still worse advised; and still more have there been which, though seeming to be well arranged, have on the contrary come to a disgraceful issue. For no one² conceives his plans with [only] the same degree of confidence as he carries them out in action; but we form our opinions in security, [and therefore with assurance;] whereas we fail in action through fear.

121. "Now as for ourselves, we are at the present time preparing for war because we are injured, and have sufficient grounds of complaint; and when we have avenged ourselves on the Athenians, we will lay it down again in good time. And for many reasons it is likely that we should have the advantage; first, as we are superior in numbers and military experience; and secondly, as we all proceed with equal obedience to do what we are ordered. And for a fleet, in which they are so strong, we will equip one from the property we severally possess, and from the money at Delphi and Olympia; for by contracting a loan of that we shall be able, by means of higher pay, to rob them of their foreign sailors. For the power of the Athenians is mercenary, rather than native: but ours would be less exposed to this, as

¹ See note on I. 32. 3.

² I have followed Gölter's reading of *ὁμοία*; Arnold prefers *ὁμοῖα*, considering it as dependent on the two verbs *ἐνθυμεῖται* and *ἐπιτίθεται*. "What we speculate on in our expectations, and what we accomplish in our practice, are wholly different from each other." My chief reason for preferring the former interpretation is, that the article is only used with *πισ-ται*, and not with both nouns, as I think it usually is in other passages, where there is so marked an opposition between them: e. g. I. 71. 1. *οἱ δὲ τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ δίκαια πράσσουσιν, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ κ. τ. λ.* II. 11. 6. *χρὴ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ πολέμῳ, τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ θαρσαλίους στρατεύειν, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ δεδιότας παρασκευάζεσθαι.* Unless it is omitted in both cases, as I. 86. 5. *τὰς τῶν πολέμιων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ ἐπιτίθενται.* For other instances of *ὁμοίως* with the force here given to it, see note on ch. 35. 5.

it is strong in men more than in money. And by one victory [gained by us] in a sea-fight, in all probability they are ruined; but should they hold out, *we* too shall have more time for studying naval matters; and when we have put our skill on an equal footing with theirs, in courage we shall most certainly excel them. For the advantage which we possess by nature cannot be acquired by them through learning; whereas the superiority which they have in point of skill may be attained by us through practice. And to have money for this purpose, we will raise contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should not refuse to contribute it for their own slavery, while we would not spend it to be avenged on our enemies, and to save ourselves at the same time, and to avoid suffering by means of this very money,¹ through having it taken from us by them.

122. "We have also other ways of carrying on war, such as causing their allies to revolt, (which is the most effectual mode of taking from them the revenues in which they are so strong,) and² raising works to annoy their country; with other things which one could not now foresee. For war least of all things proceeds on definite principles, but adopts most of its contrivances from itself to suit the occasion: in the course of which he that deals with it with good temper is more secure; while he that engages in it with passion makes the greater failure. Let us reflect also, that if we were severally engaged in [only] quarrels with our equals about boundaries of territory, it might be borne: but as it is, the Athenians are a match for us all together, and still more powerful against single states; so that unless all in a body, and nation by nation, and city by city, with one mind we defend ourselves against them, they will certainly subdue us without trouble, when divided. And as for defeat, though it may be a terrible thing for any one to hear of, let him know that it brings nothing else but downright slavery: which is disgraceful for the Peloponnese to be even

¹ i. e. as it would be made the instrument of Athenian tyranny, if by submission they allowed them to take it from them. Or, "on this very point of money," as Arnold renders it.

² See ch. 142. 3, where Pericles mentions the two different methods of *ἑπαισιχόρις*, "the one," as Arnold explains it, "by founding a city in the neighbourhood of Athens, strong enough to interfere with her trade, and be a check upon her power, *πόλις ἀντίπαλον*; the other by merely raising one or two forts in Attica, as strong-holds for plundering parties to keep the country in constant annoyance and alarm."

mentioned as contingent, and for so many cities to be ill-treated by one. In that case we should appear either to be justly treated, or to put up with it through cowardice, and to show ourselves inferior to our fathers, who liberated Greece; whereas *we* do not even secure this liberty for ourselves, but allow a tyrant state to set itself up amongst us, though we think it right to put down monarchs in any one state. And we do not know how this conduct is cleared of three of the greatest evils, folly, or cowardice, or carelessness. For you certainly have not escaped¹ these by betaking yourselves to that contempt of your foes, which has injured far more than any thing else; and which, from ruining so many, has been called by the opposite name of senselessness.

123. "With regard then to what has been done before, why need we find fault with it at greater length than is expedient for what is doing now? But with respect to what will be hereafter, we must labour for it by supporting what is present; for it is our hereditary custom to acquire virtues by labours; and you must not change the fashion, if you have a slight superiority now in wealth and power; (for it is not right that what was won in want should be lost in abundance;) but must go to the war with good courage on many grounds; since the god has commanded it, and promised to take part with you himself; while the rest of Greece will all join you in the struggle, some for fear, and some for interest. Nor will you be the first to break the treaty; for even the god himself considers it to have been violated, since he orders you to go to war; but you will rather come to its support after it has been wronged: for the breakers of it are, not those who defend themselves, but those who were the first aggressors.

124. "So then, since on every ground you have good reason for going to war, and since we all in common recommend this, inasmuch as it is most certain that this is expedient both for states and individuals [in our league]; do not defer to assist the Potidæans, who are Dorians, and are besieged by Ionians, (the contrary of which used formerly to be the case,) and to

¹ Or, "for surely you have not, through a wish to escape these imputations, betaken yourselves," &c. "The play on the words *καταφρόνησις* and *αφροσύνη*," says Arnold, "can hardly be preserved in English: 'A sense of your adversaries' inferiority is so fatal a feeling to those who entertain it, that it more fitly deserves to be called *nonsense*.'"

vindicate the liberty of the rest ; since it is no longer possible for them to wait,¹ while some are already injured, and others will be treated in the same way not much later, if we shall be known to have come together, but not to dare to avenge ourselves : but considering, allies, that we have reached a point of necessity, and, moreover, that what is mentioned is the best course, vote for the war ; not being afraid of the immediate danger, but setting your hearts on the more lasting peace that will result from it. For it is by war that peace is rendered the more stable ; but to refuse to pass from a state of quiet to one of war is not equally free from danger. Being of opinion then that the tyrant state which has set itself up in Greece, has set itself up against all alike, so that it already rules over some, and is designing to rule over others, let us go against it and reduce it ; and live ourselves free from danger in future, and give freedom to the Greeks who are now enslaved." To this effect spoke the Corinthians.

125. The Lacedæmonians, after they had heard from all what they thought, put the question to the vote of all the allies who were present in succession, both to greater and smaller states alike : and the majority voted for war. But though they had resolved on it, it was impossible to take it in hand immediately, as they were unprepared ; but it was determined that suitable means should be provided by the several states, and that there should be no delay. A year, however, did not pass while they were settling all that was necessary, but less, before they invaded Attica, and openly proceeded to the war.

126. During this time they were sending ambassadors to the Athenians with complaints, in order that they might have as good a pretext as possible for the war, in case they should not listen to them. In the first place the Lacedæmonians sent ambassadors, and ordered the Athenians to drive out the pollution of the goddess ; which pollution was of the following nature. There was one Cylon, a man who had conquered at the Olympic games, an Athenian of the olden time, both noble and powerful ; he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, who at that time was tyrant of

¹ The participle *περιμένοντας* refers to the whole body of the confederates, which is afterwards represented in two divisions by the use of the article with *μὲν* and *δέ*.

Megara. Now when Cylon was consulting the oracle at Delphi, the god told him to seize on the Acropolis of the Athenians during the greatest feast of Jupiter. So having received a force from Theagenes, and persuaded his friends to it, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnese came on, he seized the Acropolis with a view to establishing a tyranny; thinking that that was the greatest festival of Jupiter, and that it was a very proper time for *him*, as he had conquered at the Olympic games. But whether it was the greatest festival in Attica, or elsewhere, that had been alluded to, he neither stopped to consider, nor did the oracle express. For the Athenians also have a Diasian festival, which is called the greatest festival of Jupiter Milichius, held outside the city, in which all the people offer [something, though] many of them not victims, but country-offerings.¹ Thinking, however, that he understood it rightly, he took the business in hand. The Athenians, on perceiving it, ran in a body from the fields to resist them, and sitting down before the place besieged them. But as time went on, being tired out by the blockade, most of them went away, having commissioned the nine Archons to keep guard, and to arrange every thing with full powers, as they should consider best: for at that time the nine Archons transacted most of the state affairs. Now those who were besieged with Cylon were in a wretched condition for want of food and water. Cylon therefore and his brother made their escape, but when the rest were pressed hard, and some were even dying of famine, they seated themselves as suppliants on the altar of the Acropolis. And those of the Athenians who had been commissioned to keep guard, when they saw them dying in the temple, raised them up on condition of doing them no harm, and led them away and killed them; while some who were seated before the Awful Goddesses² they despatched on the altars at the side entrance. And from this both they and their descendants after them were called accursed of, and offenders against, the goddess. The Athenians therefore expelled these accursed ones, and Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian also expelled them subsequently,

¹ i. e. little figures of dough or paste made into the shape of the swine, or other animals, which they were too poor to offer.

² A title of the Furies peculiarly given to them at Athens, according to Pausanias, as that of *Euphrosides* was at Sicily—each 'per euphemismum.'

in conjunction with some Athenian partisans, both driving out the living, and taking up and casting out the bones of the dead. They returned, however, afterwards, and their descendants are still in the city.

127. This pollution then the Lacedæmonians ordered them to drive out; principally, as they professed, to avenge the honour of the gods; but really, because they know that Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, was connected with it on his mother's side, and thought that if he were banished, their business with the Athenians would more easily succeed. They did not, however, so much hope that he would be treated in that way, as that it would cause a prejudice against him in the city; from an idea that the war would in part be occasioned by his misfortune. For being the most powerful man of his time, and taking the lead in the government, he opposed the Lacedæmonians in every thing, and would not let the Athenians make concessions, but instigated them to hostilities.

128. The Athenians also, in return, commanded the Lacedæmonians to drive out the pollution of Tænarus. For the Lacedæmonians having formerly raised up some suppliants of the Helots from the temple of Neptune at Tænarus, led them away and slew them: and for this they think they were themselves also visited with the great earthquake at Sparta. They likewise ordered them to drive out the curse of Minerva of the Brazen-House; which was of the following kind. When Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, after being sent for by the Spartans for the first time from his command in the Hellespont, and brought to trial, was acquitted by them as not guilty, he was not sent out again in a public capacity; but in a private capacity, of his own accord, he took a trireme of Hermione, without the authority of the Lacedæmonians, and came to the Hellespont; nominally, to join in the war of the Greeks; but really, to carry out his measures with the king; which he had undertaken, in the first instance, from a desire of sovereignty over Greece. Now it was from the following fact that he first established a claim for service with the king, and made a commencement of the whole business. Having taken Byzantium when he was there before, after the return from Cyprus, (the Medes were in possession of it, and some connexions and relations of the king were taken in it,) on that occasion he sent back to the king those whom he had taken, not letting the other allies know;

but giving out that they had escaped from him. This he managed in concert with Gongylus the Eretrian, to whom he had committed Byzantium and the prisoners. He also sent Gongylus with a letter to him; in which, as was afterwards discovered, the following was written: "Pausanias, the general of Sparta, wishing to oblige thee, sends these men back to thee, after taking them in war. And I make a proposal, if thou also art pleased with it, that I should marry thy daughter, and make Sparta and the rest of Greece subject to thee. And I think that I am able to do this in concert with thee. If then any of these proposals please thee, send a trustworthy man to the sea, through whom in future we will confer."

129. Such was the purport of the writing; and Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and sent Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, to the sea, and ordered him to succeed to the satrapy of Dascylium, superseding Megabates, who was governor before; and gave him a letter in answer, to send over as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzantium, and to show him the seal; and whatever message Pausanias should send him on his own affairs, to execute it in the best and most faithful manner possible. On his arrival he did every thing as had been told him, and also sent over the letter; the following being written in reply to him: "Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom thou hast saved from Byzantium, and sent over the sea to me, there is laid up for thee in our house¹ [the record of] a benefit registered for ever; and I am also pleased with thy proposals. And let neither night nor day stop thee, that thou shouldst be remiss in doing any of the things which thou hast promised me: neither let them be impeded by outlay of gold or silver, nor by number of troops, whithersoever there is need of their coming; but in conjunction with Artabazus, an honourable man, whom I have sent to thee, fear not to promote both my interest and thine own, as shall be most creditable and advantageous for both."

130. On the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, though he was even before held in high repute by the Greeks for his generalship at Platæa, was then much more exalted; and could no longer live in the ordinary style, but went out of Byzan-

¹ For other instances of this custom, see Herodotus V. 11. and VIII. 85., and the book of Esther, ch. vi. According to Herodotus, the name by which persons so registered were called was "Orosangæ," or "benefactors."

tium clothed in a Median dress ; and when he went through Thrace, Medes and Egyptians formed his body-guard ; and he had a Persian table laid for him, and could not conceal his purpose, but betrayed beforehand by trifling actions what he intended to practise in future on a larger scale. He also made himself difficult of access, and indulged such a violent temper towards all, that no one dared to approach him ; and this was none of the least reasons why the confederates went over from him to the Athenians.

131. The Lacedæmonians, on becoming acquainted with it, recalled him the first time on this very account ; and when he went out the second time in the vessel of Hermione, without their orders, and appeared to be acting in this way, and did not return to Sparta when forcibly driven out from Byzantium by the Athenians after a siege, but news came of his being settled at Colonæ in the Troad, and intriguing with the barbarians, and making his stay there for no good ; under these circumstances they waited no longer, but the ephors sent a herald and a *scytale*,¹ and told him not to leave the herald, else that they declared war against him. Wishing to be as little suspected as possible, and trusting to quash the charge by means of money, he proceeded to return the second time to Sparta. And at first he was thrown into prison by the ephors, (for the ephors have power to do this to the king,) but afterwards, having settled the business, he subsequently came out, and offered himself for trial to those who wished to examine into his case.

132. Now the Spartans had no clear proof, neither his enemies nor the state at large, on which they could safely rely in punishing a man who was of the royal family and at present holding an honourable office ; (for as his cousin and guardian, he was regent for Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was king and at present a minor ;) but by his contempt of the laws, and imitation of the barbarians, he gave room for many suspicions of his not wishing to be content with things as they were. And they reviewed his other acts, in whatever on any occasion he had lived beyond the established usages ; and

¹ The *scytale* was a staff used at Sparta as a cipher for writing despatches. A strip of paper was rolled alantwise round it, on which the despatches were written lengthwise, so that when unrolled they were unintelligible ; commanders abroad had one of like thickness, round which they rolled these papers, and so were able to read the despatches.

especially, that on the tripod at Delphi, which the Greeks dedicated as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, he had formerly on his own individual responsibility presumed to have the following distich inscribed :—

“The Greek Pausanias, victor o’er the Mede,
To Phœbus this memorial decreed.”

This distich then the Lacedæmonians at the very time erased from the tripod, and engraved by name all the cities that had joined in overthrowing the barbarian, and had dedicated the offering. This, however, was considered to be an act of guilt in Pausanias; and since he had put himself in his present position, it appeared to have been done in much closer keeping with his present views. They also heard that he was tampering with the Helots; and it was the fact too; for he was promising them liberation and citizenship, if they would join in an insurrection, and in carrying out the whole of his plan. But not even then did they think right to¹ believe even any of the Helots [themselves] as informers, and to proceed to any great severity against him; acting according to the custom which they usually observe towards their own citizens, not to be hasty in adopting any extreme measure in the case of a Spartan without unquestionable evidence: until a man of Argilus, it is said, who was about to carry to Artabazus the last letter for the king, and who had before been his favourite and very much trusted by him, gave information to them; having been alarmed at a thought which struck him, that none of the messengers before him had hitherto come back again; and so, having counterfeited the seal, in order that if he were mistaken in his surmise, or if Pausanias should ask to make some alteration in the writing, he might not discover it, he opened the letter, and found written in it—having suspected² some additional order of the kind—directions to put *him* also to death.

133. Then, however, the ephors, on his showing them the letter, gave greater credence to it; but still wished to be ear-witnesses of Pausanias’ saying something. When therefore,

¹ Or, “even though they believed some of the Helots who had informed against him.”

² Προσεπιστάλθαι. The same verb occurs with the same force of the *πρὸς*, II. 85. 6, πῶ δὲ κομίζοντι αὐτὰς προσεπίστευαν ἐς Κρήτην πρῶτον ἀφικέσθαι.

from a concerted plan, the man had gone to Tænarus¹ as a suppliant, and had built himself a hut, divided into two by a partition wall, in which he concealed some of the ephors; and when Pausanias came to him, and asked the reason for his becoming a suppliant, they heard all distinctly; while the man charged him with what had been written, and set forth the other particulars, one by one, saying that he had never yet endangered him at all in his services with respect to the king, yet had been, just like the mass of his servants, preferred to death; and Pausanias acknowledged these very things, and desired him not to be angry for what had happened, but gave him the security of raising him up from the temple, and begged him to go as quickly as possible, and not to put an obstacle in the way of his designs.

134. After hearing him accurately, the ephors then went away, and having now certain knowledge [of his guilt], were preparing to arrest him in the city. But it is said that when he was just going to be arrested in the street, from seeing the face of one of the ephors as he approached him, he understood for what purpose he was coming; and on another of them making a secret nod, and out of kindness showing him [their object], he set off running to the temple of Minerva of the Brazen-House, and reached his place of refuge first; for the sacred ground was near at hand. To avoid suffering from exposure to the open air, he entered a building of no great size, which formed part of the temple, and remained quiet in it. The ephors were at the moment distanced in the pursuit; but afterwards they took off the roof of the building; and having watched him in, and cut him off from egress, they barricaded the doors; and sitting down before the place, reduced him by starvation. When he was on the point of expiring in his present situation in the building, on perceiving it, they took him out of the temple while still breathing; and when he was taken out, he died immediately. They were going therefore to cast him, as they do malefactors, into the Cœadas; but afterwards they thought it best to bury him some where near. But the god at Delphi subsequently ordered the Lacedæmonians to remove the tomb to where he died, (and he now lies

¹ i. e. to the temple of Neptune on the promontory of Tænarus, which enjoyed the privileges of an asylum, or sanctuary.

in the entrance to the sacred ground, as monumental columns declare in writing;) and as what had been done was a pollution to them, he ordered them to give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen-House. So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute for Pausanias.

135. The Athenians then, inasmuch as the god himself had decided this to be a pollution, retorted by commanding the Lacedæmonians to drive it out.—Now the Lacedæmonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians, and charged Themistocles also as an accomplice in the medizing of Pausanias, as they discovered from the examinations in his case; and demanded that he should be punished with the same penalties. In compliance with this, (he happened to have been ostracised, and though he had a residence at Argos, used to travel about to the rest of the Peloponnese,) they sent with the Lacedæmonians, who were very ready to join in the pursuit, certain men who were told to bring him wherever they might fall in with him.

136. Themistocles, being aware of this beforehand, fled from the Peloponnese to Corcyra; for he had been a benefactor to that people. But when the Corcyræans alleged that they were afraid to keep him at the risk of incurring the enmity of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, he was carried over by them to the main-land opposite. And being pursued by those who had been appointed to the work, as they heard on inquiry in what direction he was going, he was compelled in a strait to stop at the house of Admetus, the king of the Molossians, who was not on friendly terms with him. He happened to be from home; but Themistocles, addressing himself as a suppliant to his wife, was instructed by her to take their child, and seat himself on the hearth. And when Admetus came not long after, he declared who he was, and begged him not to avenge himself on a banished man, for whatever he himself might have urged against any request of his to the Athenians; "for in that case he would receive evil from the king, when he was far his inferior in power; whereas it was the part of a noble nature to avenge itself on its equals [alone], and on fair terms. Besides, he had himself opposed the king with regard to some request merely, and not on a point of bodily safety: whereas *he*, if he gave him up,

(he mentioned by whom and for what he was being pursued,) would deprive him of security of life." The king, after hearing him, raised him up with his son (for so he was sitting with him, and this was the most prevailing mode of supplication).

137. And when the Athenians and Lacedæmonians came no long time after, he did not give him up; but as he wished to go to the king, sent him by land to the other sea, to Pydna, which was in Alexander's dominions. There he found a merchant vessel putting to sea for Ionia, and having gone on board, was carried by a storm to the armament of the Athenians, that was blockading Naxos. In his fear he told the master who he was, (for he was unknown to those in the vessel,) and on what account he was flying; and said, that if he did not save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a pecuniary consideration; that their only hope of safety lay in no one's leaving the vessel till the voyage could be continued; and that if he complied with his request, he would remember him with becoming gratitude. The master did so; and after lying out at sea off the naval encampment a day and a night, subsequently arrived at Ephesus. And Themistocles rewarded him by a present of money (for there came to him afterwards money from Athens, sent by his friends, and from Argos that which had been secretly laid up there): and having gone up the country with one of the Persians on the coast, he sent a letter to king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, who was lately come to the throne. The purport of the letter was this: "I Themistocles am come to thee, who have done most harm of all the Greeks to your house, as long as I was compelled to defend myself against thy father who had attacked me, but still far more good, when he was retreating in circumstances of safety to me, but of peril to him. And return for a benefit is owed me;" (he mentioned his sending to him from Salamis previous information of the retreat of the Greeks, and the non-destruction of the bridges at that time through his instrumentality, to which he falsely laid claim;) "and now I am come with power to do thee great good, being persecuted by the Greeks because of my friendship for thee. But I wish to wait a year, and then explain in person to thee the objects of my coming."

138. The king, it is said, approved of his plan, and told him to do so. During the time that he waited he learnt as much as he could of the Persian language, and the institutions

of the country; and having gone to him after the expiration of the year, he became an influential person with him, so as none of the Greeks had hitherto been, both on account of his previous reputation, and the hope which he suggested with regard to Greece, namely, that he would make it subject to him; but most of all, from his showing himself talented by actual proofs. For Themistocles was one who most clearly displayed the strength of natural genius, and was particularly worthy of admiration in this respect, more than any other man: for by his own talent, and without learning any thing towards it before, or in addition to it, he was both the best judge of things present with the least deliberation, and the best conjecturer of the future, to the most remote point of what was likely to happen. Moreover, the things which he took in hand he was also able to carry out; and in those in which he had no experience he was not at a loss ¹ to form a competent judgment. He had too the greatest foresight of what was the better course or the worse in what was as yet unseen. In a word, by strength of natural talent, and shortness of study, he was the best of all men to do ² off-hand what was necessary. He ended his life by disease; though some say that he purposely destroyed himself by poison, on finding that he was unable to perform what he had promised to the king. Now there is a monument to him in the Asiatic Magnesia, in the market-place; for he was governor of the country, the king having given him ³ Magnesia, which brought him in fifty

¹ "It should be remembered that τὸ κρίναι, or the common-sense judgment which men may pass upon subjects which are not within their own peculiar study or possession, was constantly distinguished amongst the Greeks from that full knowledge, whether theoretical or practical, which enables men not only to judge of things when done, but to do them themselves. See II. 40. 3. VI. 39. 1. And on this principle the people at large were considered competent judges of the conduct of their magistrates, though they might be very unfit to be magistrates themselves."—*Arnold*.

² Or, as *Arnold* renders it, "in determining on a moment's notice." "His wisdom was so little the result of study, that sudden emergencies did not perplex him, as they would those who, being accustomed to trust wholly to it, are called on at once to act without it."

³ i. e. the land-tax or rent which was paid by these towns to the king, and which amounted generally to the tenth part of the produce, was given by him to Themistocles to furnish him with these articles of his establishment. In addition to similar instances mentioned in *Arnold's* note, I may refer to *Xenophon*, *Hellen.* III. 1. 6. who informs us that *Eurysthenes* and *Procles*, descendants of the Spartan king, *Demaratus*, continued to possess *Pergamus*, *Teuthrania*, and *Halisarna*, the gift of the king of Persia to their exiled ancestor.

talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus for wine, (for it was considered more productive of wine than any other place at that time,) and Myus for provisions¹ in general. But his relations say that his bones were carried, by his own command, and laid in Attica without the knowledge of the Athenians; for it was not lawful to give them burial, as they were the bones of a man banished for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, who had been the most distinguished of all the Greeks in their day.

139. On the occasion then of their first embassy the Lacedæmonians gave orders to this effect, and received commands in return about driving out the accursed. But on going subsequently to the Athenians, they commanded them to raise the siege of Potidæa, and leave Ægina independent; and declared, most especially and distinctly of all, that there would be no war, if they rescinded the decree respecting the Megareans, in which it had been declared that they should not use the ports in the Athenian empire, or the Attic market. But the Athenians were neither disposed to obey them in the other points nor to rescind the decree; as they charged the Megareans with an encroaching cultivation of the consecrated and unenclosed land, and with receiving the run-away slaves. Finally, when the last ambassadors had come from Lacedæmon, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and mentioned none of the things which they usually had before, but simply this, "The Lacedæmonians are desirous that there should be peace; and there would be, if you were to leave the Greeks independent;" the Athenians called an assembly, and proposed the subject for their consideration, and resolved, once for all, to deliberate and answer respecting all their demands. And many others came forward and spoke, supporting both views of the question; both that they should go to war, and that the decree should not be an obstacle to peace, but that they should rescind it: and then came forward Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, the first man of the Athenians at that time, and most able both in speaking and acting, and advised them as follows.

¹ i. e. all additional articles of food, such as meat, fish, or vegetables, which were called by the common name of *ψρον*, in opposition to bread and wine, which were considered the main supports of human life.

140. "I always adhere to the same opinion, Athenians, that we should make no concessions to the Lacedæmonians; although I know that men are not persuaded to go to war, and act when engaged in it, with the same temper; but that, according to results, they also change their views. Still I see that the same advice, or nearly the same, must be given by me now as before; and I claim from those of you who are being persuaded to war, that you will support the common resolutions, should we ever meet with any reverse; or not, on the other hand, to lay any claim to intelligence, if successful. For it frequently happens that the results of measures proceed no less incomprehensibly than the counsels of man; and therefore we are accustomed to regard fortune as the author of all things that turn out contrary to our expectation. Now the Lacedæmonians were both evidently plotting against us before, and now especially are doing so. For whereas it is expressed in the treaty, that we should give and accept judicial decisions of our differences, and each side [in the mean time] keep what we have; they have neither themselves hitherto asked for such a decision, nor do they accept it when we offer it; but wish our complaints to be settled by war rather than by words; and are now come dictating, and no longer expostulating. For they command us to raise the siege of Potidæa, and to leave Ægina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Megareans; while these last envoys that have come charge us also to leave the Greeks independent. But let none of you think that we should be going to war for a trifle, if we did not rescind the decree respecting the Megareans, which they principally put forward, [saying,] that if it were rescinded, the war would not take place: nor leave in your minds any room for self-accusation hereafter, as though you had gone to war for a trivial thing. For this trifle involves the whole confirmation, as well as trial, of your purpose. If you yield to these demands, you will soon also be ordered to do something greater, as having in this instance obeyed through fear: but by

¹ "Furnishes you with an opportunity of confirming your resolution, while it tries it." It would confirm their resolution, and secure it against future attempts of the enemy, for the reason given two lines afterwards, ἀπισχυριστάμενοι δὲ γὰρ ἐς ἐν καταστήσασιν, κ. τ. λ. "Εἶμι here exactly agrees with Götter's explanation of it quoted in the note to c. 9. 2. "Ausam dat alicui rei."—*Arnold*.

resolutely refusing you would prove clearly to them that they must treat with you more on an equal footing.

141. "Henceforth then make up your minds, either to submit before you are hurt, or, if we go to war, as I think is better, on important or trivial grounds alike to make no concession, nor to keep with fear what we have now acquired; for both the greatest and the least demand from equals, imperiously urged on their neighbours previous to a judicial decision, amounts to the same degree of subjugation. Now with regard to the war, and the means possessed by both parties, that we shall not be the weaker side, be convinced by hearing the particulars. The Peloponnesians are men who ¹ cultivate their land themselves; and they have no money either in private or public funds. Then they are inexperienced in long and transmarine wars, as they only wage them with each other for a short time, owing to their poverty. And men of this description can neither ² man fleets nor often send out land armaments; being at the same time absent from their private business, and spending from their own resources; and, moreover, being also shut out from the sea: but it is super-abundant revenues that support wars, rather than compulsory contributions. And men who till the land themselves are more ready to wage war with their persons than with their money: feeling confident, with regard to the former, that they will escape from dangers; but not being sure, with regard to the latter, that they will not spend it before they have done; especially should the war be prolonged beyond their expectation, as [in this case] it probably may. For in one *battle* the Peloponnesians and their allies might cope with all the Greeks together; but they could not carry on a *war* against resources of a different description to their own; since they have no one board of council, so as to execute any measure with vigour; and all having equal votes, and not being of the same races, each forwards his own interest; for which reasons nothing generally is brought to completion. For some of them wish to avenge themselves as much as possible on some particular party; while others wish as little as possible to waste their own pro-

¹ Literally, "who work themselves;" in opposition to such as had slaves to work for them. The substantive *ἔργα*, and the verb *ἐργάζομαι*, are frequently used with especial reference to agricultural work, e. g. II. 72. 8.

² Göller repeats *ἐκπέμπειν* with *πληροῦντες*.

perty. And after being slow in coming together, it is but during a small part of the time that they look to any of the general interests, while during the greater part they are contriving for their own. And each individual does not imagine that he will do any harm by his own neglect, but thinks that it is the business of every one else too to look out for himself ; so that through the same idea being individually entertained by all, the common cause is collectively sacrificed without their observing it.

142. " Most of all will they be impeded by scarcity of money, while, through their slowness in providing it, they continue to delay their operations ; whereas the opportunities of war wait for no one. Neither, again, is their raising works against us worth fearing, or their fleet. With regard to the former, it were difficult even in time of peace to set up a rival city ; much more in a hostile country, and when we should have raised works no less against them : and if they build [only] a fort, they might perhaps hurt some part of our land by incursions and ¹ desertions ; it will not, however, be possible for them to prevent our sailing to their country and raising forts, and retaliating with our ships, in which we are so strong. For we have more advantage for land-service from our naval skill, than they have for naval matters from their skill by land. But to become skilful at sea will not easily be acquired by them. For not even have you, though practising from the very time of the Median war, brought it to perfection as yet ; how then shall men who are agriculturalists and not mariners, and, moreover, will not even be permitted to practise, from being always ² observed by us with many ships, achieve any thing worth speaking of ? Against a few ships observing them they might run the risk, encouraging their ignorance by their numbers ; but when kept in check by many, they will remain quiet ; and through not practising will be the less skilful, and therefore the more afraid. For naval service is a matter of art, like any thing else ; and does not admit of being practised just when it may happen, as a by-work ; but rather does not even allow of any thing else being a by-work to it.

¹ i. e. by harbouring the slaves and others who might go over to them.

² *ἰσχυροῦν* means properly "to lie at anchor, or take up a station, with a hostile purpose;" hence, "to observe the movements of an enemy, with a view to attack him;" or, frequently, "to blockade him."

143. " Even if they should take some of the funds at Olympia or Delphi, and endeavour, by higher pay, to rob us of our foreign sailors, that would be alarming, if we were not a match for them, by going on board ourselves and our resident aliens; but now this is the case; and, what is best of all, we have native steersmen, and crews at large, more numerous and better than all the rest of Greece. And with the danger before them, none of the foreigners would consent to fly his country, and at the same time with less hope of success to join them in the struggle, for the sake of a few days' higher pay. The circumstances of the Peloponnesians then seem, to me at least, to be of such or nearly such a character; while ours seem both to be free from the faults I have found in theirs, and to have other great advantages in more than an equal degree. Again, should they come by land against our country, we will sail against theirs; and ¹ the loss will be greater for even a part of the Peloponnese to be ravaged, than for the whole of Attica. For *they* will not be able to obtain any land in its stead without fighting for it; while *we* have abundance, both in islands and on the mainland. Moreover, consider it [in this point of view]: if we had been islanders, who would have been more impregnable? And we ought, as it is, with views as near as possible to those of islanders, to ² give up all thought of our land and houses, and keep watch over the sea and the city; and not, through being enraged on their account, to come to an engagement with the Peloponnesians, who are much more numerous; (for if we defeat them, we shall have to fight again with no fewer of them; and if we meet with a reverse, our allies are lost also; for they will not remain quiet if we are not able to lead our forces against them;) and we should make lamentation, not for the houses and land, but for the lives [that are lost]; for it is not these things that gain men, but men that gain these things. And if I thought that I should persuade you, I would bid you go out yourselves and ravage them, and show the Peloponne-

¹ Literally, "it will no longer be the same thing for some part of the Peloponnese to be ravaged, and for the whole of Attica."

² ἀφίημι is used in a similar sense by Sophocles, *Oed. Col.* 914.

ἂν τ' ἀφίης
τὰ τῆσδε τῆς γῆς κύρι', ὡδ' ἐπισπεῶν,
ἀγεις θ' ἀχρῆεις, καὶ παρίσταςαι βίη.

sians that you will not submit to them for these things, at any rate.

144. "I have also many other grounds for hoping that we shall conquer, if you will avoid gaining additional dominion at the time of your being engaged in the war, and bringing on yourselves dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans. But those points shall be explained in another speech at the time of the events. At the present time let us send these men away with this answer: that with regard to the Megareans, we will allow them to use our ports and market, if the Lacedæmonians also abstain from expelling foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies (¹for it forbids neither the one nor the other in the treaty): with regard to the states, that we will leave them independent, if we also held them as independent when we made the treaty; and when *they* too restore to the states a permission to be independent suitably to the interests,² not of the Lacedæmonians themselves, but of the several states, as they wish: that we are willing to submit to judicial decision, according to the treaty: and that we will not commence hostilities, but will defend ourselves against those who do. For this is both a right answer and a becoming one for the state to give. But you should know that go to war we must; and if we accept it willingly rather than not, we shall find the enemy less disposed to press us hard; and, moreover, that it is from the greatest hazards that the greatest honours also are gained, both by state and by individual. Our fathers, at any rate, by withstanding the Medes—though they did not begin with such resources [as we have], but had even abandoned what they had—and by counsel, more than by fortune, and by daring, more than by strength, beat off the barbarian, and advanced those resources to their present height. And we must not fall short of them; but must repel our enemies in every way, and endeavour to bequeath our power to our posterity no less [than we received it]."

145. Pericles spoke to this effect; and the Athenians,

¹ Arnold, after Hermann, understands *ἐκείνο* and *τὸδε* as accusatives, and supplies *τι* as the nominative case to *κωλύει*. Göller, after Haack, understands *κωλύει* as impersonal, "neither the one nor the other is a hindrance in the treaty."

² Compare chap. 19. 1. 76. 1.

thinking that he gave them the best advice, voted as he desired them, and answered the Lacedæmonians according to his views, both on the separate points, as he told them, and generally, that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to have their complaints settled by judicial decision, according to the treaty, on a fair and equal footing. So they went back home, and came on no more embassies afterwards.

146. These were the charges and differences that each side had before the war, beginning from the very time of the affairs at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless they continued to have intercourse during them, and to go to each other's country without any herald, though not without suspicion; for what was taking place served to break up the treaty, and was a pretext for war.

BOOK II.

1. THE war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and their respective allies now begins from this period, at which they ceased from further intercourse with each other without a herald, and having once proceeded to hostilities, carried them on continuously ; and the history of it is written in order, as the several events happened, by summers and winters.

2. For the thirty years' truce which was made after the reduction of Eubœa lasted fourteen years ; but in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood at Argos, and Ænesias was ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus had still two months to be archon at Athens ; in the sixth month after the battle at Potidæa, and in the beginning of spring, rather more than three hundred men of the Thebans, (led by Pythangelus, son of Phylidas, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, Bœotarchs,) about the first ¹ watch entered with their arms into Platæa, a town of Bœotia, which was in alliance with the Athenians. There were certain men of the Platæans who called them in, and opened the gates to them, namely, Naucrides and his party, who wished, for the sake of their own power, to put to death those of the citizens who were opposed to them, and to put the city into the hands of the Thebans. They carried on these negotiations through Eurymachus, the son of Leontiades, a very influential person at Thebes. For the Thebans, foreseeing that the war would take place, wished to surprise Platæa, which had always been at variance with them, while it was still time of peace, and the war had not openly broken out. And on this account, too, they entered the more easily without being observed, as no guard had been set before [the gates]. After piling their arms in the market-place, they did not comply with the wish of those who called them in by immediately setting to work, and going to the houses of their adversaries ; but determined

¹ Literally " first sleep."

to make a proclamation in friendly terms, and to bring the city to an agreement rather, and to friendship; and the herald proclaimed, that whoever wished to make alliance according to the hereditary principles of all the Bœotians, should come and ¹ pile his arms with them, supposing that the city would easily come over to them by this method.

3. The Platæans, on finding that the Thebans were within their walls, and that their city was unexpectedly taken, being very much alarmed, and thinking that far more had entered than really had, (for they did not see them in the night,) came to an agreement, and having accepted the terms, remained quiet; especially since they were proceeding to no violent measures against any one. But by some means or other, while making these negotiations, they observed that the Thebans were not numerous, and thought that by attacking them they might easily overpower them; for it was not the wish of the great body of the Platæans to revolt from the Athenians. They determined therefore to make the attempt; and proceeded to join each other by digging through the partition-walls [of their houses], that they might not be seen going through the streets; and set waggons without the cattle in the streets, to serve for a barricade; and got every thing else ready, as each seemed likely to be of service for the business in hand. When things were in readiness, as far as they could make them so, having watched for the time when it was still night and just about day-break, they began to go out of their houses against them; that ² they might not attack them by day-light, when they would be more bold, and on equal terms with themselves, but in the night, when they would be more timid, and fight at a disadvantage through their own acquaintance with the city. So they assailed them immediately, and came to close quarters with them as quickly as they could.

¹ "The Thebans, as usual on a halt, proceeded to pile their arms, and by inviting the Platæans to pile theirs with them, they meant that they should come in arms from their several houses to join them, and thus naturally pile their spears and shields with those of their friends, to be taken up together with theirs, whenever they should be required either to march or to fight." —*Arnold*. See his whole note.

² The original is rendered obscure by the singular change in the subjects of the two verbs, *προσφίρονται* and *γίγνυνται*; the former referring to the Platæans, the latter to the Thebans. I have allowed myself a little more licence than usual in translating the passage, to avoid the awkwardness of a literal version.

4. The Thebans, on finding themselves outwitted, proceeded to close their ranks, and repel their attacks, wherever they might fall upon them. And twice or thrice they beat them off; but afterwards, when the men were assailing them with a great clamour, and the women and slaves were raising a loud shouting and screaming from the houses, and pelting them with stones and tiles, and a violent rain also had come on in the night, they were frightened, and turned and fled through the city, the greater part of them, through the dark and dirt, (for the event happened at the end of the month,) being unacquainted with the ways out, by which they were to save themselves; while they had pursuers who were acquainted with them,¹ to prevent their escaping: so that many were put to death. Moreover, one of the Plateans had shut the gate by which they had entered, and which was the only one opened, by driving the spike of a spear into the bar, instead of a² bolt; so that there was no longer any way out even by that. As they were chased up and down the city, some of them mounted the wall and threw themselves over, and perished most of them: others came to a lone gate, and, a woman having given them an axe, cut through the bar without being observed, and went out, but in no great numbers, for it was quickly discovered; while others met their fate scattered about in different parts of the city. But the largest and most united body of them rushed into a spacious building which joined on to the wall, and the near door of which happened to be open, thinking that the door of the building was a gate [of the city], and that there was a passage straight through to the outside. When the Plateans saw them cut off, they consulted whether they should burn them where they were, by setting fire to the

¹ "Τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν." Poppo observes that the infinitive does not express a purpose, as it does elsewhere, but a result. Arnold supposes that "when thus added to sentences in the genitive case, it denotes properly neither an intended nor an unintended result, but simply a connexion, or belonging to, in the attached idea with respect to that which had preceded it. 'Having their pursuers well acquainted with the ways, which thing belonged to, or was connected with, their not escaping.'"

² "The βάλανος was a sort of pin or bolt inserted into the bar, and going through it into the gates. When driven quite home, it could of course only be extracted by a key whose pipe exactly corresponded to it in size, so as to take a firm hold on it: and hence the key was called βαλανάγρα, or catch-bolt, from its catching and so drawing out the βάλανος. The effect of putting in this spike was exactly that of spiking a cannon; it could not again be extracted, as there was no proper key to fit it."—Arnold.

building, or treat them in any other way. At last, both those and all the rest of the Thebans that were yet alive, and wandering up and down the city, agreed to deliver up themselves and their arms to the Plataeans, to do with them as they pleased. Thus then fared the party who were in Plataea.

5. The rest of the Thebans, who were to have joined them with all their forces while it was still night, in case those who had entered should be at all unsuccessful, on receiving on their march the tidings of what had happened, advanced to their succour. Now Plataea is seventy stades distant from Thebes, and the rain which had fallen in the night made them proceed the slower; for the river Asopus was flowing with a full stream, and was not to be crossed easily. So by marching through the rain, and having passed the river with difficulty, they arrived too late; as some of the men had been by this time slain, and others of them were kept alive as prisoners. When the Thebans learned what had happened, they formed a design against those of the Plataeans who were outside the city, (for there were both men and stock in the fields, inasmuch as the evil had happened unexpectedly in time of peace,) for they wished to have all they could take to exchange for their own men within, should any happen to have been taken alive. Such were their plans. But the Plataeans, while they were still deliberating, having suspected that there would be something of this kind, and being alarmed for those outside, sent out a herald to the Thebans, saying that they had not acted justly in what had been done, by endeavouring to seize their city in time of treaty; and told them not to injure what was without; else *they* also would put to death the men whom they had alive in their hands; but if they withdrew again from the territory, they would give the men back to them. The Thebans give this account of the matter, and say that they swore to it. But the Plataeans do not acknowledge that they promised to give back the men *immediately*, but when proposals had first been made, in case of their coming to any agreement: and they deny that they swore to it. ¹At any rate the Thebans retired from the ter-

¹ i. e. whichever of the two different statements was the more correct one. Such I think is generally the meaning of *δ' οὖν*; and I doubt whether it has not this force, I. 3. 5. *Οἱ δ' οὖν ὡς ἕκαστοι* "Ἕλληνες, κ. τ. λ. "Whatever truth there may be in the theory just stated, certainly the Greeks did nothing

ritory without having done any injury; but the Plataeans, after getting in as quickly as possible whatever they had in the country, immediately put the men to death. Those who had been taken were one hundred and eighty, and Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had negotiated, was one of them.

6. When they had done this, they sent a messenger to Athens, and gave back the dead to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged matters in the city to suit their present circumstances, as seemed best to them.—Now news had immediately been taken to the Athenians of what had been done with respect to the Plataeans; and they straightway seized as many of the Bœotians as were in Attica, and sent a herald to Plataea, with orders to forbid their proceeding to extremities, in the case of the Thebans whom they had in their hands, till *they* also should take counsel about them: for tidings of their being dead had not yet reached them. For the first messenger [of the Plataeans] had gone out at the very time of the entering of the Thebans; and the second, when they had just been conquered and taken: so that of the subsequent events they knew nothing. Thus then the Athenians were in ignorance when they sent their order; and the herald, on his arrival, found the men slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea, and brought in provisions, and left a garrison in it, and took out the least efficient of the men with the women and children.

7. When the business at Plataea had occurred, and the treaty had been clearly broken, the Athenians began to prepare for going to war; and so did the Lacedæmonians and their allies, both intending to send embassies to the king, and to the barbarians in other parts, from whatever quarter either party hoped to gain any assistance, and bringing into alliance with them such states as were not in their power. And ¹ on the side of the Lacedæmonians, in addition to the ships already on the spot in Sicily and Italy, belonging to those who had espoused their cause, they were ordered to build more according to the greatness of the cities, so that in the whole number

in one united body," &c. Thus it approaches more nearly in signification to γούν than to the simple οὖν, with which it generally seems to be regarded as synonymous. The tragedians very frequently use it in this manner. In other passages, however, it has the proper force of each particle, "and accordingly."

¹ For the construction of this obscure sentence see Arnold's note

they should amount to five hundred ; and to get ready a certain sum of money which was mentioned, while they remained quiet in other respects, and received the Athenians coming with a single ship, till these preparations should be made. The Athenians, on the other hand, were inspecting their present confederacy, and sending ambassadors to the countries more immediately around the Peloponnese, as Corcyra, Cephalenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus ; seeing that if these were firm friends to them, they would successfully carry on the war round the Peloponnese.

8. Indeed both parties had no small designs, but put forth their strength to the war : and not unnaturally ; for all men at the beginning apply themselves to it more eagerly ; and at that time the young men, being numerous in the Peloponnese, and also at Athens, were, through their inexperience, not unwilling to engage in the war. And the rest of Greece was all in excitement at the conflict of the principal states. And many¹ prophecies were repeated, and reciters of oracles were singing many of them, both amongst those who were going to war and in the other states. Moreover, Delos had been visited by an earthquake a short time before this, though it had never had a shock before in the memory of the Greeks ; and it was said and thought to have been ominous of what was about to take place. And whatever else of this kind had happened to occur was all searched up. The good wishes of men made greatly for the Lacedæmonians, especially as they gave out that they were the liberators of Greece. And every individual, as well as state, put forth his strength to help them in whatever he could, both by word and deed ; and each thought that the cause was impeded at that point at which he himself would not be present. So angry were the generality with the Athenians ; some from a wish to be released from their dominion, others from a fear of being brought under it. With such preparations and feelings then did they enter on the contest.

¹ Poppo, Bredow, and Haack agree in considering *λόγια* as a more general term for any prophetic announcement whatever, in opposition to *χρησμοί*, which were metrical compositions, generally in hexameters or trimeter iambs, delivered by an *oracle*, and recited by persons who collected them, and were called *χρησμολόγοι*. For a specimen of the class, see the *Birds* of Aristophanes, v. 960.

9. Each party had the following states in alliance when they set to the war. The allies of the Lacedæmonians were these : all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans (these were in friendship with both parties ; and the Pellenians were the only people of the Achæans that joined in the war at first, though afterwards all of them did) ; and without the Peloponnese, the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of these, the states which furnished a navy were the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians. Those that supplied cavalry were the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The rest of them sent infantry. This then was the Lacedæmonian confederacy. That of the Athenians comprehended the Chians, Lesbians, Platæans, the Messenians at Naupactus, the greater part of the Acarnanians, the Corcyreans, the Zacynthians : also some other states which were tributary amongst the following nations ; as the maritime parts of Caria, and Doris adjacent to it, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Greek towns Thrace-ward ; the islands, which were situated between the Peloponnese and Crete, towards the east,¹ and all the rest of the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyreans furnished a naval force, the rest of them infantry and money. Such was the confederacy on each side, and their resources for the war.

10. The Lacedæmonians, immediately after what had happened at Platæa, sent round orders through the Peloponnese and the rest of their confederacy, for the states to prepare an army and such provisions as it was proper to have for a foreign expedition, with a view to invading Attica. When they had each got ready by the appointed time, two thirds from every state assembled at the Isthmus. And after the whole army was mustered, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedæmonians, who led this expedition, summoned to his pre-

¹ I am inclined to think that *αι ἄλλαι Κυκλάδες* may signify the more westerly part of the group, in opposition to *πρὸς ἡλιον ἀνίσχονσα*. Otherwise Bloomfield's must be the only correct version ; "*namely, all the Cyclades,*" &c. The fact of both Melos and Thera being amongst the *most southerly* of all the islands seems entirely to overthrow Gölter's interpretation of the passage, which would refer *αι ἄλλαι Κυκλάδες* to the islands east of Greece Proper, in contradistinction to the Peloponnese and Crete.

sence the generals of all the states, and those highest in office and of most importance, and spoke to the following purport :

11. " Men of the Peloponnese and allies, both our fathers made many expeditions, as well in the Peloponnese as out of it, and the elder part of ourselves are not without experience in wars. Never yet, however, have we marched out with a greater force than this ; but we are now going against a most powerful state, and with a most numerous and most excellently equipped army on our own side. We ought then to show ourselves neither inferior to our fathers, nor degenerated from our own character. For the whole of Greece has its expectation raised, and is paying attention to this attack, with good wishes that we may succeed in our designs, through their hatred of the Athenians. Though, then, some may think that we are making the attack with superior numbers, and that it is very certain our adversaries will not meet us in battle, we must not, for this reason, go at all less carefully prepared ; but both the general and soldier of each state should, as far as concerns himself, be always expecting to come into danger. For the events of war are uncertain, and attacks are generally made in it with short notice, and under the impulse of passion ; frequently, too, has the less number, through being afraid, more successfully repelled the more numerous forces, through their being unprepared in consequence of their contempt. In the enemy's country indeed men ought always to march with boldness of feeling, but at the same time to make their actual preparations with a degree of fear ; for in this way they would be at once most full of courage for attacking their adversaries, and most secure against being attacked. But in our own case, we are not going against a state that is so powerless to defend itself, but against one most excellently provided with every thing ; so that we must fully expect that they will meet us in battle ; and if they have not already set out before we are there, yet [that they will do so], when they see us in their territory wasting and destroying their property. For all are angry, when suffering any unwonted evil, to see it done before their eyes, and in their very presence : and those who [on such provocation] reflect the least, set to work with the greatest passion [to avenge themselves]. And it is natural that the Athenians should do so even to a greater ex-

tent than others, since they presume to rule the rest of the world, and to go against and ravage their neighbours' land, rather than see their own ravaged. As then we are marching against a state of this description, and shall gain for our forefathers, as well as for ourselves, the most decided character, one way or the other, from the results ; follow where any one may lead you, valuing order and caution above every thing, and with quickness receiving your commands. For this is the finest and the safest thing that can be seen, for a large body of men to show themselves maintaining uniform discipline."

12. Having thus spoken, and dismissed the assembly, Archidamus first sent Melesippus son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens ; in case the Athenians might be more disposed to submit, when they saw that the Peloponnesians were now on their march. But they did not admit him into the city, nor to their assembly ; for the opinion of Pericles had previously been adopted, not to admit any herald with an embassy from the Lacedæmonians, when they had once marched out from their frontiers. They sent him back therefore before hearing him, and ordered him to beyond the borders that same day, and [to tell those who sent him] that in future, if they wished to propose any thing, they should send ambassadors after they had retired to their own territories. And they sent an escort with Melesippus, to prevent his holding communication with any one. When he was on the frontiers, and was about to be dismissed, he spoke these words and departed : " This day will be the beginning of great evils to Greece." When he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus found that the Athenians would not yet submit at all, he then set out and advanced with his army into their territory. At the same time, the Bœotians, while they furnished their contingent and their cavalry to join the Peloponnesians in their expedition, went to Platæa with the remainder of their force, and laid waste their land.

13. While the Peloponnesians were still assembling at the Isthmus, and were on their march, before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, who was general of the Athenians with nine colleagues, when he found that the invasion would take place, suspected that either Archidamus, because he happened to be his friend, might frequently pass over his

lands, and not ravage them, from a personal wish to oblige him ; or that this might be done at the command of the Lacedæmonians for the purpose of raising a slander against him—as it was also with reference to *him* that they had charged them to drive out the accursed ; and therefore he publicly declared to the Athenians in the assembly, that though Archidamus was his friend, he had not been admitted into his friendship for any harm to the state ; should, then, the enemy not lay waste his lands and houses, like those of the rest, he gave them up to be public property, and that no suspicion might arise against him on these grounds. He gave them advice also on their present affairs, the same as he had before given ; namely, to prepare for the war, and bring in their property from the country, and not go out against them to battle, but to come in and guard the city, and get ready their fleet, in which they were so strong, and keep the allies tight in hand ; reminding them that their main strength was derived from the returns of the money paid by these, and that most of the advantages in war were gained by counsel and abundance of money. And [on this head] he told them to be of good courage, as the state had, on an average, six hundred talents coming in yearly as tribute from the allies, not reckoning its other sources of income ; while there were still at that time in the Acropolis 6000 talents of coined silver ; (for the greatest sum there had ever been was 9700 talents, from which had been taken what was spent on the propylæa of the citadel, and the other buildings, and on Potidæa ;) and besides, of uncoined gold and silver in private and public offerings, and all the sacred utensils for the processions and games, and the Median spoils, and every thing else of the kind, there was not less than 500 talents. Moreover, he added the treasures in the ¹ other temples, to no small amount, which they would use ; and, in case of their being absolutely excluded from all resources, even the golden appendages of the goddess herself ; explaining to them that the statue contained 40 talents of pure gold, and that it was all removable ; and after using it for their preservation they must, he said, restore it to the same amount. With regard to money, then, he thus encouraged them. And as for heavy-armed troops, he told them that they had thirteen thousand, besides those in gar-

¹ i. e. besides the temple of Minerva, which was the public treasury.

risons and ¹on the ramparts to the number of sixteen thousand. For this was the number that kept guard at first, whenever the enemy made an incursion, drawn from the oldest and the youngest, and such of the resident aliens as were heavy-armed. For of the Phaleric wall there were five and thirty stades to the circuit of the city wall; and of that circuit itself the guarded part was three and forty stades; a certain part of it being unguarded, viz. that between ²the long wall and the Phaleric. There were also the long walls to the Piræus, a distance of forty stades, of which the outer one was manned; while the whole circumference of Piræus with Munychia was sixty stades, though the guarded part was only half that extent. Of cavalry, again, he showed them that they had twelve hundred, including mounted bowmen; with sixteen hundred bowmen [on foot], and three hundred triremes fit for service. These resources, and no fewer than these in their several kinds, had the Athenians, when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was first going to be made, and when they were setting to the war. Other statements also did Pericles make to them, as he was accustomed, to prove that they would have the superiority in the war.

14. The Athenians were persuaded by what they heard from him; and proceeded to bring in from the country their children and wives, and all the furniture which they used in their houses, pulling down even the wood-work of their residences; while they sent their sheep and cattle over to Eubœa and the adjacent islands. But the removal was made by them with reluctance, from the greater part having always been accustomed to live in the country.

15. This had, from the very earliest times, been the case with the Athenians more than with others. For under Cecrops, and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus, ³the population of Athens had always inhabited independent cities, with their own guild-halls and magistrates; and at

¹ Literally, "soldiers to line a parapet," i. e. "for garrison duty."—Arnold.

² i. e. the Piræic wall, in opposition to the Phaleric. It is sometimes spoken of in the plural number, τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη, because an inner, or southern, wall was added to the original one by Pericles. See Arnold's and Göller's notes.

³ Or, "Attica had always been inhabited by a number of independent communities," or, "civil societies," as Arnold renders it.

such times as they were not in fear of any danger, they did not meet the king to consult with him, but themselves severally conducted their own government, and took their own counsel; and there were instances in which some of them even waged war [against him], as the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did against Erechtheus. But when Theseus had come to the throne, who along with wisdom had power also, he both regulated the country in other respects, and having abolished the council-houses and magistracies of the other cities, he brought them all into union with the present city, assigning them one guild-hall and one council-house; and compelled them all, while they enjoyed each their own property as before, to use this one city only; which, since all were counted as belonging to it, became great, and was so bequeathed by Theseus to those who came after him. And from that time even to this the Athenians keep, at the public expense, a festival to the goddess, called ¹ *Synæcia*. Before that time, what is now the citadel was the city, with the district which lies under it, looking chiefly towards the south. And this is a proof of it; the temples of the other gods as well [as of Minerva] are in the citadel itself, and those that are out of it are situated chiefly in this part of the city; as that of the Olympian Jupiter, of the Pythian Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in Limnæ, in whose honour the more ancient festival of Bacchus is held on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion; as the Ionians also, who are descended from the Athenians, even to this day observe it. And there are other ancient temples also situated in this quarter. The conduit too, which is now called Enneacrunus, [or, nine-pipes,] from the tyrants having so constituted it, but which had formerly the name of Calirrhoe, when the springs were open, the men of that day used, as it was near, on the most important occasions; and even at the present time they are accustomed, from the old fashion, to use the water before marriages, and for other sacred purposes. Moreover, from their living of old in this quarter, the citadel even to this day is called by the Athenians the city.

16. For a long time then the Athenians enjoyed their independent life in the country; and after they were united, still, from the force of habit, the generality of them at that

¹ i. e. the feast of the union.

early period, and even afterwards, down to the time of this war, having with all their families settled and lived in the country, did not remove without reluctance, (especially as they had but lately recovered their establishments after the Median war,) but were distressed and grieved to leave their houses, and the temples which, according to the spirit of the ancient constitution, had always been regarded by them as the ¹ places of their hereditary worship; going, as they now were, to change their mode of life, and ² each of them doing what was equivalent to leaving his native city.

17. When they came into the city, some few indeed had residences, and a place of refuge with some of their friends or relations; but the great bulk of them dwelt in the unoccupied parts of the city, and in all the temples and hero-chapels, except the Acropolis, and the temple of the Eleusinian Ceres, and any other that was kept constantly locked up. The Pelasgium also, as it is called, under the Acropolis, which it was even forbidden by a curse to inhabit, and prohibited by the end of a Pythian oracle, to this effect, "the Pelasgium is better unoccupied," was, nevertheless, built over, from the immediate necessity of the case. And, in my opinion, the oracle proved true in the contrary way to what was expected. For it was not, I think, because of their unlawfully inhabiting this spot, that such misfortunes befell the city; but it was owing to the war that the necessity of inhabiting it arose; which war though the god did not mention, he foreknew that [owing to it] the Pelasgium would hereafter be inhabited for no good. Many, too, quartered themselves in the towers of the walls, and in whatever way each could: for the city did not hold them when they were come all together; but subsequently they occupied the long walls, partitioning them out amongst them, and the greater part of the Piræus. At the same time they also applied themselves to matters connected with the war; mustering their allies, and equipping an armament of a hundred ships for the Peloponnesians. The Athenians then were in this state of preparation.

18. As for the army of the Peloponnesians, on the other

¹ And therefore the only ones in which they thought the gods would receive their prayers and sacrifices. See Arnold's note.

² Literally, "doing nothing else but leaving," &c. Compare III. 39. 2. *τί ἄλλο οὐτοί, ἢ ἐπεβούλευσαν*; and IV. 14. 3. *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐκ γῆς ἐναυμάχουν*. See Jelf's Gr. Gr. 895. c.

hand, the first town it came to in Attica was CEnoe, at which point they intended to make their inroad. And having sat down before it, they prepared to make assaults on the wall, both with engines and in every other way. For CEnoe, as lying on the frontiers of Attica and Bœotia, had been surrounded with a wall, and the Athenians used it as a garrisoned fort, whenever any war befell them. They prepared then for assaulting it, and wasted their time about it to no purpose. And from this delay, Archidamus incurred the greatest censure: though he had, even while the war was gathering, been thought to show a want of spirit, and to favour the Athenians, by not heartily recommending hostilities. And again, after the army was mustered, the stay that was made at the Isthmus, and his slowness on the rest of the march, gave occasion for charges against him, but most of all his stopping at CEnoe. For the Athenians during this time were carrying in their property, and the Peloponnesians thought that by advancing against them quickly they would have found every thing still out, but for his dilatoriness. Such resentment did the army feel towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it is said, was waiting in expectation that the Athenians would give in, while their land was still unravaged, and would shrink from enduring to see it wasted.

19. When, however, after assaulting CEnoe, and trying every method, they were unable to take the place, and the Athenians sent no herald to them, then indeed they set out from before it, and about eighty days after the events at Plataæ, caused by the Thebans who had entered it, when the summer was at its height, and the corn ripe, they made their incursion into Attica; Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, being their commander. After pitch-

¹ By the expression, ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου, he refers to the gradual maturing of their hostile intentions, and especially to the efforts of the Corinthians to induce a positive declaration of hostilities, as narrated in the first book; and so to precipitate that "storm of war" (to use a common metaphor) which had long been "gathering." Bloomfield is correct in saying that "it cannot signify, as the translators render, 'in gathering the forces together,' which would be a strange *Hysteron proteron*." But I do not think that either of the passages he quotes can warrant his rendering ξυναγωγῇ by "congress:" for in one of them ξυνάγειν is followed by its proper accusative case, and in the other ξυναγωγῇ has its proper genitive, as it evidently has here: though, were it otherwise, such an absolute use of the word by Polybius would by itself be no authority for supposing that Thucydides used it in the same way.

ing their camp there, they first ravaged Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and put to flight some Athenian cavalry near a place called Rheiti [or "the brooks"]. Afterwards they continued their march, keeping Mount Ægaleos on their right through Cropæa, till they came to Acharnæ, a place which is the largest of the *demes*, [or townships,] as they are called, of Attica. And sitting down before it they formed an encampment, and stayed a long time in the place, and continued ravaging it.

20. It was with the following views that Archidamus is said to have remained in order of battle at Acharnæ, and not to have gone down to the plain during that incursion. He hoped that the Athenians, abounding as they were in numbers of young men, and prepared for war as they had never before been, would perhaps come out against him, and not stand still and see their land ravaged. Since, then, they had not met him at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, he pitched his camp at Acharnæ, and tried whether they would now march out against him. For he thought the post a favourable one for encamping in, and moreover that the Acharnians, forming as they did a large part of the state, (for they amounted to three thousand heavy-armed,) would not overlook the destruction of what belonged to them, but would stir up the whole army also to an engagement. If, on the other hand, the Athenians should *not* come out against him during that incursion, he would then lay waste the plain with less fear in future, and advance to the city itself; for the Acharnians, after losing their own property, would not be so forward to run into danger for that of other people, but there would be a division in their counsels. It was with this view of the case that Archidamus remained at Acharnæ.

21. As for the Athenians, so long as the army was in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they had some hope of its not advancing nearer; remembering the case of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, the king of the Lacedæmonians, when with a Peloponnesian army he made an inroad into Attica, as far as Eleusis and Thria, fourteen years before this war, and retired again without advancing any further (for which reason indeed he was banished from Sparta, as he was thought to have been bribed to make the retreat). When, however, they saw the army at Acharnæ, only sixty stades from the city, they considered it no longer bearable,

and, as was natural, when their land was being ravaged before their eyes—a thing which the younger men had never yet seen, nor even the elder, except in the Persian wars—it was thought a great indignity, and all of them, especially the young men, determined to go out against them, and not to put up with it. They met therefore in knots and were in a state of great dissension, some urging them to go out, others dissuading them from it. Prophets too were repeating all kinds of oracles, to which ¹they eagerly listened, as they were severally disposed. The Acharnians especially, thinking that no considerable part of the Athenian forces was in their ranks, urged them to march out, while their land was being ravaged. Nay, in every way the city was excited; and they were angry with Pericles, and remembered none of the advice which he had before given them, but abused him for not leading them out, as their general; and they regarded him as the author of all that they were suffering.

22. He, in the mean time, seeing them angry at the present state of things, and not in the best mind; and being confident that he took a right view in not wishing to march out against the enemy, did not call them to an assembly, or any other meeting (that they might not commit themselves by coming together with more anger than judgment); but looked to the defence of the city and kept it quiet, as far as possible. He was, however, continually sending out cavalry, to prevent the advanced guard of the army from falling on the estates near the city and ravaging them. There was also a skirmish of cavalry at Phrygia, between one squadron of the Athenian horse, joined by some Thessalians, and the cavalry of the Bœotians, in which the Athenians and Thessalians had rather the advantage, until, on the heavy-armed coming to the succour of the Bœotians, they were routed, and some few of them killed: they took up their bodies however on the same day without a truce; and the Peloponnesians erected a trophy the day after. This assistance on the part of the Thessalians was given to the Athenians on the ground of their ancient alliance; and those

¹ "The construction seems to be, that the finite verb ἄρρητο is in sense repeated: 'which they were eager to listen to, as each was eager: which they were severally eager to listen to.' He adds ὡς ἕκαστος ἄρρητο, because different persons ran to listen to different prophecies, each choosing those which encouraged his own opinions or feelings."—*Arnold*.

who came to them consisted of Larissæans, Pharsalians, [Parasians,] Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheræans. Their commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, each from his own faction, and Menon from Pharsalus. The rest also had their commanders according to their respective cities.

23. The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians did not come out against them to battle, broke up from before Acharnæ, and proceeded to ravage some others of the townships between Mount Parnes and Brilessus. While they were in the country, the Athenians despatched round the Peloponnese the hundred ships they were preparing, [when I last mentioned them,] with a thousand heavy-armed on board, and four hundred bowmen under the command of Caranus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. So they weighed anchor, and were cruising round with this armament; while the Peloponnesians, after staying in Attica the time for which they had provisions, retired through Bœotia, (not by the same way they had made their inroad,) and passing by Oropus ravaged the Piræic territory, as it is called, which the Oropians inhabit as subjects of the Athenians. On arriving at the Peloponnese, they were disbanded, and returned to their several cities.

24. When they had retired, the Athenians set guards by land and by sea, as they intended to keep them through the whole war. And they resolved to take out and set apart a thousand talents from the money in the Acropolis, and not to spend them, but to carry on the war with their other resources; and if any one should move or put to the vote a proposition for applying that money to any other purpose, except in case of the enemy sailing against the city with a naval armament, and its being necessary to defend themselves, they declared it a capital offence. Together with this sum of money, they also laid by a hundred triremes, the best they had each year, and trierarchs for them; none of which were they to use except with the money, and in the same peril [as that was reserved for], should any such necessity arise.

25. The Athenians on board the hundred ships around Peloponnese, and the Corcyræans with them, who had come to their aid with fifty ships, and some others of the allies in those parts, ravaged other places as they cruised round, and landed at Methone in Laconia, and assaulted the wall, which was

weak and had no¹ men within it. Now Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in command of a guard for the defence of those parts; and, on hearing of the attack, he came to the assistance of those in the place with a hundred heavy-armed. Dashing, therefore, through the army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the country, and had its attention directed towards the wall, he threw himself into Methone; and having lost a few of his own men in entering it, both saved the city, and from this daring deed was the first that received praise at Sparta in the course of the war. Upon this the Athenians weighed anchor, and coasted along; and landing at Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the territory for two days, and conquered in battle three hundred picked men, who had come to the rescue from the inhabitants of² the Vale of Elis, and from the Eleans in the immediate neighbourhood. But a violent wind coming down upon them, being exposed to the storm in a harbourless place, the greater part of them went on board their ships, and sailed round the promontory called Ichthys, into the port at Pheia; but the Messenians, and some others who would not go on board, went in the mean time by land, and took Pheia. Afterwards the fleet sailed round and picked them up, and they evacuated the place and put out to sea; the main army of the Eleans having by this time come to its rescue. The Athenians then coasted along to other places and ravaged them.

26. About the same time they sent out thirty ships to cruise about Locris, and also to serve as a guard for Eubœa. Their commander was Cleopompus, son of Clinias, who, making descents, ravaged certain places on the sea-coast, and captured Thronium, and took hostages from them; defeating also, in a battle at Alope, those of the Locrians who had come to the rescue.

27. This summer the Athenians also expelled the Ægeians from their island, themselves, their children, and wives, charging them with being the chief authors of the war they

¹ i. e. no garrison for its defence.

² "Or the valley of the Peneus, in which Elis itself was situated. This, as the richest of the whole territory, was naturally occupied by the conquering Ætolians, when they came in with the Dorians at what is called the return of the Heracleidæ. The neighbourhood of Pheia, on the other hand, was inhabited by the descendants of the older people, who were conquered by the Ætolians, and now formed, as in so many Peloponnesian states, the subordinate class called *παισιτικοί*."—*Arnold*.

were engaged in; besides which, it appeared safer to send settlers of their own to hold Ægina, lying so near as it does to the Peloponnese. No long time after therefore they sent the colonists to it; while to the Æginetans who were expelled the Lacedæmonians gave Thyrea to live in, and the territory to occupy, as well on the ground of their quarrel with the Athenians, as because they had been benefactors to themselves at the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, stretching down to the sea. So some of them dwelt there, while others were scattered through the rest of Greece.

28. The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, (the only time at which it appears possible,) the sun was eclipsed after mid-day, and became full again after it had assumed a crescent form, and after some of the stars had shone out.

29. It was also in the course of the same summer that Nymphodorus son of Pythes, a man of Abdera, whose sister was the wife of Sitalces, and who had great influence with that monarch, was made their ¹*proxenus* by the Athenians, who had before considered him hostile to them, and was sent for by them, because they wished Sitalces, son of Teres, king of the Thracians, to become their ally. Now this Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first who founded the great kingdom of the Odrysæ on a larger scale than those in the rest of Thrace; for indeed a large part of the Thracians are independent. This Teres is not at all connected with Tereus who married from Athens Procne, the daughter of Pandion; nor were they of the same part of Thrace. The latter lived in Daulis, a part of what is now called Phocis, which was then inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that the women perpetrated the [cruel] deed to Itys, and by many of the poets, when they mention the nightingale, it is called the Daulian bird. Besides, it is probable that Pandion should have formed the connexion for his daughter [with one who lived] at that distance, with a view to mutual succour, rather than at the distance of several days' journey, [as it is] to the Odrysæ. On the other hand, Teres, besides not having the same name, was the first king of the *Odrysæ* that

¹ i. e. was publicly appointed by them to show hospitality to any of their citizens going to that country, and to look after their interests there; very nearly like a consul of modern Europe. See note, III. 70. 5.

attained to any power. Sitalces then, being this man's son, the Athenians made their ally, wishing him to join them in conquering the Thrace-ward towns and Perdiccas. So Nymphodorus came to Athens and concluded the alliance with Sitalces, and made his own son Sadocus a citizen of Athens, and undertook to bring to a close the war on the side of Thrace; for he said he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. Moreover, he reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and also persuaded them to restore Therme to him; and Perdiccas immediately joined in an expedition against the Chalcidians with the Athenians and Phormio. Thus Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, became an ally of the Athenians, as also did Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians.

30. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels, still cruising around the Peloponnese, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corinthians, and gave it up to the Palæreans alone of the Acarnanians, to enjoy the territory and city; and having stormed Astacus, of which Evarchus was tyrant, they expelled him, and won the place for their confederacy. They then sailed to the island of Cephallenia, and brought it over to their side without fighting. Cephallenia lies opposite Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, the Paleans, Cranians, Samæans, and Pronæans. Not long after, the ships returned to Athens.

31. About the autumn of this summer, the Athenians invaded the Megarid with all their forces, themselves and the resident aliens, under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus. And the Athenians in the hundred ships around the Peloponnese, (for they happened at this time to be at Ægina on their return home,) finding that the men of the city were in full force at Megara, sailed and joined them. And this was certainly the largest army of the Athenians that ever assembled together; as the city was at the height of its strength, and not yet afflicted with the plague; for of the Athenians themselves there were not fewer than ten thousand heavy-armed, (besides which they had the three thousand at Potidæa,) and of resident aliens who joined them in the incursion not fewer than three thousand heavy-armed; and added to these, there was all the crowd of light-armed in great numbers.

After ravaging the greater part of the territory, they returned. Other incursions into the Megarid were also afterwards made annually by the Athenians in the course of the war, both with their cavalry and with all their force, until Nisæa was taken by them.

32. Moreover Atalanta, the island near the Opuntian Locrians, which had previously been unoccupied, was fortified by the Athenians as a stronghold at the close of this summer, to prevent privateers from sailing out from Opus and the rest of Locris, and plundering Eubœa. These were the events which occurred in the course of this summer, after the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica.

33. The following winter Evarchus the Acarnanian, wishing to return to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred heavy-armed and restore him, he himself hiring some auxiliaries besides : the commanders of the army were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. So they sailed and restored him ; and wishing to gain certain places in the rest of Acarnania, along the coast, and having made an attempt without being able to succeed, they sailed back homeward. Having landed, as they coasted along, on Cephallenia, and made a descent on the territory of the Cranians, they were deceived by them after an arrangement that they had come to, and lost some of their men in an unexpected attack of the Cranians ; then, having put out to sea with some precipitation, they returned home.

34. In the course of this winter the Athenians, in accordance with the custom of their forefathers, buried at the public expense those who had first fallen in this war, after the following manner. Having erected a tent, they lay out the bones of the dead three days before, and each one brings to his own relative whatever [funeral offering] he pleases. When the funeral procession takes place, cars convey coffins of cypress wood, one for each tribe ; in which are laid the bones of every man, according to the tribe to which he belonged ; and one empty bier is carried, spread in honour of the missing, whose bodies could not be found to be taken up. Whoever wishes, both of citizens and strangers, joins in the procession ; and their female relatives attend at the burial to make the wailings. They lay them then in the public sepulchre, which is

in the fairest suburb of the city, and in which they always bury those who have fallen in the wars (except, at least, those who fell at Marathon; but to them, as they considered their valour distinguished above that of all others, they gave a burial on the very spot). After they have laid them in the ground, a man chosen by the state—one who in point of intellect is considered talented, and in dignity is pre-eminent—speaks over them such a panegyric as may be appropriate; after which they all retire. In this way they bury them: and through the whole of the war, whenever they had occasion, they observed the established custom. Over these who were first buried¹ at any rate, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And when the time for doing so came, advancing from the sepulchre on to a platform, which had been raised to some height, that he might be heard over as great a part of the crowd as possible, he spoke to the following effect:

35. "The greater part of those who ere now have spoken in this place, have been accustomed to praise the man who introduced this oration into the law; considering it a right thing that it should be delivered over those who are buried after falling in battle. To me, however, it would have appeared sufficient, that when men had shown themselves brave by deeds, their honours also should be displayed by deeds—as you now see in the case of this burial, prepared at the public expense—and not that the virtues of many should be perilled in one individual, for credit to be given him according as he expresses himself well or ill. For it is difficult to speak with propriety on a subject on which even the impression of one's truthfulness is with difficulty established. For the hearer who is acquainted [with the facts], and kindly disposed [towards those who performed them], might perhaps think them somewhat imperfectly set forth, compared with what he both wishes and knows; while he who is unacquainted with them might think that some points were even exaggerated, being led to this conclusion by envy, should he hear any thing surpassing his own natural powers. For praises spoken of others are only endured so far as each one thinks that he is himself also capable of doing any of the things he hears; but that which exceeds their own capacity men at once envy and disbelieve. Since, however, our ancestors judged this to

¹ Or, "accordingly over these," etc. See note, II. 5. 8.

be a right custom, I too, in obedience to the law, must endeavour to meet the wishes and views of every one, as far as possible.

36. "I will begin then with our ancestors first : for it is just, and becoming too at the same time, that on such an occasion the honour of being thus mentioned should be paid them. For always inhabiting the country without change, through a long succession of posterity, by their valour they transmitted it free to this very time. Justly then may they claim to be commended ; and more justly still may our own fathers. For in addition to what they inherited, they acquired the great empire which we possess, and by painful exertions bequeathed it to us of the present day : though to most part of it have additions been made by ourselves here, who are still, generally speaking, in the vigour of life ; and we have furnished our city with every thing, so as to be most self-sufficient both for peace and for war. Now with regard to our military achievements, by which each possession was gained, whether in any case it were ourselves, or our fathers, that repelled with spirit hostilities brought against us by barbarian or Greek ; as I do not wish to enlarge on the subject before you who are well acquainted with it, I will pass them over. But by what a mode of life we attained to our power, and by what form of government and owing to what habits it became so great, I will explain these points first, and then proceed to the eulogy of these men ; as I consider that on the present occasion they will not be inappropriately mentioned, and that it is profitable for the whole assembly, both citizens and strangers, to listen to them.

37. "For we enjoy a form of government which does not copy the laws of our neighbours ; but we are ourselves rather a pattern to others than imitators of them. In name, from its not being administered for the benefit of the few, but of the many, it is called a democracy ; but with regard to its laws, all enjoy equality, as concerns their private differences ; while with regard to public rank, according as each man has reputation for any thing, he is preferred for public honours, not so much from consideration of party, as of merit ; nor, again, on the ground of poverty, while he is able to do the state any good service, is he prevented by the obscurity of his position. We are liberal then in our public administration ; and with re-

gard to mutual jealousy of our daily pursuits, we are not angry with our neighbour, if he does any thing to please himself; nor wear on our countenance offensive looks, which though harmless, are yet unpleasant. While, however, in private matters we live together agreeably, in public matters, under the influence of fear, we most carefully abstain from transgression, through our obedience to those who are from time to time in office, and to the laws; especially such of them as are enacted for the benefit of the injured, and such as, though unwritten, bring acknowledged disgrace [on those who break them].

38. "Moreover, we have provided for our spirits the most numerous recreations from labours, by celebrating games and sacrifices through the whole year, and by maintaining elegant private establishments, of which the daily gratification drives away sadness. Owing to the greatness too of our city, every thing from every land is imported into it; and it is our lot to reap with no more peculiar enjoyment the good things which are produced here, than those of the rest of the world likewise.

39. "In the studies of war also we differ from our enemies in the following respects. We throw our city open to all, and never, by the expulsion of strangers, exclude any one from either learning or observing things, by seeing which unconcealed any of our enemies might gain an advantage; for we trust not so much to preparations and stratagems, as to our own valour for daring deeds. Again, as to our modes of education, *they* aim at the acquisition of a manly character, by laborious training from their very youth; while *we*, though living at our ease, no less boldly advance to meet equal dangers. As a proof of this, the Lacedæmonians never march against our country singly, but with all [their confederates] together: while we, generally speaking, have no difficulty in conquering in battle upon hostile ground those who are standing up in defence of their own. And no enemy ever yet encountered our whole united force, through our attending at the same time to our navy, and sending our troops by land on so many different services: but wherever they have engaged with any part of it, if they conquer only some of us, they boast that we were all routed by them; and if they are conquered, they say it was by all that they were beaten.

And yet if with careless ease rather than with laborious practice, and with a courage which is the result not so much of laws as of natural disposition, we are willing to face danger, we have the advantage of not suffering beforehand from coming troubles, and of proving ourselves, when we are involved in them, no less bold than those who are always toiling; so that our country is worthy of admiration in these respects, and in others besides.

40. "For we study taste with economy, and philosophy without effeminacy; and employ wealth rather for opportunity of action than for boastfulness of talking; while poverty is nothing disgraceful for a man to confess, but not to escape it by exertion is more disgraceful. Again, the same men can attend at the same time to domestic as well as to public affairs; and others, who are engaged with business, can still form a sufficient judgment on political questions. For we are the only people that consider the man who takes no part in these things, not as unofficious, but as useless; and we ourselves judge rightly of measures, at any rate, if we do not originate them; while we do not regard words as any hinderance to deeds, but rather [consider it a hinderance] not to have been previously instructed by word, before undertaking in deed what we have to do. For we have this characteristic also in a remarkable degree, that we are at the same time most daring and most calculating in what we take in hand; whereas to other men it is ignorance that brings daring, while calculation brings fear. Those, however, would deservedly be deemed most courageous, who know most fully what is terrible and what is pleasant, and yet do not on this account shrink from dangers. As regards beneficence also we differ from the generality of men; for we make friends, not by receiving, but by conferring kindness. Now he who has conferred the favour is the firmer friend, in order that he may keep alive the obligation by good will towards the man on whom he has conferred it; whereas he who owes it in return feels less keenly, knowing that it is not as a favour, but as a debt, that he will repay the kindness. Nay, we are the only men who fearlessly benefit any one, not so much from calculations of expediency, as with the confidence of liberality.

41. "In short, I say that both the whole city is a school for Greece, and that, in my opinion, the same individual would

amongst us prove himself qualified for the most varied kinds of action, and with the most graceful versatility. And that this is not mere vaunting language for the occasion, so much as actual truth, the very power of the state, which we have won by such habits, affords a proof. For it is the only country at the present time that, when brought to the test, proves superior to its fame; and the only one that neither gives to the enemy who has attacked us any cause for indignation at being worsted by such opponents, nor to him who is subject to us room for finding fault, as not being ruled by men who are worthy of empire. But we shall be admired both by present and future generations as having exhibited our power with great proofs, and by no means without evidence; and as having no further need, either of Homer to praise us, or any one else who might charm for the moment by his verses, while the truth of the facts would mar the idea formed of them; but as having compelled every sea and land to become accessible to our daring, and every where established everlasting records, whether of evil or of good. It was for such a country then that these men, nobly resolving not to have it taken from them, fell fighting; and every one of their survivors may well be willing to suffer in its behalf.

42. "For this reason, indeed, it is that I have enlarged on the characteristics of the state; both to prove that the struggle is not for the same object in our case as in that of men who have none of these advantages in an equal degree; and at the same time clearly to establish by proofs [the truth of] the eulogy of those men over whom I am now speaking. And now the chief points of it have been mentioned; for with regard to the things for which I have commended the city, it was the virtues of these men, and such as these, that adorned her with them; and few of the Greeks are there whose fame, like these men's, would appear but the just counterpoise of their deeds. Again, the closing scene of these men appears to me to supply an illustration of human worth, whether as affording us the first information respecting it, or its final confirmation. For even in the case of men who have been in other respects of an inferior character, it is but fair for them to hold forth as a screen their military courage in their country's behalf; for, having wiped out their evil by their good, they did more service collectively, than harm by their

individual offences. But of these men there was none that either was made a coward by his wealth, from preferring the continued enjoyment of it; or shrank from danger through a hope suggested by poverty, namely, that he might yet escape it, and grow rich; but conceiving that vengeance on their foes was more to be desired than these objects, and at the same time regarding this as the most glorious of hazards, they wished by risking it to be avenged on their enemies, and so to aim at procuring those advantages; committing to hope the uncertainty of success, but resolving to trust to action, with regard to what was visible to themselves; and in that action, being minded rather to resist and die, than by surrendering to escape, they fled from the shame of [a discreditable] report, while they endured the brunt of the battle with their bodies; and after the shortest crisis, when at the very height of their fortune, were taken away from their glory rather than their fear.

43. "Such did these men prove themselves, as became the character of their country. For you that remain, you must pray that you may have a more successful resolution, but must determine not to have one less bold against your enemies; not in word alone considering the benefit [of such a spirit], (on which one might descant to you at great length—though you know it yourselves quite as well—telling you how many advantages are contained in repelling your foes;) but rather day by day beholding the power of the city as it appears in fact, and growing enamoured of it, and reflecting, when you think it great, that it was by being bold, and knowing their duty, and being alive to shame in action, that men acquired these things; and because, if they ever failed in their attempt at any thing, they did not on that account think it right to deprive their country also of their valour, but conferred upon her a most glorious joint-offering. For while collectively they gave her their lives, individually they received that renown which never grows old, and the most distinguished tomb they could have; not so much that in which they are laid, as that in which their glory is left behind them, to be everlastingly recorded¹ on every occasion for doing so, either by word or deed, that may from time to time present itself. For of illustrious men the whole earth

¹ Literally, "on every occasion, either of word or deed, that may from time to time present itself."

is the sepulchre; and not only does the inscription upon columns in their own land point it out, but in that also which is not their own there dwells with every one an unwritten memorial of the heart, rather than of a material monument. Vieing then with these men in your turn, and deeming happiness to consist in freedom, and freedom in valour, do not think lightly of the hazards of war. For it is not the unfortunate, [and those] who have no hope of any good, that would with most reason be unsparing of their lives; but those who, while they live, still incur the risk of a change to the opposite condition, and to whom the difference would be the greatest, should they meet with any reverse. For more grievous, to a man of high spirit at least, is the misery which accompanies cowardice, than the unfelt death which comes upon him at once, in the time of his strength and of his hope for the common welfare.

44. "Wherefore to the parents of the dead—as many of them as are here among you—I will not offer condolence, so much as consolation. For they know that they have been brought up subject to manifold misfortunes; but that happy is *their* lot who have gained the most glorious—death, as these have,—sorrow, as you have; and to whom life has been so exactly measured, that they were both happy in it, and died in [that happiness]. Difficult, indeed, I know it is to persuade you of this, with regard to those of whom you will often be reminded by the good fortune of others, in which you yourselves also once rejoiced; and sorrow is felt, not for the blessings of which one is bereft without full experience of them, but of that which one loses after becoming accustomed to it. But you must bear up in the hope of other children, those of you whose age yet allows you to have them. For to yourselves individually those who are subsequently born will be a reason for your forgetting those who are no more; and to the state it will be beneficial in two ways, by its not being depopulated, and by the enjoyment of security; for it is not possible that those should offer any fair and just advice, who do not incur equal risk with their neighbours by having children at stake. Those of you, however, who are past that age, must consider that the longer period of your life during which you have been prosperous is so much gain, and that what remains will be but a short one; and you must cheer your-

selves with the fair fame of these [your lost ones]. For the love of honour is the only feeling that never grows old; and in the helplessness of age it is not the acquisition of gain, as some assert, that gives greatest pleasure, but the enjoyment of honour.

45. "For those of you, on the other hand, who are sons or brothers of the dead, great, I see, will be the struggle of competition. For every one is accustomed to praise the man who is no more; and scarcely, though even for an excess of worth, would you be esteemed, I do not say equal to them, but only slightly inferior. ¹For the living are exposed to envy in their rivalry; but those who are in no one's way are honoured with a good will free from all opposition. If, again, I must say any thing on the subject of woman's excellence also, with reference to those of you who will now be in widowhood, I will express it all in a brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling short of the natural character that belongs to you; and great is hers, who is least talked of amongst the men, either for good or evil.

46. "I have now expressed *in word*, as the law required, what I had to say befitting the occasion; and, *in deed*, those who are here interred, have already received part of their honours; while, for the remaining part, the state will bring up their sons at the public expense, from this time to their manhood; thus offering both to these and to their posterity a beneficial reward for such contests; for where the greatest prizes for virtue are given, there also the most virtuous men are found amongst the citizens. And now, having finished your lamentations for your several relatives, depart."

47. Such was the funeral that took place this winter, at the close of which the first year of this war ended. At the very beginning of the next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with two thirds of their forces, as on the first occasion, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; and after

¹ Or, as Göller explains it, "the living feel envy towards their rivals." "Τὸ ἀντίπαλον intelligendos esse *æmulos*, non *æmulationem*, ea quoque indicant quæ contrariè ponuntur: τὸ μὴ ἐμποδῶν, i. e. ii, qui non impedi-mento, non *æmulî* sunt (utpote mortui)."—But is not the opposition really between τοῖς ζῶσι and τὸ μὴ ἐμποδῶν? like the sentiment of Horace,

"Urit enim fulgore suo, qui prægravat artes
Infra se positas: extinctus amabitur idem."

encamping, they laid waste the country. When they had not yet been many days in Attica, the plague first began to show itself amongst the Athenians; though it was said to have previously lighted on many places, about Lemnos and elsewhere. Such a pestilence, however, and loss of life as this was no where remembered to have happened. For neither were physicians of any avail at first, treating it as they did, in ignorance of its nature,—nay, they themselves died most of all, inasmuch as they most visited the sick,—nor any other art of man. And as to the supplications that they offered in their temples, or the divinations, and similar means, that they had recourse to, they were all unavailing; and at last they ceased from them, being overcome by the pressure of the calamity.

48. It is said to have first begun in the part of *Æthiopia* above Egypt, and then to have come down into Egypt, and Libya, and the greatest part of the king's territory. On the city of Athens it fell suddenly, and first attacked the men in the Piræus; so that it was even reported by them that the Peloponnesians had thrown poison into the cisterns; for as yet there were no fountains there. Afterwards it reached the upper city also; and then they died much more generally. Now let every one, whether physician or unprofessional man, speak on the subject according to his views; from what source it was likely to have arisen, and the causes which he thinks were sufficient to have produced so great a change [from health to universal sickness]. I, however, shall only describe what was its character; and explain those symptoms by reference to which one might best be enabled to recognise it through this previous acquaintance, if it should ever break out again; for I was both attacked by it myself, and had personal observation of others who were suffering with it.

49. That year then, as was generally allowed, happened to be of all years the most free from disease, so far as regards other disorders; and if any one *had* any previous sickness, all terminated in this. Others, without any ostensible cause, but suddenly, while in the enjoyment of health, were seized at first with violent heats in the head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes; and the internal parts, both the throat and the tongue, immediately assumed a bloody tinge, and emitted an unnatural and fetid breath. Next after these symptoms,

sneezing and hoarseness came on ; and in a short time the pain descended to the chest, with a violent cough. When it settled in the stomach, it caused vomiting ; and all the discharges of bile that have been mentioned by physicians succeeded, and those accompanied with great suffering. An ineffectual retching also followed in most cases, producing a violent spasm, which in some cases ceased soon afterwards, in others much later. Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor was it pale ; but reddish, livid, and broken out in small pimples and sores. But the internal parts were burnt to such a degree that they could not bear clothing or linen of the very lightest kind to be laid upon them, nor to be any thing else but stark naked ; but would most gladly have thrown themselves into cold water if they could. Indeed many of those who were not taken care of did so, plunging into cisterns in the agony of their unquenchable thirst : and it was all the same whether they drank much or little. Moreover, the misery of restlessness and wakefulness continually oppressed them. The body did not waste away so long as the disease was at its height, but resisted it beyond all expectation : so that they either died in most cases on the ninth or the seventh day, through the internal burning, while they had still some degree of strength ; or if they escaped [that stage of the disorder], then, after it had further descended into the bowels, and violent ulceration was produced in them, and intense diarrhoea had come on, the greater part were afterwards carried off through the weakness occasioned by it. For the disease, which was originally seated in the head, beginning from above, passed throughout the whole body ; and if any one survived its most fatal consequences, yet it marked him by laying hold of his extremities ; for it settled on the pudenda, and fingers, and toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, while some also lost their eyes. Others, again, were seized on their first recovery with forgetfulness of every thing alike, and did not know either themselves or their friends.

50. For the character of the disorder surpassed description ; and while in other respects also it attacked every one in a degree more grievous than human nature could endure, in the following way, especially, it proved itself to be something different from any of the diseases familiar to man. All the birds and beasts that prey on human bodies, either did

not come near them, though there were many lying unburied, or died after they had tasted them. As a proof of this, there was a marked disappearance of birds of this kind, and they were not seen either engaged in this way, or in any other; while the dogs, from their domestic habits, more clearly afforded opportunity of marking the result I have mentioned.

51. The disease, then, to pass over many various points of peculiarity, as it happened to be different in one case from another, was in its general nature such as I have described. And no other of those to which they were accustomed afflicted them besides this at that time; or whatever there was, it ended in this. And [of those who were seized by it] some died in neglect, others in the midst of every attention. And there was no one settled remedy, so to speak, by applying which they were to give them relief; for what did good to one, did harm to another. And no constitution showed itself fortified against it, in point either of strength or weakness; but it seized on all alike, even those that were treated with all possible regard to diet. But the most dreadful part of the whole calamity was the dejection felt whenever any one found himself sickening, (for by immediately falling into a feeling of despair, they abandoned themselves much more certainly to the disease, and did not resist it,) and the fact of their being charged with infection from attending on one another, and so dying like sheep. And it was this that caused the greatest mortality amongst them; for if through fear they were unwilling to visit each other, they perished from being deserted, and many houses were emptied for want of some one to attend to the sufferers; or if they did visit them, they met their death, and especially such as made any pretensions to goodness; for through a feeling of shame they were unsparing of themselves, in going into their friends' houses [when deserted by all others]; since even the members of the family were at length worn out by the very moanings of the dying,¹ and were overcome by their excessive misery. Still more, however, than even these, did such as had escaped the disorder show pity for the dying and the suffering, both from their previous knowledge of what it was, and from their being now in no fear of it themselves; for it never seized the same person twice, so as

¹ Or, "by lamenting for the dying." See Arnold's note.

to prove actually fatal. And such persons were felicitated by others; and themselves, in the excess of their present joy, entertained for the future also, to a certain degree, a vain hope that they would never now be carried off even by any other disease.

52. In addition to the original calamity, what oppressed them still more was the crowding into the city from the country, especially the new comers. For as they had no houses, but lived in stifling cabins at the hot season of the year, the mortality amongst them spread without restraint; bodies lying on one another in the death-agony, and half-dead creatures rolling about in the streets and round all the fountains, in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which they had quartered themselves, were full of the corpses of those that died there in them: for in the surpassing violence of the calamity, men not knowing what was to become of them, came to disregard every thing, both sacred and profane, alike. And all the laws were violated which they before observed respecting burials; and they buried them as each one could. And many from want of proper means, in consequence of so many of their friends having already died, had recourse to shameless modes of sepulture; for on the piles prepared for others, some, anticipating those who had raised them, would lay their own dead relative and set fire to them; and others, while the body of a stranger was burning, would throw on the top of it the one they were carrying, and go away.

53. In other respects also the plague was the origin of lawless conduct in the city, to a greater extent [than it had before existed]. For deeds which formerly men hid from view, so as not to do them just as they pleased, they now more readily ventured on; since they saw the change so sudden in the case of those who were prosperous and quickly perished, and of those who before had had nothing, and at once came into possession of the property of the dead. So they resolved to take their enjoyment quickly, and with a sole view to gratification; regarding their lives and their riches alike as things of a day. As for taking trouble about what was thought honourable, no one was forward to do it; deeming it uncertain whether, before he had attained to it, he would not be cut off; but every thing that was immediately pleasant, and that which was conducive to it by any means whatever, this was laid down to be both honourable and expedient. And fear of gods, or law of

men, there was none to stop them ; for with regard to the former they esteemed it all the same whether they worshipped them or not, from seeing all alike perishing ; and with regard to their offences [against the latter], no one expected to live till judgment should be passed on him, and so to pay the penalty of them ; but they thought a far heavier sentence was impending in that which had already been passed upon them ; and that before it fell on them, it was right to have some enjoyment of life.

54. Such was the calamity which the Athenians had met with, and by which they were afflicted, their men dying within the city, and their land being wasted without. In their misery they remembered this verse amongst other things, as was natural they should ; the old men saying that it had been uttered long ago ;

“ A Dorian war shall come, and plague with it.”

Now there was a dispute amongst them, [and some asserted,] that it was not “ a plague” [*loimos*] that had been mentioned in the verse by the men of former times, but “ a famine,” [*limos*] : the opinion, however, at the present time naturally prevailed that “ a plague” had been mentioned : for men adapted their recollections to what they were suffering. But, I suppose, in case of another Dorian war ever befalling them after this, and a famine happening to exist, in all probability they will recite the verse accordingly. Those who were acquainted with it recollected also the oracle given to the Lacedæmonians, when on their inquiring of the god whether they should go to war, he answered, “ that if they carried it on with all their might, they would gain the victory ; and that he would himself take part with them in it.” With regard to the oracle then, they supposed that what was happening answered to it. For the disease had begun immediately after the Lacedæmonians had made their incursion ; and it did not go into the Peloponnese, worth even speaking of, but ravaged Athens most of all, and next to it the most populous of the other towns. Such were the circumstances that occurred in connexion with the plague.

55. The Peloponnesians, after ravaging the plain, passed into the Paralian territory, as it is called, as far as Laurium, where the gold mines of the Athenians are situated. And first

they ravaged the side which looks towards Peloponnese; afterwards, that which lies towards Eubœa and Andrus. Now Pericles being general at that time as well as before, maintained the same opinion as he had in the former invasion, about the Athenians not marching out against them.

56. While they were still in the plain, before they went to the Paralian territory, he was preparing an armament of a hundred ships to sail against the Peloponnese; and when all was ready, he put out to sea. On board the ships he took four thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians, and three hundred cavalry in horse-transport, then for the first time made out of old vessels: a Chian and Lesbian force also joined the expedition with fifty ships. When this armament of the Athenians put out to sea, they left the Peloponnesians in the Paralian territory of Attica. On arriving at Epidaurus, in the Peloponnese, they ravaged the greater part of the land, and having made an assault on the city, entertained some hope of taking it; but did not, however, succeed. After sailing from Epidaurus, they ravaged the land belonging to Trœzen, Halice, and Hermione; all which places are on the coast of the Peloponnese. Proceeding thence they came to Prasîa, a maritime town of Laconia, and ravaged some of the land, and took the town itself, and sacked it. After performing these achievements, they returned home; and found the Peloponnesians no longer in Attica, but returned.

57. Now all the time that the Peloponnesians were in the Athenian territory, and the Athenians were engaged in the expedition on board their ships, the plague was carrying them off both in the armament and in the city, so that it was even said that the Peloponnesians, for fear of the disorder, when they heard from the deserters that it was in the city, and also perceived them performing the funeral rites, retired the quicker from the country. Yet in this invasion they stayed the longest time, and ravaged the whole country: for they were about forty days in the Athenian territory.

58. The same summer Hagnon son of Nicias, and Cleompus son of Clinias, who were colleagues with Pericles, took the army which he had employed, and went straightway on an expedition against the Chalcidians Thrace-ward, and Potidæa, which was still being besieged: and on their arrival they brought up their engines against Potidæa, and endea-

voured to take it by every means. But they neither succeeded in capturing the city, nor in their other measures, to any extent worthy of their preparations: for the plague attacked them, and this indeed utterly overpowered them there, wasting their force to such a degree, that even the soldiers of the Athenians who were there before were infected with it by the troops which came with Hagnon, though previously they had been in good health. Phormio, however, and his sixteen hundred, were no longer in the neighbourhood of the Chalcidians [and so escaped its ravages]. Hagnon therefore returned with his ships to Athens, having lost by the plague fifteen hundred out of four thousand heavy-armed, in about forty days. The soldiers who were there before still remained in the country, and continued the siege of Potidæa.

59. After the second invasion of the Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, when their land had been again ravaged, and the disease and the war were afflicting them at the same time, changed their views, and found fault with Pericles, thinking that he had persuaded them to go to war, and that it was through him that they had met with their misfortunes; and they were eager to come to terms with the Lacedæmonians. Indeed they sent ambassadors to them, but did not succeed in their object. And their minds being on all sides reduced to despair, they were violent against Pericles. He therefore, seeing them irritated by their present circumstances, and doing every thing that he had himself expected them to do, called an assembly, (for he was still general,) wishing to cheer them, and by drawing off the irritation of their feelings to lead them to a calmer and more confident state of mind. So he came forward and spoke as follows:

60. "I had both expected the proofs of your anger against me, which have been exhibited, (for I am aware of the causes of it,) and have now convened an assembly for this purpose, that I may remind you [of what you have forgotten], and reprove you if in any respect you are wrong, either in being irritated against me or in succumbing to your misfortunes. For I consider that a state which in its public capacity is successful confers more benefit on individuals, than one which is prosperous as regards its particular citizens, while collectively it comes to ruin. For though a man is individually prosperous, yet if his country is ruined, he none the less shares

in its destruction ; whereas, if he is unfortunate in a country that is fortunate, he has a much better hope of escaping his dangers. Since then a state is able to bear the misfortunes of individuals, while each individual is unable to bear hers, how can it fail to be the duty of all to support her, and not to act as *you* are now doing, who, being panic-stricken by your domestic afflictions, give up all thought of the public safety, and are blaming both me who advised you to go to war, and yourselves who joined in voting for it. And yet I, with whom you are angry, am a man who deem myself second to none in at once knowing what measures are required, and explaining them to others ; a lover too of my country, and superior to the influence of money. For he who knows a thing that is right, but does not explain it with clearness, is no better than if he had never had a conception of it ; and he, again, who has both these requisites, but is ill-affected towards his country, would not so well speak for her interest. And even if this qualification be added to the others, while he is influenced by regard for money, all of them together would be sacrificed for this one consideration. So that if you were persuaded by me to go to war, because you thought that I possessed these qualities even in a moderate degree more than other men, I cannot now fairly be charged with injuring you, at any rate.

61. " For those indeed to go to war, who, while successful in other things, have had a choice in the matter allowed them, it is great folly. But if [in our case] it were necessary, either immediately to submit to our neighbours, if we made concessions, or to preserve our independence by running a great risk ; then he who shrunk from the risk is more reprehensible than he who faced it. For my part then, I am the same that I ever was, and do not depart from my opinion ; but you are changing, since it happens that you were persuaded [to go to war] while unscathed, but repent of it now you are suffering : and that my advice appears wrong through the weakness of your resolution ; because pain is now in possession of each man's feeling, while the certainty of the benefit is as yet hidden from all : and a great reverse having befallen you, and that suddenly, your mind is too prostrated to persevere in your determinations. For the spirit is enslaved by what is sudden and unlooked for, and most beyond our calculation ;

which has been your case, in addition to every thing else, more especially with regard to the plague. Living, however, as you do in a great city, and brought up with habits corresponding to it, you ought to be willing to encounter the greatest misfortunes, and not to sully your reputation; (for men think it equally just to find fault with him who weakly falls short of his proper character, and to hate him who rashly grasps at that which does not belong to him;) and you ought to cease grieving for your private sufferings, and to devote yourselves to the safety of the commonwealth.

62. "But with regard to your trouble in the war, lest you should fear that it may prove great, and we may still be none the more successful, let those arguments suffice you, with which on many other occasions I have proved the error of your suspicions respecting it. At the same time, I will also lay before you the following advantage, which yourselves do not appear ever yet to have thought of as belonging to you, respecting the greatness of your empire, and which I never urged in my former speeches; nor would I even now, as it has rather too boastful an air, if I did not see you unreasonably cast down. You think then that you only bear rule over your own subject allies; but I declare to you that of the two parts of the world open for man's use, the land and the sea, of the whole of the one you are most absolute masters, both as far as you avail yourselves of it now, and if you should wish to do so still further; and there is no power, neither the king nor any nation besides at the present day, that can prevent your sailing [where you please] with your present naval resources. This power then evidently is far from being merely on a level with the benefits of your houses and lands, which you think so much to be deprived of: nor is it right for you to grieve about them, but rather to hold them cheap, considering them, in comparison with this, as a mere garden-plot and embellishment of a rich man's estate. You should know, too, that liberty, provided we devote ourselves to *that*, and preserve it, will easily recover these losses; whereas those who have once submitted to others find even their greatest gains diminish. Nor should you show yourselves inferior in both respects to your fathers, who with labour, and not by inheritance from others, acquired these possessions, and moreover kept them, and bequeathed them to us; for it is more

disgraceful to be deprived of a thing when we have got it, than to fail in getting it. On the contrary, you should meet your enemies, not only with spirit, but also with a spirit of contempt. For *confidence* is produced even by lucky ignorance, ay, even in a coward; but *contempt* is the feeling of the man who trusts that he is superior to his adversaries in counsel also, which is our case. And ability, with a high spirit, renders more sure the daring which arises from equal fortune; and does not so much trust to mere hope, whose strength mainly displays itself in difficulties; but rather to a judgment grounded upon present realities, whose anticipations may be more relied upon.

63. "It is but fair, too, that you should sustain the dignity of the state derived from its sovereignty, on which you all pride yourselves; and that either you should not shrink from its labours, or else should lay no claim to its honours either. Nor should you suppose that you are struggling to escape one evil only, slavery instead of freedom; but to avoid loss of dominion also, and danger from the animosities which you have incurred in your exercise of that dominion. And from this it is no longer possible for you to retire; if through fear at the present time any one is for so playing the honest man in quiet. For you now hold it as a tyranny, which it seems wrong to have assumed, but dangerous to give up. And men with these views would very quickly ruin the state, whether they persuaded others [to adopt the same], or even lived any where independently by themselves; for quietness is not a safe principle, unless ranged with activity; nor is it for the interest of a sovereign state, but of a subject one, that it may live in safe slavery.

64. "Do you then neither be seduced by such citizens, nor be angry with me, whom yourselves also joined in voting for war, though the enemy has invaded our country, and done what it was natural that he should do, if you would not submit; and though, besides what we looked for, this disease also has come upon us—the only thing, indeed, of all that has happened beyond our expectations. And it is through this, I well know, that in some degree I am still more the object of your displeasure; yet not with justice, unless you will also give me the credit when you meet with any success beyond your calculation. The evils then which are sent by heaven,

you must bear perforce ; those which are inflicted by your enemies, with courage : for such was formerly the custom of this country, and let it not now meet with a check in your case. But consider that it has the greatest name in all the world from not yielding to misfortunes, and from expending in war more lives and labours than any other state ; and that it has now the greatest power that ever existed up to the present time ; the memory of which, even should we now at length give way, (for every thing is naturally liable to decrease,) will be left to posterity for ever, namely, that we had dominion over more Greeks than any other Greek state ever had ; and held out in the greatest wars against them, both collectively and singly ; and inhabited a city better provided with all things than any other, and greater. And yet your quiet man would find fault with these things ; but the man who has himself a wish to achieve something, will emulate them ; while whoever does not possess them will envy them. But to be hated and offensive for the time present has been the lot of all who have ever presumed to rule over others ; that man, however, takes wise counsel, who incurs envy for the greatest things. For odium does not last long ; but present splendour and future glory are handed down to perpetual memory. Do you then, providing ¹both for your future honour, and for your immediate escape from disgrace, secure both objects by your present spirit : and neither send any heralds to the Lacedæmonians, nor show that you are weighed down by your present troubles ; for such as in feeling are least annoyed at their misfortunes, while in action they most courageously resist them, these, both of states and of individuals, are the best."

65. By speaking to this effect Pericles endeavoured both to divert the Athenians from their anger towards himself, and to lead away their thoughts from their present hardships. And in a public point of view they were persuaded by his speech, and were no longer for sending to the Lacedæmonians, but

¹ "Recte Dukas τὸ μέλλον καλὸν ἀδ τὴν ἔπειτα δόξαν, τὸ αὐτίκα μὴ αἰσχρὸν ἀδ τὴν παρὰντίκα λαμπρότητα respicere adnotat."—Göller, whose interpretation is adopted by Arnold. By others καλὸν and μὴ αἰσχρὸν are taken as dependent on πρόγοντες ; "providing what is honourable for the future and not disgraceful for the present." The rhythm of the sentence is, I think, in favour of the latter interpretation ; the absence of the article from the neuter singular adjectives, in favour of the former.

were more resolute for the war; though in their private feelings they were distressed by their sufferings; the commons, because, having set out with less resources, they had been deprived of even those; the higher orders, because they had lost fine possessions in the country, both in buildings and expensive establishments, and, what was the greatest evil of all, had war instead of peace. They did not, however, cease from their public displeasure towards him, till they had fined him in a sum of money. But no long time after, as the multitude is wont to act, they again elected him general, and committed every thing to him; for on the points in which each man was vexed about his domestic affairs, they now felt less keenly; but with regard to what the whole state needed, they thought that he was most valuable. For as long as he was at the head of the state in time of peace, he governed it with moderation, and kept it in safety, and it was at its height of greatness in his time: and when the war broke out, he appears to have foreknown its power in this respect also. He survived its commencement two years and six months; and when he was dead, his foresight with regard to its course was appreciated to a still greater degree. For he said that if they kept quiet, and attended to their navy, and did not gain additional dominion during the war, nor expose the city to hazard, they would have the advantage in the struggle. But they did the very contrary of all this, and in other things which seemed to have nothing to do with the war, through their private ambition and private gain, they adopted evil measures both towards themselves and their allies; which, if successful, conduced to the honour and benefit of individuals; but if they failed, proved detrimental to the state with regard to the war. And the reason was, that he, being powerful by means of his high rank and talents, and manifestly proof against bribery, controlled the multitude with an independent spirit, and was not led by them so much as he himself led them; for he did not say any thing to humour them, for the acquisition of power by improper means; but was able on the strength of his character to contradict them even at the risk of their displeasure. Whenever, for instance, he perceived them unseasonably and insolently confident, by his language he would dash them down to alarm; and, on the other hand, when they were unreasonably alarmed, he would raise them again to confidence. And so, though in

name it was a democracy, in fact it was a government administered by the first man. Whereas those who came after, being more on a level with each other, and each grasping to become first, had recourse to devoting [not only their speeches, but] even their *measures*, to the humours of the people. In consequence of this both many other blunders were committed, as was likely in a great and sovereign state, and especially the expedition to Sicily; which was not so much an error of judgment with respect to the people they went against, as that those who had sent them out, by not afterwards voting supplies required by the armament, but proceeding with their private criminations, to gain the leadership of the commons, both blunted the spirit of measures in the camp, and for the first time were embroiled with one another in the affairs of the city. But even when they had suffered in Sicily the loss of other forces, and of the greater part of their fleet, and were now involved in sedition at home, they nevertheless held out three years, both against their former enemies, and those from Sicily with them, and moreover against the greater part of their allies who had revolted, and Cyrus, the king's son, who afterwards joined them, and who supplied the Peloponnesians with money for their fleet: nor did they succumb, before they were overthrown and ruined by themselves, through their private quarrels. Such a superabundance of means had Pericles at that time, by which he himself foresaw that with the greatest ease he could gain the advantage in the war over the Peloponnesians by themselves.

66. The Lacedæmonians and their allies the same summer made an expedition with a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies over against Elis. The inhabitants are a colony of the Achæans of the Peloponnesus, and were in alliance with the Athenians. On board the fleet were a thousand heavy-armed of the Lacedæmonians, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. Having made a descent on the country, they ravaged the greater part of it; and when they did not surrender, they sailed back home.

67. At the end of the same summer, Aristæus, a Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, Timagoras, a Tegean, and Pollis, an Argive in a private capacity, being on their way to Asia, to obtain an interview with the king, if by any means they might

prevail on him to supply money and join in the war, went first to Thrace, to Sitalces the son of Teres, wishing to persuade him, if they could, to withdraw from his alliance with the Athenians, and make an expedition against Potidæa, where was an armament of the Athenians besieging the place ; and then, to proceed by his assistance to their destination across the Hellespont, to Pharnaces the son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them up the country to the king. But some Athenian ambassadors, Learchus son of Callimachus, and Aminiades son of Philemon, happening to be with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus his son, who had been made an Athenian citizen, to put the men into their hands, that they might not, by passing over to the king, do their best to injure [what was now] his own country. He, in compliance with their request, having sent some other men with Learchus and Aminiades, seized them as they were travelling through Thrace to the vessel in which they were to cross the Hellespont, before they went on board, and gave orders to deliver them up to the Athenian ambassadors ; who, having received them, took them to Athens. On their arrival the Athenians, being afraid that if Aristeus escaped he might do them still more mischief, (for even before this he had evidently conducted all the measures in Potidæa and their possessions Thrace-ward,) without giving them a trial, though they requested to say something [in their own defence], put them to death that same day, and threw them into pits ; thinking it but just to requite them in the same way as the Lacedæmonians had begun with ; for they had killed and thrown into pits the merchants, both of the Athenians and their allies, whom they had taken on board trading vessels about the coast of the Peloponnese. Indeed all that the Lacedæmonians took on the sea at the beginning of the war, they butchered as enemies, both those who were confederates of the Athenians and those who were neutral.

68. About the same time, when the summer was drawing to a close, the Ambraciots, with their own forces and many of the barbarians whom they had raised, made an expedition against Argos in Amphilochia, and the rest of that country. Now their enmity against the Argives first arose from the following circumstances. Argos in Amphilochia and the rest of the country was colonized by Amphilocheus the son of Amphiarus, when he returned home after the Trojan war, and

was not pleased with the state of things at Argos; [and he built it] on the Ambracian Gulf, and called it Argos after the name of his own country. This was the largest city of Amphilochia, and had the most powerful inhabitants. But many generations afterwards, being pressed by misfortunes, they called in the Ambraciots, who bordered on Amphilochia, as joint-inhabitants; and from the Ambraciots who joined them they were taught the Greek language which they now speak, the rest of the Amphilochians being barbarians. Now the Ambraciots in process of time drove out the Argives, and held the city by themselves. Upon this the Amphilochians gave themselves up to the Acarnanians; and both together having called in the Athenians, who sent them Phormio for a general and thirty ships, on the arrival of Phormio they took Argos by storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots; while the Amphilochians and Acarnanians occupied the town in common. And it was after this event that the alliance between the Athenians and Acarnanians was first made. The Ambraciots then first conceived their enmity to the Argives from this enslavement of their people; and afterwards, during the war, formed this armament from themselves and the Chaonians, and some other of the neighbouring barbarians. Having come to Argos, they obtained command of the country; but being unable to take the city by assault, they retired homeward, and disbanding returned to their different nations. These were the events of the summer.

69. The following winter, the Athenians sent twenty ships round the Peloponnese, with Phormio as commander, who, making Naupactus his station, kept watch that no one either sailed out from Corinth and the Crisean Bay, or into it. Another squadron of six they sent towards Caria and Lycia, with Melesander as commander, to raise money from those parts, and to hinder the privateers of the Peloponnesians from making that their rendezvous, and interfering with the navigation of the merchantmen from Phaselis and Phœnice, and the continent in that direction. But Melesander, having gone up the country into Lycia with a force composed of the Athenians from the ships and the allies, and being defeated in a battle, was killed, and lost a considerable part of the army.

70. The same winter, when the Potidæans could no longer hold out against their besiegers, the inroads of the Pelopon-

nesians into Attica having had no more effect towards causing the Athenians to withdraw, and their provisions being exhausted, and many other horrors having befallen them in their straits for food, and some having even eaten one another; under these circumstances, I say, they make proposals for a capitulation to the generals of the Athenians who were in command against them, Xenophon son of Euripides, Histiodorus son of Aristoclide, and Phanomachus son of Calimachus; who accepted them, seeing the distress of their army in so exposed a position, and the state having already expended 2000 talents on the siege. On these terms therefore they came to an agreement; that themselves, their children, wives, and auxiliaries, should go out of the place with one dress each—but the women with two—and with a fixed sum of money for their journey. According to this treaty, they went out to Chalcidice, or where each could: but the Athenians blamed the generals for having come to an agreement without consulting them; for they thought they might have got possession of the place on their own terms; and afterwards they sent settlers of their own to Potidæa and colonized it. These were the transactions of the winter; and so ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

71. The following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies did not make an incursion into Attica, but marched against Platæa, being led by Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. Having encamped his army, he was going to ravage the land; but the Platæans immediately sent ambassadors to him, and spoke as follows: "Archidamus and Lacedæmonians, you are not doing what is right, or worthy either of yourselves or of the fathers from whom you are sprung, in marching against the territory of the Platæans. For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedæmonian, when he had liberated Greece from the Medes, in conjunction with those Greeks who had been willing to incur with him the peril of the battle that was fought near our city, after sacrificing in the market-place of Platæa to Jupiter the Deliverer, and assembling all the allies, proceeded to grant to the Platæans to live in independent possession of their land and city, and that no one should ever make war upon them unjustly, or to enslave them; else that the allies then present

should assist them to their utmost. These rewards your fathers gave us for our valour and zeal, shown in those scenes of danger; but *you* are doing the very contrary; for in conjunction with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, you are come to enslave us. Calling the gods then to witness, both those who at that time received the oaths, and those of your own fathers, and those of our country, we charge you not to injure the Plataean territory, nor break the oaths, but to let us live independent, as Pausanias thought right to grant us."

72. When the Plataeans had spoken thus much, Archidamus took them up and said: "You speak what is just, Plataeans, if you act in accordance with your speech. As then Pausanias bequeathed to you, so both enjoy independence yourselves, and assist in liberating the rest, as many as shared the dangers of that day, and are now under the rule of the Athenians; and for whose liberation, and that of the rest [of their subjects], all this provision and war has been undertaken. Do you then yourselves abide by the oaths, by taking your part in this liberation, if possible; but if not, then, as we before proposed, keep quiet in the enjoyment of your own possessions, and do not join either side, but receive both as friends, and for warlike purposes neither the one nor the other. And this will satisfy us." Thus much said Archidamus. The Plataeans having heard it went into the city, and after communicating to the whole people what had been said, answered him, that it was impossible for them to do what he proposed without consulting the Athenians; for their children and wives were with *them*; and that they had also fears for the whole city, lest when the Lacedæmonians had retired, the Athenians should come and not leave it in their hands; or the Thebans, as being included in the treaty, on the strength of their "receiving both parties," should again endeavour to seize on it. To encourage them on these points he said, "Do you then give up your city and houses to us Lacedæmonians, and point out the boundaries of your territory, and your trees in number, and whatever else can be reduced to number; and yourselves remove wherever you please for as long as the war may last. When it is over, we will restore to you whatever we may have received. Till then we will hold it in trust, cultivating it, and bringing to you such of the produce as will be sufficient for you."

73. When they had heard his proposal, they went again

into the city, and after consulting with the people, said that they wished first to communicate to the Athenians what he proposed, and should they gain their consent, then to do so ; but till that time they begged him to grant them a truce, and not to lay waste the land. So he granted them a truce for the number of days within which it was likely they would return home, and in the mean time did not begin to ravage the land. The Platæan ambassadors having come to the Athenians and consulted with them, returned with the following message to those in the city : " Men of Platæa, the Athenians say, that never in time past, since we became their allies, have they on any occasion deserted us when injured ; nor will they neglect us now, but will succour us to the best of their power. And they charge you by the oaths which your fathers swore, to make no innovation in the terms of the alliance."

74. The ambassadors having delivered this message, they resolved not to prove false to the Athenians, but to endure, if necessary, both to see their land ravaged, and to suffer whatever else might befall them. They resolved also that no one should go out again, but that they should reply from the walls, that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedæmonians proposed. When they had given this answer, king Archidamus proceeded in the first place to call to witness the gods and heroes of the country, in these words : " Ye gods and heroes that dwell in the land of Platæa, bear witness that it was neither unjustly in the first instance, but when these men had first broken the agreement they had sworn to, that we came against this land, in which our fathers prayed to you before they conquered the Medes, and which you rendered an auspicious one for the Greeks to contend in ; nor shall we act unjustly now, whatever we may do ; for though we have made many fair proposals, we have not succeeded in gaining their assent. Grant then that those may be punished for the wrong who were the first to begin it, and that those may obtain their revenge who are lawfully trying to inflict it."

75. Having thus appealed to the gods, he set his army to the war. In the first place he enclosed them with a palisade, made of the trees which they cut down, that no one might go out of the town any longer. Next they began to throw up a mound against the city, hoping that the reduction of it would be very speedily effected with so large an army at work.

Cutting down timber therefore from Cithæron, they built it up on each side, laying it like lattice-work, to serve as walls, that the mound might not spread over a wide space; and they carried to it brush-wood, and stone, and soil, and whatever else would help to complete it when thrown on. Seventy days and nights continuously they were throwing it up, being divided into relief-parties, so that some should be carrying, while others were taking sleep and refreshment; the Lacedæmonian officers who shared the command over the contingents of each state urging them to the work. But the Platæans, seeing the mound rising, put together a wooden wall, and placed it on the wall of their city, where the mound was being made, and built bricks inside it, which they took from the neighbouring houses. The timbers served as a frame for them, to prevent the building from being weak as it became high; and for curtains it had skins and hides, so that the workmen and the timbers were not exposed to fiery missiles, but were in safety. So the wall was raised to a great height, and the mound rose opposite to it no less quickly. The Platæans also adopted some such device as follows: they took down a part of the wall, where the mound lay against it, and carried the earth into the city.

76. The Peloponnesians, on perceiving this, rammed down clay in wattles of reed, and threw it into the breach, that it might not be loose, and so carried away like the soil. Being thus baffled, the Platæans ceased from this attempt; but having dug a passage under ground from the city, and having guessed their way under the mound, they began again to carry the soil in to them. And for a long time they escaped the observation of the enemy outside; so that though they continued to throw on materials, they were further from finishing it; as their mound was carried away from beneath, and continually sinking down into the vacuum. Fearing, however, that they might not even by this means be able to hold out, so few in numbers against so many, they adopted the following additional contrivance. They ceased to work at the great building opposite to the mound; but beginning at either end of it, where the wall was of its original height, they built another in the form of a crescent, running inwards into the city; that if the great wall were taken, this might hold out, and their opponents might have to throw up a second mound against it,

and as they advanced within, might have double trouble, and be more exposed to missiles on both their flanks. At the same time that they were raising the mound, the Peloponnesians brought engines also to play upon the city; one of which, being brought up close to the wall, shook down a considerable part of the great building, and terrified the Plateans. Others were advanced against different parts of the wall; but the Plateans broke them off by throwing nooses around them. They also suspended great beams by long iron chains from the extremity of two levers, which were laid upon the wall, and stretched out beyond it; and having drawn them up at an angle, whenever the engine was going to fall on any point, by loosing the chains and not holding them tight in hand, they let the beam drop; which, falling on it with great impetus, broke off the ¹ head of the battering-ram.

77. After this, when their engines were of no avail, and the building of the wall was going on in opposition to the mound, the Peloponnesians, thinking it impossible to take the city by their present means of offence, prepared for circumvallating it. First however they determined to make an attempt upon it by fire, [and see] whether with the help of a favourable wind they could burn the town, as it was not a large one: for they thought of every possible device, if by any means it might be reduced by them without the expense of a siege. They took therefore faggots of brushwood, and threw them from the mound; at first into the space between it and the wall, and when that had soon been filled by the many hands at work, they piled them up also as far into the town as they could reach from the height; and then lighted the wood by throwing on it fire with sulphur and pitch. By this means such a flame was raised as no one had ever yet seen produced by the hand of man; [though *natural* conflagrations might have exceeded it;] for ere now the wood of a mountain forest has been known to take fire of itself, and to emit a flame in consequence, through the mutual attrition of the boughs by high winds. This fire, however, was a great one, and was within very little of destroying the Plateans, after they had

¹ Arnold thinks that the battering engine ended in a point, to force its way into the wall, rather than with a thick solid end, merely to batter it; and so that τὸ προίχον τῆς ἐμβολῆς answers exactly to τὸ πρύπανον in a parallel passage quoted by him from Æneas Tacticus.

escaped all their other dangers ; for there was a considerable part of the town within which it was not possible to approach ; and if a wind had risen to blow upon it, as their enemy hoped, they would not have escaped. As it was, however, the following occurrence is also said to have favoured them ; a heavy rain and thunder-storm came on, and quenched the flame ; and so the danger ceased.

78. When the Peloponnesians had failed in this attempt also, they left behind them a certain part of their force, [having disbanded the rest,] and proceeded to raise a wall of circumvallation round the town, dividing the whole extent amongst the contingents of the different states. There was a ditch, too, both inside and outside of the lines, from which they made their bricks. All being finished by about the ¹rising of Arcturus, they left troops to man half the extent of the wall, (the other half being manned by the Bœotians,) and retired with their army, and dispersed to their different cities. Now the Platæans had previously carried out of the town to Athens their children, and wives, and oldest men, and the mass of the inhabitants that would be of no service ; but the men themselves who were left in the place and stood the siege, amounted to four hundred, with eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women to make bread for them. This was the total number of them when they began to be besieged, and there was no one else within the walls, either bond or free. Such was the provision made for the siege of Platæa.

79. The same summer, and at the same time as the expedition was made against the Platæans, the Athenians marched with two thousand heavy-armed of their own, and two hundred horse, against the Thrace-ward Chalcidians, and the Bottiæans, when the corn was ripe, under the command of Xenophon son of Euripides, and two colleagues. On arriving under the walls of Spartolus in Bottiæa, they destroyed the corn ; and expected that the town would also surrender to them, through the intrigues of a party within. Those, however, who did not wish this, having sent to Olynthus, a body of heavy-armed and other troops came as a garrison for the place ; and on their making a sally from it, the Athenians met them in battle close to the town. The heavy-armed of the

¹ i. e. its morning rising, nearly coincident with the autumnal equinox.

Chalcidians, and some auxiliaries with them, were defeated by the Athenians, and retired into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian horse and light-armed defeated the horse and light-armed of the Athenians. They had [from the first] some few targeteers from the district of Crusia, as it is called; and when the battle had just been fought, others joined them from Olynthus. When the light-armed from Spartolus saw these, being encouraged by the accession to their force, and by the fact that they were not worsted before, in conjunction with the Chalcidian horse and the late reinforcement they attacked the Athenians again; who retired to the two divisions they had left with the baggage. Whenever the Athenians advanced against them, they gave way; but on their beginning to retreat, they pressed them close, and harassed them with their darts. The cavalry of the Chalcidians also rode up and charged them wherever they pleased; and having struck the greatest panic into them, routed and pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians fled for refuge to Potidæa, and having subsequently recovered their dead by truce, returned to Athens with the remnant of the army; four hundred and thirty of them having been killed, and all the generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiæans erected a trophy, and after taking up their dead, separated to their different cities.

80. The same summer, not long after these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians wishing to subdue the whole of Acarnania, and to separate it from its connexion with Athens, persuaded the Lacedæmonians to equip a fleet from their confederacy, and to send one thousand heavy-armed to Acarnania; saying that if they were to join them with both a naval and land force, while the Acarnanians on the coast were unable to succour [their countrymen], after gaining possession of Acarnania, they would easily make themselves masters of Zacynthus and Cephallenia; and so the Athenians would no longer find the circumnavigation of the Peloponnese what it had hitherto been. They suggested too that there was a hope of taking Naupactus also. Being thus persuaded, the Lacedæmonians despatched immediately Cnemus, who was still high-admiral, and the heavy-armed on board a few vessels; while they sent round orders for the fleet to prepare as quickly as possible, and sail to Leucas. Now the Corinthians were

most hearty in the cause of the Ambraciots, who were a colony of theirs; and the squadrons from Corinth and Sicyon, and those parts were in preparation; while those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia had arrived before, and were waiting for them at Leucas. In the mean time Cnemus and the one thousand heavy-armed with him had effected a passage unobserved by Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian ships that kept guard off Naupactus; and they immediately prepared for the expedition by land. There were with him, of the Greeks, the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and his own force of one thousand Peloponnesians; of the barbarians, one thousand Chaonians, who were not under kingly government, but who were led by Photys and Nicanor, of the family to which the chieftainship was confined, with a yearly exercise of that power. With the Chaonians some Thesprotians also joined the expedition, being [like them] not under kingly government. Some Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabylinthus, as guardian of Tharypus, their king, who was yet a minor; and some Paraveans by Oroëdus their king. One thousand of the Orestians, of whom Antiochus was king, accompanied the Paraveans, Oroëdus being intrusted with the command of them by that monarch. Perdicas also, without the knowledge of the Athenians, sent one thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late. With this force Cnemus commenced his march, without waiting the arrival of the fleet from Corinth: and in their passage through the Argive country they sacked Limnæa, an unfortified village; and then went against Stratus, the capital city of Acarnania, thinking that if they took that first, the other towns would readily surrender to them.

81. The Acarnanians, finding that a large army had invaded them by land, and that the enemy would also be upon them with a fleet by sea, did not prepare to make any united resistance, but to defend their own separate possessions; while they sent to Phormio, and desired him to succour them; who, however, said that it was impossible for him to leave Naupactus unprotected, while a fleet was on the point of sailing out from Corinth. So the Peloponnesians and their allies, having formed themselves into three divisions, were advancing to the city of Stratus; that after encamping near to it, they might attempt the wall by force, if they could not prevail

on them [to surrender] by words. As they advanced, the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians occupied the centre ; the Leucadians and Anactorians, and those with them, were on their right ; and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on their left : but they were at a considerable distance from each other, and sometimes not even within sight. The Greeks advanced in good order, and keeping a look-out, until they had encamped in a convenient position ; but the Chaonians, confident in themselves, and being reputed by the inhabitants of those parts of the continent to be the most warlike tribe, did not wait to take up their position, but rushing on with the rest of the barbarians thought they should take the town at the first assault, and so the achievement would be all their own. The Stratians, informed of this while they were yet coming on, and thinking that if they could defeat them while thus by themselves, the Greeks would not attack them with the same eagerness, laid an ambush near the walls ; and when they had come near, attacked them in close combat, both from the town and from the ambuscade. Being thrown into consternation, great numbers of the Chaonians were slain ; and when the rest of the barbarians saw them giving way, they no longer stood their ground, but took to flight. Now neither of the Greek ¹divisions was aware of the battle, as their confederates had proceeded far in advance, and had been supposed to be hurrying on to occupy their encampment. But when the barbarians broke in upon them in their flight, they rallied them ; and after uniting their separate divisions, remained there quiet during the day ; as the Stratians did not come to close quarters with them, because the rest of the Acarnanians had not arrived to help them ; but annoyed them with their slings from a distance, and distressed them, (for it was impossible for them to stir without their armour,) the Acarnanians being considered to excel very much in this mode of warfare.

82. When night came on, Cnemus retired as quickly as he could with his army to the river Anapus, which is eighty stades distant from Stratus, and the next day recovered his dead by truce ; and the Ceniadæ having joined him, on the ground of a friendly connexion, he fell back upon that city before the reinforcements of the enemy had arrived. Thence

¹ Or, "camps," the word being frequently used in both senses.

they departed to their respective homes ; while the Stratians erected a trophy for the result of their engagement with the barbarians.

83. Now the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates coming from the Crisæan Bay, which ought to have joined Cnemus, in order to prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from succouring their countrymen in the interior, did not do so ; but they were compelled, about the same time as the battle was fought at Stratus, to come to an engagement with Phormio and the twenty Athenian vessels that kept guard at Naupactus. For Phormio kept watching them as they coasted along out of the gulf, wishing to attack them in the open sea. But the Corinthians and the allies were not sailing to Acarnania with any intention to fight by sea, but were equipped more for land service. When, however, they saw them sailing along opposite to them, as they themselves proceeded along their own coast ; and on attempting to cross over from Patræ in Achaia to the mainland opposite, on their way to Acarnania, observed the Athenians sailing against them from Chalcis and the river Evenus ; (for they had not escaped their observation when they had endeavoured to bring to secretly during the night ;) under these circumstances they were compelled to engage in the mid passage. They had separate commanders for the contingents of the different states that joined the armament, but those of the Corinthians were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharcidas. And now the Peloponnesians ranged their ships in a circle, as large as they could without leaving any opening, with their prows turned outward and their sterns inward ; and placed inside all the small craft that accompanied them, and their five best sailers, to advance out quickly and strengthen any point on which the enemy might make his attack.

84. On the other hand, the Athenians, ranged in a single line, kept sailing round them, and reducing them into a smaller compass ; continually brushing past them, and making demonstrations of an immediate onset ; though they had previously been commanded by Phormio not to attack them till he himself gave the signal. For he hoped that their order would not be maintained like that of a land-force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of each other, and that the other craft would cause confusion ; and if the wind should blow from the

gulf, in expectation of which he was sailing round them, and which usually rose towards morning, that they would not remain steady an instant. He thought too that it rested with *him* to make the attack, whenever he pleased, as his ships were better sailers [than those opposed to him]; and that then would be the best time for making it. So when the wind came down upon them, and their ships, being now brought into a narrow compass, were thrown into confusion by the operation of both causes—the violence of the wind, and the small craft dashing against them—and when ship was falling foul of ship, and the crews were pushing them off with poles, and in their shouting, and trying to keep clear, and abusing each other, did not hear a word either of their orders or the boatswains' directions; while, through inexperience, they could not lift their oars in the swell of the sea, and so rendered the vessels less obedient to the helmsmen; just then, at that favourable moment, he gave the signal. And the Athenians attacked them, and first of all sunk one of the admiral-ships, then destroyed all wherever they went, and reduced them to such a condition, that owing to their confusion none of them thought of resistance, but they fled to Patræ and Dyme, in Achaia. The Athenians having closely pursued them, and taken twelve ships, picking up most of the men from them, and putting them on board their own vessels, sailed off to Molycrium; and after erecting a trophy at Rhium, and dedicating a ship to Neptune, they returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also immediately coasted along with their remaining ships from Dyme and Patræ to Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans; and Cnemus and the ships that were at Leucas, which were to have formed a junction with these, came thence, after the battle at Stratus, to the same port.

85. Then the Lacedæmonians sent to the fleet, as counsellors to Cnemus, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron; commanding him to make preparations for a second engagement more successful than the former, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For the result appeared very different from what they might have expected; (particularly as it was the first sea-fight they had attempted;) and they thought that it was not so much their fleet that was inferior, but that there had been some cowardice [on the part of the admiral]; for

they did not weigh the long experience of the Athenians against their own short practice of naval matters. They despatched them therefore in anger ; and on their arrival they sent round, in conjunction with Cnemus, orders for ships to be furnished by the different states, while they refitted those they already had, with a view to an engagement. Phormio too, on the other hand, sent messengers to Athens to acquaint them with their preparations, and to tell them of the victory they had [themselves] gained ; at the same time desiring them to send him quickly the largest possible number of ships, for he was in daily expectation of an immediate engagement. They despatched to him twenty ; but gave additional orders to the commander of them to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was their *proxenus*, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, telling them that he would reduce it under their power ; for it was at present hostile to them. His object, however, in calling them in was, that he might oblige the Polichnitæ, who bordered on the Cydonians. The commander therefore of the squadron went with it to Crete, and in conjunction with the Polichnitæ laid waste the territory of the Cydonians ; and wasted no little time in the country, owing to adverse winds and the impossibility of putting to sea.

86. During the time that the Athenians were thus detained on the coast of Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, having made their preparations for an engagement, coasted along to Panormus in Achæa, where the land-force of the Peloponnesians had come to support them. Phormio, too, coasted along to the Rhium near Molycrium, and dropped anchor outside of it, with twenty ships, the same as he had before fought with. This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians ; the other, namely, that in the Peloponnese, is opposite to it ; the distance between the two being about seven stades of sea, which forms the mouth of the Crissæan Gulf. At the Rhium in Achæa, then, being not far from Panormus, where their land-force was, the Peloponnesians also came to anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw that the Athenians had done the same. And for six or seven days they lay opposite each other, practising and preparing for the battle ; the Peloponnesians intending not to sail beyond the Rhia into the open sea, for they were afraid of a disaster like the former ; the Athenians, not to sail into the straits, for they thought that fighting in a confined

space was in favour of the enemy. Afterwards Cnemus, and Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement as quickly as they could, before any reinforcement came from Athens, assembled the men first; and seeing the greater part of them frightened in consequence of their former defeat, and not eager for the battle, they cheered them by speaking as follows:

87. "The late sea-fight, Peloponnesians, if owing to it any one be afraid of this before us, affords no just ¹grounds for his alarm. For it was deficient, as you know, in preparation; and we were sailing not so much for a naval engagement as for a land expedition. It happened too that not a few of the chances of war were against us; while partly, perhaps, our inexperience caused our failure, as it was our first battle by sea. It was not then through our cowardice that we experienced the defeat; nor is it right that our spirits, which were not crushed by force, but still retain a measure of ²defiance to the enemy, should lose their edge from the result of that mishap. We should rather think, that men may indeed be overthrown by mere chances, but that in spirit the same men ought always to be brave; and that while their courage remains, they cannot reasonably on any occasion act like cowards under the cloak of inexperience. In your case, however, you are not so far inferior to the enemy, even through your inexperience, as you are superior to him in daring. As for their skill, of which you are most afraid, if indeed it be joined with courage, it will also be accompanied with presence of mind in danger to execute what it has learned; but without gallantry no art whatever is of any avail in the face of perils. For fear banishes presence of mind; and art without bravery is good for nothing. Against their greater experience then put your own greater daring; against your fear in consequence of your defeat put the fact of your having then been unprepared; and

¹ Literally, "no ground for drawing this conclusion, so as to alarm him;" the infinitive τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι being explanatory of τέκμαρσιν.

² Ἀντιλογίαν is opposed to "the acknowledgment of our own defeat," and signifies literally "making answer; maintaining the quarrel."—*Arnold*. Compare the use of our word "controversy," by which it may generally be rendered, in Shakspeare's *Julius Cæsar*.

"The torrent roar'd, and we did buffet it
With lusty sinews; throwing it aside,
And stemming it with hearts of controversy."

there is in your favour a clear balance of superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast in the presence of your heavy-armed; and victory, generally speaking, declares for those who are the more numerous and better appointed. On no one single ground then do we find it probable that we should be defeated. As for the blunders we committed before, the very fact of their having been committed will now teach us a lesson. With good courage, therefore, both steersmen and sailors, do every man your own duty, without leaving the post assigned to each. And *we* will prepare for the engagement not worse than your former commanders; and will give no one any excuse for being a coward: but if any one should wish to be one, he shall be visited with the punishment he deserves; while the brave shall be honoured with the rewards befitting their bravery."

88. Such was the exhortation given to the Peloponnesians by their commanders. Phormio, on the other hand, being also alarmed at the apprehensions of his men, and perceiving that they formed in groups amongst themselves, and showed their fears of the superior numbers of the ships opposed to them, wished to assemble and cheer them, and offer them some advice at the present juncture. For before this he always used to tell them, and prepare their minds for the conviction, that there was no number of ships whatever so great that they ought not to face it, if it sailed against them; and his men had for a long time entertained this resolution, that from no multitude of Peloponnesian ships whatever would they, Athenians as they were, retire. Seeing them, however, at that time out of spirits, he wished to remind them of their former confidence, and therefore called them together, and addressed them as follows:

89. "Seeing you, my men, alarmed at the numbers of your opponents, I have called you together; as I do not wish you to be in dread of what is not really to be feared. For these men, in the first place, because they have been previously conquered by us, and do not even themselves think that they are a match for us, have equipped this great number of ships, and not such as would be merely equal to ours. Then, for the fact on which they chiefly rely in coming against us—that it is their natural character to be courageous—they feel this confidence for no other reason than because they are

generally successful owing to their experience in land-service ; and they think 'it will do the same for them at sea. But this, in all reason, will rather be our advantage now, as it is theirs in that case : for in valour they are not at all superior to us ; but from our being respectively more experienced in one particular service, we are also more confident respecting it. Moreover, the Lacedæmonians lead their allies from regard to their own glory, and bring the greater part of them into dangers against their will ; else, [without such compulsion,] they would have never dared to fight again by sea, after being so decidedly beaten. Do not then be afraid of their boldness. It is *you* that cause *them* a much greater and better-founded alarm, both on the ground of your having previously conquered them, and because they think we should not have faced them if we did not mean to do something worthy our decisive victory. For when equal to their opponents, men generally come against them, as these do, trusting to their power rather than to their spirit ; but those who dare to meet them with far inferior resources, and yet without being compelled, do so because they have the strong assurance of their own resolution. From this consideration these men fear us more for the inequality of our preparations, than they would have done for more proportionate ones. Many armies, too, have ere now been overthrown by an inferior force through want of skill, and others through want of daring ; with neither of which have we now any thing to do. As for the battle, I will not, if I can help, fight it in the strait ; nor will I sail in there at all ; being aware that for a few skilfully managed and fast-sailing vessels, against a large number unskilfully managed, want of sea-room is a disadvantage. For one could neither sail up as he ought to the charge, without having a view of the enemy from a distance ; nor retire at the proper time, if hard-pressed ; and there is no breaking through the line, nor returning to a second charge—which are the manœuvres of the better-sailing vessels—but the sea-fight must in that case become a land-fight ; and then the greater number of ships gain the superiority. On these points then I will exercise as much forethought as possible ; and do you, remaining in good order in your ships, be quick in receiving

¹ For an explanation of the confused construction in this passage, see Arnold's note.

the word of command ; especially as our post of observation is at so short a distance : and during the action attach the greatest importance to order and silence, which is of service for operations of war in general, and for a naval engagement more particularly : and repel these your enemies in a manner worthy of your former achievements. Great indeed is the struggle in which you are engaged, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesians as regards their navy, or to bring nearer home to the Athenians apprehensions for the command of the sea. Again I remind you that you have already conquered the greater part of them ; and the spirits of defeated men will not be what they were, in the face of the same dangers."

90. Such was the exhortation that Phormio, on his side, addressed to his men. Now when the Athenians did not sail into the narrow part of the gulf to meet them, the Peloponnesians, wishing to lead them on even against their will, weighed in the morning, and having formed their ships in a column four abreast, sailed to their own land towards the inner part of the gulf, with the right wing taking the lead, in which position also they lay at anchor. In this wing they had placed their twenty best sailors ; that if Phormio, supposing them to be sailing against Naupactus, should himself also coast along in that direction to relieve the place, the Athenians might not, by getting outside their wing, escape their advance against them, but that these ships might shut them in. As they expected, he was alarmed for the place in its unprotected state ; and when he saw them under weigh, against his will, and in great haste too, he embarked his crews and sailed along shore ; while the land-forces of the Messenians at the same time came to support him. When the Peloponnesians saw them coasting along in a single file, and already within the gulf and near the shore, (which was just what they wished,) at one signal they suddenly brought their ships round and sailed in a line, as fast as each could, against the Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships. Eleven of them, however, which were taking the lead, escaped the wing of the Peloponnesians and their sudden turn into the open gulf ; but the rest they surprised, and drove them on shore, in their attempt to escape, and destroyed them, killing such of the crews as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships

they lashed to their own and began to tow off empty, and one they took men and all; while in the case of some others, the Messenians, coming to their succour, and dashing into the sea with their armour, and boarding them, fought from the decks, and rescued them when they were already being towed off.

91. To this extent then the Peloponnesians had the advantage, and destroyed the Athenian ships; while their twenty vessels in the right wing were in pursuit of those eleven of the enemy that had just escaped their turn into the open gulf. They, with the exception of one ship, got the start of them and fled for refuge to Naupactus; and facing about, opposite the temple of Apollo, prepared to defend themselves, in case they should sail to shore against them. Presently they came up, and were singing the pæan as they sailed, considering that they had gained the victory; and the one Athenian vessel that had been left behind was chased by a single Leucadian far in advance of the rest. Now there happened to be a merchant-vessel moored out at sea, which the Athenian ship had time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in pursuit of her amid-ship, and sunk her. The Peloponnesians therefore were panic-stricken by this sudden and unlooked for achievement; and moreover, as they were pursuing in disorder, on account of the advantage they had gained, some of the ships dropped their oars, and stopped in their course, from a wish to wait for the rest—doing what was unadvisable, considering that they were observing each other at so short a distance—while others even ran on the shoals, through their ignorance of the localities.

92. The Athenians, on seeing this, took courage, and at one word shouted for battle, and rushed upon them. In consequence of their previous blunders and their present confusion, they withstood them but a short time, and then fled to Panormus, whence they had put out. The Athenians pursued them closely, and took six of the ships nearest to them, and recovered their own, which the enemy had disabled near the shore and at the beginning of the engagement, and had taken in tow. Of the men, they put some to death, and made others prisoners. Now on board the Leucadian ship, which went down off the merchant-vessel, was Timocrates the Lacedæmonian; who, when the ship was destroyed, killed himself, and falling overboard was floated into the harbour of Naupactus. On their return, the Athenians erected a trophy at the

spot from which they put out before gaining the victory; and all the dead and the wrecks that were near their coast they took up, and gave back to the enemy theirs under truce. The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy, as victors, for the defeat of the ships they had disabled near the shore; and the ship they had taken they dedicated at Rhium, in Achæa, by the side of the trophy. Afterwards, being afraid of the reinforcement from Athens, all but the Leucadians sailed at the approach of night into the Crisæan Bay and the port of Corinth. Not long after their retreat, the Athenians from Crete arrived at Naupactus, with the twenty ships that were to have joined Phormio before the engagement. And thus ended the summer.

93. Before, however, the fleet dispersed which had retired to Corinth and the Crisæan Bay, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the rest of the Peloponnesian commanders wished, at the suggestion of the Megareans, to make an attempt upon Piræus, the port of Athens; which, as was natural from their decided superiority at sea, was left unguarded and open. It was determined, therefore, that each man should take his oar, and cushion, and ¹*tropoter*, and go by land from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens; and that after proceeding as quickly as possible to Megara, they should launch from its port, Nisæa, forty vessels that happened to be there, and sail straightway to Piræus. For there was neither any fleet keeping guard before it, nor any thought of the enemy ever sailing against it in so sudden a manner; and as for their venturing to do it openly and deliberately, they supposed that either they would not think of it, or themselves would not fail to be aware beforehand, if they should. Having adopted this resolution, they proceeded immediately [to execute it]; and when they had arrived by night, and launched the vessels from Nisæa, they sailed, not against Athens as they had intended, for they were afraid of the risk, (²some wind or other was also said to have prevented them,) but to the headland of Salamis looking towards Megara; where there was a fort, and a guard of three

¹ Supposed to have been a thong, or rope, wound round the loom of a portlock oar, and serving the triple purpose of a counterpoise, a nut, and a loop. See Arnold, vol. i. Appendix 3.

² *Tis* is here used, I think, with that signification of *contempt* which it sometimes conveys; to mark the writer's utter disbelief of the report alluded to.

ships to prevent any thing from being taken in or out of Megara. So they assaulted the fort, and towed off the triremes empty; and making a sudden attack on the rest of Salamis, they laid it waste.

94. Now fire-signals of an enemy's approach were raised towards Athens, and a consternation was caused by them not exceeded by any during the whole war. For those in the city imagined that the enemy had already sailed into Piræus; while those in Piræus thought that Salamis had been taken, and that they were all but sailing into their harbours: which indeed, if they would but have not been afraid of it, might easily have been done; and it was not a *wind* that would have prevented it. But at day-break the Athenians went all in a body to Piræus to resist the enemy; and launched their ships, and going on board with haste and much uproar, sailed with the fleet to Salamis, while with their land-forces they mounted guard at Piræus. When the Peloponnesians saw them coming to the rescue, after overrunning the greater part of Salamis, and taking both men and booty, and the three ships from the port of Budorum, they sailed for Nisæa as quickly as they could; for their vessels too caused them some alarm, as they had been launched after lying idle a long time, and were not at all water-tight. On their arrival at Megara they returned again to Corinth by land. When the Athenians found them no longer on the coast of Salamis, they also sailed back; and after this alarm they paid more attention in future to the safety of Piræus, both by closing the harbours, and by all other precautions.

95. About the same period, in the beginning of this winter, Sitalces son of Teres, the king of the Odrysian Thracians, made an expedition against Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Thrace-ward Chalcidians; of two promises wishing to enforce the one, and himself to perform the other. For Perdiccas had made him certain promises if he would effect a reconciliation between him and the Athenians, when he was hard pressed by the war at its commencement, and if he would not restore his brother Philip, who was at enmity with him, to place him on the throne; but he was not disposed to perform what he had promised. On the other hand, Sitalces had pledged himself to the Athenians, when he entered into alliance with them, to bring the Chalcidian war in Thrace to

a successful issue. It was with both these objects then that he made the invasion; in which he took with him Philip's son Amyntas, to set him on the throne of Macedonia, and some envoys from Athens, who happened to be at his court on this business, and Hagnon as commander; for the Athenians also were to join him against the Chalcidians with a fleet, and as large an army as they could raise.

96. Setting out then from the Odrysians, he summoned to his standard, first the Thracians within Mount Hæmus and Rhodope, as many as were subject to him, as far as the coast of the Euxine and the Hellespont; next the Getæ beyond Hæmus, and all the other hordes that were settled¹ south of the Danube, more towards the sea-board of the Euxine; the Getæ and the tribes in this part being both borderers on the Scythians, and equipped in the same manner, for they are all mounted bowmen. He also invited many of the Highland Thracians, who are independent, and armed with swords; they are called the Dii, and are mostly inhabitants [of the valleys] of Hæmus: some of these he engaged as mercenaries, while others followed him as volunteers. Moreover, he summoned the Agrianians and Lææans and all the other Pæonian tribes that acknowledged his sway. And these were the last people in his dominion, for at the Graæans and Lææans, both of them Pæonian tribes, and at the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scomius through their country, his empire terminated on the side of the Pæonians, who from this point were independent. On the side of the Triballi, who were also independent, the border tribes were the Treres and Tilatæans, who live to the north of Mount Scombrus, and stretch towards the west as far as the river Oscius. This river flows from the same mountain as the Nestus and the Hebrus, an uninhabited and extensive range, joining on to Rhodope.

97. The extent then of the Odrysian dominion, taking the line of its sea-coast, was from the city of Abdera to the Euxine, up to the mouth of the Danube. This tract is by the shortest way a voyage of four days and nights for a merchant-vessel, supposing the wind to be always steady astern. By land, taking the shortest way from Abdera to the [mouth of] the Danube, a quick traveller performs the journey in eleven days. Such was the extent of its sea-board. As for the in-

¹ Literally, "within the Danube."

terior, from Byzantium to the Lææans and the Strymon, (for at this point it reached its greatest extent up the country from the sea,) for a quick traveller it was a journey of thirteen days. The tribute raised from all the barbarian dominions and the Grecian cities, taking the sum which they paid under Seuthes, who was successor of Sitalces, and raised it to its greatest amount, was about 400 talents in gold and silver. Presents were also made to no less an amount in gold and silver; and besides these there was all the clothing, both figured and plain, and other articles for use; and that not only for himself, but for those of the Odrysians also who were his lords and nobles. For they established their custom the very reverse of that in the Persian kingdom, (though it prevails amongst the rest of the Thracians also,) namely, to receive rather than to give; and it was considered more disgraceful not to give when asked, than not to succeed by asking. But [though the other Thracians practised the same thing], still the Odrysians, owing to their greater power, practised it to a greater extent; for it was impossible to get any thing done without making presents. The kingdom then had reached a high pitch of power. For of all those in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was the greatest in amount of revenue and general prosperity; while in military power and number of troops it was decidedly next to that of the Scythians. But with *this* not only is it impossible for those in Europe to vie, but even in Asia, putting one nation against another, there is none that can stand up against the Thracians, if they are all unanimous. Not, however, that they are on a level with other men in general good management and understanding in the things of common life.

98. Sitalces, then, being king over all this extent of country, prepared his army to take the field. And when all was ready for him, he set out and marched against Macedonia; at first through his own dominions, then over Cercine, a desert mountain, which forms the boundary between the Sintians and Pæonians, crossing it by a road which he had himself before made, by felling the timber, when he turned his arms against the Pæonians. In crossing this mountain from the Odrysians, they had the Pæonians on their right, and on their left the Sintians and Mædians; and after crossing it they arrived at Doberus in Pæonia. While he was on the march,

there was no diminution of his army, (except by disease,) but accessions to it; for many of the independent Thracians, though uninvited, followed him for plunder; so that the whole number is said to have been not less than one hundred and fifty thousand, of which the greater part was infantry, but about a third cavalry. Of the cavalry the Odrysians themselves furnished the largest portion; next to them, the Getæ. Of the infantry, the most warlike were those armed with swords, the independent tribe that came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him, was far more formidable for its numbers than any thing else.

99. They mustered, then, at Doberus, and made their preparations for bursting from the highland down upon the lower Macedonia, which formed the dominion of Perdiccas. For under the name of Macedonians are included also the Lyncestæ and Elemiotæ, and other highland tribes, which are in alliance with the lowlanders and subject to them, but have separate kingdoms of their own. But the Macedonia along the coast, now properly so called, was first acquired and governed by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, who were originally of the family of Temenus of Argos. These expelled by force of arms the Pierians from Pieria, who afterwards lived under Mount Pangæus, beyond the Strymon, in Phagres and some other places (and even now the country under Pangæus down to the sea continues to be called the Pierian Gulf). They also drove out of the country called Bottia, the Bottiæans, who now live on the confines of the Chalcidians; while in Pæonia they acquired a narrow strip of territory along the river Axius, stretching down to Pella and the sea-coast; and beyond the Axius, as far as the Strymon, they occupy what is called Mygdonia, having expelled the Edonians from it. Again, they drove out the Eordians from what is now called Eordia, (of whom the greater part perished, though a small division of them is settled about Physca,) as also the Almopians from Almopia. Those Macedonians, moreover, subdued [the places belonging to] the other tribes, which they still continue to hold, such as Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of the country that belonged to the original Macedonians. The whole of it is called Macedonia, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, was king of the country when Sitalces invaded it.

100. These Macedonians, then, on the approach of so large an enemy, not being able to offer any resistance, betook themselves to their strong-holds and fortifications, such as they had in the country. These, however, were not numerous; but it was at a later period that Archelaus son of Perdiccas, when he came to the throne, built those which are now in the country, and cut straight roads, and made other arrangements, both for its having horses and arms for war, and resources of all other kinds, better than had been provided by all the rest of the kings, eight in number, who had preceded him. Now the army of the Thracians, advancing from Dobrus, overran first of all what had once been the government of Philip; and took Idomene by storm, and Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places by capitulation, as they came over to him from their friendship for Amyntas, Philip's son, who was with him. To Europus they laid siege, but could not reduce it. Afterwards he advanced into the rest of Macedonia, on the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Beyond these they did not march, namely, into Bottiæa and Pieria, but stayed to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians, meanwhile, had not even a thought of resisting them with their infantry; but having sent for an additional supply of horse from their allies in the interior, attacked the Thracian host, few as they were against so many, wherever an opportunity offered. And wherever they charged them, no one stood his ground against troops who were excellent horsemen and armed with breastplates; but surrounded as they were by superior numbers, they exposed themselves to peril by fighting against that crowd of many times their own number: so that at length they kept quiet, not thinking themselves able to run such hazards against a force so far superior.

101. In the mean time, Sitalces conferred with Perdiccas on the objects of his expedition; and since the Athenians had not joined him with their fleet, (not believing that he would come,) but had sent presents and envoys to him, he sent a part of his forces against the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, and after shutting them up within their walls, laid waste their country. While he was staying in these parts, the people towards the south, as the Thessalians, the Magnesians, with others who were subject to the Thessalians, and the Greeks as far as Thermopylæ, were afraid that the army might ad-

vance against them, and were preparing [for such an event]. The northward Thracians, too, beyond the Strymon were alarmed, as many as lived in a champaign country, namely, the Panæi, the Odomanti, the Droi, and the Dersæi; who are all independent. Nay, it afforded subject of discussion even with the Greeks who were enemies of the Athenians, whether they were not led on by that people on the strength of their alliance, and might not come against *them* also. Sitalces then was commanding at once Chalcidice, Bottica, and Macedonia, and was ravaging them all. But when none of the objects for which he made the expedition was being gained by him, and he found his army without provisions and suffering from the severity of the weather, he was persuaded by Seuthes the son of Spardacus, who was his nephew and next in authority to himself, to return with all speed. For Seuthes had been secretly won over by Perdiccas, who promised to give him his sister, and a sum of money with her. Thus persuaded then, after remaining [in the enemy's country] thirty days in all, and eight of them in Chalcidice, he retired home with his army as quickly as he could: and Perdiccas subsequently gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes, as he had promised. Such were the events that happened in the expedition of Sitalces.

102. During this winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians had dispersed, the Athenians at Naupactus under the command of Phormio, after coasting along to Astacus, and there disembarking, marched into the interior of Acarnania, with four hundred heavy-armed of the Athenians from the ships and four hundred of the Messenians. From Stratus, Coronta, and some other places, they expelled certain individuals who were not thought to be true to them; and having restored Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, returned again to their vessels. For against the Æniadæ, who alone of the Acarnanians had always been hostile to them, they did not think it possible to march during the winter, as the river Achelous, which flows from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the country of the Agræans and Amphilocheians and the plain of Acarnania, passing by the town of Stratus in the upper part of its course, and by Æniadæ near its mouth, forms lakes round their city, and so makes it impracticable to lead an army against it in the winter on account of the water. Op-

posite to Æniadæ lie most of the islands called Echinades, close to the mouths of the Achelous; so that the river, being so large as it is, continually forms depositions round them, and some of the islands have been joined to the continent, as I expect will be the case with all of them in no long period of time. For the stream is strong, and deep, and turbid, and the islands are thick together, and mutually serve to connect the alluvium so as to prevent its being dispersed; as they lie in alternating rows, not in one line, and have no free passages for the water into the open sea. They are uninhabited, and of no great extent. ¹ There is a report which I may also mention, that when Alcmaeon, son of Amphiaraus, was wandering about after the murder of his mother, Apollo directed him by an oracle to inhabit this region, by suggesting to him that he would have no release from his terrors till he should discover and inhabit a country which had not yet been seen by the sun, nor existed as land, at the time he slew his mother; since all the rest of the earth was polluted to him. He was perplexed, they say, [by such a command]; but at length observed this alluvial deposition of the Achelous, and thought that enough might have been thrown up to support life during the long period that he had been a wanderer since killing his mother. Accordingly he settled in the parts about Æniadæ, and became powerful, and left the name to the country from his son Acarnan. Such is the account we have received respecting Alcmaeon.

103. The Athenians then, and Phormio, having departed from Acarnania and arrived at Naupactus, sailed home to Athens at the return of spring, taking with them such of the prisoners from the naval battles as were freemen, (who were exchanged man for man,) and the ships they had captured. And so ended this winter, and the third year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

¹ Such appears to be the force of the conjunctions *δὲ καί*, by which the following story is introduced in connexion with the preceding account of the islands.

BOOK III.

1. THE following summer, as soon as the corn was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. There they encamped, and laid waste the land; while charges were made upon them, as usual, by the Athenian cavalry, wherever opportunity offered; and they prevented the main host of the light-armed from advancing far from ¹their camp, and damaging the property near the city. After remaining in the country the time for which they had taken provisions, they returned and dispersed to their respective cities.

2. Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, all Lesbos, with the exception of Methymna, revolted from the Athenians; having wished indeed to do so before the commencement of the war, (the Lacedæmonians, however, did not accept their offers,) and yet compelled even now to execute their purpose sooner than they intended. For they were inclined to wait the completion of the moles for the security of their harbours, and of the building of their walls and ships, and the arrival of all that was to come from the Pontus, namely, bowmen and corn, and whatever they had sent for. [But this they were prevented doing:] ²for the Tenedians, who were at variance with them, and the Methymnæans, and even some private individuals of the Mytilenæans, under the influence of party spirit, as *proxeni* of the Athenians informed that people that the Mytilenæans were forcibly bringing [the rest of] Lesbos into union with their own city, and hurrying all their preparations for a revolt, in conjunction with the

¹ Literally, "from their arms," i. e. the place in which the spears and shields of the heavy-armed soldiers were piled; and so, in a more general sense, the camp where they were quartered.

² The γὰρ in this sentence refers to ἀναγκασθέντες in the first section; as that in the preceding one does to διανοούντο.

Lacedæmonians and Bœotians, ¹who were of the same race as themselves, and that if some one did not at once anticipate their designs, they would lose Lesbos.

3. But the Athenians (being distressed by the plague and the war, which had so recently broken out and was now at its height) thought it a serious business to incur the additional hostility of Lesbos, with her fleet and power hitherto unimpaired; and were not at first disposed to listen to the charges, allowing too much weight to their wish that it might not be true. When, however, they had even sent ambassadors without prevailing on the Mytilenæans to stop their measures for the union and their preparations, they were alarmed, and wished to reduce them by surprise. Accordingly they despatched with all haste forty ships that happened to have been equipped for cruising round the Peloponnese, under the command of Cleippides son of Dinias, and two colleagues. For information had been brought them that there was a festival in honour of the Malean Apollo outside the city, at which all the people of the Mytilenæans kept holyday; and there was reason to hope that by coming with all speed they would thus fall upon them by surprise. If then the attempt should succeed, [all would be well]; if not, they ²should charge the Mytilenæans to deliver up their fleet and dismantle their walls; and if they did not obey, should make war upon them. So the ships set sail; but the ten triremes of the Mytilenæans, which had come to them as a reinforcement, according to the terms of their alliance, were detained by the Athenians, and the crews of them were put in prison. The Mytilenæans, however, were informed of the expedition against them by a man who crossed over from Athens to Eubœa, and having gone by land to Geræstus, there found a merchant-vessel getting under weigh, and so proceeded by sea, and arrived at Mytilene the third day after leaving Athens. Accordingly they both abstained from going out to the temple at Malea, and, for the rest, barricaded and kept guard around their half-finished walls.

¹ i. e. of the Æolic race, to which most of the northern states of Greece considered themselves to belong, and amongst the rest the Bœotians, who had chiefly composed the colony headed by Penthius, the son of Orestes, from which the Lesbians derived their origin.

² i. e. the commanders. The infinitive seems to depend upon ἐκείλευσαν, or some such word, understood.

4. When the Athenians sailed up soon after and saw this, the commanders delivered their orders; and as the Mytilenæans did not obey them, they commenced hostilities. Being thus compelled to go to war while unprepared, and without any notice, the Mytilenæans sailed out with their fleet to battle, a short distance from their harbour; but when driven to shore by the Athenian ships, they then proposed terms to the commanders, wishing, if they could, to get the squadron sent back for the present on any reasonable conditions. The Athenian commanders agreed to their proposals, having fears on *their* side also, that they might not be able to carry on war with the whole of Lesbos. Accordingly, having concluded an armistice, the Mytilenæans sent to Athens one of their accusers, who now repented [of what he had said], and some others, to try if by any means they might persuade them to let the squadron return, on the belief of their meditating no innovation. In the mean time they also sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon in a trireme, having escaped the observation of the Athenian fleet, which was anchored at Malea, northward of the city; for they were not confident of the success of the answer from Athens. These having reached Lacedæmon with much trouble across the open sea, negotiated for some succours being sent to them.

5. When the ambassadors from Athens came back without having effected any thing, the Mytilenæans commenced hostilities, and all the rest of Lesbos excepting [the people of] Methymna; but these had reinforced the Athenians, with the Imbrians, Lesbians, and some few of the rest of the allies. The Mytilenæans then made a sally with all their forces against the camp of the Athenians; and a battle was fought, in which though the former had the advantage, they neither spent the night on the field, nor felt any confidence in themselves, but withdrew. After this they remained quiet, wishing to hazard a battle in conjunction with additional troops from the Peloponnese, if any force should join them: (for there had come to them Meleas, a Lacedæmonian, and Hermæondas, a Theban, who had been despatched before the revolt, but not being able to anticipate the expedition of the Athenians, sailed up by stealth in a trireme after the battle, and advised them to send another trireme and ambassadors in company with themselves; which they did.)

6. The Athenians, on the other hand, being much assured by the quiet of the Mytilenæans, were calling allies to join them, who came much quicker from seeing no vigour on the part of the Lesbians; and ¹bringing round their ships to a new station on the south of the town, they fortified two camps, one on each side of the town, and established their blockades at both the harbours. Thus they excluded the Mytilenæans from the use of the sea; but of the whole of the land they were still masters, with the rest of the Lesbians who had now come to their assistance; while the Athenians commanded only the small extent round their camps, Malea being rather a station for their ships and a market [than any thing else]. Such were the features of the war about Mytilene.

7. About the same period of this summer the Athenians also despatched thirty ships to the Peloponnese, with Asopius son of Phormio as commander; the Acarnanians having requested them to send them either a son or other relative of his to take the command. The ships, as they coasted along, ravaged the maritime towns of Laconia. Afterwards Asopius sent back home the greater part of them, but himself went to Naupactus with twelve; and subsequently, having raised the whole population of the Acarnanians, marched against Ceniadæ; sailing with his fleet by the Achelous, and his army by land laying waste the country. When it did not surrender, he dismissed his land-forces, and having himself sailed to Leucas, and made a descent upon Nericus, was cut off on his return, and some part of his army with him, by the people of the neighbourhood who had come to the rescue, and some few guard-troops. The Athenians, after sailing away, subsequently recovered their dead from the Leucadians by treaty.

8. Now the ambassadors of the Mytilenæans sent out in the first ship, being told by the Lacedæmonians to come to Olympia, in order that the rest of the confederates also might hear and consult upon their case, accordingly went thither. It was the Olympiad at which Dorieus the Rhodian gained his second victory. And when after the festival they came to a conference, the envoys spoke as follows:

¹ Gölter differs from Arnold's interpretation which I have given, and takes τὸ πρὸς νότον with ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, thinking that both the camps were to the south of the city, one on the east, the other on the west side of it. See their notes, and also that of Bishop Thirlwall, vol. iii. p. 173.

9. "With the settled principle of the Greeks [with regard to a case like ours], Lacedæmonians and allies, we are well acquainted; for when men revolt in war, and leave their former confederacy, those who receive them are pleased with them so far as they derive benefit from them; but inasmuch as they consider them traitors to their former friends, they have a meaner opinion of them. And this is no unfair estimate of their conduct, supposing that both those who revolt, and those from whom they separate, agreed in their views and in kindly feeling, and were equally matched in resources and power, and no reasonable ground for the revolt previously existed. But this was not the case with us and the Athenians; nor ought we to be worse thought of by any one for revolting from them in the time of their peril, when we were honoured by them in time of peace.

10. "For it is on the justice and goodness of our cause that we will first address you, especially as we are requesting the favour of your alliance; knowing that neither friendship between individuals, nor league between communities, is ever lasting, unless ¹they formed the connexion with an appearance of good principle towards each other, and were of congenial dispositions in other respects; for from difference of feelings difference of conduct also arises. Now between us and the Athenians alliance was first made when you left us, and withdrew from the Median war, while they stood by us to finish the business. We became allies, however, not to the Athenians for the enslaving of the Greeks, but to the Greeks for their liberation from the Mede. And so long as they led us on equal terms, we followed them heartily; but when we saw them relaxing in their hostility to the Mede, and ²undertaking to enslave the Greeks, we were no longer without alarm. Being incapable, however, through the number of those who had votes, to join together and defend themselves, the allies were reduced to slavery, except ourselves and the Chians; but *we* joined their enterprises as independent, forsooth, and free—in *name*. And now we had no longer in the Athenians such leaders as we could trust, having before us the examples that were already given: for it was not

¹ According to Gölle, φίλοι is understood after γίγνεται; according to Poppo, φιλία καὶ κοινωνία before it. I prefer the former construction.

² Or, as Poppo takes it, "bringing on the subjugation."

likely that they should reduce to subjection those whom they had taken into treaty along with us, and not do the same to the rest, if ever they had the power.

11. "If indeed we had all been still independent, they might have been better trusted by us not to attempt any innovation : but having the majority subject to them, while they associated with us on terms of equality ; and comparing the submission of the greater part with our alone being treated as equals, they would naturally brook it the worse ; especially as they were themselves growing more powerful than ever, and we more destitute. But equality of fear is the only sure basis of an alliance ; for then the party that wishes to commit any offence is deterred by the knowledge that he would not attempt it with any advantage on his side. Again, we were left independent for no other reason than inasmuch as their schemes of empire appeared attainable by specious language, and encroachment in the way of policy rather than of force. For at the same time they used us as evidence that such as had equal votes with themselves, at any rate, would not join them in their enterprises against their will ; [and therefore not at all,] unless those they attacked were in the wrong : and by the same system they also led the stronger states with them against the weaker ones first, and by leaving the more powerful until the last they were sure to find them less so, when all the rest had been stripped away from them. But if they had begun with us, while all of them still had their power, and a centre round which to take their stand, they would not have subdued them so easily. Our fleet, too, caused them a degree of fear, lest by uniting together, and joining either you or any other power, it might some time bring them into danger. And again, to a certain extent we preserved ourselves by paying court to their commons, and to those who from time to time took the lead of them. We did not, however, expect to be long able to do so, if this war had not broken out ; looking to the examples they had given in their dealings with the rest.

12. "What then was that alliance of ours, or that freedom to be relied on, in which we received each other contrary to our real sentiments ; and they, through fear, courted us in war, while we did the same to them in peace ? And whereas in the case of others it is kindness that most secures faith, in our case it was fear that gave this assurance ; and we were constrained to

be allies by terror more than by affection ; and to whichever party security should first give confidence, that party was sure to be the first also to violate the treaty in some way or other. If therefore we are thought by any one to be wrong in first revolting, because they deferred the evils we dreaded, while we did not wait in return to see whether any of them would be inflicted, he does not view the case aright. ¹ For if we were able on equal terms with them to return their plots against us, and their delay in the execution of them, what reason was there, that being, [according to this view of the case,] on an equal footing, we should [really] be at their mercy? But as it was always in *their* power to make the attempt, it ought to be in *ours* to guard against it beforehand.

13. "It was on such grounds and with such reasons, Lacedæmonians and allies, that we revolted ; sufficiently clear ones for those who hear them to judge that we acted rightly ; and sufficiently strong ones to alarm us, and make us betake ourselves to some means of safety : which indeed we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you, while the peace yet lasted, on the subject of our revolting, but were prevented by your not receiving us into alliance. But now, when the Boeotians invited us, we immediately listened to their proposals ; and thought that we should withdraw ourselves in a twofold manner ; from the Greeks, so as not to join in injuring them in company with the Athenians, but to join in giving them liberty ; and from the Athenians, so as not to be ruined by them ourselves after the rest, but to be beforehand in acting [against them]. Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely, and without due preparations ; for which reason also it is the more incumbent on you to receive us as allies, and send us succour speedily ; that you may be seen both assisting those whom you ought, and at the same time hurting your enemies. And there is an opportunity for doing that, such as there never was before ; for the Athenians have been wasted both by disease and pecuniary expenditure ; and their ships are either cruising round your coasts, or stationed against us ; so that it is not likely they should have any to spare, if in the course of this summer you should invade them a second time both by

¹ In other words, the *fact* of their being always at the mercy of the Athenians proved the falsity of the *hypothesis* of their being on equal terms with them, and therefore the reasonableness of their anticipating the attack which might at any time be made upon them, instead of waiting till it had actually been made. Such I think is the meaning of this very difficult passage.

sea and land; but they will either offer no resistance to your naval attack, or withdraw their forces from both our shores. And let no one deem that he would thus be incurring peril to himself in defence of another man's country. For whoever thinks Lesbos far off, will find it close at hand for assisting him. For it is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as men imagine, but in that quarter from which Attica derives its succours. Now their revenue is drawn from their allies; and it will be still greater, if they subdue us; for no one else will revolt, and our resources will be added to theirs; and we should be treated worse than those who were enslaved before [they revolted]. But if you will give us hearty assistance, you will both add to your league a state that has a large navy, of which you especially stand in need, and will the more easily overthrow the Athenians, by depriving them of their allies, (for every one will then join you more boldly,) and will escape the charge you have incurred of not assisting those who revolt. If, however, you show yourselves as liberators, you will find your advantage in the war more certain.

14. "From respect then for the hopes of the Greeks reposed in you, and for that Olympian Jupiter in whose temple we stand¹ in the character of suppliants, assist the Mytilenæans by becoming their allies; and do not abandon us [to destruction], standing as we do the brunt of the danger in our own persons, while we shall confer on all a general benefit from our success, and a still more general detriment, if we are ruined through your not being prevailed on to help us. Show yourselves then to be such men as the Greeks esteem you, and as our fear would have you to be."

15. To this effect spoke the Mytilenæans. When the Lacedæmonians and the confederates had heard them, they admitted the force of their arguments, and received the Lesbians into alliance. And with regard to the invasion of Attica, they told the confederates who were present to go with all speed to the isthmus with two thirds of their forces, to put it into execution, and were themselves the first to arrive there, and proceeded to get ready at the isthmus machines for hauling their ships, with a view to transporting them from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens, and making an attack both by sea and land at the same time. They, then, were heartily engaged in these operations; but the rest of the confederates were slow

¹ Literally, "like as suppliants."

in assembling, as they were occupied in gathering in their harvest, and sick of making expeditions.

16. The Athenians were aware that they were making these preparations from a conviction of their weakness; and wishing to show that it was not a correct opinion, but that they were able, without moving the squadron stationed against Lesbos, at the same time to repel with ease that which was coming against them from the Peloponnese, they manned a hundred ships, going on board themselves, (with the exception of the knights and the *'pentacosio-medimni*.) and their resident aliens; and having put out to the isthmus, they made both a display [of their power], and descents on whatever parts of the Peloponnese they pleased. When the Lacedæmonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought that what had been told them by the Lesbians was not true; and considering themselves in a strait, as their allies at the same time had not joined them, and the thirty Athenian ships cruising round the Peloponnese were reported to be ravaging the land near their city, they returned home. Afterwards, however, they prepared a fleet to send to Lesbos, and gave orders to the different states for ships to the number of forty, and appointed Alcidas,² who was to conduct the expedition, their high-admiral. The Athenians, too, returned with their hundred ships, when they saw that the Lacedæmonians had done so.

17. ³At the time that this squadron was at sea, they had

¹ These were the citizens whose lands brought them in yearly 500 medimni (equal to about 94 English quarters) of corn, wine, or oil; and they formed the highest of the four classes into which Solon divided the Athenian people. The knights formed the second class, their qualification being 300 medimni; and were so called from being obliged to serve in war on horseback.

² I am far from certain what is the exact force of this clause, but think it may possibly refer to the fact of Alcidas having been fixed upon to command this expedition *before* the office of high-admiral was conferred upon him; and that his subsequent appointment to that office is also referred to, c. 26. 1, τὰς—ναὺς ἀπέστειλαν ἔχοντα Ἀλκίδα, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς ναύαρχος, προστάξαντες: in which case *προστάξαντες* would be far from being superfluous, as it has generally been supposed. If, however, this interpretation be thought fanciful, the *ἡμελλεν* must simply mean that he "was to conduct the expedition" in his capacity as admiral.

³ "The object of this chapter," as Arnold observes, "is merely to bring in what Thucydides had forgotten to mention in its proper place, namely, the greatest naval force, and the greatest war expenditure, which Athens had ever been able to employ and support; just as he had mentioned, II. 31. 3, the greatest land army which she had ever sent out on one service."

about the largest number of ships they had ever possessed at once, ¹in effective and fine condition : (though they had as many, or even more, at the beginning of the war.) For a hundred kept guard round Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis, while another hundred were cruising about the Peloponnese, besides those at Potidæa and in other places ; so that altogether there were two hundred and fifty [in service] in the course of that one summer. And it was this, in conjunction with Potidæa, that most exhausted their revenues. For at Potidæa the number of heavy-armed that kept guard at two drachmas a day, (for each man received one for himself and another for his servant,) was at first three thousand ; and not fewer than these remained there to the end of the siege, besides one thousand six hundred with Phormio, who went away before it was concluded ; while all the ships, too, received the same pay. In this way then was their money heedlessly lavished at first ; and such was the largest number of ships manned by them.

18. At the same time that the Lacedæmonians were in the neighbourhood of the isthmus, the Mytilenæans marched by land, both themselves and their auxiliaries, against Methymna, in hope of its being betrayed to them. After assaulting the city, when they did not succeed as they had expected to do, they withdrew to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, and having rendered the condition of those towns more secure, and strengthened the fortifications, they returned home. When they had retired, the Methymnæans marched against Antissa ; and being defeated by the inhabitants and their auxiliaries in a sortie that was made, many of them were slain, and the remainder retreated as quickly as possible. The Athenians, on receiving this intelligence of the Mytilenæans' commanding the country, and their own troops not being sufficient to keep them in check, sent, about the beginning of autumn, Paches son of Epicurus as commander, with a thousand heavy-armed of their own ; who having themselves rowed their ships, arrived at Mytilene, and enclosed it all round with a single wall ; forts being built on some of the strongest points of it. Thus the place was vigorously blockaded on both sides, by land and by sea ; and the commencement of winter was near at hand.

¹ Literally, " effective, in fine condition," " with handsomeness," as Bloomfield renders it ; whose interpretation of the passage I prefer to either Göller's or Poppo's.

19. The Athenians, being in want of money for the siege, although they had among themselves for the first time raised a contribution of two hundred talents, despatched to their allies also twelve ships to levy subsidies, and Lysicles with five others in command of them. Accordingly he levied them in various places, cruising about; and having gone up the country from Myus in Caria, across the plain of the Mæander, as far as the hill of Sandius, he was both slain himself and many of the army besides, in an attack made by the Carians and the people of Anæa.

20. The same winter the Plataeans, (for they were still besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians,) when distressed by the failure of their provisions, and when there was no hope of aid from Attica, and no other means of safety presented itself, both themselves and the Athenians who were besieged with them formed a design, in which they were at first unanimous, for all to sally forth and pass the walls of the enemy, if they could force their way over them; the attempt having been suggested to them by Theænetus son of Tolmidæa, a soothsayer, and Eupomidas son of Daimachus, who was also one of their generals. Subsequently half of them shrank from it, thinking it a great risk; but about two hundred and twenty voluntarily persevered in the attempt, [which they effected] in the following manner. They made ladders to suit the height of the enemy's wall, measuring by the layers of bricks, where the wall looking toward them happened to be imperfectly whitewashed. Now many counted the layers at the same time; and though some would naturally miss the correct calculation, the majority would attain it; especially as they counted them many times over, and were also at no great distance, but the wall was easily observed by them as far as they wished. In this way they ascertained the proper length of the ladders, guessing the measure from the thickness of the bricks.

21. Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was of the following construction. It consisted of two lines round the place, one against the Plataeans, and another in case any one should attack them on the outside from Athens; and the lines were about sixteen feet apart. In this interval then of the sixteen feet there were quarters built, and partitioned out amongst the soldiers that were on guard; and these were continuous, so that it appeared but one thick wall, with battlements on each

side. At the distance of every ten battlements there were towers, of considerable size, and of the same breadth as the wall, reaching both to its inner and its outer front, so that there was no passage by the side of a tower, but they passed through the middle of them. During the nights therefore, whenever it was stormy and wet weather, they used to leave the battlements, and to keep watch from the towers, as they were only at a short distance one from another, and were covered in above. Such then was the nature of the wall by which the Plateans were enclosed.

22. When they had made their preparations, having watched for a stormy night of wind and rain, and at the same time moonless, they went forth under the guidance of those who had been the authors of the enterprise. In the first place then they crossed the ditch which ran round their city, and then came up to the enemy's wall, unperceived by the sentinels; for they did not see before them in the dark, and did not hear them owing to the wind, which drowned with its clatter the noise of their approach; besides, they went far apart from each other, that their arms might not clash together and betray them. They were also lightly armed, and had only the left foot shod, for security against slipping in the mire. So they came up to the battlements at one of the spaces between the towers, knowing that they were deserted. First came those who carried the ladders, which they planted; then twelve light-armed, with only a dagger and a breastplate, proceeded to mount, Ammias son of Corcelius leading them, and being the first to mount, and after him his followers, six going to each of the towers. Next after them came another party of light-armed, with darts, whose shields, that they might the more easily advance, others carried in the rear, and were ready to hand them to them whenever they came to the enemy. When a considerable number had got up, the sentinels in the towers discovered it; for one of the Plateans, in laying hold of the battlements, threw down a tile from them, which made a noise as it fell. And immediately a shout was raised, and the troops rushed to the wall, for they did not know what the alarm was, the night being dark, and the weather stormy; and besides, those of the Plateans who had been left behind in the town sallied forth, and made an attack on the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite side to

where their men were getting over, that they might pay as little attention as possible to them. Thus, though they were alarmed, and stood to their several posts, no one ventured to go to the rescue beyond his own station, but they were at a loss to conjecture what was going on. Meanwhile their three hundred, whose orders were to give aid at whatever point it might be necessary, proceeded outside the wall in the direction of the shout. Fire-signals of an attack from the enemy were likewise raised towards Thebes; but the Plataeans in the city also raised many others, which had been prepared beforehand for this purpose, that the indications of the enemy's signals might be indistinct, and so [their friends] might not come to their aid, thinking the business something different from what it really was, till those of their own number who had gone out should have escaped and gained their safety.

23. In the mean time, with regard to the party of Plataeans that were scaling the wall, when the first of them had mounted, and after putting the sentinels to the sword, had taken possession of each of the two towers, they posted themselves in them, and kept guard, to prevent any reinforcement coming through them; and when they had raised ladders to them from the wall, and sent up a considerable party of men, those at the towers kept in check with their missiles,¹ both from above and below, such as were coming to the rescue; while the other and greater part of them had in the mean time planted many ladders, and thrown down the battlements, and were passing over between the towers. As each successively effected his passage, he took his stand on the edge of the ditch; and thence they used their bows and darts against any one that came to the rescue along the wall, and tried to stop the passage [of their comrades]. When all were over, those on the towers descended—the last of them with great difficulty—and proceeded to the ditch; and in the mean time the three hundred were coming against them with torches. Now the Plataeans, as they stood in the dark on the edge of the ditch, had a better view of them, and discharged their arrows and darts against the exposed parts of their bodies; while they themselves, in the obscurity of their position, were the less seen for the torches; so that even the last of the Plataeans

¹ i. e. from the top of the towers and from the wall at their base.

got clear over the ditch, though with difficulty and by a violent effort; for ice had frozen over it, not strong enough to allow of their walking on it, but rather watery, as it usually is with a wind more east than north; and the night being somewhat snowy in consequence of such a wind, had swollen the water in it, which they crossed with their heads barely above it. ²But at the same time their escape was mainly effected through the violence of the storm.

24. Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went in a body along the road leading to Thebes, keeping the chapel of the hero Androcrates on their right, thinking that the Peloponnesians would least suspect their taking *that* road, towards their enemies' country; and in the mean time they saw them in pursuit with torches along the road to Cithæron and the Oak-heads, in the direction of Athens. So after they had gone six or seven stades along the road to Thebes, they then turned off, and took that which leads to the mountain, to Erythræ, and Hysiaë; and having reached the hills, they escaped to Athens, to the number of two hundred and twelve out of one originally greater; for some of them turned back again into the city before they passed over the wall, and one bowman was taken prisoner at the outer ditch. So the Peloponnesians gave up the pursuit and returned to their posts; while the Plataeans in the town, knowing nothing of what had happened, but having been informed by those who returned that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as soon as it was day, and wished to make a truce for taking up their dead; when, however, they knew the truth, they ceased from their application. In this way then the party of Plataeans passed over the wall and were saved.

25. At the close of the same winter, Salaëthus the Lacedæ-

¹ Arnold and Bloomfield, on the authority of the Scholiast, supply *μῆλον* before *ἦ*. Indeed, if both the east and north wind were rainy, from what quarter could a clear and dry frost be expected? For the character here attributed to the east wind, compare Horace, *Epod.* 16. 53, "Ut neque largis Aquosus Eurus arva radat imbribus." In the words that follow, if the *ὄψο* in *ὀπρωσιφομένη* has the diminutive force which is generally attributed to it, the swelling of the water in the ditch must be referred to the general character of the night, as before described; for without the violent storms of rain it is evident that a little snow could have produced no such effect in so short a time.

² The force of the *καί* seems to be, that although the storm increased the difficulty of crossing the ditch, it also contributed very largely to the success of their plan in other respects.

monian was sent out from Lacedæmon in a trireme to Mytilene; and having gone by sea to Pyrrha, and thence by land, he entered Mytilene unobserved, along the bed of a torrent, where the lines round the town were passable, and told the magistrates that there would be an invasion of Attica, and at the same time the ships would come which were to have assisted them before; and that he himself had been despatched in advance on this account, and to attend to all other matters. The Mytilenæans therefore took fresh courage, and thought less of coming to terms with the Athenians. And so ended this winter, and the fourth year of the war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

26. The following summer, after the Peloponnesians had despatched Alcidas, who was their high-admiral, (for they had conferred that office upon him,) with the ¹two and forty ships to Mytilene, they themselves and their allies made an irruption into Attica; that the Athenians, being harassed both ways, might be the less able to send succours against the ships that were sailing to Mytilene. The commander in this irruption was Cleomenes, as representative of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who was king, and still a minor, and Cleomenes was his father's brother. They ravaged therefore both the parts which had been devastated before, if there were any thing that had shot up again, and all that had been passed over in their previous irruptions. And this invasion was most severely felt by the Athenians, next to the second; for continually expecting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement performed by their ships, which they thought had by this time made their passage, they went on committing general devastation. When, however, none of the results which they expected was obtained, and when their provisions had failed, they returned, and were dispersed through their several countries.

27. The Mytilenæans, meanwhile, as the ships from the Peloponnese had not come to them, but were wasting the time, and as their provisions had failed, were compelled to

¹ As only forty are mentioned before, c. 16. 3, and 25. 2, Arnold thinks it possible that the additional two formed the contingent of Lacedæmon itself. They are again spoken of as forty, c. 29. 1, and 69. 1; in which places he may refer to them merely in round numbers. In the words that follow, Arnold agrees with Gôller that either *ἑξήντα* or *πρωτάξαντες* is superfluous; but see note on c. 16. 3.

come to terms with the Athenians, by the following circumstances. Since even Salæthus himself no longer expected the arrival of the fleet, he equipped as heavy-armed soldiers the commons who had before been only light-armed, with a view to sallying out against the Athenians; but as soon as they were in possession of arms, they no longer obeyed their commanders, but collecting in groups, ordered those in power to bring the provision-stores into public view, and divide them amongst all; or they would themselves make terms with the Athenians, and deliver up the city.

28. The members of the government, knowing that they would not be able to prevent them, and that they would themselves be exposed to danger if excluded from the arrangement, made a general agreement with Paches and the army, that the Athenians should be at liberty to adopt what measures they chose respecting the Mytilenæans; that they should receive the army into the city, and send ambassadors to Athens to plead their cause; and that until they returned, Paches should neither throw into prison, nor reduce to slavery, nor put to death, any of the Mytilenæans. This was the nature of the agreement: but those of the inhabitants who had been most prominent in negotiating with the Lacedæmonians, were very much alarmed when the army entered the city, and could not restrain themselves, but went and seated themselves by the altars, notwithstanding [the assurances that had been given]. Paches, however, raised them up with a promise to do them no harm, and deposited them in Tenedos until the Athenians should have come to some determination about them. He also sent some triremes to Antissa, and won the place over; and arranged all other matters concerning the forces as he pleased.

29. Now the Peloponnesians on board the forty ships, who ought with all speed to have joined the Mytilenæans, both lost time in cruising about the Peloponnese itself, and proceeded at their leisure during the rest of the voyage, unobserved by the Athenians at home, until they touched at Delos; after leaving which island they came to land at Icarus and Myconus, and there received the first tidings of the capture of Mytilene. Wishing, however, to know the exact truth of the matter, they put into Embatium in the Erythræan territory; seven days having elapsed from the taking of Mytilene when

they did so. After hearing the exact truth, they consulted on the present state of affairs; and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows:

30. "Alcidas, and the rest of my Peloponnesian colleagues in the command of the forces, my opinion is that we should sail ¹straightway to Mytilene, before we have been heard of. For in all probability we shall find great want of watchfulness, as is usual on the part of men who have but recently taken possession of a city. By sea, indeed, where they have no thought of any enemy attacking them, and where our strength mainly lies, this will be altogether the case; and even their land-forces are likely to be dispersed through the houses too carelessly. If then we were to fall upon them suddenly and in the night, I hope that with the aid of those in the city, (if, indeed, there be any one left who wishes us well,) ²possession of the place might be gained. And let us not shrink from the danger, but consider that the proverbial "surprises of war" are nothing else than chances such as this; which if any one should guard against in his own case, and avail himself of them, when he saw them in the case of his enemy, he would be a most successful general."

31. Such was his speech; but he did not persuade Alcidas. On the other hand, some of the exiles from Ionia and the Lesbians who were on board with them, advised, that since he was afraid of that danger, he should seize one of the Ionian cities, or Cyme in Æolia; so that having a city as the base of their operations they might excite Ionia to revolt: (and there was reason to hope this, for their arrival was unwelcome to no one.) If then they should take away from the Athenians this their chief source of revenue, ³and if at the same time

¹ Literally, "just as we are."

² Or more literally, "our measures might be achieved."

³ The difficulties in the construction of this passage are too numerous to be even separately mentioned here. What I have given is, I think, the most probable meaning of the original, according to Arnold's text; as the position of the *σφίσι* seems absolutely to require that it should be taken after *γίνηται*, and not after *ἐφορμῶσιν*. Göller and Bloomfield reject it altogether as a mere gloss; and according to that reading the *ἐφορμῶσιν* would, of course, refer to the Athenians. For my own part, I am far from certain that *ἐφορμῶσιν*, the reading which is found in all the manuscripts, has not unnecessarily been altered; whether *αὐτοῖς* or *αὐτοῖσι* be the genuine form of the pronoun governed by it. In the former case it would mean, "if they should be put to expense by exciting them to hostilities," i. e. the Ionians, understood from *τῇ Ἰωνίᾳ*; in the latter "by attacking them." For though

they should themselves incur the expense of keeping a fleet of observation, they thought they should prevail on Pisuthnes also to take part in the war with them. He did not, however, accede to this proposal either; but was most strongly inclined, since he had come too late for Mytilene, to reach the Peloponnese again as quickly as possible.

32. Weighing therefore from Embatum, he coasted along, and having touched at Myonnesus, a place belonging to the Teians, he butchered most of the prisoners he had taken on his passage. On his coming to anchor at Ephesus ambassadors came from the Samians of Anæa, and told him that he was not liberating Greece in the right way, by destroying men who were neither raising their hands against him, nor were hostile to him, but allies of the Athenians through necessity; and if he did not cease, he would bring few of his enemies into friendship with him, but would find many more of his friends become his enemies. He was convinced [by these arguments], and set at liberty all the Chians he had still in his hands, and some of the others. [¹ And there had been very many taken by him]; for at the sight of his ships the men did not fly, but rather came to them, thinking they were from Athens; and they had not even the slightest expectation, that while the Athenians had command of the sea, Peloponnesian ships would dare to cross over to Ionia.

33. From Ephesus Alcidas sailed as quickly as possible, and took to flight. For while still lying at anchor off Clarus, he had been seen by the Salaminian and the Paralus ships, (which happened to be sailing from Athens,) and fearing pursuit, he took his course across the open sea, intending to make no land voluntarily but the Peloponnese. Now tidings of him had been sent to Paches and the Athenians from the Erythræan country, and indeed from every quarter; for as Ionia had no fortified towns, the alarm was great lest the Peloponnesians in coasting along, even though they did not intend to stay, might at the same time assault and plunder the cities. And now the Paralus and Salaminian, having seen

the *middle* voice of the verb is more generally used in that sense, I cannot think it impossible that Thucydides might sometimes use the active also; as Euripides does, Hippol. 1270.

¹ Some such clause as this seems necessary, as the following paragraph is intended to account for his having made so many prisoners.

him at Clarus, themselves brought intelligence of the fact. Accordingly he made chase with all speed, and continued in pursuit of him as far as the isle of Patmos, but returned when he found that he was not within distance to be overtaken. He considered it, however, a lucky thing, as he did not fall in with them out at sea, that they had not been overtaken any where near shore, and obliged to form an encampment, and so give his forces the trouble of watching and blockading them.

34. As he coasted along on his return, he touched, amongst other places, at Notium, [the port] of the Colophonians, where they had settled after the capture of the upper city by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been called in by individuals on the ground of a factious quarrel. The city was taken about the time that the second irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica took place. Those then who had fled for refuge to Notium, and settled there, having again split into factions, one party introduced and kept in the fortified quarter of the town an auxiliary force of Arcadians and barbarians sent by Pisuthnes; and those of the Colophonians in the upper city who formed the Median party, went in with them and joined their community; while those who had retired from them, and were now in exile, introduced Paches. He invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a parley, on condition that if he proposed nothing to meet his wishes, he should restore him safe and sound to the fortress; but when he went out to him, he kept him in hold, though not in bonds; and having assaulted the place on a sudden and when they were not expecting it, he took it, and put to the sword the Arcadians and all the rest that were in it. Having afterwards taken Hippias into it, as he had agreed to do, he seized him when he was inside, and shot him through. He then gave up Notium to the Colophonians, excepting the Median party; and the Athenians subsequently sent out colonists, and settled the place according to their own laws; having collected all the Colophonians, wherever there was one in any of the cities.

35. On his arrival at Mytilene Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus, and having seized Salæthus the Lacedæmonian in the

¹ Properly "the cross-wall," which divided one part of the town from the rest.

city, where he was hiding, he despatched him to Athens, and with him the Mytilenæans at Tenedos, whom he had deposited there, and whomever else he thought implicated in the revolt. He also sent back the greater part of his forces. With the remainder he stayed there, and settled the affairs of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, as he thought proper.

36. On the arrival of the men with Salæthus, the Athenians immediately put the latter to death, though he held out certain promises, and amongst others, that he would obtain the retreat of the Peloponnesians from Platæa (for it was still being besieged): but respecting the former they deliberated what to do; and in their anger they determined to put to death, not only those that were there, but all the Mytilenæans also that were of age; and to make slaves of the women and children. For they both urged against them [the aggravated character of] their revolt in other respects, namely, that they had executed it without being subject to their dominion, like the rest; and the fact of the Peloponnesian ships having dared to venture over to Ionia to assist them, contributed also no little to their wrath; for they thought, it was with no short premeditation that they had revolted. They sent therefore a trireme to Paches with intelligence of their resolution, and commanded him to despatch the Mytilenæans as quickly as possible. The next day they felt immediately a degree of repentance, and reflected that the resolution they had passed was a cruel and sweeping one, to put a whole city to the sword, instead of those who were guilty. When the Mytilenæan ambassadors who were present, and those of the Athenians who co-operated with them, perceived this, they got the authorities to put the question again to the vote; and the more easily prevailed on them to do it, because they also saw plainly that the majority of the citizens wished some one to give them another opportunity of deliberating. An assembly therefore being immediately summoned, different opinions were expressed on both sides; and Cleon, son of Cleænetus, who had carried the former resolution, to put them to death, being on other subjects also the most violent of the citizens, and by far the most influential with the commons, at that time came forward again, and spoke as follows:

37. "On many other occasions before this have I been convinced that a democracy is incapable of maintaining dominion

over others, and I am so more than ever from your present change of purpose respecting the Mytilenæans. For owing to your daily freedom from fear, and from plotting against each other, you entertain the same views towards your allies also. And you do not reflect, in whatever case you may either have made a mistake through being persuaded by their words, or may have given way to pity, that you show such weakness to your own peril, and at the same time too gain no gratitude from your allies ; not considering that it is a tyrannical dominion which you hold, and over men who are plotting against you, and involuntarily subject to you ; and who obey you not from any favours you confer on them to your own hurt, but from the fact of your being superior to them through your power, rather than their good feeling. But of all things it is the most fearful, if nothing of what we have resolved is to be steadfast ; and if we are not convinced that a state with inferior laws which are unchanged is better than one with good ones which are not authoritative ; that homely wit with moderation is more useful than cleverness with intemperance ; and that the duller class of men, compared with the more talented, generally speaking, manage public affairs better. For the latter wish to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule what is ever spoken for the public good—thinking that they could not show their wisdom in more important matters—and by such means they generally ruin their country. But the former, distrusting their own talent, deign to be less learned than the laws, and less able than to find fault with the words of one who has spoken well ; and being judges on fair terms, rather than rivals for a prize, they are more commonly right in their views. So then ought *we* also to do, and not to advise your people contrary to our real opinion, urged on by cleverness and rivalry of talent.

38. "I, then, continue of the same opinion ; and am astonished at those who have proposed to discuss a second time the case of the Mytilenæans, and caused in it a delay of time, which is all for the advantage of the guilty (for so the sufferer proceeds against the offender with his anger less keen ; whereas when retribution treads most closely on the heels of suffering, it best matches it in wreaking vengeance). I wonder, too, who will be the man to maintain the opposite opinion, and to pretend to show that the injuries done by the Mytilenæans

are beneficial to us, and that our misfortunes are losses to our allies. It is evident that either trusting to his eloquence he would strive to prove, in opposition to us, that what we consider most certain has not been ascertained ; or, urged on by the hope of gain, will endeavour to lead us away by an elaborate display of specious language. But in such contests as these the state gives the prizes to others, and takes only the dangers itself. And it is you who are to blame for it, through unwisely instituting these contests ; inasmuch as you are accustomed to attend to speeches like spectators [in a theatre], and to facts like mere listeners [to what others tell you] ; with regard to things future, judging of their possibility from those who have spoken cleverly about them ; and with regard to things which have already occurred, not taking what has been done as more credible from your having seen it, than what has been only heard from those who in words have delivered a clever invective. And so you are the best men to be imposed on with novelty of argument, and to be unwilling to follow up what has been approved by you ; being slaves to every new paradox, and despisers of what is ordinary. Each of you wishes, above all, to be able to speak himself ; but if that is not possible, in rivalry of those who so speak, you strive not to appear to have followed his sentiments at second-hand ; but when he has said any thing cleverly, you would fain appear to have anticipated its expression by your applause, and are eager to catch beforehand what is said, and at the same time slow to foresee the consequences of it. Thus you look, so to speak, for something different from the circumstances in which we are actually living ; while you have not a sufficient understanding of even that which is before you. In a word, you are overpowered by the pleasures of the ear, and are like men sitting to ¹ be amused by rhetoricians rather than deliberating upon state affairs.

39. "Wishing then to call you off from this course, I declare to you that the Mytilenæans have injured you more than any one state ever did. For I can make allowance for men who have revolted because they could not endure your government, or because they were compelled by their enemies. But for those who inhabited an island with fortifications, and had only to fear our enemies by sea, on which element, too, they were

¹ Literally, "as spectators" of them.

themselves not unprotected against them by a fleet of triremes, and who lived independent, and were honoured in the highest degree by us, and then treated us in this way ; what else did those men do than deliberately devise our ruin, and rise up against us, rather than revolt from us, (revolt, at least, is the part of those who are subject to some violent treatment,) and seek to ruin us by siding with our bitterest enemies? Yet surely that is more intolerable than if they waged war against you by themselves for the acquisition of power. Again, neither were the calamities of their neighbours, who had already revolted from us and been subdued, a warning to them ; nor did the good fortune they enjoyed make them loath to come into trouble ; but being over-confident with regard to the future, and having formed hopes beyond their power, though less than their desire, they declared war, having determined to prefer might to right ; for at a time when they thought they should overcome us, they attacked us, though they were not being wronged. But success is wont to make those states insolent to which it comes most unexpected and with the shortest notice ; whereas the good fortune which is according to men's calculation is generally more steady than when it comes beyond their expectation ; and, so to say, they more easily drive off adversity than they preserve prosperity. The Mytilenæans, then, ought all along to have been honoured by us on the same footing as the rest, and in that case they would not have come to such a pitch of insolence ; for in other instances, as well as theirs, man is naturally inclined to despise those who court him, and to respect those who do not stoop to him. But let them even now be punished as their crime deserves ; and let not the guilt attach to the aristocracy, while you acquit the commons. For at any rate they all alike attacked *you* ; since they might have come over to us, and so have been now in possession of their city again. Thinking, however, the chance they ran with the aristocracy to be the safer, they joined them in revolting. And now consider ; if you attach the same penalties to those of the allies who were compelled by their enemies to revolt, and to those who did it voluntarily, which of them, think you, will not revolt on any slight pretext, when he either gains his liberation, if he succeed, or incurs no extreme suffering, if he fail? And so we shall presently have to risk both our money and our lives

against each separate state. And if we are successful, by taking possession of a ruined city, you will hereafter be deprived of all future revenue from it—in which our strength consists; while if we fail, we shall have fresh enemies in addition to those we have already; and during the time that we ought to be opposing our present foes, we shall be engaged in hostilities with our own allies.

40. "You ought not therefore to hold out any hope, either relying on oratory or purchased with money, of their receiving allowance for having erred through human infirmity. For they did not involuntarily hurt you, but wittingly plotted against you; and it is only what is involuntary that can claim allowance. I, then, both on that first occasion [so advised you], and now contend that you should not rescind your former resolutions, nor err through three things, the most inexpedient for empire, namely, pity, delight in oratory, and lenity. For pity is properly felt towards those of a kindred temper, and not towards those who will not feel it in return, but are of necessity our enemies for ever. And the orators who delight us with their language will have a field in other subjects of less importance, instead of one in which the state, after being a little pleased, will pay a great penalty; while they themselves from their good speaking will receive good treatment in return. And lenity is shown to those who will be well-disposed in future, rather than to those who remain just what they were, and not at all less hostile. To sum up in one word, if you are persuaded by me, you will do what is just towards the Mytilenæans, and at the same time expedient; but if you decide otherwise, you will not oblige *them*, but will rather pass sentence upon *yourselves*. For if they were right in revolting, you cannot properly maintain your empire. If, however, you determine to do so, even though it is not proper, you must also, overlooking what is right, punish these men from regard to expediency, or else give up your empire, and act the honest man without danger. Resolve, then, to requite them with the same penalty; and not to show yourselves, in escaping their designs, more insensible than those who formed them against you; considering what they would probably have done, if they had prevailed over you; especially, as they were the first to begin the wrong. For it is those who do ill to any one without reason,

that persecute him most bitterly, ¹ nay, even to the death, from suspicion of the danger of their enemy's being spared; since he who has suffered evil without any necessity, [but by provoking it himself,] is more bitter, if he escape, than one who was an enemy on equal terms. Be not therefore traitors to your own cause; but bringing yourselves in feeling as near as possible to the actual state of suffering, and reflecting how you would in that case have valued their subjection above every thing, now pay them back in return, not indulging in weakness at the present moment, nor forgetting the danger which once hung over you. Punish these men, I say, as they deserve; and give a striking example to the rest of your allies, that whoever revolts will pay the penalty for it with his life. For if they know this, you will less frequently have to neglect your enemies, while you are fighting with your own confederates."

41. To this effect spoke Cleon. After him Diodotus son of Eucrates, who in the former assembly spoke most strongly against putting the Mytilenæans to death, came forward then also, and said as follows.

42. "I neither blame those who have a second time proposed the discussion of the case of the Mytilenæans, nor commend those who object to repeated deliberation on the most important subjects; but I think that the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion, one of which is generally the companion of folly, and the other of coarseness and narrowness of mind. And whoever contends that words are not to be the exponents of measures, is either wanting in understanding, or self-interested: wanting in understanding, if he thinks it possible to express himself in any other way on what is future and not certain; self-interested, if, when wishing to persuade to something base, he thinks that he could not speak to his credit on a discreditable subject, but that by clever calumny he might confound both his opponents and audience. But most cruel of all are those who charge us besides with a display [of rhetoric] for pecuniary motives. For if they only imputed ignorance, he who failed in carrying his point would retire with a character for want of understanding, rather than of honesty: but when a

¹ Gölle and Poppo follow Hermann in taking ἀπολλύται passively, "they are killed by living in suspicion of danger," &c.

charge of dishonesty is brought against him, if successful, he is suspected; and if unsuccessful, together with his inability, he is also thought dishonest. And the state is not benefited by such a system; for through fear it is deprived of its counsellors. Most prosperous indeed would it be, if such of its citizens were incapable of speaking; for then they would be less often persuaded to do wrong. But the good citizen ought to show himself the better speaker not by terrifying his opponent, but by meeting him on equal terms; and the state that acts wisely should not, indeed, confer honour on the man who most frequently gives good advice, but neither should it detract from what he enjoys already; and so far from punishing him who is wrong in his judgment, it should not even degrade him. For so the successful counsellor would be least tempted to speak any thing contrary to his real opinion, in order to gratify his hearers; and the unsuccessful one would be least anxious by the same means of gratification to bring over the multitude to *his* side also.

43. "But we do the contrary of this; and moreover, if any one be suspected of speaking with a view to his own advantage, though at the same time what is best, through grudging him the gain of which we have but an uncertain idea, we deprive the state of its certain benefit. And thus good advice, given in a straightforward manner, has come to be no less suspected than bad; so that it is equally necessary for one who wishes to carry the most dreadful measures to win over the multitude by trickery, and for one who speaks on the better side to gain credit by falsehood. And the state alone it is impossible, owing to these over-wise notions, to serve in an open manner and without deceiving it; for he who openly confers any good upon it is suspected of getting secretly, in some way or other, an advantage in return. Now on subjects of the greatest importance, and with such an estimate of our conduct, we [orators] ought to speak with more extensive forethought than you who take but an off-hand view of measures; especially as we ¹are responsible for the advice we give, whereas you are irresponsible for listening to it. For if he who offered counsel, and he who followed it, suffered alike, you would judge more prudently. But as it is, through

¹ Literally, "have our advising responsible, in opposition to (or compared with) your irresponsible listening."

whatever passion you may at any time have met with disasters, you punish the single judgment of the man who persuaded you, and not your own, for having so numerous joined in the blunder.

44. "I came forward, however, neither to speak against any one in defence of the Mytilenæans, nor to accuse any one. For the question we have to decide is not, if we take a wise view of it, respecting their guilt, but respecting our taking good counsel. For though I should prove them to be utterly guilty, I will not for that reason also bid you to put them to death, unless it were expedient: and though they might claim some allowance, [I would not bid you make it,] unless it should appear good for the state. But I am of opinion that we are deliberating for the future, rather than the present; and as to what Cleon most positively asserts, that it will be advantageous to us in future, with a view to less frequent revolts, if we hold out death as the penalty; I too as positively contradict him, with regard to what is good for the future, and maintain the opposite opinion. And I beg you not to reject the utility of my advice for the plausibility of his. For his words might perhaps attract you, through being more just with regard to your present displeasure against the Mytilenæans: but we are not holding a judicial inquiry in their case, that we should want what is just; but are deliberating respecting them, how they may be of service to us.

45. "Now the penalty of death has been enacted in states for many offences, and those not equal to this, but less heinous; and yet, urged on by hope, men venture to commit them; and no one ever yet came into danger ¹ with a conviction of his own mind that he would not succeed in his attempt. What city, too, when bent on revolt, ever attempted it with deficient resources—according to its own idea—either internal, or by means of alliance with others? Indeed all men, both in a private and public capacity, are naturally disposed to do wrong, and there is no law that will keep them from it; at least men have gone through all kinds of punishments in their enactments, to try if by any means they might be less injured by evil-doers, and it is probable that in early times the punishments for the greatest offences were more lenient; but as they are disregarded, they generally, in the course of time, ex-

¹ Literally, "having passed sentence upon himself."

tend to death; and still even this is disregarded. Either, then, some fear more dreadful than this must be discovered, or this, at any rate, does not restrain men: but poverty inspiring boldness through necessity, and larger means inspiring ambition through insolence and pride, and the other conditions of life through some human passion or other, according as they are severally enslaved by some fatal and overpowering one, lead men on to dangers. Moreover, hope and desire for every thing, the one taking the lead, and the other following; and the one devising the attempt, while the other suggests the facility of succeeding in it; cause the most numerous disasters; and though unseen, they are more influential than the dangers that are seen. Fortune, too, aids them no less in urging men on; for by sometimes siding with them unexpectedly, she induces them to run the risk even with inferior means; especially in the case of states, inasmuch as the venture is for the greatest objects, namely, freedom, or empire over others; and as each individual, when acting in concert with all, unreasonably carries his ideas to an extravagant length concerning them. In short, it is impossible [to remedy the evil], and the man is very simple who thinks, that when human nature is eagerly set on doing a thing, he has any means of diverting it, either by the rigour of laws, or any other kind of terror.

46. "We must not, then, either take bad counsel through trusting to the punishment of death as a thing to be relied on, or leave to those who have revolted no hope of being allowed to change their minds, and wipe out their offence in as short a time as possible. For consider that at present, if any city, even after revolting, find that it will not succeed, it would come to terms while it has still means of refunding the expenses, and of paying tribute in future. But in the other case, which of them, think you, would not make better preparations for the attempt than they do now, and hold out against its besiegers to the utmost, if it is all one whether it surrender slowly or quickly? And how can it fail to be injurious for us to be put to expense by sitting down before it, because it will not surrender; and if we take the city, to recover it in a ruined condition, and be deprived of the revenue from it in future? For our strength against the enemy lies in this. So then we must not hurt ourselves, by being strict judges of the offenders, but rather see how, by punishing them

moderately, we may be able in future to avail ourselves of the cities with unimpaired means on the score of money ; and we must resolve to derive our protection, not from severity of laws, but from attention to deeds. The very contrary of which we do at present ; and if we have subdued any power that was [once] free, and, when harshly governed, naturally revolted for its independence, we fancy that we are bound to avenge ourselves with severity. But in dealing with freemen, we must not *punish* them rigorously when they revolt, but *watch* them rigorously *before* they revolt, and prevent their even coming to the thought of it ; and when we have got the mastery of them, we should attach the guilt to as few as possible.

47. " Now consider what an error you would commit in this also, if persuaded by Cleon. For at present the commons in all the states are well disposed towards you, and either do not revolt with the aristocratical party, or if compelled to do so, are straightway hostile to those who made them ; and you have the mass of the city opposed to you on your side, when you proceed to war. But if you butcher the commons of Mytilene, who took no part in the revolt, and when they had got possession of arms, voluntarily gave up the city ; in the first place you will act unjustly by slaying your benefactors ; and in the next you will produce for the higher classes of men a result which they most desire ; for when they lead their cities to revolt, they will immediately have the commons on their side, because you had shown them beforehand that the same penalty is appointed for those who are guilty and those who are not. On the contrary, even if they *were* guilty, you ought to pretend not to notice it ; that the only class still allied with us may not become hostile to us. And this I consider far more beneficial towards retaining our empire—that we should voluntarily be treated with injustice—than that with justice we should put to the sword those whom we ought not. And so the identity of the justice and expediency of the punishment, which Cleon asserts, is found impossible to exist therein.

48. " Being convinced then that this is the better course, and not allowing too much weight either to pity or to lenity, (for neither do I, [any more than Cleon,] wish you to be influenced by these,) but judging from the advice itself which is given you, be persuaded by me to try calmly those of the Mytilenæans whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to allow the

rest to live where they are. For this is both profitable for the future, and terrible to your enemies at the present moment; since whoever takes good advice against his adversaries is stronger than one who recklessly proceeds against them with violence of action."

49. To this effect spoke Diodotus. These being the views that were expressed in most direct opposition to one another, the Athenians, notwithstanding [their wish to reconsider the question], came to a conflict of opinion respecting them, and were nearly matched in the voting, though that of Diodotus prevailed. And they immediately despatched another trireme with all speed, that they might not find the city destroyed through the previous arrival of ¹the first; which had the start by a day and a night. The Mytilenæan ambassadors having provided for the vessel wine and barley-cakes, and promising great rewards if they should arrive first, there was such haste in their course, that at the same time as they rowed they ate cakes kneaded with oil and wine; and some slept in turns, while others rowed. And as there happened to be no wind against them, and the former vessel did not sail in any haste on so ²horrible a business, while this hurried on in the manner described; though the other arrived so much first that Paches had read the decree, and was on the point of executing the sentence, the second came to land after it, and prevented the butchery. Into such imminent peril did Mytilene come.

50. The other party, whom Paches had sent off as the chief authors of the revolt, the Athenians put to death, according to the advice of Cleon, amounting to rather more than one thousand. They also dismantled the walls of the Mytilenæans, and seized their ships. After this they did not impose any tribute on the Lesbians, but having divided the land, excepting that of the Methymnæans, into three thousand portions, they set apart three hundred of them as consecrated to the

¹ The common reading *δευτέρως* is abandoned by all the best editors; and therefore it is not without great diffidence that I confess my inability to understand why it need be so. The sense of the passage would be equally good if it were translated, "that by the previous arrival of the second, they might avoid finding the city ruined;" and I cannot but think such a method borne out by many other passages of our author; e. g. II. 3. 3, *ἔννελέγοντο—ὅπως μὴ διὰ τῶν ὀδῶν φανεροὶ ᾖσιν λόγους*. And again in the next section, *Ἐχώρου ἐκ τῶν οἰκίων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ φῶς θαρσαλειώτεροι οὖσι προσφέρωνται*, κ. τ. λ.

² Literally, "monstrous."

gods, and to the rest sent out as shareholders those of their own citizens to whose lot they had fallen; with whom the Lesbians having agreed to pay in money two minæ a year for each portion, farmed the land themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent of which the Mytilenæans were masters, and they were afterwards subject to Athens. Such then was the issue of affairs as regarded Lesbos.

51. In the course of the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians made an expedition under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, against the island of Minoa, which lies off Megara, and which the Megareans used as a fortress, having built a tower on it. From this spot, being more close at hand, Nicias wished the Athenians to keep their guard [over Nisæa], instead of from Budorum and Salamis, and to prevent the Peloponnesians from sailing out thence unobserved, as was formerly the case, with triremes and privateers; and at the same time to see that nothing was imported by the Megareans. Having therefore in the first instance taken by engines from the sea two towers which projected on the side of Nisæa, and having cleared the entrance to 'the strait between the island [and the continent], he proceeded to cut off all communication on the side of the mainland also, where there was a passage by a bridge over a morass for succouring the island, which lay not far off from the continent. This having been accomplished by them in a few days, he afterwards left works on the island also, with a garrison, and retired with his forces.

52. It was also about the same period of this summer that the Plateans, having no longer any provisions and being unable to endure the blockade, surrendered to the Peloponnesians in the following manner. The enemy assaulted their wall and they were incapable of defending it. So when the Lacedæmonian commander was aware of their powerless condition, he did not wish to take it by storm, (for such were his instructions from Lacedæmon, in order that if a treaty should ever be made with the Athenians, and they should agree to restore such

¹ Gölter translates this expression by "viam in portum aperuit:" but the strict meaning of the *μεταξὺ* must be, I think, that which I have given to it, and which it has IV. 25. 1, 'Ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ μεταξὺ οἱ Σπαρτιάται, κ. τ. λ.

places as they had respectively taken in the war, Plataea might not be given up, on the strength of its inhabitants having voluntarily gone over to them,) but he sent to them a herald with this question, "Were they disposed voluntarily to surrender their city to the Lacedæmonians, and submit to them as their judges; and that they should punish the guilty, but no one contrary to justice?" Such were the words of the herald; and they, being now in a state of extreme weakness, surrendered the city. The Peloponnesians then fed the Platæans for nine days, till the judges from Lacedæmon, five in number, arrived. When they were come, no charge was preferred against them; but they called them forward, and merely asked them this question, "Had they in any particular done the Lacedæmonians and the allies any service during the present war?" They made a speech [in reply], for they had requested permission to speak at greater length, and had deputed to plead their cause Astymachus the son of Asopolæus, and Lacon the son of Aeimnestus, who came forward and said as follows:

53. "The surrender of our city, Lacedæmonians, we made with full confidence in you, not supposing that we should be subjected to such a trial as this, but that it would be one more consistent with law; and with an agreement that we should not, as we now are, be at the mercy of any other judges but yourselves; thinking that so we should best obtain what was fair. But as things are, we fear that we have failed at once in both expectations. For with reason we suspect that our contest is ¹for life or death, and that you will not prove impartial; inferring this from the fact of there having been made against us no previous charge for us to reply to, (but it was ourselves who requested permission to speak,) and from the question put to us being so concise; a true answer to which tells against us, while a false one is open to refutation. Being involved, however, in perplexity on all sides, we are compelled, and it seems the safer course, to say something at all risks; for the words that had been left unspoken might occasion to men in our situation the self-accusing thought, that if they had been spoken, they might have saved us. But in addition to our other disadvantages, the work of convincing you is also surrounded with difficulties. Were we unacquainted

¹ Literally, "for the most fearful things."

with each other, we might derive assistance from bringing forward fresh proofs of what you did not know : but as it is, every thing will be said to men who know it already ; and our fear is, not that you have before considered our services as inferior to your own, and now make that fact a ground of accusation against us ; but that, through your determination to gratify another party, we are brought to a trial which is already decided against us.

54. "Nevertheless, while we urge what claims of justice we have, both against the Thebans, and with respect to you, and the rest of the Greeks, we will remind you of our good deeds, and endeavour to persuade you [to have mercy on us]. With regard then to your brief question, 'whether we have done any service to the Lacedæmonians and the allies in this war,' we say, that if you ask us as enemies, you are not wronged by us, though you should have received no good at our hands ; and that if you consider us as friends, you are yourselves more in the wrong, for having marched against us. With respect, however, to what happened during the peace, and in opposition to the Mede, we proved ourselves good and true men ; for we have not now been the first to break the peace, and we were then the only part of the Boeotians who joined in attacking the Mede for the liberty of Greece. Even though we are an inland people, we were present in the sea-fight at Artemisium, and in the battle fought in our territory we stood by you and Pausanias ; and whatever other perilous achievement was performed by the Greeks, we took part in every thing beyond our strength. And to you, Lacedæmonians, in particular, at the very time when, after the earthquake, the greatest alarm surrounded Sparta, because of the Helots who had established themselves in revolt at Ithome, we sent the third part of our own people to your assistance : and you ought not to forget this.

55. "With regard to events of early date, and of the greatest importance, such was the part we thought right to act ; though afterwards we became your enemies. But it is you that are to blame for that ; for on our requesting an alliance with you, when the Thebans had used violence towards us, you rejected our suit, and told us to apply to the Athenians, since they were near to us, whereas you lived far away from us. In the war, however, you neither suffered, nor would have suffered,

any improper treatment from us. But if we would not revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we did no wrong in that ; for it was they who assisted us against the Thebans, when you refused ; and to give them up would not then have been honourable—especially as we had taken them for allies after receiving good from them, and at our own request, and had shared the rights of citizenship with them—but it was only reasonable that we should heartily obey their commands. And as to the measures in which either of you take the lead of your allies, it is not those who follow that are to blame, if you have ever done any thing wrong, but those who lead them on to what is not right.

56. " With respect to the Thebans, they had on many other occasions wronged us ; and as for the last occasion, you know yourselves on what account we are in our present condition. For as they were seizing our city in time of peace, and, moreover, at a holy time of the month, we did right in avenging ourselves on them, according to the principle recognised by all, that it is allowable to defend oneself against the attack of an enemy ; and it would not now be fair that we should suffer on their account. For if you take your views of justice from your own immediate advantage and their animosity, you will show yourselves no true judges of what is right, but rather attentive to what is expedient. And yet if they appear to be serviceable to you now, much more did we and the rest of the Greeks then, when you were in greater danger. For now you are yourselves attacking others, and the objects of their fear ; but at that crisis, when the barbarian was bringing slavery on all, these Thebans were on his side. And it is but just, that against our present misdeed—if we have really done amiss—you should set the zeal we showed then ; and you will find it greater ¹ than the fault to which it is opposed, and exhibited at those critical times when it was a rare thing for any of the Greeks to oppose his courage to the power of Xerxes ; and therefore those were the more commended who did not in safety act for their own interest with regard to his invasion, but were willing to dare with dangers the better part. But though *we* were of that number, and honoured by you in the highest degree, we are now afraid that we have been ruined by acting on the same principles,

¹ Literally, " the greater opposed to the less."

because we chose the side of the Athenians from regard to right, rather than yours from regard to interest. And yet men should consistently take the same view of the same case, and account expediency to be nothing else than this—when good allies receive everlasting gratitude for their services, while our own immediate interest in any case is secured.

57. "Consider, too, that at present you are esteemed by the Greeks in general a pattern of honour and virtue: but if you pass an unjust sentence on us, (for this is no obscure cause that you will decide, but as men of high repute yourselves, you will pass sentence on us who are also not contemptible,) beware lest they may not approve of your coming to any improper decision respecting men of good character, though you are yourselves of still better; nor of spoils which were taken from us, the benefactors of Greece, being devoted in the national temples. For it will seem a shocking thing that Lacedæmonians should have destroyed Platæa; and that your fathers should have inscribed the name of that city on the tripod at Delphi for its good services, whereas you utterly obliterated it from the whole Grecian name for the sake of Thebans. For to such a degree of misfortune have we been brought: if the Medes had been victorious, we should have been ruined; and now we are supplanted by Thebans in your good opinion, who were before our best friends; and we have been subjected to two dangers, the greatest that can be imagined—then, to that of being ¹starved to death, if we had not surrendered our city; and now, to that of being tried for our lives. And thus we Platæans, who were zealous beyond our power in the cause of the Greeks, are rejected by all, deserted and unassisted; for of those who were then our allies, no one helps us; and as for you, Lacedæmonians, our only hope, we fear that you are not to be depended upon.

58. "And yet, for the sake of the gods who once presided over our confederacy, and of our valour in the cause of the

¹ Bloomfield, in his last edition, rightly explains *αλεξις* (as Gölter had already done) by comparing the words of Ammianus Marcellinus, "fame, *ignavissimo* mortis genere, tabescentes;" and observes that "to be pined to death was, according to the idea of the ancients, a death, as compared with that of dying with arms in one's hands, especially *ignominious*, as suggesting the idea of a snared brute beast." Yet he inconsistently retains the part of his original note, in which he objected to Hobbes rendering the word by "base," a term to which Hobbes himself doubtless attached the same meaning.

Greeks, we call on you to relent and change your mind, if you have been persuaded to any thing by the Thebans ; and to ask as a boon from them in return, that they would not kill those whose death is not honourable to you ; and to receive an honest gratitude [from us], instead of a disgraceful one [from them] ; and not, after giving pleasure to others, to incur infamy for it yourselves. For it is an easy matter to take away our lives, but a difficult one to wipe out the disgrace of it ; since we are not enemies, that you should justly take vengeance on us, but men well disposed towards you, and who went to war with you only on compulsion. You would judge the case therefore rightly, if you both granted us personal security, and considered beforehand that you received us by our own consent, and while holding forth our hands to you—and the law of the Greeks is not to kill such—and, moreover, after our being all along your benefactors. For look to the sepulchres of your fathers, whom, after being slain by the Medes, and buried in our country, we used to honour every year at the public expense with both garments and other things that are usual, and by offering first-fruits of all that our land produced in its season ; as friends from a friendly country, and as allies to our former companions in arms. But you would do the contrary of this, should you decide unjustly. For consider : Pausanias buried them with a conviction that he was laying them in a friendly land, and amongst men of that character ; but you, if you kill us, and make the Plataean territory a part of the Theban, what else will you do but leave your fathers and kinsmen in a hostile country, and amongst their murderers, unhonoured with the gifts which they now receive ? And further, you will condemn to slavery the land in which the Greeks won their freedom ; will desolate the temples of the gods to whom they prayed, before conquering the Medes ; and will take away our ¹ancestral sacrifices from those who founded and instituted them.

59. " This were not to your credit, Lacedæmonians, nor to offend against the general principles of the Greeks and your own forefathers, nor to destroy us, your benefactors, for other

¹ Gottleber and Poppo refer *ἱερῶν* as well as *κτισάντων* to *θεῶν* ; and the collocation of the words certainly makes this the most natural mode of explaining them. Bloomfield, however, denies that *ἱε* is ever used in such a figurative sense, and maintains that it can only refer here to *ἱερά*.

men's hatred of us, without having been wronged yourselves ; but rather, to spare us, and relent in your hearts, having taken a rational pity on us ; reflecting not only on the dreadful nature of the things we should suffer, but also on the character of the sufferers, and how misfortune admits not of calculating on whom it may one day fall, even without his deserving it. We then, as is suitable for us, and as our need induces us to do, entreat you, with invocations to the gods who are worshipped at the same altar, and by all the Greeks in common, that we may prevail on you in these things ; pleading the oaths which your fathers swore, we pray that you will not be unmindful of them : we beseech you by your fathers' tombs, and appeal for aid to the dead, that we may not come under the power of the Thebans, nor those who are dearest to them be given up to those who are most hateful. We remind you, too, of that day on which we performed the most glorious things in their company, and yet now on this day are in danger of suffering the most dreadful. But, to bring our speech to a close—a thing which is necessary, and at the same time hard for men so circumstanced, because the peril of our life approaches with it—we now say, in conclusion, that we did not surrender our city to the Thebans, (for before that we would have preferred to die the most inglorious death—that of famine,) but confided in and capitulated to *you*. And it were but fair, that, if we do not persuade you, you should restore us to the same position, and let us ourselves take the risk that befalls us. At the same time we solemnly beseech you, that we who are Plataeans, and who showed the greatest zeal for the cause of the Greeks, may not be given up, suppliants as we are, out of your hands and your good faith, Lacedæmonians, to Thebans, who are our bitterest enemies ; but that you would become our preservers, and not, while you are giving freedom to the rest of the Greeks, bring utter destruction upon us."

60. To this effect spoke the Plataeans. The Thebans, fearing that the Lacedæmonians might somewhat relent in consequence of their words, came forward, and said that *they* also wished to address them, since, contrary to their expectation, the Plataeans had had a longer speech allowed them than a simple answer to the question. So when they had given them leave, they spoke as follows :

61. "We should not have asked permission to make this address, if the Plataeans, on their part, had briefly answered the question put to them, and had not turned upon us and delivered an invective; while at the same time they made a long defence of themselves, beyond the limits of the present question, and on points that had never been the grounds of any charge, together with a panegyric for things which no one found fault with. But as it is, we must answer their accusations, and refute their self-praises; that neither our disgrace nor their reputation may assist them, but that you may hear the truth on both points, and so decide. We quarrelled then with them in the first instance, because, on our settling Plataea at a later period than the rest of Boeotia, and some other places with it, of which we took possession after driving out their mixed population, these men did not think fit, as had been first arranged, to submit to our supremacy, but, apart from the rest of the Boeotians, offended against the principles of their fathers, and when they were being compelled to observe them, went over to the Athenians, in conjunction with whom they did us many injuries, for which they also suffered in return.

62. "Again, when the barbarian came against Greece, they say that they were the only part of the Boeotians that did not Medize; and it is on this point that they most pride themselves, and abuse us. But *we* say that they did not *Medize*, because the Athenians did not either; but that in the same way, when the Athenians afterwards attacked the Greeks, they were the only people that *Atticized*. Yet look in what political condition we respectively did this. For our city happened at that time to be governed neither by an oligarchy¹ with equal laws, nor by a democracy; but what is most opposed to laws and the best form of government, and comes nearest to [the rule of] a tyrant, a dominant party of a few individuals had the administration of affairs. And so they, hoping to hold it still more surely if the cause of the Medes were triumphant, kept down the populace by force, and introduced him; and the whole city was not its own mas-

¹ "The term *ισόνομος* relates to the equality of all the citizens with one another, as far as related to their private disputes and private injuries; whereas under the worst form of oligarchy, which was called *δυναστεία*, those who were possessed of political power were also above the law in private matters, and could oppress their fellow-citizens at their pleasure. See Aristotle, *Politics*, iv. 5. 2."—*Arnold*.

ter when it so acted ; nor is it right to reproach it for what it did amiss when not in the enjoyment of its laws. At any rate, after the Mede had retreated, and it had regained its laws, you ought to consider, that when the Athenians subsequently attacked the rest of Greece, and endeavoured to bring our country under their power, and by the aid of faction were already in possession of the greater part of it, we fought and conquered them at Coronea, and liberated Bœotia, and are now heartily joining in the liberation of the other states, by furnishing horses, and such a force as no other of the allies do. With regard, then, to our Medizing, such is the defence we make.

63. "But that it is *you*, [Platæans,] who have both done more injury to Greece, and are more deserving of extreme punishment, we will now attempt to prove. It was for vengeance against us, you say, that you became allies and fellow-citizens of the Athenians. Then you ought to have introduced them for aid against us alone, and not to have joined with them in attacking others ; such a course having certainly been open to you, in case of your being at all led on by the Athenians against your will, since the confederacy against the Mede had already been formed by these Lacedæmonians here, which you yourselves bring forward most prominently [in your own defence]. Surely this was strong enough to divert us from attacking you, and, what is the greatest advantage, to enable you to take counsel in security. But of your own accord, and not by compulsion, you still took the part of the Athenians by preference. And you say that it had been base for you to betray your benefactors ; but much more base and criminal was it so utterly to betray the whole body of the Greeks, with whom you confederated, than to give up the Athenians alone, who were enslaving Greece, while the others were its liberators. And it was no equal return of favour that you made them, nor one free from disgrace. For you introduced them, as you say, when you were being injured ; but you became co-operators with them in injuring others. And yet not to return equal favours is more disgraceful than to fail in those which, though justly due, will be returned in furtherance of injustice.

64. "You showed then plainly, that not even at that time was it for the sake of the Greeks that you alone did not

Medize, but because the Athenians did not either, and because you wished to side with them, and against the rest. And now you claim to derive assistance from the circumstances in which you acted well through the influence of others. That however is not reasonable; but as you chose the Athenians, stand the brunt of the struggle with them, and do not bring forward the league that was then made, as though you ought to be spared from regard to that. For you deserted it, and in violation of it joined in enslaving the Æginetans, and some others who had entered into it, rather than prevented their being enslaved; and that too not against your will, but while enjoying the same laws as you have to the present time, and without any one's compelling you, as they did us. Besides, the last proposal made to you before you were blockaded, that you should remain unmolested on condition of your aiding neither side, you did not accept. Who, then, could be more justly hated by the Greeks than you, who assumed an honourable bearing for their injury? And the goodness which you say you once exhibited, you have now shown to be not your proper character; but what your nature always wished, has been truly proved against you; for you accompanied the Athenians when they were walking in the path of injustice. With regard then to our involuntary *Medizing*, and your voluntary *Atticizing*, such are the proofs we have to offer.

65. "As for the last injuries which you say that you received, namely, that we came against your city in time of peace and at a holy time of the month, we are of opinion that neither in this point did we act more wrongly than you. If, indeed, we came against your city by our own design, and fought, and ravaged the land as enemies, we are guilty. But if men who were the first among you, both in property and family, wishing to stop you from your foreign connexion, and restore you to your hereditary principles common to all the Boeotians, voluntarily called us to their aid, how are we guilty? ¹ For it is those who lead that are the transgressors, rather than those who follow. But neither did they do wrong, in our judgment, nor did we; but being citizens, like yourselves, and having more at stake, by opening their walls to us and introducing us into

¹ Retorting the remark of the Plataeans, ch. 55. 5, οὐχ οἱ ἐπόμουν αἰτιοί — ἀλλ' οἱ ἄγοντες.

their city in a friendly, not in a hostile, manner, they wished the bad among you no longer ¹to become worse, and the good to have their deserts; being reformers of your principles, and not depriving the state of your persons, but restoring you to your kinsmen; making you foes to no one, but friends alike to all.

66. "And we gave you a proof of our not having acted in a hostile manner; for we injured no one, but made proclamation, that whoever wished to be governed according to the hereditary principles of all the Bœotians, should come over to us. And you gladly came, and made an agreement with us, and remained quiet at first; but afterwards, when you perceived that we were few in number, even supposing that we might be thought to have acted somewhat unfairly in entering your city without the consent of your populace, you did not requite us in the same manner—by not proceeding to extreme measures in action, but persuading us by words to retire—but you attacked us in violation of your agreement. And as for those whom you slew in battle, we do not grieve for them so much (for they suffered according to law—of a certain kind); but in the case of those whom you lawlessly butchered while holding forth their hands, and when you had given them quarter, and had subsequently promised us not to kill them, how can you deny that you acted atrociously? And now, after having perpetrated in a short time these three crimes—the breach of your agreement, the subsequent murder of the men, and the falsification of your promise not to kill them, in case we did no injury to your property in the country—you still assert that it is we who are the transgressors; and yourselves claim to escape paying the penalty for your crimes. No, not if these your judges come to a right decision; but for all of them shall you be punished.

67. "And now, Lacedæmonians, it is with this view that we have gone so far into these subjects—both with reference to you and to ourselves—that *you* may know that you will justly pass sentence on them, and *we*, that we have still more

¹ i. e. understanding *χείρους* again after *μᾶλλον*, as Poppo explains it. Bloomfield supposes that *μᾶλλον* here assumes the nature of an adjective; and thus *μᾶλλον γενέσθαι* will mean, "to be uppermost," to have the upper hand,—“to be [in power] rather than others.” But the passage which he quotes, ch. 82. 2, as an instance of such a usage, is not, I think, sufficiently parallel to justify this interpretation.

righteously been avenged on them ; and that you may not relent on hearing of their virtues in times long gone by (if, indeed, they ever had any) ; for though these ought to be of service to the injured, to such as are doing any thing base they should be a reason for double punishment, because they do amiss in opposition to their proper character. Nor let them derive benefit from their lamentations and pitiful wailing, while they appeal to the tombs of your fathers and their own destitution. For *we* show you, on the other hand, that our youth who were butchered by them received far more dreadful treatment ; some of whose fathers fell at Coronea, in bringing Bœotia into connexion with you ; while others, left lonely in their old age, and their houses desolate, prefer to you a far more just request for vengeance on these men. And with regard to pity, it is those men who suffer undeservedly that better deserve to receive it ; but those who suffer justly, as these do, deserve, on the contrary, to be rejoiced over. Their present destitution, then, they have incurred by their own conduct ; for they wilfully rejected the better alliance. Nor did they thus outrage all law in consequence of having first suffered at our hands, but from deciding under the influence of hatred, rather than of justice. And they have not now given us proportionate satisfaction for their crimes ; for they will suffer by a legal sentence, and not while holding forth their hands after battle, as they say, but after surrendering to you on definite terms to take their trial. Avenge therefore, Lacedæmonians, the law of the Greeks which has been violated by these men. And to us who have been treated in contempt of all law return a due gratitude for the zeal we have shown ; and let us not lose our place in your favour through their words, but give the Greeks a proof that you will not institute contests of words, but of deeds ; for which a short statement is sufficient when they are good ; but when they are done amiss, harangues dressed out with imposing language serve as veils for them. But if ruling states should, like you in the present instance, summarily pronounce their decisions on all offenders, men would be less disposed to seek for fine words as a screen for unjust actions."

68. To this effect then spoke the Thebans. The Lacedæmonian judges, thinking that the question, "Whether they had received any service from them during the war," would

be a fair one for them to put, because they had all along requested them, as they said, to remain quiet according to the original covenant of Pausanias, after the [retreat of the] Medæ; and when afterwards they made to them the proposal which they did before they were besieged—to be neutral, according to the terms of that compact—in consequence of their not receiving it, they considered that on the strength of their own just wish they were now released from covenant with them, and had received evil at their hands. Accordingly, bringing each of them forward, and asking the same question, “Whether they had done the Lacedæmonians and allies any service in the war,” when they said they had not, they led them away and killed them, not excepting one. Of the Platæans themselves they slew not less than two hundred, and of the Athenians twenty-five, who were besieged with them; the women they sold as slaves. As for the city, the Thebans gave it for about a year to some of the Megareans to inhabit, who had been banished by party influence, and to such of the Platæans on their own side as still survived. Afterwards they razed the whole of it to the ground, from the very foundations, and built to the sacred precinct of Juno an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round, above and below, making use of the roofs and doors of the Platæans; and with the rest of the furniture, in brass and iron, that was ¹within the wall, they made couches and dedicated them to Juno, building also in her honour a stone chapel of one hundred feet square. The land they confiscated, and let out for ten years, its occupiers being Thebans. And nearly throughout the whole business it was on account of the Thebans that the Lacedæmonians were so averse to the Platæans; for they con-

¹ Or, as Bloomfield and Göller render it, “whatever movable materials there were in the wall;” referring to the metal cramps by which the coping-stones were fastened. But though lead and iron are mentioned as having been used for that purpose, (see I. p. 93. 6,) they do not bring forward any instance of *brass* having been used with them; nor does it seem probable that such would be the case. I have therefore followed Poppo, Haack, and others, in supposing, that as the wood work in the new building was taken from the houses in the town, a similar use was made of the iron and brass implements, which must also surely have been found there. At least it is very difficult to imagine, with Göller, that they had been all used up by the garrison during the siege. And instead of the *opposition* which he says is intended between the wood in the houses and the metal in the wall, the use of the *ἀλλοις* appears rather to imply that the rafters, doors, and metal implements were *all* taken from the *same* quarter.

sidered them to be of service for the war which had then but recently broken out. Such then was the end of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after they became allies of the Athenians.

69. Now the forty ships of the Peloponnesians which had gone to the relief of the Lesbians, (and which were flying, at the time we referred to them, across the open sea, and were pursued by the Athenians, and caught in a storm off Crete, and from that point had been dispersed,) on reaching the Peloponnese, found at Cyllene thirteen ships of the Leucadians and Ambraciots, with Brasidas son of Tellis, who had lately arrived as counsellor to Alcidas. For the Lacedæmonians wished, as they had failed in saving Lesbos, to make their fleet more numerous, and to sail to Corecra, which was in a state of sedition; as the Athenians were stationed at Naupactus with only twelve ships; and in order that they might have the start of them, before any larger fleet reinforced them from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas proceeded to make preparations for these measures.

70. For the Corcyraeans began their sedition on the return home of the prisoners taken in the sea-fights off Epidamnus, who had been sent back by the Corinthians, nominally on the security of eight hundred talents given for them by their *proxeni*, but in reality, because they had consented to bring over Corcyra to the Corinthians. These men then were intriguing, by visits to each of the citizens, to cause the revolt of the city from the Athenians. On the arrival of a ship from Athens and another from Corinth, with envoys on board, and on their meeting for a conference, the Corcyraeans voted to continue allies of the Athenians according to their agreement, but to be on friendly terms with the Peloponnesians, as they had formerly been. Now there was one Pithias, a 'volunteer *proxenus* of the Athenians, and the leader of the popular party; him these men brought to trial, on a charge of enslaving Corcyra to the Athenians. Having been acquitted, he brought to trial in return the five richest individuals of their party, charging them with cutting stakes in the ground sacred to Jupiter and to [the hero] Alcinous; the penalty

¹ i. e. an individual who of his own accord took upon himself to look after the interests of any particular foreign nation, without being recognised by that people, and having his appointment entered in the public records. Or as Böckh thinks, without being publicly appointed by his own country. See note on II. 29. 1.

affixed being a stater for every stake. When they had been convicted, and, owing to the amount of the penalty, were sitting as suppliants in the temples, that they might be allowed to pay it by instalments, Pithias, who was a member of the council also, persuades that body to enforce the law. So when they were excluded from all hope by the severity of the law, and at the same time heard that Pithias was likely, while he was still in the council, to persuade the populace to hold as friends and foes the same as the Athenians did, they conspired together, and took daggers, and, having suddenly entered the council, assassinated Pithias and others, both counsellors and private persons, to the number of sixty. Some few, however, of the same party as Pithias, took refuge on board the Athenian trireme, which was still there.

71. Having perpetrated this deed, and summoned the Corcyraeans to an assembly, they told them that this was the best thing for them, and that so they would be least in danger of being enslaved by the Athenians; and they moved, that in future they should receive neither party, except coming in a quiet manner with a single ship, but should consider a larger force as hostile. As they moved, so also they compelled them to adopt their motion. They likewise sent immediately ambassadors to Athens, to show, respecting what had been done, that it was for their best interests, and to prevail on the refugees there to adopt no measure prejudicial to them, that there might not be any reaction.

72. On their arrival, the Athenians arrested as revolutionists both the ambassadors and all who were persuaded by them, and lodged them in custody in Ægina. In the mean time, on the arrival of a Corinthian ship and some Lacedaemonian envoys, the dominant party of the Corcyraeans attacked the commonalty, and defeated them in battle. When night came on, the commons took refuge in the citadel, and on the eminences in the city, and there established themselves in a body, having possession also of the Hyllaic harbour; while the other party occupied the market-place, where most of them dwelt, with the harbour adjoining it, looking towards the mainland.

73. The next day they had a few skirmishes, and both parties sent about into the country, inviting the slaves, and offering them freedom. The greater part of them joined the

commons as allies ; while the other party was reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent.

74. After the interval of a day, a battle was again fought, and the commons gained the victory, having the advantage both in strength of position and in numbers : the women also boldly assisted them, throwing at the enemy with the tiling from the houses, and standing the brunt of the *mêlée* beyond what could have been expected from their nature. About twilight the rout of the oligarchical party was effected ; and fearing that the commons might carry the arsenal at the first assault, and put them to the sword, they fired the houses round about the market-place, and the lodging-houses, to stop their advance, sparing neither their own nor other people's ; so that much property belonging to the merchants was consumed, and the whole city was in danger of being destroyed, if, in addition to the fire, there had been a wind blowing on it. After ceasing from the engagement, both sides remained quiet, and kept guard during the night. On victory declaring for the commons, the Corinthian ship stole out to sea ; while the greater part of the auxiliaries passed over unobserved to the continent.

75. The day following, Nīcostratus son of Diitrephes, a general of the Athenians, came to their assistance from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred heavy-armed, and wished to negotiate a settlement, persuading them to agree with each other to bring to trial the ten chief authors of the sedition, (who immediately fled,) and for the rest to dwell in peace, having made an arrangement with each other, and with the Athenians, to have the same foes and friends. After effecting this he was going to sail away ; but the leaders of the commons urged him to leave them five of his ships, that their adversaries might be less on the move ; and they would themselves man and send with him an equal number of theirs. He consented to do so, and they proceeded to enlist their adversaries for the ships. They, fearing that they should be sent off to Athens, seated themselves [as suppliants] in the temple of the Dioscuri ; while Nicostratus was trying to persuade them to rise, and to encourage them. When he did not prevail on them, the commons, having armed themselves on this pretext, alleged that they had no good intentions, [as was evident] from their mistrust in not sailing with them ; and removed their arms

from their houses, and would have despatched some of them whom they met with, if Nicostratus had not prevented it. The rest, seeing what was going on, seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of Juno, their number amounting to not less than four hundred. But the commons, being afraid of their making some new attempt, persuaded them to rise, and transferred them to the island in front of the temple, and provisions were sent over there for them.

76. When the sedition was at this point, on the fourth or fifth day after the transfer of the men to the island, the ships of the Peloponnesians, three-and-fifty in number, came up from Cyllene, having been stationed there since their return from Ionia. The commander of them, as before, was Alcidas, Brasidas sailing with him as counsellor. After coming to anchor at Sybota, a port on the mainland, as soon as it was morning they sailed towards Corcyra.

77. The Corcyraeans, being in great confusion, and alarmed both at the state of things in the city and at the advance of the enemy, at once proceeded to equip sixty vessels, and to send them out, as they were successively manned, against the enemy; though the Athenians advised them to let *them* sail out first, and afterwards to follow themselves with all their ships together. On their vessels coming up to the enemy in this scattered manner, two immediately went over to them, while in others the crews were fighting amongst themselves, and there was no order in their measures. The Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, drew up twenty of their ships against the Corcyraeans, and the remainder against the twelve of the Athenians, amongst which were the two celebrated vessels, Salaminia and Paralus.

78. The Corcyraeans, coming to the attack in bad order, and by few ships at a time, were distressed through their own arrangements; while the Athenians, fearing the enemy's numbers and the chance of their surrounding them, did not attack their whole fleet, or even the centre of the division opposed to themselves, but took it in flank, and sunk one ship. After this, when the Peloponnesians had formed in a circle, they began to sail round them, and endeavoured to throw them into confusion. The division which was opposed to the Corcyraeans perceiving this, and fearing that the same thing might happen as had at Naupactus, advanced to their support.

Thus the whole united fleet simultaneously attacked the Athenians, who now began to retire, rowing astern ; at the same time wishing the vessels of the Corcyraeans to retreat first, while they themselves drew off as leisurely as possible, and while the enemy were still ranged against them. The sea-fight then, having been of this character, ended at sun-set.

79. The Corcyraeans, fearing that the enemy, on the strength of his victory, might sail against the city, and either rescue the men in the island, or proceed to some other violent measures, carried the men over again to the sanctuary of Juno, and kept the city under guard. The Peloponnesians, however, though victorious in the engagement, did not dare to sail against the city, but withdrew with thirteen of the Corcyraean vessels to the continent, whence they had put out. The next day they advanced none the more against the city, though the inhabitants were in great confusion, and though Brasidas, it is said, advised Alcidas to do so, but was not equal to him in authority ; but they landed on the promontory of Leucimne, and ravaged the country.

80. Meanwhile, the commons of the Corcyraeans, being very much alarmed lest the fleet should sail against them, entered into negotiation with the suppliants and the rest for the preservation of the city. And some of them they persuaded to go on board the ships ; for [notwithstanding the general dismay] they still manned thirty, in expectation of the enemy's advance against them. But the Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land till mid-day, sailed away : and at night-fall the approach of sixty Athenian ships from Leucas was signaled to them, which the Athenians had sent with Eurymedon son of Thucles, as commander, on hearing of the sedition, and of the fleet about to go to Corcyra with Alcidas.

81. The Peloponnesians then immediately proceeded homeward by night with all haste, passing along shore ; and having hauled their ships over the isthmus of Leucas, that they might not be seen doubling it, they sailed back. The Corcyraeans, on learning the approach of the Athenian fleet and the retreat of the enemy, took and brought into the city the Messenians, who before had been without the walls : and having ordered the ships they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour, while they were going round, they put to death any of their opponents they might have happened to

seize; and afterwards despatched, as they landed them from the ships, all that they had persuaded to go on board. They also went to the sanctuary of Juno, and persuaded about fifty men to take their trial, and condemned them all to death. The majority of the suppliants, who had not been prevailed on by them, when they saw what was being done, slew one another there on the sacred ground; while some hanged themselves on the trees, and others destroyed themselves as they severally could. During seven days that Eurymedon stayed after his arrival with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans were butchering those of their countrymen whom they thought hostile to them; bringing their accusations, indeed, against those only who were for putting down the democracy; but some were slain for private enmity also, and others for money owed them by those who had borrowed it. Every mode of death was thus had recourse to; and whatever ordinarily happens in such a state of things, all happened then, and still more. For father murdered son, and they were dragged out of the sanctuaries, or slain in them; while in that of Bacchus some were walled up and perished. So savagely did the sedition proceed; while it appeared to do so all the more from its being amongst the earliest.

82. For afterwards, even the whole of Greece, so to say, was convulsed; struggles being every where made by the popular leaders to call in the Athenians, by the oligarchical party, the Lacedæmonians. ¹ Now they would have had no pretext for calling them in, nor have been prepared to do so, in time of peace. But when pressed by war, and when an alliance also was maintained by both parties for the injury of their opponents and for their own gain therefrom, occasions of inviting them were easily supplied to such as wished to effect any revolution. And many dreadful things befell the cities through this sedition, which occur, and will always do

¹ "Here, as in I. 36. 3, the participle and the finite verb are made to answer to each other, *οὐκ ἂν ἔχόντων—ἱπορίζοντο*, whereas it should have been either *οὐκ ἂν εἶχον πρόφασιν—ἱπορίζοντο*, or *οὐκ ἂν ἔχόντων—τῶν ἱπαγωγῶν πορίζομένων*."—*Arnold*. The only way to avoid this confusion of constructions would be to understand *ἔχόντων* and *ἱπορίμων* again after *πολεμουμένων*. "And as they would have had no pretext for calling them in, nor have been prepared to do it, in time of peace, but *were* so in time of war,—occasions of inviting them were easily supplied, when this war had broken out." But from the fact of no commentator (so far as I am aware) having adopted this method, there are probably greater objections to it than, I confess, present themselves to my own mind.

so, as long as human nature is the same, but ¹ in a more violent or milder form, and varying in their phenomena, as the several variations of circumstances may in each case present themselves. For in peace and prosperity both communities and individuals have better feelings, through not falling into ² urgent needs; whereas war, by taking away the free supply of daily wants, is a violent master, and assimilates most men's tempers to their present condition. The states then were thus torn by sedition, and the later instances of it in any part, from having heard what had been done before, exhibited largely an excessive refinement of ideas, both in the eminent cunning of their plans, and the monstrous cruelty of their vengeance. The ordinary meaning of words was changed by them as they thought proper. For reckless daring was regarded as courage that was true to its friends; prudent delay, as specious cowardice; moderation, as a cloak for unmanliness; being intelligent in every thing, as being useful for nothing. Frantic violence was assigned to the manly character; cautious plotting was considered a specious excuse for declining the contest. The advocate for cruel measures was always trusted; while his opponent was suspected. He that plotted against another, if successful, was reckoned clever; he that suspected a plot, still cleverer; but he that forecasted for escaping the necessity of all such things, was regarded as one who broke up his party, and was afraid of his adversaries. In a word, the man was commended who anticipated one going to do an evil deed, or who persuaded to it one who had no thought of it. Moreover, kindred became a tie less close than party, because the latter was more ready for unscrupulous audacity. For such associations have nothing to do with any benefit from established laws, but are formed in opposition to those institutions by a spirit of rapacity. Again, their mutual grounds of confidence they confirmed not so much by any reference to the divine law as by fellowship in some act of lawlessness. The fair professions of their adversaries they received with a cautious eye to their actions, if they were stronger than themselves, and not with a spirit of generosity. To be avenged on another was deemed of greater consequence than to escape

¹ For a similar use of μάλλον compare IV. 19. 7, εἴτε καὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντες μάλλον ἂν χειρωθείεν.

² Literally "compulsory," i. e. which compel a man to do what he would otherwise not think of.

being first injured oneself. As for oaths, if in any case exchanged with a view to a reconciliation, being taken by either party with regard to their immediate necessity, they only held good so long as they had no resources from any other quarter; but he that first, when occasion offered, took courage [to break them], if he saw his enemy off his guard, wreaked his vengeance on him with greater pleasure for his confidence, than he would have done in an open manner; taking into account both the safety of the plan, and the fact that by taking a treacherous advantage of him he also won a prize for cleverness. And the majority of men, when dishonest, more easily get the name of talented, than, when simple, that of good; and of the one they are ashamed, while of the other they are proud. Now the cause of all these things was power pursued for the gratification of covetousness and ambition, and the consequent violence of parties when once engaged in contention. For the leaders in the cities, having a specious profession on each side, putting forward, respectively, the political equality of the people, or a moderate aristocracy, while in word they served the common interests, in truth they made them their prizes. And while struggling by every means to obtain an advantage over each other, they dared and carried out the most dreadful deeds; heaping on still greater vengeance, not only so far as was just and expedient for the state, but to the measure of what was pleasing to either party in each successive case: and whether by an unjust sentence of condemnation, or ¹on gaining the ascendancy by the strong hand, they were ready to glut the animosity they felt at the moment. Thus piety was in fashion with neither party; but those who had the luck to effect some odious purpose under fair pretences were the more highly spoken of. The neutrals amongst the citizens were destroyed by both parties; either because they did not join them in their quarrel, or for envy that they should so escape.

83. Thus every kind of villany arose in Greece from these seditions. Simplicity, which is a very large ingredient in a noble nature, was laughed down and disappeared; and mutual opposition of feeling, with a want of confidence, prevailed to

¹ Or, *χειρί* may be taken by itself, in opposition to *μετὰ ψήφου ἄδικον καταγνώσεως*: but the rhythm of the sentence appears better with the other construction.

a great extent. For there was neither promise that could be depended on, nor oath that struck them with fear, to put an end to their strife; but all being in their calculations more strongly inclined to despair of any thing proving trustworthy, they looked forward to their own escape from suffering more easily than they could place confidence [in arrangements with others]. And the men of more homely wit, generally speaking, had the advantage; for through fearing their own deficiency and the cleverness of their opponents, lest they might be worsted in words, and be first plotted against by means of the versatility of their enemy's genius, they proceeded boldly to deeds. Whereas their opponents, arrogantly thinking that they should be aware beforehand, and that there was no need for their securing by action what they could by stratagem, were unguarded and more often ruined.

84. It was in Corcyra then that most of these things were first ventured on; both the deeds which men who were governed with a spirit of insolence, rather than of moderation, by those who afterwards afforded them an opportunity of vengeance, would do as the retaliating party; or which those who wished to rid themselves of their accustomed poverty, and passionately desired the possession of their neighbours' goods, might unjustly resolve on; or which those who had begun the struggle, not from covetousness, but on a more equal footing, might savagely and ruthlessly proceed to, chiefly through being carried away by the rudeness of their anger. Thus the course of life being at that time thrown into confusion in the city, human nature, which is wont to do wrong even in spite of the laws, having then got the mastery of the law, gladly showed itself to be unrestrained in passion, above regard for justice, and an enemy to all superiority. They would not else have preferred vengeance to religion, and gain to innocence; in which state envy would have had no power to hurt them. And so men presume in their acts of vengeance to be the first to violate those common laws on such questions, from which all have a hope secured to them of being themselves rescued from misfortune; and they will not allow them to remain, in case of any one's ever being in danger and in need of some of them.

85. Such then were the passions which the Corcyræans in the city indulged towards one another, being the first that did so. And Eurymedon and the Athenians sailed away with

their ships ; after which the Corcyræan exiles, (for five hundred of them had escaped,) having taken some forts that were on the mainland, were masters of their own territory on the opposite coast, and sallying forth from it, plundered those in the island, and did them much damage, a violent famine being produced in the city. They also sent embassies to Lacedæmon and Corinth about their restoration. When they met with no success, they afterwards got some boats and auxiliaries and crossed over to the island, to the number of six hundred in all ; and having burnt their boats, that they might have no hope from any thing but the command of the country, they went up to the hill Istone, and after building a fort on it, began to annoy those in the city, and were in the mean time masters of the country.

86. At the close of the same summer the Athenians despatched twenty ships to Sicily, with Laches son of Melanopus, and Charœades son of Euphiletus, in command of them. For the Syracusans and Leontines had gone to war with each other ; the Syracusans having, with the exception of Camarina, all the Dorian cities in alliance with them—for indeed these had joined the Lacedæmonian confederacy at the commencement of the war, though they had not taken any part in it with them—while the Leontines had the Chalcidian cities, and Camarina. In Italy the Locrians were on the side of the Syracusans ; the Rhegians, on that of the Leontines, in consequence of their affinity to them. So the allies of the Leontines sent to Athens, both on the ground of their former confederacy with them and because they were Ionians, and urged the Athenians to send them a fleet, for they were excluded by the Syracusans from the use both of land and sea. Accordingly the Athenians sent it, on the pretence of their relationship, but really from a wish that no corn might be brought thence to the Peloponnese ; and to make an experiment whether it were possible for them to bring Sicily into subjection to themselves. Having established themselves therefore at Rhegium in Italy, they began the operations of the war in concert with their allies. And so the summer ended.

87. The following winter the plague a second time attacked the Athenians, having indeed never entirely left them, though there had been some abatement of it. It lasted the second time not less than a year—the former attack having lasted

two—so that nothing reduced the power of the Athenians more than this. For not less than four thousand four hundred heavy-armed in the ranks died of it, and three hundred of the equestrian order, with a number of the multitude that was never ascertained. It was at that time also that the numerous earthquakes happened at Athens, Eubœa, and Bœotia, particularly at Orchomenos in the last-named country.

88. During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands of Æolus ; for in summer it was impossible to invade them, owing to their want of water. They are occupied by the Liparæan colony from Cnidos, who live in one of the islands which is of no great extent, called Lipara, and proceed from that to cultivate the rest, namely, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. Now the people in those parts think that in Hiera Vulcan works as a smith ; because it is seen to emit abundance of fire by night, and of smoke by day. These islands lie opposite the coasts of the Sicels and Messanians, and were in alliance with the Syracusans. The Athenians ravaged their territory, and when they did not surrender, sailed back to Rhegium. And so the winter ended, and the fifth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

89. The following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies proceeded as far as the Isthmus for the invasion of Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians ; but on the occurrence of numerous earthquakes, they turned back again, and no invasion was made. About this period, when the earthquakes were so prevalent, the sea at Orobæ in Eubœa, having retired from what was then the line of coast, and afterwards returned with a great swell, invaded a portion of the city, and partly inundated it, though it also partly subsided ; and so that is now sea which was before land. It also destroyed the inhabitants, excepting such as could run up first to the higher parts of the city. There was a similar inundation too at Atalanta, the island off the Opuntian Locri, which carried away a part of the fort built by the Athenians, and wrecked one of two ships that were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus too there was a retreat of the sea, though no inundation followed ; and an earthquake threw down a part of the wall, with the town-hall, and a few houses besides. The cause of this, in my own

opinion, is, that where the shock of the earthquake has been most violent, there it drives the sea back, and this suddenly coming on again with a violent rush causes the inundation. But without an earthquake I do not think that such an occurrence would ever happen.

90. During the same summer different parties, as they might severally happen, made war in Sicily; both the Sicilians themselves against each other, and the Athenians in concert with their allies; but I shall [only] mention the most memorable actions achieved by the Athenians and their allies, or against the Athenians by the enemy. Charæades then, the Athenian commander, having already been killed in war by the Syracusans, Laches, who was now in sole command of the fleet, turned his arms, in concert with his allies, against Mylæ, a town belonging to the Messanians. Now there were two divisions of the Messanians in garrison at Mylæ, and they had laid an ambush for the party coming from their ships. But the Athenians and their allies routed the troops in ambush, and slew many of them, and having assaulted the fortifications, compelled them to surrender the citadel, and to march with them against Messana. Afterwards, on the attack of the Athenians and their allies, the Messanians too capitulated, giving hostages and 'all other securities.

91. The same summer the Athenians despatched thirty ships to cruise about the Peloponnese, under the command of Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Procles son of Theodorus, and sixty ships and two thousand heavy-armed against Melos, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus. For as the Melians were islanders, and yet would not submit to them nor join their confederacy, they wished to reduce them. When, however, they did not surrender to them on the wasting of their territory, they sailed to Oropus, on the coast opposite Attica; and having landed at night, the heavy-armed immediately marched from their ships to Tanagra in Bœotia; while the Athenians in the city, on a given signal, met them at the same place by land in full force, under the command of Hipponicus son of Callias, and Eurymedon son of Thucles. Having pitched their camp for that day in the territory of Tanagra, they laid it waste, and passed the night there. The next day, after defeating in battle those of the

¹ "Satisfying the Athenians in all other points." Lit. "presenting all other things of such a nature as to be satisfactory."—*Arnold*.

Tanagræans and the Thebans who had come out against them, and after taking some arms, and erecting a trophy, they returned, one party to the city, the other to their fleet. And Nicias, with his sixty ships, coasted along and ravaged the maritime parts of Locris, and then returned home.

92. About this time the Lacedæmonians prepared to found their colony of Heraclea, in Trachinia, with the following purpose. The Melians form, in all, three tribes, the Paralians, Hiæreans, and Trachinians. Of these, the Trachinians, having been reduced to great weakness by the Ætæans, who border on them, intended at first to give themselves up to the Athenians; but afterwards, fearing that they could not be trusted by them, they sent to Lacedæmon, having chosen Tisamenus as their envoy. They were joined in the embassy by the Dorians also, the mother-state of the Lacedæmonians, with the same petition; for they, too, were much injured by the Ætæans. On hearing their request, the Lacedæmonians determined to send out this colony, from a wish to assist both the Trachinians and the Dorians. Besides, they thought the town would be placed advantageously for them with respect to the war with the Athenians; for a fleet might be equipped so as to have a short passage to Eubœa, and it would be useful for marching to Thrace. Indeed on all accounts they were anxious to found the place. They first consulted therefore the god at Delphi; and on his advising them to do it, they despatched the settlers, taken both from their own citizens and from the *Periæci*, and gave permission to any of the rest of the Greeks that wished to accompany them, except Ionians, Achæans, and some other races. Three of the Lacedæmonians led them as founders of the colony, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. When they had established themselves in the country, they fortified anew the city which is now called Heraclea, distant about forty stades from Thermopylæ, and twenty from the sea. They also provided themselves with docks, beginning to build them at Thermopylæ, just by the pass, that they might the more easily be defended by them.

93. When this town was being thus jointly founded, the Athenians were at first alarmed, thinking that it was being set up chiefly for the annoyance of Eubœa, because the passage to Cîneum in that island is a short one. The event, however, afterwards proved contrary to their expectation, for no

danger arose from it. And the reason was this. The Thes-salians, who had dominion in these parts, and to the injury of whose territory the place was being founded, fearing they might prove very powerful neighbours, continually harassed and made war upon the new settlers, till they wore down their strength, though at first they had been very numerous ; for as the Lacedæmonians were the founders of the town, every one went to it with confidence, thinking it a place of security. It was, however, the Lacedæmonian officers themselves, who went to it, that chiefly contributed to ruining its interests, and reducing it to a scanty population, by frightening away the greater part, and governing harshly, and in some cases not fairly, so that their neighbours then prevailed over them more easily.

94. The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians were detained at Melos, the forces on board the thirty ships that were cruising about the Peloponnese first of all laid an ambush at Ellomenus in Leucadia, and cut off some garrison troops ; and afterwards came against Leucas with a larger force, and with all the Acarnanians, who accompanied them in a body, except the Æniadæ, and with the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen ships of the Corcyræans. The Leucadians, on the wasting of their territory, both without and within the isthmus, on which stands Leucas and the temple of Apollo, being overpowered by such numbers, remained quiet ; while the Acarnanians requested Demosthenes, the general of the Athenians, to cut them off by a wall, thinking that they might then easily take them by storm, and so be rid of a city which was always hostile to them. But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, with so large an army collected together, to attack the Ætolians, who were hostile to Naupactus, and by reducing whom he would easily win for Athens the rest of the continent in these parts. For they represented to him that the nation of the Ætolians, though numerous and warlike, were yet not difficult to subdue before succours reached them, as they lived in unfortified villages, and those far apart, and used but light armour. And they advised him to attack in the first place the Apodotians, next the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytians, which are the largest division of the nation, speaking, it is said, the most

unintelligible language, and being cannibals ; for if these were subdued, the rest would readily surrender.

95. He consented to do so, out of regard for the Messenians, and still more because he thought, that without employing the forces of Athens, with only continental tribes as his allies, and with the Ætolians, he would be able to go by land against the Bœotians, through the Locri Ozolæ to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right hand till he reached the Phocians, who, he thought, would eagerly join him, for the friendship they had always borne the Athenians, or might be brought over by force ; and to Phocis Bœotia is at once the bordering state. Starting therefore with all his armament from Leucas, in opposition to the wishes of the Acarnanians, he coasted along to Sollium. There he communicated his plan to the Acarnanians ; and when they did not assent to it in consequence of his refusal to invest Leucas, he himself with the remainder of the force, the Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and the three hundred ¹*epibatæ* from his own ships, (for the fifteen Corcyraean vessels had gone away,) made an expedition against the Ætolians, having his head-quarters at Æneon in Locris. Now the Locri Ozolæ were allies of the Athenians, and were to meet them in full force in the heart of the country : for as they bordered on the Ætolians, and were similarly equipped, they were thought likely to prove of great service in acting with them, from their acquaintance both with the Ætolian mode of fighting and with the localities.

96. After bivouacking with the army in the sacred precinct of the Nemean Jupiter, in which Hesiod the poet is said to have been killed by the people of this country, an oracle having before declared that he should meet with this fate at Nemea ; in the morning he set out and marched into Ætolia. On the first day he took Potidanea ; on the second, Crocyleum ; and on the third, Tichium, where he halted, and sent off his booty to Eupalium in Locris : for he intended, when he had subdued the other parts, to make a subsequent expedition against the Ophionians, if they would not surrender, after returning to Naupactus. But the Ætolians were both aware of these preparations when he first formed his designs against

¹ i. e. the heavy-armed soldiers who served on board ship, answering to our marines.

them, and when the army had invaded their country they came to the rescue with a great force, all of them, so that even the most distant of the Ophionians, who stretch towards the Melian Gulf, the Borniensians and Calliensians, joined in bringing aid.

97. Now the Messenians gave Demosthenes the following advice, as they also did at first. Assuring him that the reduction of the Ætolians was easy, they urged him to go as quickly as possible against their villages, and not wait till the whole people should unite and oppose him, but to endeavour successively to make himself master of each village ¹ before him. Being thus persuaded by them, and relying on his fortune, because nothing ever went against him, without waiting for those who should have reinforced him (for he was most in want of light-armed dartmen) he advanced for Ægittium, and took it by assault, the inhabitants flying before him, and posting themselves on the hills round the town; for it stood on high ground, at the distance of about eighty stades from the sea. The Ætolians (for they had now come to the rescue of Ægittium) charged the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills in different directions, and plied them with darts; retreating when the Athenian force advanced against them, and pressing it close when it retired. And for a long time this was the character of the engagement—repeated pursuing and retreating—in both of which the Athenians had the worse.

98. Now so long as they saw that their archers had their arrows and were able to use them, they continued to resist; for, when harassed by the bowmen, the Ætolians, being a light-armed force, retired. But when, after the fall of their leader, the archers were dispersed, and they themselves distressed by enduring for a long time the same labour, and the Ætolians were pressing hard on them, and pouring their darts on them; then indeed they turned and fled, and falling into pathless ravines and places with which they were unacquainted, were cut off: for the guide who showed them the way, Chromon the Messenian, had been killed. And the Ætolians, still plying them with missiles, by their rapid movements (for they are swift of foot and light-armed) took many of them there in the rout, and put them to the sword; but the greater part missing their

¹ Or, "as it came in his way." Literally, "at his feet." Compare Herodotus, 3. 79, πάντα τινὰ τῶν Μάγων τὸν ἐν ποσὶ γινόμενον.

way and rushing into the forest, from which there were no roads out, they brought fire and burnt it round them. Indeed the Athenian forces were subjected to every form of flight and death, and it was with difficulty that the survivors escaped to the sea and to Ceneon in Locris, the same place from which they had set out. Great numbers of the allies were slain, and of the Athenians themselves about a hundred and twenty heavy-armed—so many in number, and all in the prime of their youth. These were the best men of the city of Athens that fell during this war. One of the generals also, namely, Procles, was slain. Having taken up their dead under truce, and retired to Naupactus, they afterwards went with their ships to Athens. But Demosthenes stayed behind in the neighbourhood of Naupactus and those parts, being afraid of the Athenians in consequence of what had been done.

99. About the same period the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to Locris, and in a descent which they made on the country, defeated those of the Locrians who came against them, and took a guard-fort which stood on the river Halex.

100. The same summer the Ætolians, having before [the invasion of their country] sent as envoys to Corinth and Lacedæmon, Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades the Eurytæan, and Tisander the Apodotian, persuaded them to send them an army to attack Naupactus, because it had brought the Athenians against them. And the Lacedæmonians despatched about autumn three thousand heavy-armed of the allies; five hundred of whom were from Heraclea, their newly founded city in Trachis. Eurylochus, a Spartan, had the command of the force, accompanied by Macarius and Meneæus, who were also Spartans.

101. When the army had assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locri Ozolæ; for the route to Naupactus was through their territory, and moreover he wished to make them revolt from the Athenians. Those amongst the Locrians who most forwarded his views were the Amphissians, who were alarmed in consequence of the enmity of the Phocians. These first gave hostages themselves, and persuaded the rest to do so, in their fear of the invading army; first the Myoneans, who were their neighbours, (for on this side Locris is most difficult to enter,) then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritæans, Chalæans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Ceantheans. All these joined the expedition also. The Olpæans gave

hostages, but did not accompany them ; while the Hyæans refused to give hostages, till they took a village belonging to them, called Polis.

102. When every thing was prepared, and he had placed the hostages at Cytinium in Doris, he advanced with his army against Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians ; and on his march took Œneon, one of their towns, and Eupalium ; for they refused to surrender. When they had reached the Naupactian territory, and the Ætolians also had now come to their aid, they ravaged the country, and took the 'suburb of the capital, which was unfortified. They also went against and took Molyenium, which, though a colony from Corinth, was subject to the Athenians. Now Demosthenes, the Athenian, (for after what had happened in Ætolia, he was still in the neighbourhood of Naupactus) having previous notice of the armament, and being alarmed for the town, went and persuaded the Acarnanians (though with difficulty, on account of his retreat from Leucas) to go to the relief of Naupactus. Accordingly they sent with him on board his ships a thousand heavy-armed, who threw themselves into the place and saved it. For the walls being extensive, and the garrison small, there was reason to fear that they might not hold out. When Eurylochus and his colleagues found that this force had entered the town, and that it was impossible to take it by storm, they withdrew, not towards the Peloponnese, but to Æolis, ² which is now called Calydon and Pleuron, with the places in that quarter, and to Proschium in Ætolia. For the Ambraciots had come to them, and urged them to make, in concert with themselves, an attack upon the Amphilocheian Argos and the rest of that country, and upon Acarnania at the same time ; telling them that if they made themselves masters of these countries, the whole of the continent would be united in alli-

¹ We have no term exactly answering to the Greek *προαστίον*, or, "approach to the city;" for, as Arnold observes on IV. 69. 5, it "was not what we call a suburb, but rather an open space like the parks in London, partly planted with trees, and containing public walks, colonnades, temples, and the houses of some of the principal citizens. It was used as a ground for reviews of the army and for public games. At Rome the Campus Martius was exactly what the Greeks call *προαστίον*."

² i. e. (as Arnold explains it, after Wasse, Palmer, and Kruse,) the district once called Æolis was now called by the names of the two principal towns in it, Calydon and Pleuron. Poppo and Göller understand it as the ancient name of Calydon alone.

ance with the Lacedæmonians. So Eurylochus consented, and having dismissed the Ætolians, remained quiet with his army in that neighbourhood, till he should have to assist the Ambraciots, on their taking the field before Argos. And so the summer ended.

103. The following winter, the Athenians in Sicily having marched with their Grecian allies, and as many of the Sieels as joined them in the war—being either subject by force to the Syracusans or allies who had revolted from them—against Inessa, the Sieel town, the citadel of which was held by the Syracusans, attacked it, and, not being able to take it, retired. On their return, the Syracusans from the citadel fell on the allies as they were retiring somewhat after the Athenians, and routed a division of their army, and killed no small number. After this, Laches and the Athenians, with the fleet, made some descents upon the Locrian territory, by the river Cœcinus, and defeated in battle those of the Locrians who came out against them with Proxenus the son of Capaton, about three hundred in number, and having taken some arms, departed.

104. The same winter also the Athenians purified Delos, in obedience, as they professed, to a certain oracle. For Pisistratus the tyrant had also purified it before; not the whole of the island, but as much of it as was within sight of the temple. At this time, however, the whole of it was purified in the following manner. All the sepulchres of those who had died in Delos they removed, and commanded that in future no one should either die in the island or bear a child, but that [in such cases all should] be carried across to Rhenea. (This Rhenea is so short a distance from Delos, that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, after being powerful at sea for a considerable time, and ruling over the rest of the islands, and taking Rhenea, dedicated it to the Delian Apollo, by connecting it with Delos by a chain.) It was at this time too, after the purification, that the Athenians first celebrated the quinquennial festival of the Delian games. There had been, however, even in very early times, a great assembly of the Ionians and the neighbouring islanders held at Delos; for they used to come to the feast with their wives and children, as the Ionians now do to the Ephesian festivals, and gymnastic and musical contests were held, and the different cities took up bands of

dancers. Homer shows most clearly that such was the case, in the following verses, taken from a hymn to Apollo.

"Anon to Delos, Phœbus, wouldst thou come,
Still most delighting in thine island-home;
Where the long-robed Ionians thronging meet,
With wives and children, at thy hallow'd seat;
With buffets, dance, and song extol thy name,
And win thy smile upon their solemn game."

That there was a musical contest also, and that they went to take part in it, he shows again in the following verses, taken from the same hymn. For after mentioning the Delian dance of the women, he ends his praise of the god with these verses, in which he also makes mention of himself.

Now be Apollo kind, and Dian too;
And ye, fair Delian damsels, all adieu!
But in your memory grant me still a home;
And oft as to your sacred isle may come
A pilgrim care-worn denizen of earth,
And ask, while joining in your social mirth,
"Maidens, of all the bards that seek your coast,
"Who sings the sweetest, and who charms you most?"
Then answer one and all, with gracious smile,
"A blind old man who lives in Chios' rocky isle."

Such evidence does Homer afford of there having been, even in early times, a great assembly and festival at Delos. But afterwards, though the islanders and the Athenians sent the bands of dancers with sacrifices, the games and the greater part of the observances were abolished—as is most probable, through adversity—until the Athenians held the games at that time, with horse-races, which before had not been usual.

105. The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when they retained his army, marched forth against the Amphilocheian Argos with three thousand heavily-armed; and entering the Argive territory, occupied Olpæ, a strong-hold on a hill near the sea, which the Acarnanians had once fortified, and used as their common place of meeting for judicial purposes; its distance from the city of Argos on the coast being about twenty-five stades. Now some of the Acarnanians went to the relief of Argos, while others encamped in Amphilochia, in the place called ¹Crenæ, being on the watch to prevent the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus passing through unobserved to the Ambraciots. They also sent for Demosthenes, who had commanded the Athenian ex-

¹ Corresponding exactly to our "Wells."

pedition against Ætolia, to be their leader ; and for the twenty Athenian ships that happened to be cruising about the Peloponnese, under the command of Aristoteles son of Timocrates, and Hierophon son of Antimnestus. The Ambraciots at Olpæ also sent a messenger to their city, desiring them to come in full force to their assistance, fearing that the troops under Eurylochus might not be able to effect a passage through the Acarnanians, and that they themselves might either have to fight unsupported, or, if they wished to retreat, find it unsafe to do so.

106. The Peloponnesians with Eurylochus, therefore, finding that the Ambraciots at Olpæ were come, set out from Proschium and went as quickly as possible to their aid ; and having crossed the Achelôüs, proceeded through Acarnania, which was left deserted in consequence of the reinforcement sent to Argos ; keeping on their right hand the city of the Stratiæans with their garrison, and on the left the rest of Acarnania. After passing the territory of the Stratiæans, they proceeded through Phytia, and again through Medeon, along the borders ; then through Limnæa ; and so they entered the territory of the Ægræans, which formed no part of Acarnania, but was friendly to themselves. Then, having reached Mount Thyamus, which is uncultivated, they proceeded across it, and so came down into the Argive country by night, and passing unobserved between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian posts at Crenæ, joined the Ambraciots at Olpæ.

107. Having thus effected a union at day-break, they sat down at the place called Metropolis, and formed their encampment. Not long after, the Athenians came with their twenty ships into the Ambracian Gulf to assist the Argives ; and Demosthenes arrived with two hundred heavy-armed of the Messenians, and sixty Athenian archers. The fleet therefore at Olpæ blockaded the hill from the sea ; while the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilocheians (for the majority were forcibly detained by the Ambraciots) had by this time met at Argos, and were preparing to engage with the enemy, having appointed Demosthenes as commander of the whole army in concert with their own generals. He, having led them near to Olpæ, encamped there ; a great ravine separating their armies. For five days they remained still, but on the sixth both sides drew up for battle. And as the force of the Pe-

loponnesians was the larger, and outflanked his, Demosthenes, fearing that he might be surrounded, placed in ambush in a hollow way covered with a thicket, a body of heavy and light-armed troops, four hundred in all, that on the flank of the enemy which reached beyond his own, these troops might rise up in the very midst of the conflict and take them in their rear. When the preparations were completed on both sides, they closed in battle. Demosthenes occupied the right wing with the Messenians and the few Athenians; while the remainder of the line was formed by the Acarnanians in their several divisions, and the Amphilochean dartmen that were present. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up without distinction, excepting the Mantineans, who kept together more on the left, though not in the extremity of the flank, for the extreme left was held by Eurylochus and his men, opposed to the Messenians and Demosthenes.

108. When the Peloponnesians, being now engaged, outflanked their opponents, and were surrounding their right, the Acarnanians, rising from the ambuscade, fell on them in the rear, and broke them; so that they did not stand to make any resistance, and, moreover, by their panic threw their main army into flight: for when they saw the division of Eurylochus, and the bravest of their forces being cut to pieces, they were far more alarmed. It was the Messenians, posted in that part of the field with Demosthenes, that performed the chief part of the work. But the Ambraciots and those in the right wing defeated the division opposed to them, and pursued it back to Argos; for they are the most warlike of all in those parts. When, however, on their return they saw their main army defeated, and the rest of the Acarnanians were pressing them closely, they escaped with difficulty into Olpæ; and many of them were killed, while they hurried on without any order, excepting the Mantineans, who kept their ranks best of all the army during the retreat. And so the battle ended, after lasting till evening.

109. The next day Menedæus, who on the death of Eurylochus and Macarius had succeeded to the sole command, was at a loss, since so great a defeat had been experienced, to see in what way he should either remain and sustain a siege—cut off as he was by land, and at the same time, through the presence of the Athenian fleet, by sea—or should

escape if he retreated. He therefore made proposals to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians for a truce, and permission to retire, as well as for the recovery of his dead. They restored him his dead, and themselves erected a trophy, and took up their own dead, about three hundred in number; but for permission to retire they did not openly grant any truce to the whole army; but Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues secretly granted one to the Mantineans, and Medonæus and the other Peloponnesian commanders, to retreat with all speed; wishing to strip of their supporters the Ambraciots and the mercenary host of foreigners; but most of all desiring to raise a prejudice against the Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians amongst the Greeks in those parts, from the impression of their having betrayed their friends, and deemed their own interest of more importance. They, then, took up their dead, and were burying them with all speed, as circumstances allowed; while those who had received permission were planning their retreat.

110. Now tidings were brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambraciots at home, in compliance with the first message from Olpæ, were marching in full force with succours through Amphilochia, with a wish to join their countrymen at Olpæ, and knowing nothing of what had happened. Accordingly he straightway sent a division to lay ambushes beforehand in the roads, and to preoccupy the strong positions; while with the rest of his army he prepared to march against them.

111. Meanwhile the Mantineans, and those to whom the truce had been granted, going out under the pretext of gathering herbs and fire-wood, secretly went away in small parties, picking up at the same time the things for which they professed to have left the camp: but when they had now proceeded some distance from Olpæ, they began to retreat at a quicker pace. The Ambraciots and the rest, as many as happened thus to have gone out with them in ¹a body, when they found that they were gone away, themselves also pushed forward, and began running, on purpose to overtake them. But the Acarnanians at first thought that all alike were flying

¹ Ἀθροοί seems to be in opposition to κατ' ἀλλήλους in the preceding section. Or it may signify, as Arnold takes it, in such numbers as would justify the experiment, which small parties might think too hazardous.

without permission, and began to pursue the Peloponnesians; and when some even of their generals tried to stop them, and said that permission had been granted to the Peloponnesians, one or two men threw their darts at them, believing that they were being betrayed. Afterwards, however, they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go away, but killed the Ambraciots. And there was much contention and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. They killed some two hundred of them; the rest escaped into Agræa, a bordering territory, and Salæthus, king of the Agræans, being their friend, received them.

112. The Ambraciots from the city arrived at Idomene. This town consists of two high hills; the greater of which, after night had come on, the troops sent forward from the camp by Demosthenes preoccupied unobserved; while the Ambraciots had previously ascended the smaller, and bivouacked on it. Demosthenes, after supper, marched with the rest of the army as soon as it was evening; himself with half of his force making for the pass, the remainder proceeding over the mountains of Amphilochia. At dawn of day he fell upon the Ambraciots, while they were yet in their beds, and had had no notice of his measures, but much rather imagined that his forces were their own countrymen. For Demosthenes had purposely posted the Messenians first, with orders to address them, speaking in the Doric dialect, and so creating confidence in the sentinels; while at the same time they were not visible to the eye, as it was still night. When therefore he fell upon them, they routed them, and slew the greater part on the spot; the rest rushed in flight over the mountains. But as the roads were preoccupied, and the Amphilochians, moreover, were well acquainted with their own country, and light-armed against a heavy-armed enemy, whereas the Ambraciots were unacquainted with it, and knew not which way to turn, they perished by falling into ravines, and the ambushes that had been previously laid. After attempting every mode of escape, some of them also turned to the sea, which was not far off; and when they saw the Athenian ships coasting along shore at the time that the affair happened, they swam to them, in their present alarm thinking it better to be slain, if they must, by those on board, than by their barbarous and most bitter enemies, the Amphi-

lochians. The Ambraciots then were destroyed in this manner, and only few of many escaped to their city. The Acarnanians, after stripping the dead, and erecting trophies, returned to Argos.

113. The next day there came to them a herald from the Ambraciots who had fled from Olpæ into Agræa, to ask permission to take up the dead whom they had slain after the first engagement, when they left the camp without permission with the Mantineans and those who had received it. At sight of the arms taken from the Ambraciots from the city, the herald was astonished at their number; for he was not acquainted with the disaster, but imagined that they had belonged to their own party. And some one asked him why he was so astonished; and how many of them had been killed; his interrogator again supposing him to be the herald from the troops at Idomene. He said, "About two hundred." His interrogator, taking him up, said, "These then are evidently not the arms [of such a number], but of more than a thousand." The herald said in reply, "Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us." He answered, "Yes, they are; if at least it was you that fought yesterday at Idomene." "*We* fought with no one yesterday; but the day before, on our retreat." "Ay, but *we* fought yesterday with these, who had come as a reinforcement from the city of the Ambraciots." When the herald heard that, and learned that the reinforcement from the city had been cut off, breaking out into wailing, and astounded at the magnitude of the present evils, he returned without executing his commission, and no longer asked back the bodies. For this was the greatest disaster that befell any one Grecian city in an equal number of days during the course of this war: and I have not recorded the numbers of the slain, because the multitude said to have fallen is incredible, in comparison with the size of the city. I know, however, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilocheians had wished, in compliance with the advice of Demosthenes, to take Ambracia, they would have done so on the first assault: but as it was, they were afraid that the Athenians, if they had possession of it, might prove more troublesome neighbours to themselves.

114. After this, they allotted a third of the spoils to the Athenians, and divided the rest amongst their several cities.

Those given to the Athenians were taken while on their voyage home; and what are now deposited in the temples of Attica, are three hundred full suits of armour, which were reserved for Demosthenes, and with which he sailed back home; his restoration after the disaster in Ætolia being rendered more safe in consequence of this achievement. The Athenians on board the twenty ships also returned to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, on the departure of the Athenians and of Demosthenes, granted a truce to the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthus and the Agræans, to return from Æniada, whither they had removed from the country of Salynthus. And to provide for the future, they also concluded a treaty and alliance for a hundred years with the Ambraciots, on these conditions: that neither the Ambraciots should march with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the Athenians; but that they should succour each other's country; and that the Ambraciots should restore whatever towns or hostages they held from the Amphilochians, and not go to the assistance of Anactorium, which was hostile to the Acarnanians. Having made these arrangements, they put an end to the war. Afterwards the Corinthians sent a garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia, consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, under the command of Xenoclides son of Euthycles, who reached their destination by a difficult route through Epirus. Such was the conclusion of the measures in Ambracia.

115. The Athenians in Sicily the same winter made a descent from their ships on the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who had made an irruption on its borders from the interior; they also sailed against the islands of Æolus. On their return to Rhegium they found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, a general of the Athenians, had come to succeed to the command of the ships under Laches; the allies in Sicily having sailed and persuaded the Athenians to assist them with more vessels. For though the Syracusans commanded their land, yet, as they were excluded from the sea by only a few ships, they were making preparations, and raising a fleet, with a determination not to put up with it. And the Athenians manned forty ships to send to them; thinking that so the war in that quarter would be more

speedily brought to a conclusion, and at the same time wishing to practise their men in seamanship. They despatched therefore one of their commanders, Pythodorus, with a few ships ; intending to send out Sophocles son of Sostradides, and Eurymedon son of Thucles, with the larger squadron. So Pythodorus, being now in command of Laches' ships, sailed at the close of the winter to the fort of the Locrians, which Laches had formerly taken ; and returned after being defeated in battle by the Locrians.

116. Just about the beginning of this spring, the fire flood issued from *Ætna*, as it had done on former occasions, and destroyed some of the territory of the *Catanæans*, who live on *Mount Ætna*, the largest mountain in *Sicily*. It is said that this eruption took place fifty years after the preceding one ; and that it has occurred three times in all since *Sicily* has been inhabited by the Greeks. These were the events of this winter ; and so ended the sixth year of this war, of which *Thucydides* wrote the history.

BOOK IV.

1. THE following summer, about the time of the corn's coming into ear, ten Syracusan ships and an equal number of Locrians sailed and occupied Messana in Sicily, at the invitation of the inhabitants; and so Messana revolted from the Athenians. This was chiefly done, by the Syracusans, because they saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and were afraid that the Athenians might hereafter make it their head-quarters and proceed against them with a larger force; by the Locrians, for hatred of the people of Rhegium, and with a wish to reduce them by hostilities on both sides. At the same time too the Locrians had invaded the territory of Rhegium with all their forces, to prevent their going to the rescue of Messana, and also at the instigation of some exiles from Rhegium who were with them. For that town had been for a long time torn by faction, and it was impossible at the present time to resist the Locrians; for which reason they were the more determined to attack them. After devastating the country, the Locrians retired with their land-forces, but their ships remained to guard Messana; and others that were being manned were to go to that station, and carry on the war from it.

2. About the same period of the spring, before the corn was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an incursion into Attica, under the conduct of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; and pitching their camp in the country, proceeded to lay it waste. But the Athenians despatched the forty ships to Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, and the remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles; for Pythodorus, the third of them, had already arrived in Sicily before them. These they also ordered to attend, as they sailed by the island, to those of the Corcyræans who were in the city, and who were being plundered by the exiles on the mountain; sixty ships having likewise sailed from the Peloponnese

to assist those on the mountain, and with an idea, that as there was a great famine in the city, they should easily possess themselves of the government. Demosthenes, who had continued in a private capacity since his return from Acarnania, was, at his own request, authorized by them to use that fleet, if he wished, for service about the Peloponnese.

3. When, on their voyage, they were off Laconia, and heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for hastening thither, but Demosthenes desired them to touch first at Pylus, and after doing what was necessary, then to proceed on their voyage. While they were making objections, a storm happened to come on, and carried the fleet to Pylus. So Demosthenes immediately begged them to fortify the place, (for this, he said, was his object in sailing with them,) and showed them that there was great abundance of timber and stone, and that the post was a strong one, and unoccupied, both itself and a considerable distance of the country round. For Pylus is about four hundred stades from Sparta, and is situated in what was once the Messenian territory, being called by the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium. But the commanders said that there were many unoccupied promontories in the Peloponnese, if he wished to put the state to expense by occupying them. He, however, considered that this was a more advantageous post than any other, inasmuch as there was a harbour close by, and the Messenians, who in early times were connected with the place, and spoke the same dialect with the Lacedæmonians, would do them very great injury by their excursions from it, and at the same time be trusty guardians of the place.

4. When he could not convince either the generals or the soldiers, having subsequently communicated his views to the subordinate officers also, he remained quiet from stress of weather; till the soldiers themselves, in their want of occupation, were seized with a desire to set to and fortify the post. Accordingly they took the work in hand, and proceeded with it, though they had no iron tools, but carried stones just as they picked them up, and put them together, as they severally might happen to fit; while the mortar, wherever it was necessary to use any, for want of hods they carried on their back, stooping down in such a way that it might best lie on, and clasping their hands behind them, to prevent its falling

off. Indeed in every way they made haste to anticipate the Lacedæmonians, by completing the most assailable points of the work before they came to the rescue ; for the greater part of the position was strong by nature, and had no need of fortifications.

5. Now the Lacedæmonians happened to be celebrating a festival ; and, moreover, when they heard it, they made light of it, thinking that when they took the field, either the enemy would not wait their attack, or they should easily take the place by storm. To a certain extent also the fact of their army being still before Athens delayed them. So the Athenians, after fortifying in six days the side towards the interior, and what most required it, left Demosthenes there with five ships to protect the place, while with the main body of the fleet they hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

6. When the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of Pylus, they returned home with all speed ; for the Lacedæmonians and Agis their king thought that the affair of Pylus closely affected them ; and, besides, having made their incursion early in the season, and while the corn was still green, they were in want of provisions for most of their troops ; while stormy weather, coming on with greater violence than was usual at that season, distressed the army. So that for many reasons it happened that they returned quicker than usual, and that this was the shortest incursion they had made ; for they remained in Attica but fifteen days.

7. At this same period, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having got together a few Athenians from the guard-stations, and a large body of the allies in that neighbourhood, took possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony from Mende, and hostile [to Athens], which was betrayed to him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiæans having immediately come to its rescue, he was beaten out of it, and lost many of his soldiers.

8. On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the *Periæci* immediately went to the rescue of Pylus ; but the other Lacedæmonians were more slow in marching against it, as they had but just reached home from a different expedition. They despatched orders also through the rest of the Peloponnese to bring up their reinforcements to Pylus as quickly as possible,

and sent for their sixty ships at Corcyra. These having been hauled over the isthmus of Leucas, and having so escaped the observation of the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, reached Pylus; the land-forces also having by that time arrived. While the Peloponnesians were yet sailing up, Demosthenes anticipated them by secretly sending two ships with a message to Eurymedon and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus to join him, as the place was in danger. So the ships sailed with all speed, according to the orders of Demosthenes; while the Lacedæmonians prepared to assault the place both by land and sea, hoping easily to take a building completed in haste, and with only a few men in it. At the same time, expecting the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus to its relief, they intended, in case of their not having taken it before, to bar also the entrances into the harbour, that the Athenians might not be able to come to anchor in it. For the island that is called Sphacteria both secures the harbour, by stretching in a line with it, and close off it, and narrows its entrances; on one side, near the Athenian fortifications and Pylus, leaving a passage for two ships; on the other, towards the rest of the mainland, for eight or nine. It was all woody and pathless from its desert condition, and in extent about fifteen stades. The entrances then they intended to bar with a close line of vessels, with their heads looking outwards; while fearing this island, lest the enemy should carry on their operations against them from it, they conveyed over some heavy-armed troops into it, and posted others along the mainland. For so they thought that both the island would be unfavourable to the Athenians, and the mainland also, as it did not afford any landing-place; for the shores of Pylus itself outside the inlet, looking towards the open sea, would present no ground from which they might proceed to the aid of their countrymen; and so they should storm the place, in all probability, without the risk of a sea-fight, as there were no provisions in it, and it had been occupied after short preparation. Having adopted these resolutions, accordingly they conveyed over the heavy-armed into the island, drafting them by lot from all the ¹*lochi*. There had also been some others sent over before in turns; but these last who went, and who were left there, were four

¹ On these divisions of the Lacedæmonian army see Arnold's note, V. 68. 3.

hundred and twenty in number, with their attendant Helots; their commander being Eпитadas son of Molobrusa.

9. Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedæmonians about to attack him both by sea and land at once, made his own preparations also; and having drawn up under the fortifications the triremes he had remaining from those that had been left him, he enclosed them in a stockade, and armed the crews taken out of them with shields of an inferior kind, and in most cases made of osiers. For it was not possible in so lonely a place to provide themselves with arms; but even these they had got from a thirty-oared privateer and skiff belonging to some Messenians, who happened to have come to them. Of these Messenians there were also about forty heavy-armed, whose services he used with the rest. The main body, both of the unarmed and the armed, he posted at the most fortified and secure points of the place, facing the interior, with orders to repel the land-forces, should they make an assault; while he himself, having picked from the whole force sixty heavy-armed and a few bowmen, proceeded outside the wall to the sea, where he most expected that they would attempt a landing, on ground which was difficult, indeed, and rocky, looking as it did to the open sea, but still, as their wall was weakest at that point, ¹ he thought that this would tempt them to be eager in attacking it. For they built it of no great strength just there, expecting never to be beaten at sea themselves; and also thinking that if the enemy once forced a landing, the place then became easy to take. At this point then he went down to the very sea, and posted his heavy-armed, to prevent a landing, if possible; while he encouraged them with these words:

10. "Soldiers, who have shared with me this adventure, let none of you in such an emergency wish to show himself clever

¹ I have followed the usual interpretation of this sentence, though the sense cannot fairly be drawn from the words as they now stand. Either *δὲ* must be supplied with *ἐπιστάσασθαι*, or it must be changed into the future, as Dobree proposes, even allowing Göller's explanation of the following verb being put in the future: "Futuro *προθυμύσασθαι* usus est, quia in totâ sententiâ futuræ rei significatio inest." Would it be possible to avoid the difficulty by taking *ἐπιστάσασθαι* in one of its other senses, "to win" or "carry" the wall? The general usage of Thucydides, I confess, is against this interpretation; but, on the other hand, there is in all the MSS. but one various reading of the passage, and that would not remedy the fault in the tense, if the ordinary force of the verb be retained.

by calculating the whole amount of the danger that surrounds us, but rather to charge the enemy with reckless confidence, and with the probability of escaping by these means. For circumstances which are as pressing as ours by no means admit of calculation, but require the danger to be faced as quickly as possible. But indeed I see the greater part of them favourable to us, if we will but stand our ground, and not, through being alarmed at the enemy's numbers, throw away the advantages we have. For the difficulty of landing which the place presents I consider to be in our favour: for while we remain where we are, this assists us in the struggle; but if we retreat, we shall find that though [naturally] difficult, it will be easy when there is no one to offer resistance. And in that case we shall find the enemy the more formidable on this very account, because his retreat will not be easily effected, even though he may be driven back by us. For while on board their ships, they are most easy to repel; but when they have once landed, they are then on equal terms with us. Nor should you be very much alarmed at their numbers; for though great, they will engage in small detachments, through the impossibility of bringing to: and it is not an army on the land, fighting on equal ground, while superior in numbers; but one on board a fleet, for which, when at sea, many lucky chances are required [to make it effective]. So that I consider their difficulties a fair equivalent for our 'numbers; and at the same time I call on you, Athenians as you are, and knowing from experience as you do the nature of a naval descent on the coast of others, namely, that if a man should stand his ground, and not retreat for fear of the roaring surf and the terrors of the ships sailing to shore, he would never be driven back; [I call on you, I say,] now in your own case to stand your ground, and by resisting them along the very beach to save both yourselves and the place."

11. When Demosthenes had thus encouraged them, they were more inspired, and went down against them, and ranged themselves close along the sea. The Lacedæmonians,

¹ With the use of *πληθος* in this passage, to signify inferior numbers, compare the frequent use of *ποσούτος* and *τηλικούτος* with the same indefinite meaning, applying to small quantities or numbers, as well as to great; e. g. Demosth. Philipp. I. 23, *Τοσαύτην μὲν, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνὶ νῦν ἡμῖν πορίσασθαι δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνῃ παραταξομένην.* "Only so large a force." So also Soph. *Aj.* 747, and Eur. *Hipp.* 804.

moved from their position, and assaulted the fort at the same time both with their army by land and with their ships, of which there were forty-three; the admiral on board being Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he assaulted it just where Demosthenes was expecting him. So the Athenians defended themselves on both sides, landward and seaward; while their opponents, divided into detachments of a few ships, because it was not possible for more to bring to, and relieving each other in turn, were sailing up against them with all eagerness and mutual exhortation, if by any means they might force their passage and take the place. The most distinguished of all, however, was Brasidas. For being captain of a trireme, and seeing that, in consequence of the difficulty of the position, the captains and steersmen, even where it did seem possible to land, shrunk back and were cautious of wrecking their vessels, he shouted out, and said, that it was not right to be chary of timbers, and put up with the enemy's having built a fort in their country; but he bade them shiver their vessels to force a landing, and told the allies not to shrink, in return for great benefits received, to sacrifice their ships for the Lacedæmonians on the present occasion, but to run them ashore, and land by any means, and secure both the men and the place.

12. In this way he urged on the rest, and having compelled his own steersman to run the ship ashore, he stepped on the gang-board, and was endeavouring to land when he was cut down by the Athenians, and fainted away after receiving many wounds. Having fallen into the ship's bows, his shield slipped from around his arm into the sea; and on its being thrown ashore, the Athenians picked it up, and afterwards used it for the trophy which they erected for this attack. The rest were eager to land, but unable, both from the difficulty of the ground and from the Athenians standing firm and not giving way. And such was the revolution of fortune, that Athenians fighting from land, and that a part of Laconia, were repelling Lacedæmonians when sailing against them; while Lacedæmonians were landing from ships, and on their own country, now hostile to them, to attack Athenians. [I call it a revolution of fortune,] for it formed at that time the main glory of the Lacedæmonians, that they were an inland people, and most powerful by land; and of the Athenians, that they

were a maritime people, and had by far the most powerful navy.

13. Having then made their attacks during that day and part of the following, they ceased from them, and on the third sent some of their ships to Asine, to fetch timber for the construction of their engines ; hoping that though the wall opposite the harbour was high, yet as the landing was most practicable there, they would take it by means of engines. Meanwhile the Athenian ships from Zacynthus arrived, fifty in number ; for they were reinforced by some of the guard-ships at Naupactus, and four Chians. When they saw both the mainland and the island crowded with heavy-armed, and the ships in the harbour, and not sailing out of it ; being at a loss where to get anchorage, they sailed at the time to the island of Prote, which is not far off, and is uninhabited, and there they passed the night. The next day they weighed anchor in readiness for an engagement in the open sea, should the enemy be disposed to put out to meet them there ; if not, intending to sail in and attack them. They, however, neither put out to meet them, nor had done what they had intended, viz. to bar the entrances ; but remaining quiet on shore, were manning their ships, and preparing, in case of any one's sailing in, to engage in the harbour, which is of no small extent.

14. The Athenians, on perceiving this, advanced against them by each entrance ; and finding most of their ships already afloat and drawn up to meet them, they attacked and put them to flight, and chasing them as well as the short distance permitted, disabled many, and took five, one of them with its crew ; while the rest they charged after they had taken refuge under the land. Some too were battered while still being manned, before they got under weigh ; while others they lashed to their own, and began to tow off empty, the crews having taken to flight. The Lacedæmonians seeing this, and being exceedingly distressed at the disaster, because their men were being intercepted on the island, went to the rescue, and rushing into the sea with their arms, laid hold of the vessels, and began to pull them back again ; every one thinking the business to be obstructed in that part in which he was not himself engaged. Thus the uproar occasioned was great, and the very reverse of what was habitual to both parties with regard to ships : for the Lacedæmonians, in their eagerness and

dismay, were absolutely engaged in a sea-fight, so to speak, from the land ; and the Athenians, victorious as they were, and wishing to follow up their present success as far as possible, were engaged in a land-fight from their vessels. After inflicting much labour and many wounds on each other, they separated ; and the Lacedæmonians saved their empty vessels, excepting those first taken. Both sides having returned to their encampment, the Athenians erected a trophy, gave back the slain, secured the wrecks, and immediately began to cruise round the island, and guarded it vigilantly, considering the men as intercepted ; while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, who had by this time come with their contingents from all the cities, remained stationary at Pylus.

15. When tidings of what had taken place at Pylus reached Sparta, it was determined that, in so great a calamity, the authorities should go down to the camp, and ¹immediately decide on inspection what they thought best. They, seeing that it was impossible to assist their men, and not wishing to run the risk of their perishing by starvation, or being overpowered and taken by superior numbers, determined to conclude with the Athenian generals, if they were willing, an armistice concerning matters at Pylus, and then send ambassadors to Athens on the subject of a convention, and to try to recover their men as quickly as possible.

16. The generals having acceded to their proposal, an armistice was concluded on the following terms : " That the Lacedæmonians should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the Athenians, the ships with which they had fought the battle, and all in Laconia that were vessels of war ; and should make no attack on the fort, either by land or sea. That the Athenians should allow the Lacedæmonians on the mainland to send over to their men in the island a stipulated quantity of corn, ready-kneaded, viz. two Attic chœnixes of barley-meal a man, with two cotylæ of wine and a piece of flesh ; and half that quantity for ²each attendant. That they should send in these rations under the eyes of the Athenians, and that no vessel should sail in by stealth. That the Athenians should keep guard over the island, nevertheless, so long as they did not

¹ Haack, Göller, and Dindorf retain the old reading, *πρὸς τὸ χρεῖμα*, depending on *ὁρῶντας*, "on inspection of the case."

² i. e. each of those who are called, ch. 8. 9, *ἐλωστες οἱ περὶ αὐτοῦς*.

land on it, and should abstain from attacking the forces of the Peloponnesians, either by land or by sea. That if either party should break any of these terms, in any particular whatever, the armistice should at once be void. That it should be in force till the Lacedæmonian ambassadors returned from Athens, the Athenians conveying them thither in a trireme, and bringing them back again. That on their arrival this armistice should be void, and the Athenians should deliver back the ships, in the same condition as they had received them." The armistice was concluded on these terms; and accordingly the ships, amounting to about sixty, were given up, and the ambassadors despatched; who, on their arrival at Athens, spoke as follows:

17. "Athenians, the Lacedæmonians have sent us to effect, in behalf of our men in the island, whatever arrangement we may prove to be most advantageous for you, while at the same time it would be most creditable for us with regard to our misfortune, as far as present circumstances allow. Nor will it be contrary to our habit that we shall address you at some length; but it is the fashion of our country, where few words are sufficient, not to use many; but to use more than ordinary, when there is occasion for proving by words a point of importance to us, and so effecting our purpose. Receive then what we say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as though you were considered ignorant and were being instructed by us; but rather regarding it as an admonition to take good advice, offered to men who are well informed. For it is in your power honourably to secure your present good fortune, keeping the advantages you have, and receiving an accession of honour and renown; and not to feel as men do that gain any advantage contrary to their habit; for through hope they are ever grasping for more, because they have unexpectedly enjoyed even their present good luck. But those who have had most changes of fortune both ways, ought fairly to be most distrustful of prosperity. And this might reasonably be the case, both with your city, owing to its great experience, and with ourselves.

18. "You may learn this lesson by looking at our present misfortunes; for though enjoying the highest reputation of all the Greeks, we are now come [with this request] to you, though we were before accustomed to think that we had ourselves more power to grant what we have now come to sue

for. And yet we were not reduced to this either from decay of power, or from insolence on account of greater accession to it, but from failure in our plans, while reckoning on our ordinary resources; a subject in which the same thing is alike incident to all. So that it is not right for you to suppose, that because of the present strength of your city and its accessions, fortune too will be always on your side. They indeed are wise men who cautiously regard their good things as doubtful; (the same men would also deal with misfortunes more discreetly than others;) and who think that war does not conform itself to that measure on which men may wish to meddle with it, but will proceed as chances may lead them on. Such men, too, while they meet with fewest failures, because they are not elated by confiding in their military success, would be most inclined to bring the war to a conclusion during their prosperity. And you, Athenians, have now an excellent opportunity of doing this with us; and of escaping hereafter, should you not be persuaded by us, and then meet with reverses, (which is very possible,) the imputation of having gained even your present advantages by mere chance; when you might have left behind you a character for power and wisdom exposed to no such hazard.

19. "Now the Lacedæmonians invite you to a treaty and conclusion of the war, offering you peace and alliance, and that there should subsist between us in other respects close friendship and intimacy with one another; while they ask back, in return, their men in the island; at the same time, thinking it better for both parties not to try the chances of war to the uttermost, whether they may escape by force through some accidental means of preservation, or be reduced to surrender, and be more severely dealt with. And we think that great enmities would be most effectually reconciled, not if one party, acting in a revengeful spirit, and after gaining most advantages in the war, should bind the other down by compulsory oaths, and make an arrangement with him on unequal terms; but if, when he might do so, showing regard for fairness, and conquering him by a display of goodness, he should, beyond his expectations, be reconciled to him on moderate terms. For his adversary being now bound, not to retaliate on him, as one who had been treated with violence, but to make him a return of goodness, is more disposed, for

very shame, to abide by the terms of his agreement. And men act thus towards their greatest enemies, more than towards those who have quarrelled with them in an ordinary degree : and they are naturally disposed with pleasure to give way in their turn to such as willingly yield to them ; but against those that are overbearing, to hazard all, even against their better judgment.

20. "To come to terms then were good for both of us now, if ever, before any irremediable disaster overtake us in the mean time ; in which case we must for ever feel a private hatred of you, in addition to the public one ; and you must lose the advantages to which we now invite you. But whilst things are undecided, and whilst glory and friendship with us are offered to you, our own misfortune, on the other hand, being adjusted on moderate terms, before any disgrace befalls us, let us be reconciled, and both ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant a respite from their miseries to the rest of the Greeks ; who herein also will think you the chief agents. For they are harassed with war without knowing which of the two parties began it ; but if a pacification be effected, on which you have now the greater power to decide, they will refer the obligation to you. If you thus decide, you have an opportunity of becoming firm friends with the Lacedæmonians, at their own request, and by conferring a favour on them, rather than by treating them with violence. And in this consider what great advantages are likely to be involved ; for if we and you agree together, be assured that the rest of Greece, being inferior in power, will honour us in the highest degree."

21. The Lacedæmonians then spoke to this effect, thinking that the Athenians were before desirous of a truce, but debarred from it through their own opposition ; and that if peace were offered, they would gladly accept it, and give back the men. They, however, since they had the men in the island, thought the treaty was now ready for them, whenever they might wish to conclude it with them, and were grasping after further advantage. They were especially urged to this by Cleon son of Cleænetus, a demagogue at that time, and most influential with the populace ; who persuaded them to answer, that the men in the island must first surrender their arms and themselves, and be conveyed to Athens ; and that on their arrival, when the Lacedæmonians had restored Nisæa,

Pegæ, Troezen, and Achaia—which they had taken, not by war, but by virtue of the former arrangement, when the Athenians had conceded them under the pressure of calamities, and were at that time somewhat more in need of a truce—they should then recover their men, and conclude a treaty for as long a period as both sides might wish.

22. To this answer they made no reply, but desired them to choose commissioners to meet them, who should speak and hear on each point, and so calmly come to any arrangement to which they might persuade each other. Upon that Cleon fell violently upon them, saying that he knew beforehand that they had no sound purpose; and it was evident now; since they were unwilling to say any thing before the people, but wished to meet in council with a few individuals; if, however, they had any honest intentions, he told them to declare it before all. But the Lacedæmonians seeing that they could not speak before the multitude, (even though they did think it best, in consequence of their misfortune, to make some concessions,) lest they should lose favour with their allies by speaking and not succeeding; and being convinced that the Athenians would not grant their proposals on moderate terms, returned from Athens without effecting their purpose.

23. On their arrival, the truce concluded at Pylus was immediately at an end, and the Lacedæmonians asked back their ships, according to agreement. But the Athenians, alleging as grounds of complaint an attack on the fort in contravention of the truce, and other particulars which appear not worth mentioning, refused to return them; laying stress on its having been said, that if there were any violation of it whatever, the truce was at an end. The Lacedæmonians denied it, and charging them with injustice in their conduct respecting the ships, went away, and set themselves to the war. And now hostilities were carried on at Pylus with the greatest vigour on both sides; the Athenians cruising round the island continually with two ships in opposite directions during the day, while by night they were all moored round it, except on the side of the open sea, whenever there was a wind blowing; (twenty ships too had joined them from Athens to assist in the blockade, so that in all they amounted to seventy); and the Peloponnesians being encamped on the continent, and

making attacks on the fort, on the look-out for an opportunity, should any offer, of rescuing their men.

24. In the mean time the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily, having taken to join the ships on guard at Messana the other squadron which they were preparing, carried on the war from that place. They were especially urged on to this by the Locrians, out of hatred for the people of Rhegium, whose territory they had themselves also invaded with all their forces. And they wished to try the result of a sea-fight, seeing that the Athenian ships stationed at Messana were but few; while by the greater part of them, including those that were to come thither, they heard that the island was being blockaded. For if they gained the advantage by sea, they hoped that by blockading Rhegium both with their land-forces and their ships they would easily reduce it, and then their success would be secured; for as the promontory of Rhegium in Italy, and that of Messana in Sicily, lay close together, the Athenians would not be able to cruise against them, and command the strait. This strait is formed by the sea between Rhegium and Messana, where Sicily is at the least distance from the continent; and is the Charybdis, so called, through which Ulysses is said to have sailed. And as the sea falls into it through a narrow passage from two great mains, the Tuscan and Sicilian, flowing at the same time with a strong current, it has naturally been considered dangerous.

25. In this strait then the Syracusans and their allies, with rather more than thirty ships, were compelled to engage, late in the day, about the passage of a boat, and put out to meet sixteen vessels from Athens and eight from Rhegium. Being defeated by the Athenians, they sailed off with all speed, as they severally happened, to their own camps, the one at Rhegium, the other at Messana, after the loss of one ship, night having overtaken them in the action. After this, the Locrians withdrew from the Rhegian territory; and the fleet of the Syracusans and their allies united and came to anchor at Cape Pelorus in the Messanian territory, their land-forces having also joined them. The Athenians and Rhegians sailed up to them, and seeing their ships unmanned, attacked them, and now on *their* side lost a ship, through an iron grapple

having been thrown on it, but the men swam out of it. Afterwards, when the Syracusans had gone on board their ships, and were being towed along shore to Messana, the Athenians again advanced against them, and lost another vessel, the enemy having ¹got their ships out into the open sea, and charged them first. Thus the Syracusans had the advantage in the passage along shore and in the engagement, which was such as has been described, and passed on to the port of Messana. The Athenians, on receiving tidings that Camarina was going to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed thither; while the Messanians, in the mean time, with all their forces made an expedition, at once by land and by sea, against Naxos, a Chalcidian town near their borders. The first day, having driven the Naxians within their walls, they ravaged the land, and the next day sailed round with their fleet, and did the same in the direction of the river Acesines, while with their land-forces they made their incursion towards the city. Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the highlands in great numbers to assist against the Messanians; and when the Naxians saw them, they took courage, and cheering themselves with the belief that the Leontines and other Grecian allies were coming to their aid, made a sudden sally from the town, and fell upon the Messanians, and having routed them, slew more than a thousand, the rest having a miserable return homeward; for the barbarians fell upon them on the road, and cut off most of them. The ships, having put in at Messana, subsequently dispersed for their several homes. Immediately after this, the Leontines and their allies, in conjunction with the Athenians, turned their arms against Messana, in the belief of its having been weakened; and attempted it by an attack, the Athenians with their ships on the side of the harbour, the land-forces on the side of the town. But the Messanians, and some Locrians with Demoteles, who after its disaster had been left in it as a garrison, suddenly fell upon them, and routed the greater part of the Leontine troops, and slew many of them. The Athenians, on seeing it, landing from their ships, went to their assistance, and drove the Messanians back again into the town, having come upon them while in confusion; they then erected

¹ For the different explanations of ἀποσιμωσάντων, see Arnold's note.

a trophy and returned to Rhegium. After this, the Greeks in Sicily continued to make war on each other by land without the co-operation of the Athenians.

26. At Pylus, in the mean time, the Athenians were still blockading the Lacedæmonians in the island, and the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remained where they were. But the watch was kept by the Athenians with great trouble, through want of both victuals and water; for there was no spring but one in the citadel of Pylus itself, and that not a copious one; but most of them were drinking such water as they would be likely to find by digging through the shingle near the sea. They suffered too from want of room, being encamped in a narrow space; and as the ships had no roadstead, some of them took their meals on shore in their turn, while others lay off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was caused by the time being prolonged beyond their expectation; for they imagined that they should reduce them to surrender in a few days, shut up in a desert island as they were, and having only brackish water to drink. The cause of this delay was the Lacedæmonians having proclaimed, that any one who wished should carry into the island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food that might be serviceable in the siege; rating it at a high price, and promising freedom to any of the Helots who should carry it in. Many others therefore carried it in, at all risks, and especially the Helots, putting out from any part of the Peloponnesians, as might happen, and landing by night on the side of the island towards the open sea. But what they particularly watched for was a chance of being carried to shore by a wind; for they more easily escaped the look-out of the triremes, when there was a breeze from sea-ward; as it was then impossible for the cruisers to anchor round it, while their own landing was effected in a reckless manner; for their boats being rated at their value in money, they drove them up on the beach, while the soldiers were watching for them at the landing-places in the island. But all that ran the risk in calm weather were taken prisoners. Divers also swam in under water on the side of the harbour, dragging by a cord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; but though these escaped unobserved at first, precautions were afterwards taken against them. Indeed each party contrived in every possible manner, the one to

throw in provisions, the other to prevent its being done without their observation.

27. When they heard at Athens the circumstances of the army, that it was thus being harassed, and that corn was thus taken in for the men in the island, they were perplexed, and afraid that winter might surprise them in the blockade. For they saw that both carrying provisions round the Peloponnese would then be impossible—at the same time they were in an uninhabited country, [where they could get none themselves,] and even in summer they were not able to send round sufficient supplies for them—and that the blockade by sea of so harbourless a country could not be continued; but that the men would either escape through their giving up their guard, or would watch for a storm, and sail out in the boats that carried the corn in for them. Above all, they were alarmed by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians; for they imagined that it was from their having some strong point on their side that they made no more overtures to them; and they regretted not having assented to the treaty. Cleon observing their suspicions of him, with regard to the obstacles thrown in the way of the convention, said that their informants did not speak the truth. When those who had come with the tidings advised them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, he himself, with Theogenes, was chosen by the Athenians for that purpose. Aware therefore that he would be compelled either to give the same account as those whom he was slandering, or to be proved a liar if he gave a different one, he advised the Athenians—seeing that they were really more inclined in their minds for a fresh expedition—that they should not send commissioners, nor delay and waste their opportunity, but sail against the men, if they thought the report was true. And he pointedly alluded to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was general at the time; hating him, and tauntingly observing, that it was easy, if their generals were men, to sail with a force and take those in the island; and that if he had himself been in office, he would have done it.

28. Nicias, observing that the Athenians began to murmur at Cleon for not sailing as it was, if he thought it so easy, and at the same time seeing that he aimed his taunts at *him*, desired him to take whatever force he chose, as far as the generals were concerned, and make the attempt. Cleon, thinking

at first that he only pretended to give up the command to him, was prepared to accept it; but when he found that he really wished to transfer it to him, he drew back, and said that he was not general, but they; being afraid now, and not supposing that Nicias would have brought himself to retire in his favour. He, however, again urged him to undertake it, and resigned the command against Pylus, and called on the Athenians to attest it. They, as the multitude is ever wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition, and tried to escape from what he had said, pressed Nicias the more to give up the command to him, and called loudly on Cleon to set sail. So that not knowing how to evade his words any longer, he undertook the voyage, and, coming forward, said, that he was not afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but would set sail, taking with him no one out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that were there, with some targeteers that had come to their aid from CEnus, and four hundred bowmen from other quarters. With these, in addition to the soldiers at Pylus, he said that within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedæmonians alive, or kill them on the spot. The Athenians were seized with laughter at his vain talking, but nevertheless the sensible part of them were pleased with the business, reckoning that they should gain one of two good things; either to be rid of Cleon, which they rather hoped, or, if deceived in their opinion, to get the Lacedæmonians into their hands.

29. When he had thus arranged every thing in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted him the command of the expedition, having associated with himself one of the generals at Pylus, namely, Demosthenes, he prepared to set sail as quickly as possible. He chose Demosthenes for his colleague, because he heard that he was himself meditating a descent on the island. For the soldiers, being distressed by their want of room, and being a besieged rather than a besieging party, were eager to run all risks. The firing of the island had moreover given him confidence. For formerly, in consequence of its being extensively covered with wood, and pathless, from its having always been uninhabited, he was afraid, and considered this to be rather in favour of the enemy; as when he landed with a large force, they might attack him from an unseen position, and so do him damage. For, owing to the forest, their

mistakes and amount of forces would not be so distinctly seen by him, while all the blunders of his troops would be visible to them; so that they might fall on him unexpectedly at whatever point they pleased, it being always in their power to make the attack. And if, again, he should force them to an engagement in the forest, he thought the smaller number, with knowledge of the country, would have an advantage over the larger without that knowledge; and that their own army, great as it was, might imperceptibly be cut off, while they could not see in which direction to assist each other.

30. It was, above all, from his disaster in *Ætolia*, which in a great measure had been occasioned by the forest, that these thoughts struck him. The soldiers, however, having been compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of the island, and take their dinners, with a guard posted in advance; and one of them having unintentionally set fire to a small part of the wood, and a wind having afterwards risen, the greater part of it was consumed before they were aware of it. In this way then observing, on a clearer view, that the *Lacedæmonians* were more numerous than he had expected—for before this, he imagined that they took in provisions for a smaller number—and now perceiving that the *Athenians* were more in earnest about it, as a thing that was worth their attention, and that the island was more easy to land on, he was preparing for the adventure, by sending for troops from the neighbouring allies, and getting every thing else in readiness, when *Cleon*, after previously sending him word that he was coming, arrived at *Pylus* with the forces he had asked for. After their meeting, they sent, in the first place, a herald to the camp on the continent, wishing to know whether, without running any risk, they would desire the men in the island to surrender to them their arms and themselves, on condition of their being kept in mild custody, till some general agreement were concluded.

31. When they did not accept their proposal, they waited one day, and on the next put out by night, having embarked all their heavy-armed on board a few vessels, and a little before morning effected a landing on each side of the island, both that of the open sea and that of the harbour, amounting to about eight hundred heavy-armed, and proceeded at a run against the first post in the island. For the following was the

way in which the men were disposed. In this first guard there were thirty heavy-armed; the centre and most level part was held by their main body, and Epitadas their commander; while a small division guarded the very corner of the island, towards Pylus, which on the sea side was precipitous, and on the land side least exposed to assault. For there stood there an old fort, ¹rudely built of stone, which they thought might be of service to them, if they should be driven to a compulsory retreat. In this way then were they posted.

32. The Athenians immediately put to the sword the men forming the first guard, whom they had thus attacked; for they were still in their beds, or only just taking up their arms, the landing having surprised them, as they fancied that the ships were only sailing, according to custom, to their stations for the night. As soon as it was morning, the rest of the forces also disembarked, viz. all the crews of seventy ships and rather more, (except the lowest rank of rowers,) with their different equipments; eight hundred bowmen, and no less a number of targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all others who were in any positions about Pylus, except the garrison on the fortifications. By the arrangement of Demosthenes, they were divided into parties of two hundred, more or less, and occupied the highest grounds, that the enemy might be most severely harassed by being surrounded on all sides, and not know where to make resistance, but be annoyed by a double discharge of missiles; being attacked by those behind them, if they charged those before, and by those posted on each side, if they made a flank movement. And so, wherever they went, they would have the enemy on their rear, light-armed, and the most difficult to deal with, being strong at a distance from the use of arrows, darts, stones, and slings, and it being impossible even to get near them; for they would conquer while flying, and when their enemy retreated, would press them close. It was with such a view of the case that Demosthenes both originally planned the descent, and made his arrangements in the execution of it.

33. The party under Epitadas, which was also the main division in the island, on seeing the first post cut off, and an army advancing against themselves, closed their ranks, and

¹ Literally, "with stones as they were picked up."

advanced to meet the heavy-armed of the Athenians, with a wish to engage with them; for they were stationed on their front, but the light-armed on their flanks and rear. They could not however come up with them, and avail themselves of their superior skill in arms; (for the light troops kept them in check with their missiles from both sides; while at the same time the heavy-armed did not come on to meet them, but remained still;) but the irregulars, on whatever point they ran up and charged them most closely, they routed; and these again would retreat, and still defend themselves, being lightly equipped, and easily getting a good start in their flight, from the difficult nature of the ground, and its rough condition through being before uninhabited, over which the Lacedæmonians with their heavy armour could not pursue them.

34. For some short time then they skirmished with each other in this way. But when the Lacedæmonians were no longer able with vigour to dash out against them where they made their attack, the light-armed, observing that they were now slackening in their resistance, and themselves deriving most confidence from a closer view—appearing as they did many times more numerous than the enemy—and having now more accustomed themselves to look on them no longer with such terror, because they had not at once suffered as much as they had expected, when they were first landing with spirits cowed at the thought of attacking Lacedæmonians; [under these circumstances, I say,] they despised them, and with a shout rushed on them in one body, and attacked them with stones, arrows, and darts, whichever came first to their hand. From the shouting thus raised, while they ran upon them, bewilderment seized them, as men unaccustomed to such a mode of fighting. The dust also from the wood that had been burnt was rising thick into the air, and it was impossible for any one to see before him, for the arrows and stones which, together with the dust, were flying from such a host of men. And here the action became distressing to the Lacedæmonians; for their caps were not proof against the arrows, and darts were broken in them, when they were struck; and they could make no use of their weapons, being excluded, so far as sight was concerned, from any view before them; and not hearing, for the louder shouts of the enemy, their own word of command; while danger surrounded them on every side, and they

had no hope of any means of defending and saving themselves.

35. At last, when many were now being wounded from constantly moving in the same place, they formed into a close body, and went to the fort in the corner of the island, which was not far off, and to their own guards there. On their giving way, the light-armed then at once took courage, and pressed on them with a far louder shout than ever. Those of the Lacedæmonians then who were overtaken in the retreat were slain ; but the greater part escaped to the fort, and with the garrison that was there ranged themselves all along it, to defend themselves where it was assailable. The Athenians, on coming up, could not surround and enclose them, owing to the natural strength of the place, but advanced in front, and endeavoured to force their position. And thus for a long time, indeed for the greater part of the day, though suffering from the battle, dust, and sun, both sides held out ; the one striving to drive them from the high ground, the other not to give way ; and the Lacedæmonians now defended themselves more easily than before, as there was no surrounding them on the flanks.

36. When the business was still undecided, the commander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were labouring in vain ; but if they would give him a part of the bowmen and light-armed, to go round in their rear by a way that he should himself discover, he thought he could force the approach. Having received what he asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, that they might not observe it, and, advancing wherever the precipitous side of the island allowed a passage, and where the Lacedæmonians, relying on the strength of the ground, kept no guard, with great labour and difficulty he got round unobserved, and suddenly appearing on the height in their rear, struck the enemy with dismay at the unexpected movement, and gave much greater confidence to his friends by the sight of what they were looking for. And now the Lacedæmonians were exposed to missiles on both sides, and reduced to the same result (to compare a small case with a great one) as that which happened at Thermopylæ ; for those troops were cut off through the Persians' getting round by the path ; and these, being more assailed on all sides, no longer held their

ground, but from fighting, as they were, a few against many, and from weakness of body through want of provisions, they began to retreat; and so the Athenians now commanded the approaches.

37. Cleon and Demosthenes, aware that if they gave way even the least degree more, they would be destroyed by the Athenian forces, stopped the engagement, and kept their men off them, wishing to take them alive to Athens, if by any means, in accordance with their proposals, they might be induced to surrender their arms, and yield to their present danger. And so they sent a herald, to ask if they would surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, ¹ to be treated at their discretion.

38. On hearing this, the greater part of them lowered their shields, and waved their hands, to show that they accepted the proposal. After this, when the cessation of hostilities had taken place, a conference was held between Cleon and Demosthenes, and Styphon the son of Pharax, on the other side; for Epitadas, the first of their former commanders, had been killed, and Hippagretas, the next in command, was lying amongst the slain, still alive, but given up for dead; and Styphon had been chosen, according to custom, to take the command in case of any thing happening to them. He, then, and those who were with him, said that they wished to send a herald to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland, and ask what they should do. When the Athenians would not allow any of them to leave the island, but themselves called for heralds from the mainland; and when questions had passed between them twice or thrice, the last man that came over to them from the Lacedæmonians on the mainland brought them this message; "The Lacedæmonians bid you to provide for your own interests, so long as you do nothing dishonourable." So after consulting by themselves, they surrendered their arms and their persons. That day and the following night the Athenians kept them in custody; but the next day, after erecting a trophy on the island, they made all their other arrangements for sailing, and distributed the men amongst the captains of the fleet, to take charge of; while the Lacedæmonians sent a herald, and recovered their dead. Now the number of those who were killed in the island, or were taken alive,

¹ Literally, "for them to decide as they pleased."

was as follows. There had crossed over in all four hundred and twenty heavy-armed, two hundred and ninety-two of which were taken [to Athens] alive, and the rest were slain. Of those that were living about one hundred and twenty were Spartans. On the side of the Athenians there were not many killed; for the battle was not fought hand to hand.

39. The whole length of time that the men were blockaded, from the sea-fight to the battle in the island, was seventy-two days; for about twenty of which, whilst the ambassadors were gone to treat of peace, they had provisions given; but for the remainder, they were fed by those that sailed in by stealth. And there was still corn in the island, and other kinds of food were found in it; for Epitadas, the commander, supplied them with it more sparingly than he might have done. The Athenians then and the Peloponnesians returned with their forces from Pylus to their several homes, and Cleon's promise, though a mad one, was fulfilled; for within twenty days he took the men to Athens, as he engaged to do.

40. And of all the events of the war this happened most to the surprise of the Greeks; for their opinion of the Lacedæmonians was, that neither for famine nor any other form of necessity would they surrender their arms, but would keep them, and fight as they could, till they were killed. Indeed they did not believe that those who had surrendered were men of the same stamp with those who had fallen; and thus one of the allies of the Athenians some time after asked one of the prisoners from the island, by way of insult, if those of them who had fallen were ¹honourable and brave men? to which he answered, that the ²*atractus* (meaning the arrow) would be worth a great deal, if it knew the brave men from the rest; thus stating the fact, that any one was killed who came in the way of the stones and arrows.

41. On the arrival of the men, the Athenians determined to keep them in prison, till some arrangement should be made; and if the Lacedæmonians should before that invade their territory, to take them out and put them to death. They also

¹ i. e. "gentlemen" of the true Spartan blood, such as they were so fond of representing themselves. See Arnold's note.

² "One of the ordinary Spartan words to express what the other Greeks called *διδόσθαι*." Id.

arranged for the defence of Pylus ; and the Messenians of Naupactus sent to the place, as to the land of their fathers, (for Pylus is a part of what was formerly the Messenian country,) such of their men as were most fit for the service, and plundered Laconia, and annoyed them most seriously by means of their common dialect. The Lacedæmonians having had no experience aforetime in such a predatory kind of warfare, and finding their Helots deserting, and fearing that they might see their country revolutionized to even a still greater extent, were not easy under it ; but, although unwilling to show this to the Athenians, they sent ambassadors to them, and endeavoured to recover Pylus and the men. They, however, were grasping at greater advantages, and though they often went to them, sent them back without effecting any thing. These then were the things that happened about Pylus.

42. The same summer, immediately after these events, the Athenians made an expedition against the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand heavy-armed of their own people, and two hundred cavalry on board horse-transports ; the Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, from amongst the allies, accompanying them, and Nicias the son of Niceratus taking the command, with two colleagues. Setting sail, they made land in the morning between ¹the Chersonesus and Rheitus, on the beach adjoining to the spot above which is the Solygian hill, on which the Dorians in early times established themselves, and carried on war against the Corinthians in the city, who were Æolians ; and on which there now stands a village called Solygia. From this beach, where the ships came to land, the village is twelve stades off, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty. The Corinthians, having heard long before from Argos that the armament of the Athenians was coming, went with succours to the Isthmus, all but those who lived above it : there were absent too in Ambracia and Leucadia five hundred of them, serving as a garrison ; but the rest, with all their forces, were watching where the Athenians would make the land. But when they had come to during the night unobserved by them, and the appointed signals were raised to tell them of the fact, they left half their

¹ i. e. the peninsula and the stream ; the former running out into the sea, from the ridge of Mount Oneum. See the sketch of the coast in Arnold, vol. ii.

forces at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should advance against Crommyon, and went to the rescue with all speed.

43. And Battus, one of the generals, (for there were two present in the engagement,) took a battalion, and went to the village of Solygia to defend it, as it was unwall'd; while Lycophron gave them battle with the rest. First, the Corinthians attacked the right wing of the Athenians, immediately after it had landed in front of Chersonesus; then the rest of their army also. And the battle was an obstinate one, and fought entirely hand to hand. The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for these had been posted in the extremity of the line) received the charge of the Corinthians, and drove them back after some trouble; but after retreating to a wall (for the ground was all on a rise) they assailed them with stones from the higher ground, and singing the pæan, returned to the attack; which being received by the Athenians, the battle was again fought hand to hand. Meanwhile a battalion of the Corinthians, having gone to the relief of their left wing, broke the right of the Athenians, and pursued them to the sea; but the Athenians and Carystians from the ships drove them back again. The rest of the army on both sides was fighting without cessation, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, in which Lycophron was opposed to the left of the Athenians, and acting on the defensive; for they expected them to try for the village of Solygia.

44. For a long time then they held out without yielding to each other; but afterwards (the Athenians having a serviceable force on their side in their cavalry, while the others had no horse) the Corinthians turned and retired to the hill, where they piled their arms, and did not come down again, but remained quiet. It was in this rout of the right wing that the greater part of them fell, and Lycophron their general. The rest of the army, whose flight, when it was broken, was effected in this manner—with neither hot pursuit nor hurry—withdrew to the higher ground, and there took up its position. The Athenians, finding that they no longer advanced to engage them, spoiled the dead, and took up their own, and immediately erected a trophy. But to that half of the Corinthians which had been posted at Cenchreae for protection, lest the enemy should sail against Crommyon, the battle was not visible, owing to [an intervening ridge of] Mount Oneum; but when

they saw dust, and were aware of it, they immediately went to the scene of action ; as also did the older Corinthians from the city, when they found what had been done. The Athenians, seeing them coming all together against them, and thinking that reinforcements were being brought by the neighbouring Peloponnesians, retreated with all speed to their ships, with the spoils and their own dead, except two whom they had left on the field because they could not find them. Having gone on board their ships, they crossed over to the islands that lie off the coast, and from them sent a herald, and took up under truce the bodies they had left behind them. There were killed in the battle, on the side of the Corinthians, two hundred and twelve ; of the Athenians, rather less than fifty.

45. Putting out from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon in the Corinthian territory, distant from the city one hundred and twenty stades, and having come to their moorings, ravaged the land, and passed the night there. The next day, having first coasted along to the Epidaurian territory and made a descent upon it, they came to Methone, which stands between Epidaurus and Trœzen ; and cutting off the isthmus of the peninsula in which Methone is situated, they fortified it, and having made it a post for a garrison, continued afterwards to lay waste the land of Trœzen, Haliæ, and Epidaurus. After cutting off this spot by a wall, they sailed back home with their ships.

46. At the same time that these things were being done, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after weighing from Pylus for Sicily with an Athenian squadron, came to Corcyra, and with the Corcyræans in the city carried on war upon those that had established themselves on Mount Istone, and who at that time, after crossing over subsequently to the insurrection, commanded the country, and were doing them much damage. They attacked their strong-hold and took it, but the men, having escaped in a body to a higher eminence, surrendered on condition of giving up their auxiliaries, and letting the Athenian people decide their own fate, after they had given up their arms. So the generals carried them across under truce to the island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they were sent to Athens ; with an understanding that if any one were caught running away, the treaty would be void in the case of all. But the leaders of the popular party at Corcyra, fearing

that the Athenians might not put to death those that were sent to them, contrive the following stratagem. They persuade some few of the men in the island, by secretly sending friends to them, and instructing them to say, as though with a kind motive, that it was best for them to make their escape as quickly as possible, and that they would themselves get a vessel ready, for that the Athenian generals intended to give them up to the Corcyraean populace.

47. So when they had persuaded them, and through their own arrangements about the vessel the men were caught sailing away, the treaty was declared void, and the whole party given up to the Corcyraeans. And the Athenian generals contributed no small share to such a result—that the pretext seemed strictly true, and its contrivers took it in hand more securely—by showing that they would not wish the men to be conveyed to Athens by another party, (they themselves being bound for Sicily,) and so to confer the honour on those who took them there. When the Corcyraeans had got possession of them, they shut them up in a large building, and afterwards taking them out by twenties, led them through two rows of heavy-armed soldiers posted on each side; the prisoners being bound together, and beaten and stabbed by the men ranged in the lines, wherever any of them happened to see a personal enemy; while men carrying whips went by their side, and hastened on the way those that were proceeding too slowly.

48. As many as sixty men they took out in this manner, and put to death without the knowledge of those in the building; (for they supposed that they were taking them to be removed to some other place); but when they were aware of it, through some one's having pointed it out to them, they called on the Athenians, and desired that they would themselves put them to death, if they wished. They refused also any longer to leave the building, and said they would not, as far as they could prevent it, permit any one to come in. The Corcyraeans indeed were themselves not disposed to force a passage by the doors; but having gone up to the top of the building, and broken through the roof, they threw the tiles and discharged their arrows down on them. The prisoners sheltered themselves as well as they could, while at the same time the greater part were dispatching themselves, by thrusting into

their throats the arrows which their enemies discharged, and hanging themselves with the cords from some beds that happened to be in the place, and by making strips from their clothes; and so in every manner during the greater part of the night, (for night came on while the tragedy was acting,) they were destroying themselves, and were dispatched with missiles by those on the roof. When it was day, the Corcyræans threw them in layers on waggons, and carried them out of the city; while all the women that were taken in the building were reduced to slavery. In this way were the Corcyræans of the mountain cut off by the commons; and the sedition, after raging so violently, came to this termination, at least, as far as the present war is concerned; for of one of the two parties there was nothing left worth mentioning. The Athenians then sailed away to Sicily, which was their original destination, and carried on the war with their allies there.

49. At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made an expedition, and took Anactorium, a city belonging to the Corinthians, which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and was betrayed to them. And having turned out the Corinthians, Acarnanian settlers from all parts of the country themselves kept possession of the place. And so the summer ended.

50. The following winter Aristides son of Archippus, a commander of the Athenian ships which had been sent out to the allies to levy contributions, arrested at Eion on the Strymon Artaphernes, a Persian, on his way from the king to Lacedæmon. On his being conveyed to Athens, they got his despatches translated out of the Assyrian character, and read them: the substance of which, as regarded the Lacedæmonians, (though many other things were mentioned in them,) was, that the king did not understand what they would have; for though many ambassadors had come to him, no one ever made the same statement as another; if then they would but speak plainly, they might send men to him in company with this Persian. The Athenians afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and ambassadors with him; but on hearing there that king Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for it was at that time that he died,) they returned home.

51. The same winter also the Chians dismantled their new

fortifications, at the command of the Athenians, and in consequence of their suspecting that they would form some new designs against them: they obtained, however, pledges from the Athenians, and security (as far as they could) for their making no change in their treatment of them. And so the winter ended, and the seventh year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

52. At the very commencement of the following summer, there was an eclipse of the sun at the time of a new moon, and in the early part of the same month an earthquake. Moreover, the exiles of the Mytilenæans and the other Lesbians, setting out most of them from the continent, and having taken into their pay an auxiliary force from the Peloponnese, and raised troops from the neighbourhood, took Rhœteum, but restored it without injury on the receipt of 2000 Phocæan staters. After this they marched against Antandrus, and took the town through the treachery of the inhabitants. And their design was to liberate both the other ¹ Actæan towns, as they were called—which the Athenians held, though formerly the Mytilenæans owned them—and, above all, Antandrus; having fortified which, (for there were great facilities for building ships there, as there was a supply of timber, with Ida close at hand,) and sallying from it, as they easily might, with resources of every other kind, they purposed to ravage Lesbos, which lay near, and to subdue the Æolian towns on the mainland. Such were the preparations which they meant to make.

53. The Athenians in the same summer made an expedition against Cythera, with sixty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and a few cavalry, taking with them also from amongst the allies the Milesians and some others; under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotrophes, and Autocles son of Tolmæus. This Cythera is an island lying off Laconia, opposite to Malea. The inhabitants are Laco-nians, of the class of the *periæci*, and an officer called the Judge of Cythera went over to the place annually. They also sent over regularly a garrison of heavy-armed, and paid great attention to it. For it was their landing-place for the merchantmen from Egypt and Libya; and at the same time

¹ i. e. situated on the ἀκτῆ, or coast, of Asia opposite to Lesbos.

privateers were less able to annoy Laconia from the sea, the only side on which it could be injured; for the whole of it runs out toward the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

54. The Athenians therefore, having made the land with their armament, with ten of their ships and two thousand heavy-armed of the Milesians, took the town on the coast called Scandea; while with the rest of their forces they landed on the side of the island looking towards Malea, and advanced against the lower town of Cythera, and at once found all the inhabitants encamped there. A battle having been fought, the Cytherians stood their ground for some short time, and then turned and fled into the upper town; after which they came to an agreement with Nicias and his colleagues to throw themselves on the mercy of the Athenians, only stipulating that they should not be put to death. Indeed there had been before certain proposals made by Nicias to some of the Cytherians, in consequence of which the terms of the capitulation were settled more quickly and favourably, both for their present and future interests: else the Athenians would have expelled the Cytherians, both on the ground of their being Lacedæmonians and of the island being so adjacent to Laconia. After the capitulation, the Athenians, having got possession of Scandea, the town near the harbour, and appointed a garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the places on the sea; and making descents and passing the night on shore at such spots as were convenient, they continued ravaging the country about seven days.

55. The Lacedæmonians, seeing the Athenians in possession of Cythera, and expecting them to make descents of this kind on their territory, no where opposed them with their collected forces, but sent about garrisons through the country, consisting of such numbers of heavy-armed as were required at the different places. And in other respects they were very cautious, fearing lest some innovation should be made in their constitution, in consequence of the unexpected and severe blow which had befallen them in the island, and of the occupation of Pylus and Cythera, and of their being surrounded on all sides by a war that was rapid and defied all precautions. So that, contrary to their custom, they raised four hundred horse and some bowmen; and now, if ever, they were decidedly more timid than usual in military matters,

being engaged in a conflict opposed to the usual character of their forces, to be maintained at sea, and that against Athenians, by whom whatever they did not attempt was always regarded as a failure in their estimate of the success they should have. At the same time the events of fortune, many of which had in a short space of time happened contrary to their expectation, caused them the greatest dismay; and they were afraid that some disaster like that in the island might again, some time or other, happen to them. And for this reason they had less courage for fighting, and thought that whatever movement they made they should do wrong; because their minds had lost all assurance, owing to their former inexperience in misfortune.

56. Accordingly, while the Athenians were at that time ravaging their sea-coast, whatever might be the garrison in the neighbourhood of which each descent was made, generally speaking they kept quiet, thinking themselves in each case too few to resist them, and from their present state of feeling. And one garrison which did offer resistance about Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, though it terrified by an attack the scattered crowd of light-armed, yet retreated again, on its charge being sustained by the heavy-armed; and some few men belonging to it were killed, and some arms were taken; and the Athenians raised a trophy, and then sailed back to Cythera. Thence they sailed round to the Limeran Epidaurus, and after laying waste some portion of the land, came to Thyrea, which forms a part of the Cynurian territory, as it is called, and is on the frontiers of Argos and Laconia. This district the Lacedæmonians, who owned it, gave to the Æginetans, when expelled from their island, as a residence, for the service they had done them at the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helots, and because, though subject to Athens, they always stood on *their* side.

57. While then the Athenians were yet sailing towards them, the Æginetans evacuated the fortifications on the sea which they had happened to be building, and retreated to the upper town, in which they lived, at the distance of about ten stades from the sea. And one of the garrisons in the country, which was also assisting them in the works, would not go with them within the wall, though the Æginetans requested them; but thought it dangerous to be shut up within it; and so

having retreated to the higher ground remained quiet, as they did not consider themselves a match for the enemy. In the mean time the Athenians landed, and advanced straightway with all their forces, and took Thyrea. The town they burnt down, and plundered the property in it, and took the Æginetans with them to Athens, excepting those that had fallen in battle, and the Lacedæmonian commander who was amongst them, Tantalus the son of Patrocles; for he was taken prisoner after being wounded. They also took with them some few individuals from Cythera, whom they thought best to remove for security. These the Athenians determined to deposit in the islands; to order the rest of the Cytherians, while they retained their own country, to pay a tribute of four talents; to put to death all the Æginetans that had been taken, for their former perpetual hostility; and to throw Tantalus into prison with the other Lacedæmonians taken in the island.

58. The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily first made an armistice with one another; and then all the rest of the Sicilians also assembled at Gela, with embassies from all the cities, and held a conference together on the subject of a reconciliation. And many other opinions were expressed on both sides of the question, while they stated their differences and urged their claims, as they severally thought themselves injured; and Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, the man who had the greatest influence with them, addressed the following words to the assembly:

59. "It is not because I am of a city that is either the least powerful, or the most distressed by hostilities, that I shall address you, Sicilians, but in order publicly to state what appears to me the best policy for the whole of Sicily. And now with regard to war, to prove that it is a disastrous thing, why need one particularize all the evil involved in it, and so make a long speech before those who are acquainted with it? For no one is either driven to engage in it through ignorance, or deterred from it by fear, should he think that he will gain any advantage; but it is the lot of the former to imagine the gains greater than the dangers; and the latter will face the perils rather than put up with any present loss. But if both should happen to be thus acting unseasonably, exhortations to peace would be useful. And this would be most serviceable to us

too at the present time, if we did but believe it. For it was surely with a purpose of well securing our own several interests that we both went to war at first, and are endeavouring by means of conference to come to terms again with each other; and if each one should not succeed in going away with what is fair, we shall proceed to hostilities again.

60. "We should be convinced, however, that it is not for our own separate interests alone, if we are wise, that this congress will be held; but to consider whether we shall be able any longer to save the whole of Sicily, which, as I conceive, is the object of the machinations of the Athenians. And we should regard that people as much more compulsory mediators in such case than my words; who, possessing as they do the greatest power of all the Greeks, are watching our blunders, being here with a few ships; and under the legitimate name of alliance are speciously bringing to a profitable conclusion their natural hostility to us. For if we go to war, and call them in to our aid, men who of their own accord turn their arms even upon such as do not call them in; and if we injure ourselves by means of our own resources, and at the same time pave the way for their dominion: it is probable that when they observe us worn out, they will come hereafter with a great force, and endeavour to bring all these states into subjection to them.

61. "And yet we ought, if we are wise, to aim at acquiring for our own respective countries what does not belong to them, rather than at diminishing what they already have, both in calling in allies and incurring fresh dangers; and to consider that faction is most ruinous to states, and particularly to Sicily, the inhabitants of which are all being plotted against, while we are at variance city with city. Knowing this then, we ought to make peace, individual with individual, and state with state, and to make a common effort to save the whole of Sicily: and the thought should be entertained by no one, that though the Dorian part of us are enemies of the Athenians, the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian connexion. For they are not attacking our nations, because they are different, and from their hatred of one of them; but from coveting the good things of Sicily, which we possess in common. And this they have now shown upon the invitation of the Chalcidian race: for to those who had never yet assisted them on the ground of their

alliance, they themselves with forwardness answered their claim, beyond the letter of the compact. And very excusable is it that the Athenians should practise this covetousness and forecasting ; and I blame not those who wish to reign, but those who are too ready to be subject. For human nature is always disposed to rule those that submit, but to guard against those that attack. And if any of us know this, but do not forecast as we ought, and if any one has come here without regarding it as his first care, that all should make a good arrangement for what is a general cause of alarm ; we are mistaken in our views. Most speedily then should we be rid of that alarm by making peace with each other : for it is not from their own country that the Athenians set out against us, but from that of those who invited them here. And in this way war is not terminated by war, but our quarrels are ended without trouble by peace ; and those who have been called in, having come with specious injustice, will go back with reasonable want of success.

62. "With regard to the Athenians then, so great is found to be the benefit of our taking good advice. And with regard to peace, which is acknowledged by all to be a most excellent thing, how can it fail to be incumbent on us to conclude it amongst ourselves ? Or do you think, that whatever good thing, or the contrary, any one has, quiet would not more effectually than war put a stop to the latter, and help to preserve the former ; and that peace has not the less hazardous honours and splendours ? with all other topics which one might discuss in many words, on such a subject as war. Considering then these things, you ought not to disregard what I say, but should rather provide each for your own safety in compliance with it. And if any one think that he shall certainly gain some advantage, either by right or might, let him not be annoyed by failure through the unexpected result ; knowing that many men ere now, both while pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, and hoping, in other instances, to win an advantage by greater power, in the one case, so far from avenging themselves, have not even saved themselves ; and in the other, instead of gaining more, have happened also to lose what they had. For vengeance is not necessarily successful, because a man is injured ; nor is strength sure, because it is sanguine. But the incalculable nature of the future prevails to the greatest possible degree ; and though the most

deceptive of all things, still proves the most useful : for because we are equally afraid, we are more cautious in attacking one another.

63. "And now, on account of our indefinite fear of this unknown future, and our immediate dread of the Athenians' presence, being alarmed on both these grounds, and thinking, with regard to any failure in our ideas of what we severally thought to achieve, that these obstacles are a sufficient bar to their fulfilment, let us send away from the country the enemy that is amongst us, and ourselves make peace for ever, if possible ; but if not that, let us make a treaty for the longest term we can, and put off our private differences to a future period. In a word, let us be convinced that by following my advice we shall each have a free city, from which we shall, as our own masters, make an equally good return to him who treats us either well or ill : but if, through not following it, we are subject to others, then, not to speak of avenging ourselves on any one, we necessarily become, even if most fortunate, friends to our greatest enemies, and at variance with those with whom we ought not to be so.

64. "And for myself, although, as I said at the beginning of my speech, I represent a most powerful city, and am more likely to attack another than to defend myself, yet I think it right to provide against these things, and to make concessions ; and not so to injure my enemies as to incur greater damage myself ; nor through a foolish animosity to think that I have absolute sway alike over my own plans and over fortune, which I cannot control ; but to give way, as far as is reasonable. And I call on you all, of your own free will, to act in the same manner as myself, and not to be compelled to do it by your enemies. For there is no disgrace in connexions giving way to connexions, whether a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to those of the same race ; in a word, all of us who are neighbours, and live together in one country, and that an island, and are called by the one name of Sicilians. For we shall go to war again, I suppose, when it may so happen, and come to terms again amongst ourselves by means of general conferences : but to foreign invaders we shall always, if we are wise, offer united resistance, inasmuch as by our separate losses we are collectively endangered ; and we shall never in future call in any allies or mediators. For by acting thus we shall at the present time avoid depriving Sicily of two bless-

ings—riddance both of the Athenians and of civil war—and shall in future enjoy it by ourselves in freedom, and less exposed to the machinations of others.”

65. Hermocrates having spoken to this effect, the Sicilians agreed amongst themselves in a determination to have done with the war, retaining their several possessions, but that Morgantina should be ceded to the Camarinæans on their paying a stipulated sum of money to the Syracusans. So the allies of the Athenians called those of them who were in command, and said that they should conclude peace, and that the treaty would extend to them also. When the generals had expressed their assent, they concluded peace, and the Athenian ships afterwards sailed away from Sicily. But on the arrival of the generals, the Athenians at home banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon, on the belief of their having been bribed to return, when they might have brought Sicily under their dominion. Thus in their present success they presumed that they could meet with no impediment, but equally achieve what was possible and impossible, with ample or deficient resources alike. The reason of which was their general success beyond their calculations, which suggested to them an idea of ¹strength resting only on hope.

66. The same summer, the Megareans in the city, pressed at once by the hostilities of the Athenians, who always invaded their country in full force twice a year, and by their own exiles in Pegæ, who had been expelled during the strife of factions by the popular party, and harassed them by their forays, began to discuss amongst themselves the propriety of receiving back their exiles, and not ruining the city in both ways. The friends of the banished, when aware of such discussion, themselves begged them more openly than before to adopt this proposal. But the leaders of the commons, knowing that the populace would not be able under the pressure of their sufferings to hold out with them, in their fear entered into communication with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, wishing to betray the city to them, and thinking that the danger to themselves would be less than from the return of those who had been banished by them. It was agreed then that in the first

¹ i. e. “not arising from reality or from resources now in existence, but from the hope of gaining such.”—*Arnold*.

place the Athenians should take the long walls, (they were about eight stades in length, from the city to Nisæa their port,) that the Peloponnesians might not come to the rescue from Nisæa, where they alone formed the garrison to secure the good faith of Megara; and then that they should endeavour to put the upper town into their hands: and they thought the inhabitants would the more readily surrender when that had been done.

67. The Athenians therefore, when preparations had been made on each side, both by deeds and words, sailed in the night to Minoa, an island off Megara, with six hundred heavy-armed under the command of Hippocrates, and posted themselves in an excavated piece of ground, from which they used to make their bricks, and which was not far off; while the troops, with Demosthenes, the other commander, consisting of light-armed Platæans, and a second corps composed of *peripoli*, placed themselves in ambuscade in the ground consecrated to Mars, which was at a less distance. Now no one was aware of this but those who took care to know [what was doing] that night. When day was about to dawn, the traitors amongst the Megareans did as follows. They had for a long time past used means to secure the opening of the gates, and with the consent of the officer in command, in the guise of privateers, to carry on a cart, during the night, a boat worked by sculls along the trench down to the sea, and so sail out; and before it was day, they brought it again on the cart, and took it within the wall through the gates; that the Athenians, as they pretended, might not know what precautions to take, no boat being visible in the harbour. And on that occasion the cart was already at the gates, and on their being opened in the usual manner for the skiff, as they thought, the Athenians, (for this had been done by agreement with them,) on seeing it, ran full speed from their ambush, wishing to reach the spot before the gates were shut again, and while the cart was still in the entrance, and prevented their being closed; the Megareans who were in concert with them at the same time dispatching the guard at the gate. Demosthenes with his Platæans and *peripoli* were the first to run in, (at the point where the trophy now stands,) and as soon as they were within the wall, (for

¹ The *peripoli* were employed as a movable force, and confined exclusively within the walls of fortified places, but disposable for the defence of any point that might be particularly threatened. See Arnold's note.

now the nearest Peloponnesians were aware of it,) the Plataeans engaged with and defeated those who came to the rescue, and secured the gates for the advancing heavy-armed of the Athenians.

68. Then each of the Athenians, as he successively entered, proceeded against the wall. And of the Peloponnesian garrison a few at first resisted, and defended themselves, and some of them were killed; but the greater part took to flight, being terrified in consequence of the enemy having attacked them by night, and the Megarean traitors fighting against them; and thinking that all the Megareans had betrayed them. For it happened that the Athenian herald had of his own accord proclaimed, that whoever of the Megareans wished, should go and pile his arms with the Athenians. So when they heard that, they stayed no longer; but thinking that they were certainly the objects of a common attack, fled for refuge to Nisæa. In the morning, when the walls were now taken, and the Megareans in the city were in confusion, those who had negotiated with the Athenians, and others with them, viz. the popular party who were privy to the measure, said that they ought to throw open the gates, and march out to battle. It had been arranged by them, that when the gates were opened, the Athenians should rush in; and they themselves would be distinguished from the rest, for they said they would anoint themselves with oil, that they might not be hurt. And they felt the greater security in opening the gates, since, according to agreement, the four thousand Athenian heavy-armed from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, and were now there. But when they were anointed, and were now standing about the gates, one of their associates gave information of the plot to the other party, who consequently united, and came in a body, and urged that they ought neither to march out, (for not even before, when they were stronger, had they ever ventured on this,) nor to bring the city into evident danger; and if any one did not obey them, there, [in Megara itself,] should the battle be fought. But they gave no intimation of their being acquainted with their practices, but positively maintained that they were giving the best advice; and at the same time they kept their post about the gates, so that it was not possible for the conspirators to accomplish what they intended.

69. The Athenian generals, finding that some obstacle had arisen, and that they would not be able to take the city by force, immediately proceeded to invest Nisæa; thinking that if they could take it before it was relieved, Megara also would the more quickly surrender. Now iron, stone-masons, and all other requisites were quickly brought from Athens. So they began from the wall which they occupied, and built a cross-wall on the side of Megara, from the point mentioned down to the sea on each side of Nisæa; the whole army having divided amongst themselves the trench and walls; and they used the stones and bricks from the suburb, and cutting down the fruit trees and timber, strengthened with a palisade whatever point might require it. The houses, too, in the suburb, when provided with battlements, were in themselves a fortification. That whole day they continued working; and about afternoon of the next day the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisæa, in despair of provisions, (for they used to receive daily rations from the upper city,) not thinking that the Peloponnesians would soon relieve them, and supposing the Megareans to be their enemies, capitulated to the Athenians, on condition that after surrendering their arms they should each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; but that the Lacedæmonians, both the commander and all others in the place, should be treated by the Athenians according to their pleasure. On these conditions they surrendered and went out; and the Athenians, having broken down the long walls at their abutment on Megara, and having taken possession of Nisæa, proceeded with their other preparations.

70. Now Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, preparing an army for Thrace. And when he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing both for the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be taken, he sent to the Bœotians with orders to meet him with a body of troops as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, (it is a village in the Megarean territory that has this name, under Mount Gerania,) and went himself with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy-armed, four hundred Phliasian, six hundred Sicyonian, and all his own forces that had been already raised, thinking that he should still find Nisæa untaken. But when he heard of its capture, (for he happened to have gone out to

Tripodiscus by night,) picking out three hundred men from his army, before he was heard of, he advanced to Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were about the shore; wishing nominally, and really too, if he could, to make an attempt on Nisæa; but, above all, to effect an entrance into Megara, and secure it. Accordingly he begged them to receive his forces, telling them that he was in hope of recovering Nisæa.

71. But the Megarean factions were afraid, on the one side, that he might introduce the exiles, and expel them; on the other, that the popular party, through fear of this very thing, might attack them, and so the city be ruined by their fighting with each other, while the Athenians were close at hand in ambush against them; and therefore they did not receive him, but both parties determined to remain quiet, and wait to see the result. For each side expected that a battle would be fought between the Athenians and those who had come to relieve the place, and that so it would be safer for themselves to go over to the side they favoured, if it were victorious. When therefore Brasidas did not prevail on them, he returned again to the rest of the army.

72. In the morning the Bœotians joined them, having indeed purposed, even before Brasidas sent to them, to march to the relief of Megara, considering the danger to affect themselves, and being already in full force at Platæa; but when the messenger reached them, they felt much more confidence, and after despatching two thousand two hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred cavalry, they returned again with the main force. When the whole army was now come, amounting to no less than six thousand heavy-armed, and when the Athenian heavy-armed were formed in line about Nisæa at the shore, but their light-armed were dispersed over the plain; the Bœotian horse fell upon the light-armed, and drove them to the sea, while they were not expecting it; for before this no succours had yet come to the Megareans from any quarter. But the Athenian horse charged in return, and came to close quarters with them; and there was a cavalry action which lasted for a long time, in which both parties claim to have had the better. For the Athenians, close under the walls of Nisæa, charged, killed, and stripped the Bœotian commander of the horse, and some few others; and having got possession of these bodies, restored them under truce, and

erected a trophy : yet, regarding the action as a whole, neither party retired with a decided result, but the Boeotians drew off to their forces, and the Athenians to Nisæa.

73. After this, Brasidas and the army moved nearer to the sea and to Megara ; and having chosen a convenient spot, drew up in order of battle, and remained still, thinking that the Athenians would advance against them, and knowing that the Megareans were waiting to see on which side would be the victory. And they considered that both results were favourable for them, their not being the first to make the attack, and voluntarily to begin an engagement with all its hazard, (since, at any rate, they had clearly shown that they were ready to defend themselves,) and the victory's being fairly assigned to them, without any struggle, so to speak ; and that at the same time it was favourable to their interest at Megara. For if they had not shown themselves there, they would not have had a chance, but would certainly have lost the city, being considered as good as beaten. But as it was, the Athenians might happen to be not disposed for a contest ; so that without fighting they would succeed in the objects of their coming. And this was indeed the case. For the Athenians came out, and drew up by the long walls, but remained quiet on their side also, as the enemy did not attack them : since their commanders too considered it no equal hazard, on the one hand for them, after succeeding in most of their designs, to commence an engagement against superior numbers, and either, if victorious, only to take Megara, or, if beaten, to sacrifice the flower of their heavy-soldiery ; and, on the other hand, for merely a part of their enemies' whole force, nay even of that which was present in each case, to be willing, as they reasonably might, with boldness to risk a battle. So when, after waiting some time and no attack being made on either side, the Athenians first returned to Nisæa, and then the Peloponnesians to the point they had set out from ; under these circumstances the friends of the Megarean exiles with greater confidence threw open the gates to Brasidas and the commanders from the different states, (considering that he had proved his superior strength, and that the Athenians had no longer been willing to fight,) and having received them, proceeded to confer with them, while those who had negotiated with the Athenians were now confounded.

74. Afterwards, when Brasidas had dismissed the allies to their several cities, he himself went back to Corinth, and prepared for his expedition to Thrace, which was his original destination. When the Athenians also had returned home, such of the Megareans in the city as had been most implicated in the negotiations with them, knowing that they had been marked, immediately stole away; while the rest, having conferred with the friends of the exiles, restored the party at Pegæ, after binding them by solemn oaths to forget the past, and to advise what was best for the city. When, however, they had been put in office, and held a review of the heavy-armed troops, having separated the battalions, they selected a hundred of their enemies, and of those who appeared to have joined most decidedly in the negotiations with the Athenians; and having compelled the commons to pass an open sentence upon them, on their being condemned, they put them to death, and established a thorough oligarchy in the city. And this change of government lasted a very long time, though effected by a very few men through the triumph of a faction.

75. The same summer, when Antandrus was going to be strengthened by the Mytilenæans, as they were planning [when we last mentioned them], Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders of the ships sent to levy contributions, being about the Hellespont, (for Lamachus, their third colleague, had sailed with ten ships into the Pontus,) became aware of the provisions made for the place, and thinking there was danger of its becoming what Anœa was to Samos—where the Samian exiles had established themselves, and both assisted the Peloponnesians by sending pilates to their squadrons, and threw the Samians in the city into confusion, and received those who deserted them—on these grounds they collected a force from the allies and set sail, and having defeated in a battle those who came out from Antandrus against them, retook the place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, having anchored in the river Calax, in the territory of Heraclea, lost his ships in consequence of a rain¹ in the interior, and the flood coming suddenly down upon them. He himself and his troops went by land through the Bithynian Thracians, who are situated across the strait in

¹ Poppo explains *αυροθυ* by "celitus." See Arnold's note.

Asia, to Chalcedon, the Megarean colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

76. The same summer Demosthenes, the Athenian general, went to Naupactus with forty ships immediately after the return from the Megarid. For communications respecting the affairs of Bœotia were being carried on with Hippocrates and him by certain men in the cities, who wished to change the constitution, and to bring them under a democracy like that of Athens; it being especially under the direction of Ptoædorus, an exile from Thebes, that these preparations were made by them. A party was to betray to them Siphæ, a sea-port town in the Thespian territory, on the Crissæan Bay; while Chæroneæ, which was dependent on what was formerly called the Minyan, but now the Bœotian Orchomenus, was to be delivered up by another party in that city; the exiles from it also co-operating most warmly, and raising mercenary troops from the Peloponnese. Chæroneæ is the frontier town too of Bœotia, near to Phanotis in Phocia, and a party of Phocians joined in the design. On the other hand, the Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in the territory of Tanagra, looking towards Eubœa; and these measures were to be simultaneously executed on the same day; that the Bœotians might not oppose them in a body at Delium, but have to attend to their own respective neighbourhoods that were being revolutionized. And should the attempt succeed, and Delium be fortified, they confidently hoped, that even if no change in their constitution were immediately made by the Bœotians, yet when these posts were occupied by Athenian garrisons, and the land was being plundered, and the several parties had a rallying place close at hand, that things would not remain in their present position, but that, in the course of time, when the Athenians supported the disaffected, and the power of the oligarchs was disunited, they would settle them to their own advantage. Such then was the design in preparation.

77. Now Hippocrates himself, with a force raised at home, was ready, when the time came, to take the field against the Bœotians; but Demosthenes he sent on before, with the forty ships mentioned, to Naupactus; that after raising in those quarters an army of Acarnanians and the other allies, he might sail to Siphæ, in expectation of its being betrayed to him: and the day had been fixed between them on which

they were simultaneously to carry out these plans. Accordingly, Demosthenes went to Naupactus, and finding Æniadæ compelled by all the Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederacy, and having himself raised all the allies on that side, and marched first against Salynthus and the Agræans, and reduced them to subjection, he proceeded to make his other preparations for going at the proper time to Siphæ.

78. About the same part of the summer, when Brasidas, being on his march with one thousand seven hundred heavy-armed to the Thrace-ward countries, had come to Heraclea in Trachinia; and when, on his sending before him a messenger to his partisans in Pharsalus, and requesting them to conduct himself and his army through the country, there came to Melitia, in Achaia, Panærus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, who was *proxenus* to the Chalcidians; upon that he proceeded on his march, being conducted both by other Thessalians, and especially by Niconidas of Larissa, who was a friend of Perdiccas. For on other grounds it was not easy to pass through Thessaly without an escort, and with an armed force, especially, to pass through a neighbour's country without having obtained his consent, was regarded with suspicion by all the Greeks alike. Besides, the great mass of the Thessalians had always been on friendly terms with Athens; so that, had not Thessaly, by the constitution of their country, been under the dominion of a few individuals, rather than in the enjoyment of civil equality, he would never have made his way; since even as it was, another party, of contrary views to those who have been named, met him on his march on the river Enipeus, and tried to stop him, telling him that he did wrong in advancing without the national consent. But his conductors said that they would not escort him against their will, and that they were only attending him as friends, on his unexpectedly coming to them. Brasidas himself also told them that he came as a friend both to the country of the Thessalians and to themselves, and was bringing his forces against the Athenians, who were at war with his country, and not against them; nor did he know of any enmity existing between the Thessalians and the Lacedæmonians, to prevent their having access to each other's territory: and now he would not advance against their will (for neither indeed could he); but yet he claimed not to be obstructed.

After hearing this, they went away; and he, without halting at all, pushed on at a rapid pace, according to the advice of his conductors, before a greater force might be collected to stop him. And so on the day of his setting out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus; thence to Phacium, and thence to Peræbia. At that point his Thessalian escort returned; but the Peræbians, who were subject to the Thessalians, brought him to Dium, in the dominions of Perdiccas, a town of Macedonia lying under Mount Olympus, on the side of Thessaly.

79. In this way Brasidas stole a rapid march through Thessaly, before any one was prepared to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. For what brought the army up out of the Peloponnese, while the affairs of Athens were so prosperous, was the fear of the Thrace-ward cities which had revolted from the Athenians, and that of Perdiccas: the Chalcidians thinking that the Athenians would in the first place march against them, (and moreover, the cities near to them which had not revolted, secretly joined in the invitation,) and Perdiccas, though not an open enemy, yet being afraid, on his part also, because of his old quarrels with the Athenians, and most of all being desirous of reducing to subjection Arrhibæus, the king of the Lyncestians.

80. And what contributed to their getting the army out of the Peloponnese the more easily, was the misfortune of the Lacedæmonians at that time. For as the Athenians were pressing hard upon the Peloponnese, and especially upon *their* territory, they hoped to divert them from it most effectually, if they annoyed them in return by sending an army to their allies; especially as they were ready to maintain it, and were calling them to their aid, with a view to revolting. Besides, they were glad to have a pretext for sending away some of the Helots; lest in the present state of affairs, when Pylus was occupied by an enemy, they might attempt some revolution. Indeed through fear of their youth and great numbers, they even perpetrated the following deed: (for at all times most of the Lacedæmonian institutions were framed particularly with a view to the Helots, to guard against them.) They made proclamation, that as many of them as claimed to have done the state most service against the enemy should be picked out, professing that they would give them their liberty; thus ap-

plying a test to them, and thinking that those who severally claimed to be first made free, would also, through their high spirit, be most ready to attack them. Having thus selected as many as two thousand, the Helots crowned themselves, and went round to the temples, on the strength of having gained their freedom; but the Spartans soon after did away with them, and no one ever knew by what means they were severally dispatched. And on this occasion they eagerly sent away seven hundred of them with Brasidas as heavy-armed troops: the rest of his army he induced by pay to follow him from the Peloponnese. As for Brasidas himself, it was chiefly at his own desire that the Lacedæmonians sent him out.

81. But the Chalcidians were also very anxious to have him, as a man who both appeared, while in Sparta, to be active in every thing, and after he had gone from home, proved himself most valuable to the Lacedæmonians. For at that present time, by showing himself just and moderate towards the cities, he caused their revolt in most instances; while other places he took through their being betrayed to him; so that the Lacedæmonians, if they might wish to conclude peace, (as they did,) had towns to give and receive back, and a respite from the war in the Peloponnese. And at a later period of the war, after what had happened in Sicily, it was the probity and tact of Brasidas at this time, experienced by some and heard of by others, that most raised amongst the allies of Athens a strong inclination towards the Lacedæmonians. For by going out first, and showing himself to be in all respects a worthy man, he left amongst them an assured hope that the rest also were like him.

82. On his arrival then at this time in the countries Thrace-ward, the Athenians, when they heard it, declared war against Perdiccas, thinking that he was the cause of his march thither; and kept a closer watch over their allies in that quarter.

83. Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, and led them with his own forces against Arrhibæus the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, whose territory bordered on his own; for he had a quarrel with him, and wished to reduce him to subjection. But when he had come with his army, accompanied by Brasidas, to the pass into Lyncus, Brasidas told him that he wished to go, before

hostilities were commenced, and by means of words bring Arrhibæus into alliance with the Lacedæmonians, if he could. Indeed Arrhibæus sent a herald to make some advances, being willing to refer the matter to Brasidas as an arbitrator between them: and the Chalcidian envoys who were with him, advised him not to remove the apprehensions of Perdiccas, that they might be able to command his more hearty assistance in their own affairs also. Besides, the envoys from Perdiccas had made at Lacedæmon a declaration to this effect, that he would bring many places around him into alliance with them; so that Brasidas, on the strength of this, thought himself entitled to arrange the affairs of Arrhibæus in 'common with Perdiccas, rather than leave them to him alone. But Perdiccas said that he had not taken Brasidas as an arbitrator in their disputes, but rather to destroy the enemies he should point out to him; and, that he would act unjustly, if, while he supported half his army, he should hold a conference with Arrhibæus. But Brasidas, against the king's will, and after a quarrel with him, had a meeting with Arrhibæus, and, being persuaded by his arguments, drew off the army before they entered his country. And Perdiccas after this supplied but a third, instead of half, towards the support of the army, considering himself to be aggrieved.

84. The same summer, Brasidas, accompanied by the Chalcidians, immediately made an expedition against Acanthus, the colony of the Andrians, a little before the vintage. The people there were divided into parties amongst themselves on the subject of receiving him, those who with the Chalcidians joined in inviting him, and the commons [who were opposed to it]. Nevertheless, through fear for their fruit, which was still out, when the commons were urged by Brasidas to admit him alone, and to decide after hearing him, they admitted him. And coming forward to speak to the people, (being, for a Lacedæmonian, not deficient in eloquence,) he addressed them as follows:

85. "The sending out, Acanthians, of myself and my army by the Lacedæmonians, has been executed to verify the reason we alleged for hostilities at the commencement of them, viz.

¹ Or, *κοινῇ μᾶλλον* may signify "on more public grounds," i. e. on the strength of what Perdiccas had held out at Sparta as a national advantage that would result from their sending troops to co-operate with him. Poppe and Bloomfield think it signifies "more impartially."

that to liberate Greece we should go to war with the Athenians. And if we have been long in coming to you, through being disappointed in our expectation regarding the war in those parts, according to which we hoped quickly by ourselves, and without any risk on your part, to overthrow the Athenians, let no one find fault with us; for now, when we had an opportunity, we are come, and will endeavour, in concert with you, to subdue them. But I am astonished at my being shut out of your gates, and that my arrival should be unwelcome to any of you. For we Lacedæmonians, as thinking that we should come to men who in feeling, at any rate, were on our side, even before we actually joined them, and that we should be welcome to you, ran the great risk of making a march of many days through the country of strangers, and¹ evinced all possible zeal: and now, if you have aught else in mind, or if you should stand in the way of your own liberty, and that of the rest of the Greeks, it would be a hard case. For it is not merely that you oppose me yourselves, but of those also to whom I may apply, each will be less disposed to come over to me, raising a difficulty on the ground that you, to whom I first came, and who are seen in the possession of a considerable city, and are considered to be prudent men, did not admit me. And I shall not be able to prove the credibility of the reason [alleged by us for the war], but shall be charged with either bringing to them a liberty which has an unjust end in view, or of having come too weak and powerless to assist them against the Athenians, in case of their attacking them. And yet when I went with the army I now have to the relief of Nisæa, the Athenians, though more numerous, were unwilling to engage with me: so that it is not likely, that coming with forces conveyed² by sea, they will send against you an army equal in numbers to that at Nisæa. With regard to myself, too, I have come to you, not for the injury, but for the liberation of the Greeks—having bound the Lacedæmonian authorities by the most solemn oaths, that such as I win over shall assuredly be independent confederates—nor,

¹ If the $\tau\epsilon$ after $\kappa\iota\nu\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota$ is to be retained, I think Haack's explanation of the passage the only one that can give it its true force, viz. that $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\rho\chi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota$ is carelessly introduced instead of $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\sigma\chi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha$. If Poppo's objection to this be considered valid, I should then agree with him in omitting $\tau\epsilon$.

² I have followed Poppo in understanding $\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\acute{\omega}$ after $\nu\eta\tau\acute{\iota}\rho$, so that there is no reason for striking out the words $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \epsilon\nu \text{ Nisæa}$.

again, that we may have allies whom we have got by violence or deceit, but, on the contrary, prepared to act as allies to you, who are enslaved by the Athenians. I claim, therefore, neither to be suspected myself, since I have given the strongest pledges for my honesty, nor to be considered a powerless avenger; and I call on you to come over to me with confidence.

86. "And if any one be backward to do so, from being personally afraid of some individual or other, lest I should put the city into the hands of a particular party, let him above all others feel confidence. For I am not come to be a partisan; nor am I minded to bring you a doubtful liberty, as I should do, if, disregarding your hereditary constitution, I should enslave the many to the few, or the few to the many. For that would be more grievous than foreign dominion; and towards us Lacedæmonians no obligation would be felt for our exertions, but instead of honour and glory, accusation rather. And those charges with which we are throwing down the Athenians, we should ourselves seem to incur in a more odious degree than a party which has shown no pretensions to honesty. For to gain advantage by specious trickery is more disgraceful, at any rate for men in high station, than to do it by open violence: since the one is a case of aggression on the plea of might, which fortune has given; the other, by the insidiousness of a dishonest policy. ¹ So great care do we take for things which most deeply interest us; and in addition to oaths, you could not receive a greater assurance than in the case of men whose actions, when viewed in the light of their words, convey a necessary conviction that it is even expedient for them to do as they have said.

87. "But if, when I advance these arguments, you say that you have not the power to comply with them, and yet claim, on the strength of your kind wishes, to incur no harm by refusing; and allege that freedom does not appear to you unaccompanied with danger, and that it is right to offer it to those who have the power to accept it, but to force it on no one against his will: in that case, I will take the gods and heroes of your country to witness, that after coming for your benefit, I cannot prevail upon you to accept it; and will en-

¹ "Οὕτω πολλὴν περιωπὴν, κ. τ. λ.] These words should be closely connected with the following clause, *καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείζω—ὥς εἶπον*, and the chapter should end at *εἶπον*, instead of at *ποιούμεθα*."—*Arnold*.

deavour to compel you by ravaging your country. Nor shall I then think that I am doing wrong, but that reason is on my side, on the ground of two compulsory considerations; with regard to the Lacedæmonians, that they may not, with all your kind feelings towards them, be injured, in case of your not being won over to them, by means of the money paid by you to the Athenians; and with regard to the Greeks, that they may not be prevented by you from escaping bondage. For, otherwise, certainly we should have no right to act thus; nor are we Lacedæmonians bound to liberate those who do not wish it, except on the plea of some general good. Nor is it dominion that we aim at; but rather being anxious, as we are, to stop others from acquiring it, we should wrong the majority, if, when bringing independence to all, we should permit you to stand in the way of it. Wherefore advise well, and strive to be the first to give liberty to the Greeks, and to lay up for yourselves everlasting glory; and both to avoid suffering in your private capacities, and to confer on your whole city the most honourable title."

88. To this effect spoke Brasidas. The Acinthians, after much previous speaking on both sides of the question, gave their votes upon it in secret; and because Brasidas had urged alluring arguments, and at the same time through fear for their fruit, the majority determined to revolt from the Athenians; and after pledging him to the oaths which the Lacedæmonian authorities swore before they sent him out, that such as he won over should assuredly be independent allies, in this way they admitted the army. Not long after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, also joined them in revolt. Such then were the events of this summer.

89. At the very commencement of the following winter, when the towns in Bœotia were to be delivered up to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, and Demosthenes was to repair with his ships to Siphæ, Hippocrates to Delium; a mistake having been made in the days on which they were both to take the field, Demosthenes sailed first to Siphæ, with the Acarnanians and many allies from those parts on board, but did not succeed in his undertaking, through information of the design having been given by Nicomachus, a Phocian of Phanoteus, who told the Lacedæmonians, and they the Bœotians. Accordingly, succours being brought by all

the Bœotians, (for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to 'make a diversion,) Siphæ and Chæroneæ were secured by surprise; and when the conspirators were aware of the mistake, they attempted no movement in the cities.

90. But Hippocrates, having drawn out the whole population of Athens, citizens, resident aliens, and all the foreigners then in the city, afterwards arrived at Delium, when the Bœotians had now returned from Siphæ; and having encamped his army, proceeded to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following manner. They dug a trench all round the sacred precinct and the fane, and from the ground thus excavated threw up the earth in a mound, as a substitute for a wall; and fixing stakes on it, cut down the vines that were round the sanctuary and threw them in, taking down also at the same time stones and brick-work from the neighbouring houses; and so they ran up the work in every way. They also erected wooden towers where there was occasion for them, and where there was not already any building belonging to the temple: for [on one side] the gallery that once existed had fallen down. Having begun the work on the third day after setting out from home, they continued it that day, the fourth, and till dinner-time of the fifth. Then, as the main part of it was finished, the army went forward from Delium about ten stades on its way home; whence most of the light-armed proceeded straight on, but the heavy-armed halted, and remained stationary; while Hippocrates was still staying behind, and arranging the guards, and how they should complete such parts of the out-works as remained to be finished.

91. Now during the days thus employed, the Bœotians were mustering at Tanagra; and when they were come from all the cities, and found the Athenians on their progress homeward, the rest of the Bœotarchs, (who were eleven in number,) not consenting to an engagement, since the Athenians were no longer in Bœotia, (for they were just within the borders of the Oropian territory when they halted,) Pagondas son of Æoladas, being Bœotarch of Thebes together with Arian-

¹ This is, I think, the true force of *παρεύκει* in this passage; and it has a somewhat similar one, Xen. Anab. II. 5. 29, *ἰβούλετο δὲ καὶ ὁ Κλέαρχος ἅπαν τὸ στράτευμα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην, καὶ τοὺς παραλυποῦντας ἰκποδῶν εἶναι.*

thidas son of Lysimachidas, and having the command at the time, wished to fight the battle, and thought it best to run the risk; and so, calling the men to him separately, in their different battalions, that they might not all at once leave the arms that were piled, he tried to persuade the Bœotians to march against the Athenians and bring on the contest, by speaking to this effect:

92. "Men of Bœotia, it should not have even entered the thoughts of any of us your commanders, that it would not be right to engage with the Athenians, in case we found them no longer in Bœotia. For it is Bœotia that they intend to ravage, after coming from the border territory, and building a fortress in it: and so they are surely our enemies, wherever they may be found, and from whatever country they may have come to act as enemies would. But now, if any one has thought this the safer course, let him change his mind on the question. For prudence, in the case of men attacked by others, does not admit of such nice calculation as in the case of those who are enjoying their own, and yet wilfully attack others through coveting more. The custom of your country, too, is to repel alike a foreign force that has invaded you, whether in your own or in your neighbour's territory. But against Athenians, and borderers besides, this is far more necessary than against any others. For, with respect to their neighbours, equality in the case of all men constitutes liberty; and against these men, most especially, who endeavour to make vassals not only of those who are near them, but of those also who are far away, how can it fail to be our duty to struggle to the very utmost? (for in the Eubœans across the strait, and in the greater part of the rest of Greece, we have an example of ¹the position in which they stand towards them;) and to be convinced, that with others their neighbours fight about the boundaries of their land, but that in our case there will be fixed for the whole of it, if we are conquered, one boundary, not to be controverted; for they will invade it and take by force whatever we have. So much more dangerous neighbours have we in these men than in any others. It is usual, also, with such as through confidence in their power attack those who are near them,

¹ For διακείμει used in a similar manner, comp. Xen. Anab. II. 5. 27, δῆλός τ' ἦν πᾶν φιλικῶς οἰόμενος διακείσθαι τῷ Τισσαφέρνηι. "That he was on a very friendly footing with him."

as the Athenians are now doing, to march more fearlessly against those who remain quiet, and only defend themselves in their own territory ; but to be less ready to grapple with those who meet them beyond their borders, and strike the first blow, if they have an opportunity. And we have had a proof of this in the case of these very men ; for by conquering them at Coronæa, when they got possession of our country through our own divisions, we won great security for Bœotia, which has lasted up to the present time. Remembering which, we ought, the older part of us, to come up to our former deeds, and the younger, as sons of fathers who then behaved so bravely, to strive not to disgrace the noble qualities that by birth belong to them ; but to trust that the gods will be on our side, whose sanctuary they have lawlessly fortified, and are using, and to rely on the omens, which, after sacrificing, appear favourable to us ; and so to meet these men in battle, and show them that what they want they must go and get by attacking such as will not resist them ; but that from those who deem it noble ever to secure by their arms the liberty of their own country, and not to enslave unjustly that of other people, they shall not go away without a struggle."

93. By thus exhorting the Bœotians, Pagondas persuaded them to go against the Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp, led the army forward (for it was now late in the day). On approaching near to their forces, he placed his troops in a position where, in consequence of a hill intervening, the armies did not see each other ; and there he drew them up, and made his arrangements for battle. When Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, received tidings of the advance of the Bœotians, he sent to his troops, with orders to throw themselves into line, and himself joined them soon after, leaving three hundred horse at Delium, both to defend it if any one came against it, and to watch their opportunity and fall upon the Bœotians during the engagement. Against these the Bœotians posted a division to resist their charge ; and when all was well arranged by them, they appeared over the hill, and halted in the order they intended to fight in, to the number of about seven thousand heavy-armed, more than ten thousand light-armed, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. The right wing was held by the Thebans and those of the same division of Bœotia ; the cen-

tre by the Haliartians, Coronæans, Copæans, and the other people round the lake; the left by the Thespians, Tanagræans, and Orchomenians. The cavalry and light-armed were posted on each flank. The Thebans formed their line five-and-twenty deep; the rest, as might happen. These then were the forces and the dispositions of the Bœotians.

94. On the side of the Athenians, the heavy-armed formed their whole line eight deep, being equal in numbers to their adversaries, with the cavalry on each flank. As for light-armed regularly equipped, there were neither any present on that occasion, nor had the state ever raised any. Such as had joined in the invasion, though many times more numerous than those on the other side, had, for the most part, followed unarmed; inasmuch as there was a levy "en masse" of foreigners who were present, as well as of citizens; and on their first setting out for home, they did not, with a few exceptions, keep to their standards. When the armies were formed in line, and now on the point of engaging, Hippocrates, the general, passed along the Athenian ranks, and encouraged them, by speaking as follows:

95. "Athenians, my advice is given you in a few words, but it is equally availing to brave men, and is intended to remind, rather than exhort you. Let the thought then be entertained by none of you, that we are improperly running this hazard in another people's territory. For though in these men's territory, the struggle will be for the good of our own; and if we conquer, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country, when deprived of the Bœotian horse; but in one battle you will both gain possession of this land, and confirm the liberty of that. Advance to meet them, then, in a manner worthy of the state in which each of you boasts that he has the first country in Greece; and of your fathers, who, by defeating these men in battle at Æenophyta, under Myronides, once got possession of Bœotia."

96. While Hippocrates was thus exhorting his men, and when he had reached the centre of the line, but had not had time to go farther, the Bœotians, having also been exhorted in few words by Pagondas, on that occasion as well as the former, raised their pæan, and advanced against them from the hill. The Athenians, on their side, also advanced to meet them, and closed with them at a run. The extremity of nei-

And every thing, it was natural to suppose, done under pressure of war, or any other danger, would be considered as pardonable even in the eyes of the god. For the altars were a place of refuge in unintentional offences; and transgression was a term applied to those who were wicked through no compulsion, and not to those who had ventured to do any thing in consequence of their misfortunes. Nay, the Bœotians were much more impious in wishing to give back dead bodies in return for sanctuaries, than they were who would not at the price of sanctuaries recover things not suitable [for such bartering]. They begged, then, that they would simply tell them to take up their dead, not "after evacuating the territory of the Bœotians"—for they were no longer in their territory, but in one which they had won with their arms—but, "on making a truce according to the custom of their fathers."

99. The Bœotians replied, that "if they were in Bœotia, they might take up their dead after evacuating *their* country; but if in Athenian territory, then ¹ they knew themselves what to do:" considering that the Oropian territory, in which the bodies happened to be lying, (for the battle was fought on the borders,) was indeed subject to Athens, and yet that the Athenians could not get possession of them without *their* consent. Nor, again, were they disposed, they said, to grant any truce for a country belonging to Athens; but they thought it was a fair answer to give, that "when they had evacuated the Bœotian territory, they might then recover what they asked." So the herald of the Athenians, after hearing their answer, returned without effecting his object.

100. The Bœotians immediately sent for dartmen and slingers from the Malian gulf, and having been reinforced since the battle by two thousand Corinthian heavy-armed, and the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisæa, and some Megareans with them, they marched against Delium and assaulted the fortress, both attempting it in other ways, and bringing against it an engine of the following description, which was the means of taking it. Having sawn a great beam in two, they hollowed out the whole of it, and fitted it nicely

¹ i. e. they might take them away when they pleased. But, as Arnold remarks, "the Bœotians knew all the time that this was merely vexatious; for the Athenians would not bury their dead without their leave, whether the ground which they occupied belonged to Attica or to Bœotia."

together again, like a pipe, and hung by chains at the end of it a caldron, into which was placed an iron bellows-pipe, inclining from the beam, the timber also being for a considerable distance covered with iron. This they brought up from a distance on carts to that part of the wall where it had been chiefly built of the vines and timber; and when it was near, they applied great bellows to the end of the beam next themselves, and blew them. The blast passing closely confined into the caldron, which held lighted coals, sulphur, and pitch, produced a great flame, and set fire to a part of the wall; so that no one could any longer stand upon it, but they left it and took to flight; and in this way the fortress was taken. Of the garrison some were killed, and two hundred taken: of the rest the greater part got on board their ships, and returned home.

101. Delium having thus been taken on the fifteenth day after the battle, and the Athenian herald, without knowing any thing that had happened, having soon after come again respecting the bodies, the Bœotians restored them, and no longer made the same answer as before. There fell in the engagement, of the Bœotians, not quite five hundred; of the Athenians, not quite a thousand, and Hippocrates the general; but of light-armed and camp-followers a great number.

A short time after this battle, Demosthenes, having had no success with regard to Siphæ being betrayed to him, when he sailed thither at that time, and having still on board his ships the Acarnanian and Agræan forces, with four hundred Athenian heavy-armed, made a descent on the territory of Sicyon. But before all his ships reached the shore, the Sicyonians came against them, and routed those that had landed, and drove them back to their vessels, killing some, and taking others prisoners. Having erected a trophy, they restored the dead under truce. It was also about the same time as the affair at Delium, that Sitalces, king of the Odrysæ, died, after making an expedition against the Triballi, and being defeated in battle; and Seuthes son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeded to the kingdom of the Odrysæ, and the other parts of Thrace, over which Sitalces had reigned.

102. The same winter, Brasidas with his allies Thraceward marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. On the site on which the town now stands

a settlement was before attempted by Aristagoras the Milesian when flying from king Darius; but he was driven away by the Edonians: and then by the Athenians, two-and-thirty years later, who sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens, and whoever else would go; who were cut off by the Thracians at Drabescus. Twenty-nine years after, the Athenians went again, Hagnon son of Nicias being sent on as leader of the colony, and expelled the Edonians, and founded a town on the spot which before was called "Nine ways." They set out for the purpose from Eion, which they occupied themselves at the mouth of the river, on the coast at a distance of five-and-twenty stades from the present town, which Hagnon named ¹Amphipolis, because, as the river Strymon flows round it on both sides, ²with a view to enclosing it, he ran a long wall across from river to river, and built the town so as to be conspicuous both towards the sea and towards the land.

103. Against this town then Brasidas marched with his forces, starting from Arnæ in Chalcidice. Having arrived about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe empties itself into the sea, and there supped, he proceeded during the night. The weather was stormy, and it was snowing a little; on which account he hurried on the more, wishing to surprise the people of Amphipolis, except those who were to betray it. For there were residing in it some Argilians, (this people are a colony from Andros,) and some others, who were carrying on this intrigue together; some at the suggestion of Perdiccas, others at that of the Chalcidians. But most active of all were the Argilians, who lived close by, and had always been suspected by the Athenians of forming designs upon the place. For when the opportunity now presented itself, and Brasidas had come; as they had for some time past been intriguing with their countrymen who resided there with a view to its being delivered up to him, so at that time they received him into their own town, and revolted from Athens, and took him forward that same night to the bridge over the

¹ i. e. "a city looking both ways." For a description of it see the memoir at the end of Arnold's 2nd volume.

² I have followed Arnold in supposing that *διὰ* in this passage expresses final, rather than efficient cause, as it often does with an infinitive mood: at least I infer that such was his view of it, from the passages which he compares with it, *δι' ἀχθρόνα*, ch. 40. 2, and V. 53, *διὰ τὴν ἰσπραξιν*.

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river. The town stands further off than the passage of the river, and the walls did not reach down to it as they do now, but there was only a small guard posted there; which Brasidas easily drove in, (partly from there being treason amongst them, and partly from the stormy weather and the suddenness of his attack,) and then crossed the bridge, and was at once master of all the property outside the town belonging to the Amphipolitans, who had houses over the whole quarter.

104. His passage having thus taken by surprise those who were in the city, while of those who were outside many were made prisoners, and others took refuge within the wall, the Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially as they were suspected by each other. Indeed it is said, that if Brasidas would not have set his troops to plunder, but marched straightway to the town, he would probably have taken it. But as it was, after establishing his army there, he overran the property outside; and when he found no result produced by those within, as he expected, he remained quiet. In the mean time, the party opposed to the traitors, prevailing by their numbers to prevent the gates being immediately thrown open, sent with Eucles the general, who had come to them from Athens to defend the place, to the other commander Thrace-ward, Thucydides son of Olorus, the historian of this war, who was at Thasos, (this island is a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail,) requesting him to come to their relief. On hearing the news, he set sail with the greatest speed, with seven ships which happened to be there; wishing, if possible, to reach Amphipolis in time, before any surrender was made, or, at any rate, to reach Eion.

105. In the mean time Brasidas, being afraid of the naval succour from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold mines in those parts of Thrace, and by this means had influence amongst the chief persons on the mainland, made haste to get possession of the town beforehand, if possible; lest, if he came, the populace of Amphipolis, hoping that he would raise a confederate force from the sea and from Thrace, and so save them, should not then surrender to him. Accordingly he was willing to come to moderate terms with them, and made this proclamation; that of the Amphipolitans and Athenians in the town whoever would

might remain in possession of his property, sharing in a fair and equal government ; and whoever would not, might depart and take out his property with him, within five days.

106. The mass of the people, on hearing this, rather changed their minds ; especially as only a small number of Athenians were citizens of the place, the majority being a mixed multitude. There were also within the walls many relations of those who had been taken without ; and they considered the proclamation to be reasonable, when measured by the standard of their fear. The Athenians took this view of it, because they were glad to go out, thinking that the danger was greater for them than the rest, and, besides, not expecting any speedy relief ; the rest of the multitude, because they were not to be deprived of their franchise, on an equal footing, and were released from peril beyond their expectation. When therefore the partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated these proposals, on seeing that the populace had changed their minds, and no longer listened to the Athenian commander, who was present ; the surrender was made, and they admitted him on the terms of his proclamation. In this way they delivered up the city ; and Thucydides and his ships landed at Eion late on the same day. Brasidas had just taken possession of Amphipolis, and was within a night of taking Eion ; for if the ships had not quickly come to its aid, in the morning it would have been in his hands.

107. After this, Thucydides arranged matters in Eion, so that it might be safe, both for the present time, if Brasidas should attack it, and in future ; receiving into it those who had chosen to come there from up the country, according to the terms of the treaty. And Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river to Eion, with a great number of boats, on the chance of taking the point of land which runs out from the wall, and so commanding the entrance into the place : and he attempted it by land at the same time ; but was beaten off in both instances : at Amphipolis, however, he was putting every thing in readiness. Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him ; Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, having been killed by the sons of Goaxis, and Brauro his own wife : and not long after, Galepsus and CEsyme, colonies of the Thasians, did the same. Perdiccas also came immediately after the capture of Amphipolis, and took part in these arrangements.

108. When Amphipolis was in the enemy's hands, the Athenians were reduced to great fear, especially because the town was of service to them by supplying timber for ship building, and in point of payment of revenue; and because, though as far as the Strymon the Lacedæmonians had a passage open to them for reaching the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to go through their country, yet so long as they were not masters of the bridge, they could have gone no further; as on the inland side a large lake, formed by the river, spread for a great distance, while in the neighbourhood of Eion they were watched by cruisers: but now the passage was considered to have been rendered easy. They were also afraid that their allies would revolt. For Brasidas both showed himself moderate in other respects, and in his speeches every where declared that he was sent out to give freedom to Greece. And the cities subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis, and ¹ what advantages it enjoyed, and the gentleness of Brasidas, were most strongly encouraged to make innovations, and sent secret messages to him, desiring him to come to them, and each wishing to be the first to revolt. For they thought they might do it with security; their mistake in the estimate of the Athenian power being as great as that power afterwards showed itself, and their judgment resting on blind desire, rather than on safe forethought: since men are accustomed to grant to inconsiderate hope whatever they wish; but to thrust aside with despotic reasoning whatever they do not like. Besides, as the Athenians had lately met with a heavy blow in Bœotia, and Brasidas asserted what was attractive, but not true, that the Athenians had been unwilling to fight him at Nissæa with his own force alone, they were full of confidence, and believed that no one would come against them. Above all, from regard to what was agreeable at the moment, and because they would be likely to find the Lacedæmonians zealous in their behalf at first, they were ready on all accounts to run the risk. The Athenians perceiving this, distributed guards in the different states as well as they could in a short time, and in the winter season; while

¹ *παρίχεται* has generally been supposed to refer to Brasidas; but the introduction of *ἐκείνων* before *πραδότητα* in the next clause induces me to think that Amphipolis is its subject; and the sense of enjoying is one which it often bears. See 86. 4, *πόλιν ἀξιώχρων παρεχόμενον*.

Brasidas sent despatches to Lacedæmon, begging them to send him additional forces, and himself prepared for building triremes in the Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians did not comply with his wishes, partly through envy felt by the principal men, and partly because they were more anxious to recover the men taken in the island, and to bring the war to a conclusion.

109. The same winter the Megareans took and razed to their foundations the long walls in their country which the Athenians had held; and Brasidas, after the capture of Amphipolis, marched with his allies against the territory called Acte. This territory runs out from the king's dike on the inner side of the isthmus, Athos, a high mountain which stands in it, being its boundary on the side of the Ægean Sea. Of the towns it contains, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians close to the dike, facing the sea towards Eubœa; the others are Thyssus, Cleonæ, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium. These are inhabited by mixed races of men speaking two different languages, a small portion of them being Chalcidians, but the main part Pelasgians—a tribe of those Tyrrhenians who once settled in Lemnos and Athens—Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians; and they live in small towns. The greater part of them surrendered to Brasidas, but Sane and Dium held out against him; and, accordingly, he stayed with his army in their territory, and laid it waste.

110. When they did not listen to his proposals, he marched straightway against Torone in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians, being invited by a few persons who were prepared to deliver up the town to him. Having arrived while it was yet night, and just about day-break, he sat down with his army near the temple of the Dioscuri, distant from the town about three stades. Now by the rest of the town of the Toronæans, and by the Athenians who were in garrison in it, he was not observed; but his partisans, knowing that he would come, and some few of them having privately visited him, were watching for his arrival. And when they found that he was come, they took in to them seven light-armed men with daggers; (for such only was the number, out of twenty who were at first appointed to the work, that were not afraid to enter, their commander being Lysistratus, an Olynthian.) These having passed through the sea-ward wall,

and escaped observation, went up and put to the sword the garrison in the highest guard-house, (for the town stands on a hill,) and broke open the postern towards Canastræum.

111. Brasidas, meanwhile, after advancing a short distance, remained quiet with the rest of his army, but sent forward a hundred targeteers, that when any gates were opened, and the signal raised which had been agreed on, they might be the first to rush in. These, having waited some time, and wondering at the delay, had come by degrees near the town; while those of the Toronæans within, who were preparing matters with the party that had entered, after the postern had been broken open by them, and the gates leading to the market-place opened by cutting through the bar, in the first place brought a party round to the postern and introduced them, that in their rear, and on both sides of them, they might suddenly strike terror into the townsmen, knowing nothing of what was going on. Next they raised the fire-signal as had been appointed; and then received the rest of the targeteers through the gates leading to the market-place.

112. And now Brasidas, on seeing the appointed signal, ordered his troops to rise, after giving a shout all together, and causing much consternation to those in the town, and ran at full speed. Some immediately burst in through the gates, others over some square timbers that happened to be lying by the wall, which had fallen and was being re-built, for the purpose of drawing up stones. Brasidas, therefore, and the greatest part of the troops turned immediately up to the highest parts of the town, wishing to take it from top to bottom, and securely; the rest of the multitude spread in all directions alike.

113. While the capture of Torone was being effected, the mass of the people, knowing nothing of the matter, was confounded; but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with the proceedings, straightway joined those who had entered the town. When the Athenians (for there happened to be about fifty heavy-armed sleeping in the market-place) were aware of it, some few of them were killed in close combat; of the rest, some fled by land, others to their ships, (for there were two keeping guard there,) and escaped to Lecythus, the fort which they held themselves, having occupied a corner of the town running out into the sea, and cut off by its position

on a narrow isthmus. As many of the Toronæans also as were on their side, took refuge with them.

114. When it was now day, and the town was safely in his possession, Brasidas made a proclamation to the Toronæans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that whoever wished should come out to his own property, and live in the town in security. To the Athenians he sent a herald, and told them to evacuate Lecythus under truce, with their property, as the place belonged to the Chalcidians. They refused to evacuate it, but begged him to grant them a truce for one day, that they might take up their dead. He granted it for two days; during which he himself fortified the neighbouring houses, and the Athenians their positions. Having convened also an assembly of the Toronæans, he said nearly the same things as at Acanthus; "that it was not right for them to regard as bad men, or traitors, those who had negotiated with them for the capture of the city; (for they had not done so to bring it into slavery, nor because they had been bribed, but for the advantage and liberty of the town;) nor for those who had taken no part in it to suppose that they would not reap the same benefits; for he had not come to destroy either city or individual. For this reason he had made the proclamation to those who had fled for refuge to the Athenians, as he had none the worse opinion of them for their friendship to *them*: and he thought that when they had made trial of the Lacedæmonians, they would not be less kindly disposed towards them, but far more so, inasmuch as they were acting more justly: but as it was, through want of such a trial, they were afraid of them. And he desired them all to prepare for being stanch allies, and for having to answer in future for whatever they did amiss: but as regarded the past, it was not the Lacedæmonians that were injured, but themselves rather, by others who were too strong for them; and so allowance was to be made for any thing in which they had opposed him."

115. Having thus addressed and encouraged them, on the expiration of the truce, he made his assault upon Lecythus; while the Athenians defended themselves from a poor wall, and from some houses that had battlements. For one day they beat him off; but on the next, when an engine was going to be brought up against them by the enemy, from which they intended to throw fire on the wooden defences, and when the

army was now advancing where they thought they should best bring up the engine, and where the place was most assailable; the defenders placed a wooden tower on the wall opposite to them, and carried up on to it many jars and casks of water, with large stones, and a large party of men ascended it. But the building, having had too great a weight put on it, suddenly broke down, and making a loud noise, vexed more than it terrified those of the Athenians who were near and saw it; but those who were at a distance, and most of all those who were at the greatest, thinking that the place was already taken in that quarter, hurried away, and fled to the sea and to their ships.

116. When Brasidas perceived that they were deserting the battlements, and saw what was going on, he rushed up with his army, and immediately took the fort, and put to the sword as many as he found in it. The Athenians in this way evacuated the place, and went across in their boats and ships to Pallene. Now there is in Lecythus a temple of Minerva; and Brasidas had proclaimed, when he was about to make the assault, that to the man who first scaled the wall he would give thirty minæ of silver. Thinking, therefore, that the capture had been effected by other means than human, he presented the thirty minæ to the goddess, for the use of her temple; and having razed and cleared Lecythus, he devoted the whole, as sacred ground. During the remainder of the winter, he was settling the affairs of the places in his possession, and forming designs against others; and at the expiration of the winter, the eighth year of this war ended.

117. At the commencement of the spring of the following summer, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians immediately concluded an armistice for a year; the Athenians considering that Brasidas would then no longer win any more of their towns to revolt, before they had made their preparations for securing them at their leisure; and at the same time, that if it were for their interest, they might conclude a general peace: while the Lacedæmonians thought that the Athenians feared what they really were afraid of; and that after having a suspension of their miseries and suffering, they would be more desirous, from their taste of it, to effect a reconciliation, and, restoring their men, to make a treaty for a longer time. For

they deemed it of ¹ greater importance to recover their men at a time when Brasidas was still prosperous: and, [on the other hand,] if he reached a still greater measure of success, and put matters on an equality, they were likely to lose those men, and while defending themselves with their others, on equal terms, still to run a risk of not gaining the mastery. An armistice was therefore concluded by them and their allies on the following terms:

118. "With regard to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we agree that any one who wishes, may have access to it, without deceit, and without fear, according to the laws of our respective countries. The Lacedæmonians, and such of the allies as are present, agree to this; and declare that they will, to the best of their power, persuade the Bœotians and Phocians to do so, by sending heralds to them on the subject.

"With regard to the treasures of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to find out such as unjustly meddle with them, uprightly and honestly acting in accordance with the laws of our forefathers, both we, and you, and such of the rest as may consent to this article; all acting in accordance with the laws of our respective countries. On these points, then, the Lacedæmonians and the rest of the allies agree, according to the terms mentioned.

"On the following points the Lacedæmonians and the rest of the allies agree, in case the Athenians make a treaty to that effect; that we shall each remain in our own territory, keeping what we now have; the garrison in Coryphasium confining themselves within the Buphras and Tomeus; that in Cythera holding no intercourse with the allied states, neither we with you, nor you with us; and that in Nisæa and Minoa not crossing the road, which runs from the gates leading from the temple of Nisus to that of Neptune, and from the temple of Neptune straight to the bridge at Minoa, (the Megareans and the allies being also bound not to cross this road,) and the Athenians retaining the island taken by them,

¹ I have followed Gölter in referring τοῖς δὲ to the troops which Sparta would still retain, in opposition to τῶν μὲν, the prisoners whose services she would have lost. Others refer it to the Athenians, while Arnold thinks it corrupt.

without any communication on either side ; and lastly, with regard to Trœzen, that each party shall retain what they now possess, and as was arranged with the Athenians.

“ With regard to the navigation of the sea, that along their own coast and that of their confederacy, the Lacedæmonians may sail, not in a ship of war, but in any other vessel rowed by oars, and carrying not more than 500 talents tonnage.

“ That any herald, ambassadors, and attendants, as many as they may choose, on their way to the Peloponnese or to Athens, for bringing the war to a conclusion, and adjusting all claims, shall have free passage, going and returning, both by land and by sea. That deserters shall not be received in the mean time, neither free nor bond, neither by you nor by us. Further, that we shall give judicial satisfaction, both you to us and we to you, according to the laws of our respective countries, deciding all disputes by law, without recourse to hostilities.

“ The Lacedæmonians and allies agree to these articles : but if you think any thing else either better or more just, come to Lacedæmon and explain your views ; for neither the Lacedæmonians nor the allies will object to any thing you may say with justice. But let those who come, come with full powers to treat, as you also desire us. The truce shall continue one year.”

“ The people [of Athens] ratified the truce. The tribe Acamantis had ¹ the prytany ; Phœnippus was secretary ; Nicias was chairman. Laches moved, ‘ that they do conclude the armistice, (and may they do it for the good fortune of Athens !) on the terms agreed to by the Lacedæmonians and the allies.’ And they agreed in the assembly of the people, ‘ that the armistice be for a year, commencing this very day, the fourteenth of the month of Elaphebolion ; that, during that time, ambassadors and heralds shall proceed to each other’s country, and discuss on what terms the war shall be brought to a conclusion. That the generals and prytanes having summoned an assembly of the people, the Athenians shall, in the first place, consult on the peace, and on the manner in which the envoys for putting an end to the wars shall be admitted. That the envoys now present in the city shall immediately bind themselves in the presence of the people, that

¹ For a full explanation of these terms see Schömann, *De Comititiis Atheniensium*, sec. 15.

they will assuredly abide by this truce for the space of a year.' "

119. To these articles the Lacedæmonians agreed, (their allies also swearing to them,) with the Athenians and their allies, on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius. Those who agreed to the articles and ratified them by libations, were the following: Of the Lacedæmonians, Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenæus son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas son of Eryxidaidas; of the Corinthians, Aeneas son of Ocytus, and Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; of the Sicyonians, Damotimus son of Naucrates, and Onasimus son of Megacles; of the Megareans, Nicasus son of Cecalus, and Menecrates son of Amphidorus; of the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupaidas; of the Athenians, the following generals, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Autocles son of Tolmæus. This then was the armistice which was concluded; and during it they were throughout holding conferences for a more general treaty.

120. About the time at which they were thus going backwards and forwards to each other, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. Now these Scionæans say that they are Palleneans from the Peloponnese, and that their first founders, while on their voyage from Troy, were carried to this place by the storm which the Achæans experienced, and there took up their abode. On their revolting, Brasidas crossed over to Scione by night, with a friendly trireme sailing ahead of him, and himself following at some distance in a skiff; that in case of his falling in with any vessel larger than the skiff, the trireme might come to his aid; while if another trireme of equal force came against them, he thought that it would not turn upon the smaller vessel, but upon the ship, and in the mean time he should make his escape. Having thus crossed over, and convened an assembly of the Scionæans, he spoke to the same effect as at Acanthus and Torone: and told them, moreover, that they were most deserving of praise, inasmuch as, though Pallene within the isthmus was cut off from succours by land through the Athenians occupying Potidæa, and they were virtually nothing else but islanders, they had of their own accord joined the banner of liberty, and had not through cowardice waited for compulsion to be applied to them, in the case of what was

manifestly for their own advantage. That this was a proof that they would also endure like men any other even of the greatest perils, if [by their so doing] their affairs should be arranged to their satisfaction; in short, that he should consider them as truly the most faithful allies of the Lacedæmonians, and show them all other proofs of his respect.

121. The Scionæans were elated by his language, and all alike taking courage, even those who before were not pleased with the business, resolved to carry on the war with spirit; and both received Brasidas with other marks of honour, and publicly crowned him with a crown of gold, as the liberator of Greece; while individually they decked him with garlands, and thronged to him as to a victorious athlete. At that time, after leaving them some guards, he crossed over again, and not long after sent them over a larger force; as he wished, in conjunction with them, to make an attempt on Mende and Potidæa, thinking that the Athenians would come to their relief, as though it were an island, and desiring to be beforehand with them. He was carrying on also some communications with those towns, with a view to their being betrayed to him. And thus he was meditating an attack on these places.

122. But in the mean time there came to him in a trireme the commissioners, who were carrying round intelligence of the armistice, Aristonymus on the side of the Athenians, and Athenæus on that of the Lacedæmonians. So the troops crossed over again to Torone; while they informed Brasidas of the truce, and all the allies of the Lacedæmonians Thrace-ward assented to what had been done. Now Aristonymus allowed all the other cases; but finding, on a calculation of the days, that the Scionæans had revolted after the date of the convention, he said that they would not be included in it. But Brasidas earnestly contended, on the other hand, that they had revolted before the truce was made, and refused to give the town up. So when Aristonymus reported their case at Athens, the people were immediately prepared to send an expedition against Scione. But the Lacedæmonians sent envoys and told them that they would be violating the truce; and laid claim to the town, in reliance on the statement of Brasidas; offering, at the same time, to let the question be decided by arbitration. The Athenians, however, did not wish to run the risk of arbitration, but to send the expedition as quickly as possible; be-

ing enraged to think that even the inhabitants of the islands now presumed to revolt from them, trusting in the power of the Lacedæmonians by land, which could not help them. And indeed the truth of the question respecting the revolt was rather as the Athenians maintained; for the Scionæans revolted two days after the truce was signed. Accordingly, at the instigation of Cleon, they at once passed a decree that they should reduce the Scionæans, and put them to death; and so, while they remained quiet from other undertakings, they were engaged in preparing for this.

123. In the mean time, Mende revolted from them, a town in Pallene, and a colony of the Eretrians. Brasidas received them, not thinking that he was doing wrong, because they had clearly come over to him during the armistice: for in some points he himself also charged the Athenians with infringing the truce. And for this reason the Mendæans were the more emboldened, seeing the feelings of Brasidas warmly disposed towards them, and inferring as much from the case of Scione, since he would not give it up; and at the same time because those of them who contrived the revolt were a small party, and since thinking of it on that occasion, had never let it rest afterwards, but were afraid of conviction for themselves, and forced the majority to it against their inclination. The Athenians, immediately hearing of it, were still far more enraged, and made their preparations against both the towns. And Brasidas, expecting their attack, conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionæans and Mendæans, and sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy-armed and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, with Polydamidas in command of them all. And so they joined in making their preparations, believing that the Athenians would quickly be with them.

124. Brasidas and Perdiccas meanwhile made an expedition together the second time into Lynceus, against Arrhibæus; taking with them, the latter, the forces of the Macedonians under his dominion, and some heavy-armed troops of the Greeks living amongst them; the former, in addition to those of the Peloponnesians whom he had still left, the Chalcidians, Acanthians, and of the rest according to their respective strength. In all, the heavy-armed Greeks amounted to about three thousand; all the cavalry of the Macedonians with the

Chalcidians went with them, amounting to nearly a thousand, and a large multitude of the barbarians besides. Having invaded the country of Arrhibæus, and finding the Lyncestians encamped in the field against them, they also took up a position opposite to them. The infantry occupying a hill on each side, and the space between being a plain, the horse of both armies, in the first place, galloped down into it, and engaged in a cavalry action. Then the Lyncestian heavy-armed having advanced first from their hill with their cavalry, and being ready for action, Brasidas and Perdiccas also, in their turn, led their forces against them, and engaged in battle, and routed the Lyncestians, and killed many of them; but the rest took refuge on the heights, and there remained quiet. After this, having erected a trophy, they waited two or three days, in expectation of the Illyrians, who were to join Perdiccas as mercenaries. Then Perdiccas wished to advance against the villages of Arrhibæus, and not to sit still; but Brasidas was anxious for Mende, lest if the Athenians should sail against it before his return, it should meet with some disaster; and as the Illyrians, moreover, had not joined them, he was not eager to advance, but rather to retreat.

125. In the mean time, while they were thus at variance, news arrived that the Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas, and joined Arrhibæus: so that now both parties thought it best to retreat through their fear of them, as they were men of a warlike character; but nothing being settled, in consequence of their quarrel, as to when they should march, and night coming on, the Macedonians and the multitude of the barbarians were immediately terrified, (as great armies are wont to be panic-stricken for no certain cause;) and thinking that many times more than had really come were advancing against them, and had all but reached them, they broke into sudden flight, and proceeded homeward. Perdiccas, who at first was not aware of it, was compelled by them, on his learning it, to depart before seeing Brasidas (for they were encamped at a great distance from each other). In the morning, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had gone before him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibæus were on the point of attacking him, he, on his side, drew his heavy-armed together into a square, and taking the light-armed multitude into the centre, intended to retire. And he appointed his youngest men

to dash out, on whatever point they might charge them ; while he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear intended during the retreat to face about, and resist the first of the enemy that should fall upon them. Before the enemy came near, he addressed his men, as well as the short time allowed him, with the following exhortation :

126. " Men of the Peloponnese, if I did not suspect that in consequence of your being left alone, and because your assailants are barbarians, and there are many of them, you were thrown into consternation, I should not have given you, as I do, information at the same time as encouragement. But as it is, with respect to the desertion of our friends, and the superior numbers of our adversaries, I will endeavour, by a brief admonition and advice, to convince you of what is most important for you. For it is your proper character to be brave in warlike operations, not from the presence of allies in each case, but from your own native valour; and to fear no number of your enemies whatever: ¹since neither are the governments from which you come of such a character—governments in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the smaller number the greater, having acquired their power by no other means than by being victorious in battle. But with regard to barbarians, of whom you are now afraid through inexperience, you ought to know, both from the contest you have already had with those of them who are Macedonians, and from what I myself conjecture, and indeed have ascertained from hearsay, that they will not prove formidable. For with regard to such points in an enemy as have an appearance of strength, while they are in reality weak, when correct information is gained respecting them, it rather gives confidence to those who resist them: whereas in the case of those who have any

¹ I venture to differ from all the editors whose opinion I generally follow, in thinking that there is no need to consider *οὐ* as carelessly introduced here, either by Thucydides himself, or by his copyists. The perfect agreement of all the MSS. in retaining it renders the latter supposition exceedingly improbable: and though our author is doubtless sometimes careless, there is no reason for assuming that he was so in this passage, if his words can be explained on any other view of them. And such I think is the case, if the relative clause be taken as more particularly referring to *πολιτειῶν*, instead of being regarded as explanatory of *τοιούτων*. The meaning of the latter word will then be " of such a character as to warrant your entertaining any such fear of superior numbers." When the passage is read with the stress on *πολιτειῶν*, which its prominent position seems to require, I cannot but think that this interpretation will appear most natural.

solid advantage, men would meet them the more boldly from having no previous acquaintance with them. Now these men present indeed a demonstration fearful to such as are unacquainted with them: for they are formidable in their numbers which meet the eye, and intolerable from the loudness of their shouting; and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a look of threatening. But to those who stand their ground against them, they are not what they seemed; for they have no definite order, so as to be ashamed of leaving any particular position, when hard pressed; and their retreat and attack being considered equally honourable puts their courage also beyond the reach of proof; while their independent mode of fighting would most frequently afford a man a pretext for saving himself with a fair show. And so they consider the probability of their frightening you without any danger to themselves a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; else they would have adopted that method instead of their present one. And in this way you clearly see, that all that was previously terrible in them, is but little in reality, though to the eye and to the ear very urgent. If, therefore, you stand firm against its approach, and when you have an opportunity, again retire in good order, and in your ranks, you will the sooner reach a place of safety; and will know in future, that to those who sustain their first attack, such rabbles only make a vaunting demonstration, by threatening at a distance; but in the case of those who yield to them, they are quick in displaying their courage in pursuit, when they can do it with security."

127. In this way did Brasidas exhort them, and began to lead off his forces. When the barbarians saw it, they pressed on him with much shouting and uproar, thinking that he was flying, ¹and being determined to overtake and cut him off. Then, when the reserve companies met them, at whatever point they charged; and Brasidas himself with his picked men withstood the pressure, and they had, contrary to their expectation, resisted their first rush, and, after that, received and repelled them when they came on, but retired themselves, when the enemy withdrew: then indeed the main body of

¹ *Νομίζαντες* seems to be used here in a different sense with reference to the two infinitives which follow it. For its meaning with the latter, compare chap. 86. 2, οὐδ' ἀσαφῆ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ νομίζω ἐπιφύειν.

the barbarians ceased attacking the Greeks with Brasidas in the open country ; and having left a portion of their forces to follow and harass them, the rest advanced at a run against the flying Macedonians, cutting down such as they fell in with ; and got in time to preoccupy the narrow pass which runs between two hills, into the country of Arrhibæus, knowing that there was no other way of retreat for Brasidas. And when he was coming to just where the road now became impassable, they proceeded to surround him, with a view to cutting him off.

128. He, on perceiving it, gave orders to his band of three hundred to advance at a run to that one of the hills which he thought they might take more easily, as quickly as each man could, without observing any order ; and to endeavour to dislodge from it the barbarians who were already upon it, before their main force that was surrounding him should join them there. Accordingly, they charged, and overpowered the party on the hill, and the main force of the Greeks now advanced more easily up to it ; for the barbarians were frightened on finding their men on that side dislodged from the height, and no longer followed the main body, considering that they were now on the borders, and had escaped them. When Brasidas had thus reached the heights, he proceeded with greater safety, and arrived the same day at Arnissa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas. And as the soldiers were enraged at the Macedonians' having retreated before them, whatever yokes of oxen belonging to them they fell in with on the road, or whatever baggage that had dropped off, (as was likely to happen in case of a retreat by night, and under an alarm,) on their own authority they unyoked and cut down the cattle, and appropriated the baggage. From this time Perdiccas first regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and cherished in future a hatred of the Lacedæmonians, which was not, indeed, congenial with his feelings, because of his aversion for the Athenians ; but he departed from his natural interests, and was contriving in what way he might soonest come to terms with the Athenians, and be rid of the Peloponnesians.

129. On his return from Macedonia, Brasidas found the Athenians already in possession of Mende ; and remaining quiet there, though he considered himself unable to cross over into Pallene, and assist it, he kept watch over Torone.

For about the same time as the campaign in Lynceus, the Athenians sent the expedition against Mende and Scione, as they were preparing to do, with fifty ships, ten of which were Chians, and one thousand heavy-armed of their own, six hundred bowmen, one thousand Thracian mercenaries, and others of their allies from that country serving as targeteers, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, and Nicos-tratus son of Diitrephes. After advancing from Potidæa with their ships, they came to land opposite the temple of Neptune, and proceeded against the Mendæans. They, both themselves and three hundred Scionæans who had come to their aid, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy-armed in all, with Polydamidas their commander, were encamped outside the city on a strong hill. Nicias, with one hundred and twenty Methonæan light-armed, sixty picked men of the Athenian heavy-armed, and all the bowmen, attempted to come at them by a path running up the hill; but being wounded by them, was unable to force their position: while Nicos-tratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing by a different approach, and from a more distant point, against the hill, which was difficult of access, was beaten back in utter confusion, and the whole force of the Athenians was within a little of being conquered. For that day, then, as the Mendæans and their allies did not give way, the Athenians retreated and pitched their camp; and the Mendæans, when night came on, returned into the town.

130. The day following, the Athenians sailed round to the side towards Scione, and took the suburb, and ravaged the land the whole day, no one coming out against them. For indeed there was some opposition of parties in the town; and the three hundred of the Scionæans, on the approach of night, returned home. The next day Nicias advanced with half the forces to the borders of the Scionæans, and laid waste the land, while Nicostratus with the remainder sat down before the town, near the upper gates, by the way they go to Potidæa. There Polydamidas (as the arms of the Mendæans and their auxiliaries happened to be piled in that quarter) began to draw them up for battle, and exhorted the Mendæans to march out against the enemy. One of the popular faction replying to him, in the spirit of party, that they would not go out, and did not want a war, and, when he had thus replied, being

dragged to him by the hand, and roughly treated, the commons immediately took up their arms, and advanced in a great rage against the Peloponnesians, and those who had joined them in opposition to themselves. Having thus fallen upon them, they routed them, in consequence both of the suddenness of the charge, and of their alarm at the gates being opened to the Athenians; for they imagined that the attack had been made in consequence of some agreement with them. They then, as many as were not immediately killed, took refuge in the citadel, which was before held by themselves; while the Athenians (for by this time Nicias also had returned and was close to the town) rushed with all their forces into Mende, inasmuch as it had not thrown open its gates to them on the ground of any convention, and sacked it as though they had taken it by storm; the generals with difficulty restraining them from even butchering the inhabitants. Afterwards they told the Mendæans to retain their civil rights, as usual, after having tried amongst themselves whomever they considered to have been the originators of the revolt: but the party in the citadel they cut off by a wall down to the sea on each side, and stationed troops to keep guard over them. When they had thus got possession of Mende, they proceeded against Scione.

131. The inhabitants of that town, both themselves and the Peloponnesians, marched out to oppose them, and were posted on a strong hill before the city, without the occupation of which by the enemy there was no possibility of investing them. So the Athenians attacked it vigorously, and having driven off by their charge those who were upon it, pitched their camp, and after erecting a trophy, prepared for the circumvallation of the place. Not long after, while they were now engaged in the work, the auxiliaries who were being besieged in the citadel of Mende having, during the night, driven in the guard by the sea-side, arrived at Scione; and most of them escaping through the troops encamped before it, threw themselves into the place.

132. While Scione was invested, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals, and concluded an arrangement with the Athenians, through his hatred of Brasidas in consequence of the retreat from Lyncus; having begun to negotiate for it from that very time. And, as Isagoras the Lacedæmonian then

happened to be on the point of taking an army by land to join Brasidas, Perdiccas, partly because Nicias advised him, since he had come to terms with the Athenians, to give them some clear proof of his being a firm friend; and partly because he himself wished the Lacedæmonians never again to go to his territories; won over to his views his friends in Thessaly, (for he was always intimate with the principal men,) and stopped the army and its equipments, so that they did not even try the mind of the Thessalians on the subject. Isagoras, however, Ameinias, and Aristeus, themselves came to Brasidas, being commissioned by the Lacedæmonians to inspect the state of affairs; and took from Sparta, in opposition to the spirit of their laws, some of their young men, with a view to appointing them to the command in the cities, instead of intrusting it to any that might happen to be there at present. Accordingly, he appointed Clearidas son of Cleonymus to the command in Amphipolis, and Pasitolidas son of Hegesander in Torone.

133. The same summer, the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians, on a charge of their favouring the Athenians; having always wished to do it, but finding it more easy at that time, since all the flower of their population had fallen in the battle against the Athenians. The temple of Juno at Argos was also burnt down that same summer, in consequence of Chrysis the priestess having placed a lighted torch near the garlands, and fallen asleep after it; so that they all caught fire, and were in a flame before she perceived it. Chrysis immediately, the same night, fled to Phlius, in her fear of the Argives; who, according to the law laid down on the subject, appointed another priestess, by name Phaeinis. The priesthood of Chrysis, at the time she fled, embraced eight years of this war, and to the middle of the ninth. And now, towards the close of the summer, Scione was entirely invested; and the Athenians, having left a garrison to keep watch over it, returned with the rest of their army.

134. The following winter, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians remained quiet, in consequence of the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, with the allies on both sides, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the district of Oresthis, and the victory was doubtful; for each side having put to flight one of the enemy's wings which was opposed to them, they

both erected trophies, and sent spoils to Delphi. Though, however, many had fallen on each side, and the battle was undecisive, and night interrupted the action, the Tegeans bivouacked on the field, and erected a trophy immediately; whereas the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion, and erected their counter-trophy afterwards.

135. Towards the end of the same winter, and when it was now approaching to spring, Brasidas also made an attempt on Potidæa. For he went thither by night, and planted a ladder against the wall, and so far escaped observation; the ladder having been planted just in the interval when ¹the bell had been passed round, before the man who passed it returned to that side. Afterwards, however, on their immediately perceiving it, before his troops came up to the place, he led them back again as quickly as possible, and did not wait for the day to break. And so the winter ended, and the ninth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

¹ Respecting this expedient for securing the vigilance of troops on guard see Arnold's note.



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